duke's division on the north slope of Shepherd's Mountain, about 800 or 900 yards distant from the work; Fagan's division on Marmaduke's right, its left resting on Shepherd's Mountain on a prolongation of Marmaduke's line, its right resting on the west slope of Pilot Knob Mountain, both divisions masked by the timber on the mountain and about equidistant from the work, Fagan a little nearer to it. Dobbin's brigade of about 1,500 or 1,600 men was in position about a mile duc north of the work on the road to Potosi, He was in position several hours before the line of attack was formed. Two field pieces were placed in position on Shepherd's Mountain about 1,250 yards from the work. The other guns, eight field pieces, including two or three rifles, were in reserve with a regiment dismounted at Ironton, three-fourths of a mile southeast of Pilot Knob. General Price observed to the staff officers of Generals Marmaduke and Fagan that there must be a perfect concert of action in the assault; that the movements of both divisions must be simultaneous; that they must attack together, and enjoined that Generals Marmaduke and Fagan should communicate freely with him and with each other to secure perfect harmony of action. General Price had previously, and three or four hours before the assault mas made, dispatched couriers to be mounted on the best horses to Brigadier-General Shelby, then believed to be at Potosi to march immediately for Pilot Knob with the double object of cutting the enemy's line of retreat, and operating against any force that might assist the garrison. These dispositions were complete between 2 and 3 p. m., when a few rounds, five or six in number, were fired from the guns in battery on Shepherd's Mountain. Fagan's division debouched upon the plateau at a point about 500 yards distant from the work, where his whole line came under fire. Marmaduke debouched upon the plateau about 600 yards from the work. Several (say five) minutes later Fagan's division, after advancing about 100 yards on the plateau, broke in the most disgraceful manner, and before it had experienced any material loss, with the exception of Cabell's brigade, which was on the extreme left, which moved steadily across the plateau at double-quick and delivering its fire under the fire of five or six heavy guns, two six-inch Coehorn mortars, and two or three 2-pounder steel skirmish guns which swept the gorge of the work upon which Cabell's right was moving; the enemy attempting to raise the drawbridge, but the ropes breaking the gorge was left open. The enemy's chief attention was directed to Cabell's brigade, which having reached a point in the vicinity of the ditch, and meeting with very heavy loss, fell back in very great disorder up the slope of Pilot Knob Mountain. Marmaduke, while Cabell was moving as described, moved from the southwest and west faces of the work, his command delivering its fire as it advanced. After having passed about 200 yards on the plateau in which the work is situated under fire of several of the guns of the work with but little effect on its line, the entire division halted and laid down on the dry bed of a creek about 250 or 300 yards from the work just before Cabell's line broke. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the fight concluded, Marmaduke's division continuing to remain in the bed of the creek sheltered from the fire, the other troops retiring in great disorder, General Price using every effort to rally the troops in person.

Question. What was the force under command of Major-General Marmaduke, and what the force under Major-General Fagan, and what were their respective losses in the assault on Fort Davidson?

Answer. Marmaduke's division I estimated at 3,000 or 3,500, Fagan's about 4,000. Fagan's loss in killed and wounded was about 350 officers and men, and Marmaduke's about 75 or 80, perhaps somewhat less. My estimate is based from observation of the field after the fight. This includes the reserves.

Question. How long have you been a soldier?

Answer. With the exception of brief intervals, for nineteen years, and was educated for the profession; and since May, of 1861, in the armies of the Confederacy. Question. How long in your opinion would it have required the ten guns of General Price's army on the crest of Shepherd's Mountain to have forced the surrender of Fort Davidson?

Answer. Fifteen or twenty minutes, if using shells and the practice good. Question. How long did it take to move the two guns that were in position on the crest of Shepherd's Mountain to their position?

Answer. About an hour and a half or two hours; perhaps a little longer.

Question. State if the fight was renewed on the following morning (28th September); and if not, why not?

Answer. The fight was not renewed, the enemy having evacuated the fort during the night. About 2.30 or 3 in the morning we were advised of his evacuation by the explosion of his magazine. The enemy retired by the Potosi road undisturbed.

Question. State at what time General Price's army was reformed and started in pursuit.

Answer. Very early in the morning of the 28th, some of the troops moving at daylight.

Question. State how the enemy were observed during the night, if at all, and what dispositions were then made to intercept the retreat on the following day, and with what result.

Answer. I have no personal knowledge of how they were observed by night. Until that time they were observed by Major-General Marmaduke's division and Colonel Dobbin's brigade. On the morning of the 28th our army was moved on the Potosi road in pursuit. I heard General Price ordering the pursuit to be vigorous; I know not with what result, as I was ordered to remain at Fort Davidson to destroy it and its armament.

Question. What fell into the hands of our army at Pilot Knob?

Answer. The fort, with its killed and wounded; its armament, consisting of 4 32-pounder guns, 4 24-pounder howitzers on garrison carriages, 4 6-inch Coehorn mortars, 4 steel 2-pounder skirmish guns, together with many hundred rounds of fixed ammunition for these guns; a large amount of ammunition for small-arms, and about eight or ten days' rations for 1,000 men; some 100 or 200 blankets; also the foundry, furnaces, and all the work-shops of the Pilot Knob Iron Company; the towns of Arcadia, Moulton, and Pilot Knob, and 2,000 pounds of coffee, with a large amount of supplies in those three towns.

The hour of 3 p. m. having arrived the Court adjourned to meet to-morrow, the 25th instant, at 9 a. m.

FOURTH DAY.

TUESDAY, April 25, 1865-9 a. m. At a Court of Inquiry then held at Shreveport, La., pursuant to adjournment.

Present, Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton, Provisional Army, C. S.; Brig. Gen. E. McNair, Provisional Army, C. S.; Col. P. N. Luckett, Third Texas Infantry; Maj. O. M. Watkins, assistant adjutant-general and judge-advocate.

Maj. Gen. S. Price appeared before the Court.

The proceedings of yesterday read.

The JUDGE-ADVOCATE then continued the examination of Capt. T. J. MACKEY, corps of engineers.

Question. You have stated that in crossing the Blue River our army encountered resistance. State the character of the resistance, what obstacles to our crossing were interposed by the enemy, and how the crossing of our army was effected.

Answer. The enemy had felled the timber around the ford on the road leading to Westport for 500 yards, making a very formidable entanglement. General Price in person designated a path up the bank, which was very bold, by which a part of his cavalry (Shelby's), after having dismounted, ascended the opposite bank, driving the enemy back. He then ordered me to cut a road through the entanglement without delay, so that his artillery could pass. This road was cut by 90 or 100 axmen in about one hour and a half. A portion of our troops then advanced under the immediate direction of General Price. The enemy fell back to the vicinity of Westport. Our loss very light; theirs not known to me.

Question. When the affair on the Marais des Cygnes prairie occurred (on the 25th of October) where was General Price during the engage

ment?

Answer. He was with the leading division (Shelby's), five or six miles from the field, his usual position when there was no reason to apprehend an attack in rear. Question. State whether or not, at Boonville, Mo., there was any engagement with the enemy, and, if you say there was, state the relative position of the two armies and their relative strength and the result.

Answer. We arrived at Boonville on the 10th of October. In the afternoon of the 9th of October General Shelby dashed into Boonville, capturing a garrison of about 300 men, who were behind barricades with their arms. On the 10th General Price entered Boonville at the head of the army, Fagan's division encamping on the east and southeast of the town, observing the approaches upon Boonville from those directions; Marmaduke's division south of the town, about three-fourths of a mile distant from Boonville, its left resting on the Tipton road connecting with Cabell's brigade of Fagan's right. Heavy pickets thrown out in the direction of Tipton. Shelby's division was west of the town. On the next day, the 11th, the position of the troops not being materially changed, the enemy made a demonstration from the direction of Tipton, driving in our pickets on that road. From the extent of the enemy's line observed by me I estimate their force in our immediate front at 2,500 men; some of them were dismounted. After a personal reconnaissance I reported it to Major-General Price on the field as my opinion that this was the advance of a large force. They had opened with artillery in advancing. Their advance was engaged by Cabell's brigade and checked. The enemy fell back a mile or two and General Price sent various detachments to observe his strength and position. The enemy fell back in the course of the night, and on the following morning was again in the vicinity of the town, south and west of it. General Price ordered BrigadierGeneral Shelby to turn the enemy's left, while Major-Generals Marmaduke's and Fagan's divisions pressed him on the right and center. Before the enemy could be turned effectually he fell back after a severe engagement with a part of BrigadierGeneral Shelby's division. He was pursued for eighteen or twenty miles in the direction of Tipton by Major-General Fagan's and a part of other divisions.

Question. Did you hear any general at Boonville propose to General Price to go out and crush the enemy? If so, state who the general was and the plan proposed to General Price.

Answer. I heard no general press General Price to attack the enemy, but heard General Fagan in a very undecided manner express to General Price an opinion that the enemy should be attacked. He proposed no plan.

Question. What was the character of troops opposed to General Price in Missouri and Kansas-regulars, volunteers of long service, new organizations of volunteers, or militia?

Answer. I ascertained their character from prisoners taken from various commands. Some were veteran troops from Atlanta, some from near Nashville and Vicksburg; also a large number of militia from Missouri and Kansas.

Question. You have stated that at some times short delays in the march of the army were occasioned by the necessity of removing obstructions from the road. State what measures were adopted by General Price to make those delays as short as possible. Whether or not there was an organization of a pioneer corps; and, if there was, how it was controlled and managed.

Answer. There were parts of two companies of engineer troops, numbering in the aggregate seventy-five men, under my orders. A company of pioneers was attached to Fagan's division not under my orders. These were but poorly supplied with working implements. When we were crossing at Dardanelle I was directed by General Price to fully equip them as speedily as possible. I converted three of the pontoons into wagon bodies, forming an engineer train, and a fourth pontoon converted into a wagon body to the pioneers of Fagan's division. After crossing the Missouri line all these troops were speedily fully equipped. On the day that we crossed the Arkansas River General Price ordered that the engineer troops should march in advance of the army to remove obstructions, repair bridges, &c. Fagan's company of pioneers moved always with the division, but was ordered while in Missouri by General Price to move in the front of the army under my direction, which order was obeyed for one day only. Fagan's pioneers were the most efficient in that army. The engineer troops were ragged, and many of them unshod.

Question. Was the failure to comply with this order reported to General Price? And, if so, state what measures, if any, he adopted to enforce its observance.

Answer. I reported the fact to Colonel Maclean, the assistant adjutant-general on General Price's staff, who stated that he would issue another order. I know not that it was issued.

Question. State whether or not the army was ever detained because of the engineer or pioneer troops being from the front of the army. If so, how long, and what occasioned their absence from the front?

Answer. Sometimes it was detained for an hour or two from this cause in Arkansas and Missouri; sometimes from mistakes of their own officers, mistaking a detachment to guard our flanks for the advance guard of the main army. The officer in command of engineer troops assigned by department headquarters was a confirmed cripple, and his physical incapacity to discharge the duties of his office occasioned some mismanagement of those troops. On one occasion, I think at the crossing of the Osage, where it was necessary to cut a roadway, the train was detained four or five hours by the absence of General Fagan's pioneers, whose captain reported to me as an excuse that they were eight miles behind by order of General Fagan.

Question. How long in all was the march of the army from Princeton to Fredericktown delayed because of the improper organization or management or disposition of the engineer and pioneer troops, and their want of proper implements?

Answer. About three days.

Cross-examined by Maj. Gen. S. PRICE:

Question. State if Princeton was not the place of rendezvous for the army south of the Arkansas River.

Answer. It was.

Question. State if the army under my command was not detained in organizing it, arranging transportation, and the issuing of necessary supplies until a late hour on the day I reached Tulip.

Answer. It was.

Question. State, if you know, why the route by Dardanelle was taken instead of the route east of Pine Bluff.

Answer. First, because the route east of Pine Bluff furnished but a scant subsistence. The Saline River and Bayou Batholomew crossed on that route, both unfordable, the bottoms being very bad, and the country between the Saline and Arkansas Rivers on that route had been in a great measure exhausted of its supplies by our army and that of the enemy. Second, the great probability of having our crossing of the Arkansas River disturbed by the gun-boats of the enemy on that stream. Third, in the event of crossing of that stream safely we would have had to cross the White River either at Jacksonport or Batesville. Had we moved directly upon Batesville we should have marched twenty-five or thirty miles over a long prairie, a bog in the rainy season and a desert in the dry. In addition, we would have had to cross the high, rocky spurs of mountains, almost impracticable for loaded wagons, with the enemy in position on our left flank at Little Rock and Pine Bluff, within from twenty-five to thirty miles of our line of march; also on our right flank at Devall's Bluff. Fourth. Had we marched by Jacksonport, we could have found no better ford within twenty miles of the place as reported from previous reconnaissances. This route in distance is some sixty miles the shortest. The upper route was taken because, first, it could supply forage and subsistence; second, the road practicable, better bottoms of streams, not wide; third, it masked the real object of the campaign, indicating Fort Smith as the objective point and threatening Little Rock itself, and the passage of the Arkansas safe from disturbance by gun-boats, and a greater probability of finding the river fordable above than below Little Rock.

Question. Was it not necessary to raise the quartermaster's and commissary stores in the wagons as well as the ammunition at Dardanelle! Answer. I did not observe that, but in some cases I observed that ordnance stores were raised.