has been given no definite meaning (see Feinglass v. Reinecke (N. D. Ill. 1942), 48 F. Supp. 438), or that the statute is so vague and indefinite that a person cannot determine the offenses penalized and, therefore, is unconstitutional as a violation of due process (U. S. v. Josephson (C. C. A. 2d, 1947), 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. (1948) 16 LW 3253). The proposed statute by defining carefully all terms used and the offenses covered is not open to the challenge that it uses undefined terms such as "gang," or the like, about the meaning of which a person must speculate (see Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939 306 U. S. 451 (citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, and others)). A statute does not have to be so exact as to eliminate all possible variances of meaning. In Nash v. U. S. ((1913) 229 U. S. 373, 377), Mr. Justice Holmes said: “* the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death."

* *

It cannot be contended successfully that the bill is unconstitutional because it invokes the principle of guilt by association (assuming for the purposes of argument that it does so). Despite Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring remarks in Bridges v. Wixon ((1945) 326 U. S. 135), the majority opinion in that case indicated that where a person conducts himself so that he brings about a status of mutual recognition on a fairly permanent basis with the organization condemned, raising an element of dependability and mutual cooperation, he may be said to be affiliated or associated with the organization. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra, the statute there involved was found lacking in definiteness, but was not held invalid because it invoked guilt by association. Indeed, the opinion suggests that had the statutory language been more specific. it would have been upheld.

Section 2 of the bill contains findings to demonstrate that Communist organizations are part of a world-wide conspiracy, seeking ultimate overthrow of our present form of government by violence or any other means, lawful or unlawful, and seeking to impose a dictatorship by force and against the will of the people. This meets the objection that a statute dealing with the Communist Party must do more than find merely that the party advocates a different economic or governmental system in general or supports "the political principles of foreign nations." Feinglass v. Reinecke, supra.

It has been said that the findings of a legislature that the public interest requires restriction of certain political or other activity will be respected by the courts. (Communist Party v. Peek (1942) 20 Cal. (2d) 536). H. R. 5852 does not single out any specific organization which it condemns but defines generally a type of organization and activity which is to be regulated, leaving it to administrative and judicial determination whether particular parties, persons, or acts come within the provisions of the statute. The bill thus avoids the objection that the legislature by statute condemns a particular named party as violating its terms. Communist Party v. Peek, supra.

Any contention that H. R. 5852 violates the first amendment by restricting freedom of speech or press can be met by the proposition that even these freedoms can be curtailed where there is a "clear and present danger" which the Government seeks to meet. In Schenck v. U. S. ((1919) 249 U. S. 47, 51-52), Mr. Justice Holmes said:

“It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado (205 U. S. 454, 462). We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. Aikens v. Wisconsin (195 U. S. 194, 205, 206). The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 'fire' in a theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

See also (Schaefer v. U. S. (1920) 251 U. S. 466; Hartzel v. U. S. (1944) 322 U. S. 680; Okamoto v. U. S. (C. C. A. 10th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 905). In the latter case the circuit court of appeals declared:

"Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly guaranteed by the first amendment are fundamental rights. But, though fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. These rights are not unbridled license to speak,

publish, or assemble without any responsibility whatever. Their exercise is subject to reasonable restriction required in order to protect the Government from destruction or serious injury. The delicate and difficult question usually presented is whether speech, press, and assembly are of such nature as would produce, or are calculated to produce, a clear, present, and imminent danger of a substantive evil which Congress has the constitutional power to prevent. (Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470; Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680, 64 S. Ct. 1233, 88 L. Ed. 1534). Ordinarily 'the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' in order to warrant punishment for the exercise of speech, press, or assembly. (Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315.)"

H. R. 5852 sufficiently sets out circumstances indicating the danger sought to be repelled and its immediacy. As pointed out in Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1941) 31, while freedom of speech and press is of the highest importance, yet there are purposes of government, such as order and protection against external aggression, which must be balanced against the right of unlimited discussion interfering with these functions. "The essential rights of the first amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for order without which the guaranties of civil rights to others would be a mockery." (United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947) 330 U. S. 75, 95.)

It could also be argued that Congress is exercising its power under the Constitution to guarantee to the States a republican form of government. Article IV, section 4. In the Federalist No. 43, Madison observed that the scope and intent of this provision was to protect the States, among other things, from "experiments" produced "by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers." &

In addition, it should not be forgotten that the United States is still in a technical state of war. (Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking and Lumber Co. (1947) 331 U. S. 111; Woods v. The Cloyd W. Miller Co. (1938) 333 U. S. 138, 16 LW 4165). Although the Supreme Court has indicated that there are constitutional boundaries which even a technical state of war may not serve to extend (Ibid; Hartzell v. U. S., supra), yet the governmental war powers are viewed very broadly. In Hirabayashi v. U. S. ( (1943) 320 U. S. 81), Mr. Chief Justice Stone declared:

"The war power of the National Government is the power to wage war successfully.' See Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution (42 A. B. A. Rept. 232, 238). It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise, prosecution and progress of war."

Accordingly, the war power would support on a broad scale such governmental action as Congress deems necessary to the successful prosecution of or preparation for war. And anything considered essential to the national defense is embraced within this power. U. S. v. City of Chester ((C. C. A. 3d, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 415). "Nor can it be considered necessary that the United States must be at war in order that Congress * * * possess the constitutional sanction to prepare for it. Such an interpretation would be so unrealistic as not to warrant serious consideration." Ibid. "Congress * * * can invoke the war power * ** * during times of peace, for the future protection of the Nation." Henderson v. Bryan ((S. D. Cal. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 682); see also Ashwender v. T. V. A. ((1936) 297 U. S. 288, 327-328). Testimony has been given before the Committee on Un-American Activities by an authoritative officer of the United States that the Communist Party in the United States is dedicated to force and violence for the overthrow of the United States Government, that the party maintains as a fundamental principle support of Soviet Russia, that the "Communist Party of the United States is a fifth column if there ever was one" and is "far better organized than were the Nazis in occupied countries prior to their capitulation." House hearings on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, Eightieth Congress, first session ((1947) 35-36, 43 (testimony of Hon. J. Edgar Hoover)). The argument that a bill such as H. R. 5852 invades the private or personal rights of anyone may well be answered by the statement of the court in U. S. v. Josephson ((C. C. A. 2d, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. (1948) 16 LW 3253), as follows:

"If * * * propaganda takes the form of, for example, advocacy of the overthrow of the Government by violence, it is rightfully called 'Un-American' and a sensible regard for the self-preservation of the Nation may well require

its investigation, with a view to the enactment of whatever remedial legislation may be needed or to the amendment thereof. One need only recall the activities. of the so-called fifth columns in various countries both before and during the late war to realize that the United States should be alert to discover and deal with the seeds of revolution within itself. And if there be any doubts on the score of the power and duty of the Government and Congress to do so, they may be resolved when it is remembered that one of the very purposes of the Constitution itself was to protect the country against danger from within as well as from without. See the Federalist, Nos. II-X. Surely, matters which potentially affect the very survival of our Government are by no means the purely personal concern of anyone."

II. SECTION 4

The constitutionality of section 4 of the bill may be supported by what is said in part I, supra.

III. SECTION 5

Section 5 of the bill provides for loss of citizenship through expatriation. “Citizenship" conveys the idea of membership of a nation. Minor v. Happersett ((1875) 88 U. S. 162); Ex parte Fung Sing ((W. D. Wash. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 670). "Citizenship is a political status, and may be defined and the privilege limited by Congress." Ex parte Fung Sing, supra. When a person becomes a citizen of this country by birth (Nationality Act of 1940, sec. 201, 8 U. S. C. sec. 601), that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless the person "has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles." Perkins v. Elg ((1939) 307 U. S. 325, 329); see also In re Bolter ((S. D. Cal. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 566).

* * *

Expatriation is "the voluntary act of abandoning one's country and becoming the citizen or subject of another." U. S. ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth ((W. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 770). This right is generally recognized throughout the civilized world, and is recognized in the United States by statute. "Congress has the power to say what act shall expatriate a citizen." U. S. ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, supra; see also Ex parte Fung Sing, supra. Nor does the fourteenth amendment prevent citizenship acquried either by birth or naturalization from being lost by expatriation. Reynolds v. Haskins ((C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 473, 45A. L. R. 759). In Mackenzie v. Hare ((1915) 239 U. S. 299), it was argued that Congress could not, by legislation, provide that certain acts by a natural-born citizen amounted to expatriation, in this case marriage to a foreigner. The Supreme Court denied this contention, pointing out that the United States as a sovereign may impose conditions for the maintenance of citizenship and provide that certain situations voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences, may deprive one of such citizenship. Whether the acts defined by the statute have been performed in particular cases, however, must be subject to judicial determination. Ng Fung Ho v. White ((1922) 259 U. S. 276). Section 5 appears to meet these tests.

IV. SECTION 6

Section 6 regulates employment by the United States. The right of the United States to regulate the political actviity of its employees or to say who shall not be employed is clearly supported by United Public Workers v. Mitchell ((1947) 330 U. S. 75). A person may or may not have an absolute right to indulge in certain political activity, but he has no constitutional right to be a public jobholder. See Mr. Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. New Bedford ((1891) 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517).

V. SECTION 7

This section of the bill denies the issuance of passports to members of communist political organizations. The granting of passports is not obligatory in any case and is only permitted where not prohibited by law ((1869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 90). Congress has always assumed the authority to prescribe the conditions under which passports may be issued. (See 22 U. S. C. secs. 211–229).

VI. SECTIONS 8, 9, 10, AND 15

These sections require registration and the filing of annual reports by Com-munist organizations, prescribe penalties for failure to comply, and make it unlawful for anyone to become or remain a member of such an organization which

has not compiled with the statutory requirements. Similar regulations by a State have been upheld by the Supreme Court as not violative of due process or equal protection of the laws, or as not infringing on privileges and immunities or imposing unjust discrimination. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman ((1928) 278 U. S. 60).

* *

It is true that the Supreme Court has said, with respect to a speech by a union organizer, that one who is "required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech * to enlist support for a lawful order" is deprived of his rights under the First Amendment. Thomas v. Collins ((1944) 323 U. S. 516). But this was based on the premise that "Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave and immediate danger to an interest the State is entitled to protect, are not instruments of harm which require previous idenification of the speakers." [Italics supplied.] The Court referred to New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, supra, and did not overrule it but distinguished it (p. 539). And as noted in part I, supra, it can be argued that there is a clear and present danger of harm which H. R. 5852 is designed properly to forestall.

In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan ((1913) 229 U. S. 288), it was held that the requirements that newspapers file certain statements with the Postmaster General and mark all paid for matter as "advertisement", as conditions for securing second-class mailing privileges, were not unconstitutional denials of the freedom of the press under the First Amendment. And in Jones v. S. E. C. ((C. C. A .2d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 617) revd. on other grounds 298 U. S. 1, the requirement (15 U. S. C. sec. 77f) of registration with the SEC before the mails could be used in the sale of securities was upheld as not violating the Bill of Rights or due process of law.

VII. SECTION 11

Section 11 penalizes the use of the mails or interstate commerce under certain circumstances therein set out.

Under article I, section 8, clause 7 of the Constitution Congress is vested with the authority "To establish Post Offices and post Roads." This power "has been practically construed, since the foundation of the government, to authorize not merely the designation of the routes over which the mail shall be carried, and the offices where letters and other documents shall be received to be distributed or forwarded, but the carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents." Ex parte Jackson ((1878) 96 U. S. 727), And while the legitimate end of the exercise of the power in question is to furnish mail facilities for the people of the United States, "it is also true that mail facilities are not required to be furnished for every purpose." In re Rapier ((1892) 143 U. S. 110). As a general proposition, Congress has long exercised, and the courts have sustained, the Federal power to prevent the facilities of the mails from being used to accomplish ends deemed inimical to the general welfare. Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S. E. C. ((C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 92 F. (d) 580, aff'd 303 U. S. 419). This power extends to newspapers and like publications as well as to other matter. Ex parte Jackson, supra. In Badders v. U. S. ( (1916) 240 U. S. 391), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, declared:

"The overt act of putting a letter into the post office of the United States is a matter that Congress may regulate. Ex parte Jackson (96 U. S. 727). Whatever the limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."

The postal power, of course, like all other congressional powers, is subject to the Bill of Rights. S. E. C. v. Timetrust, Inc. ((N. D. Calif. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 34.) But the examination and inspection of newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter, in a condition to be examined, is not a violation of the fourth amendment, prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures; nor is the prohibition of the circulation of such publications a violation of the first amendment, protecting freedom of speech and the press, so long as their transportation by some means other than the mails is not forbidden. Ex parte Jackson, supra. The Government may constitutionally decline to become itself an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people. In re Rapier, supra. "The freedom of communication is not abridged within the intent and meaning of the constitutional provision unless Congress is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment, through the gov

ernmental agencies which it controls." Ibid. Moreover, Congress in exerting the postal power may fix certain standards with respect to newspapers and like printed publications and impose certain conditions for their mailing, and this does not involve any unconstitutional lack of uniformity or unreasonable classification. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan ((1913) 229 U. S. 288).

The bill is not objectionable in that it makes every mailing in violation of its terms a punishable offense. See Badders v. U. S., supra, where the Court said that "there is no doubt that the law may make each putting of a letter into the post office a separate offense."

The punishment provided by the bill for violations of its terms does not appear to be cruel or excessive. Compare Badders v. U. S., supra.

The only possible argument against section 11 is that it also denies the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, as well as the mails, under certain conditions. See Ex parte Jackson, supra. But cf. Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S. E. C. ((C. C. A. 10th, 1939) 100 F. (2d) 888). The propriety of this step, however, could be based, if necessary, on what has been said in part I, supra. Congress may regulate interstate commerce to prevent the spread of any evil or harm among States (Brooks v. U. S. (1925), 267 U. S. 432; American Power and Light Co. v. S. E. C. (1946), 329 U. S. 90, 99–100), and such regulations may have the quality of police regulations (Caminetti v. U. S. (1917), 242 U. S. 470).

VIII. SECTION 12

Section 12 provides, under certain circumstances, for a denial of tax deduc tions and exemptions. Deductions allowed in computing income taxes are matters of legislative grace (New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering (1934), 292 U. S. 435; Avery v. Commissioner (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), 84 F. (2d) 905, cert. den. 299 U. S. 604). Consequently, no right is infringed by their denial

upon specified conditions

Similarly, Congress has the right to make or withdraw exemptions as it sees fit. Brushaber v. Union Pacific Co. ((1916), 240 U. S. 1; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911), 220 U. S. 107, 173).

IX. SECTIONS 13 AND 14

Section 13 provides for certain administrative determinations by the Attorney General, upon due hearing, and section 14 provides for a judicial review. It is well settled that Congress may confide to administrative or executive agencies the duty to make findings of facts and the application thereof with respect to certain statutory standards. This is not an improper grant of power; nor do the facts that penalties ultimately may be imposed and that Congress has chosen an administrative process rather than judicial one amount to a denial of due process of law. (See, among others, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (1894) 154 U. S. 447; Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting (1932) 287 U. S. 329; Yakus v. U. S. (1944) 321 U. S. 414; President, Managers and Company of the Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S. (1910) 216 U. S. 177; Louisville and Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett (1913) 231 U. S. 298.) So long as the statute is not incapable of affording those appearing before the administrative tribunal the protection of procedural due process-such as adequate notice, a right to be heard, and a fair and impartial hearing-there can be no complaint. (See Yakus v. U. S., supra.) Due process of law does not necessarily require the interference of the judicial power. In Public Clearing House v. Coyne ((1904) 194 U. S. 497, 509), the Supreme Court, quoting Judge Cooley, said:

"There is nothing in these words ('due process of law,') however, that necessarily implies that due process of law must be judicial process. Much of the process by means of which the government is carried on and the order of society maintained is purely executive or administrative. Temporary deprivations of liberty or property must often take place through the action of ministerial or executive officers or functionaries, or even of private parties, where it has never been supposed that the common law would afford redress."

It is not objectionable that the Attorney General is given the power of subpena. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, supra. This is a power commonly exercised by many executive and administrative agencies today. The question whether a particular search or seizure, in the exercise of this power, will be unconstitutional under the fourth amendment cannot be determined in advance of the event. That question is one to be determined judicially, in view of all the circumstances of the particular case presented (Mason v. Rollins (C.