having the Pavonia on her own starboard side and being on a crossing course, she did not keep out of the way of the Pavonia, and in not taking into consideration the probable and usual course of the Pavonia under the circumstances of the tide and wind, and in not reversing her engine at the time she gave her first whistle. "2. The Pavonia was without fault. "3. In the suit brought by the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company it is entitied to a decree for $4770.02, with interest from February 1, 1888, and for $2800, with interest from June 18, 1889, and for its costs in the district court, taxed at $159.75, and for its costs in this court, to be taxed. "4. In the suit brought by the Old Dominion 257] Steamship *Company a decree must be entered dismissing the libel and awarding to the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company its costs in the district court, taxed at $41.95, and its costs in this court, to be taxed." Subsequently, and upon motion of the claimant, the court made the following additional finding: "The Breakwater is an iron steamer of 1100 tons burden and 212 feet long. Before and at the time of the collision her master, chief officer, quartermaster, and a Sandy Hook pilot, who was only a passenger, were in her pilot house. The second officer was on the forward deck in front of the wheel house." From the decree of the circuit court the owners of the Break water appealed to this court Messrs. Frank D. Sturges and Edward L. Owen, for appellant: The collision was due to the fault of the Pavonia in starting from her slip at a time and under circumstances which gave the Breakwater no alternative except to reverse in order to avoid her. Rule 19, known as the starboard hand rule, does not apply. Rule 19.-If two vessels under steam are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other." Two vessels are not under steam when one is at rest; nor or they on crossing courses when one is moored to her dock. A reasonable time is no doubt required for the execution of manœuvres agreed upon. The Britania, 34 Fed. Rep. 546. Under the rule that a steamer must keep out of the way, she must, of necessity, deterinine for herself, and upon her own responsibility, independently of the sailing vessel, whether it is safer to go to the right or left or to stop. New York, L. U. 8. Mail SS. Co. v. Rumball, 62 U. S. 21 How. 372, 384 (16: 144). The principle involved is the same in the case of two steamships crossing, where it is the duty of the one who has the other on her starboard bow to keep out of the way of the other. The Britannia v. Cleugh, 153 U. S. 130, 144 (38: 660,665). Obedience to the rules is not required until the necessity arises for obedience, until the time arrives for precautions to be taken. Then the regulations must be observed, and continuously until the necessity ceases. Fraser v. The Wenona, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 41, 52 (22: 52, 58). When two vessels are in motion and have drawn together into a situation which requires the observance of a given rule, neither has the right to change that situation so as to bring it within the provisions of any other rule. The Peckforton Castle, L. R. 3 Prob. Div. 11; The Seaton, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 1; The State of Texas, 20 Fed. Rep. 254. Action under Rule 19 is not contemporaneous with action under Rule 21, requiring a vessel to slacken speed, or stop and reverse. Under Rule 19, admitting of the use of the helm, such use must be made prior to the necessity arising for use of the engine. The Free State, 1 Brown, Adm. 251, 261, 268, 91 U. S. 200 (23: 299); The Jesmond, L. R. 4 C. P. 1; The Beryl, L. R. 9 Prov. Div. 137, 142. The fact that after the Pavonia started sig nals were exchanged does not affect the principle. The signals were in conformity with the course adopted by the Pavonia. Our contention is that she had no right to such a course, and having taken it voluntarily, she could not create a new obligation under it upon the Break water, by giving or receiving signals. Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674-703 (37: 1218, 1228): The Albermarle, 8 Blatchf. 200-204; The Greenpoint, 31 Fed. Rep. 231, 232; The Nereus, 23 Fed. Rep. 456. The Pavonia was at fault for violating Rule 21, which requires vessels to slacken speed, or stop and reverse. The Albermarle, 8 Blatchf. 200. When approaching so as to involve risk of collision, each should slacken speed, and if necessary stop and reverse. This should not be delayed until efforts to slow, stop and reverse would be useless. The John McIntyre, L. R. 9 Prob. Div. 133; Brown v. Slauson (“The Nichols") 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 656-663 (19: 157, 158); The Johnson v. McCord, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 146-153 (19: 610, 611); The Huntsville, 8 Blatchf. 228-231. Nor is one vessel relieved from obedience to the rule because the other is not obedient thereto, or obedient to any other rule. The Ericsson, Swab. Adm. 38; The Galileo, 28 Fed. Rep. 469; The Aurania, 29 Fed. Rep. 123; The John McIntyre, 9 Prob. Div. 135; Williamson v. Barrett, 54 U. S. 13 How. 106109 (14: 71-73); Lane v. The A. Denike, 3 Cliff. 117-122; Beatty v. Hanna ("The Manitoba") 122 U. S. 97 (30: 1095); The Memnon, 6 Asp. Mar. Cas. 317; New Haven Steam Transp. Co. v. The Continental, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 345-359 (20: 801-803); The America v. Camdem & A. R. & Transp. Co. 92 U. S. 432 (23: 724); The Stanmore, L. R. 10 Prob. Div. 135; The Favorita, v. Union Ferry Co. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 598 (21: 856); The Jesmond, L. R. 4 C. P. 1; The Free State, 1 Brown Adm. 251; The Khedive, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 876; The Ceto, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 670. It was as much the duty of the Pavonia to have foreseen and provided against effects of the tide and wind upon herself as it was the Breakwater's duty. The Columbus, Abb. Adm. 384-387. fixed periods is bound to remain in her slip,, notwithstanding the time of her departure, if a vessel is seen, or is in a position to be seen, outside, which she will be in danger of striking if got under way at that time. Randolph v. United States, 1 Newb. Adm. 497; The Manhassett, 34 Fed. Rep. 408-422. Ferry boats have no superior privileges to those of other vessels navigating in the harbor. There is no right of way into collision; nor can one vessel insist upon a right of way, if by so doing she creates risk, or renders collision certain by proceeding when danger already exists. Miner v. The Sunnyside, 91 U. S. 208 (23: 302); Martin v. Northern Transp. Co. ("The Maria Martin") 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 31 (20: 251); The Pegasus, 19 Fed. Rep. 47; The Columbia, 23 Blatchf. 270. Gross fault on the part of one vessel will not excuse another from adopting every proper precaution required by the special circumstances of the case to prevent a collision. Pentz v. The Ariadne, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 475. 479 (20: 542, 542); Chamberlain v. Ward, 62 U. S. 21 How. 548, 560 (16: 211, 215); The Jay Gould, 19 Fed. Rep. 765. The Breakwater did not violate the provisions of Rule 21. Marshall v. The Adriatic, 107 U. S. 515 (27: 498); Sears v. The Scotia, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 170 (20: 822); The A. P. Cranmer, 19 Blatchf_507; The Baltic, 2 Ben. 98; The Ulster, 1 Mar. L. Cas. 234. The Breakwater was not in fault because of her position 400 feet from the piers. She was pursuing a proper course to make her landing against the wind and tide, and she was seen in sufficient time to avoid all danger. The City of Hartford, 4 Ben. 568; The F. M. Wilson, 7 Ben. 367; The Fanita, 8 Ben. 11; The Edmund Levy, 8 Ben. 144; The E. A. Packer, 20 Fed. Rep. 327. Messrs. Geo. Bethune Adams and Franklin A. Wilcox, for appellee: The collision was due to the neglect of the Breakwater to observe her statutory duty, confirmed by an agreement of signals to keep out of the why of the ferryboat. Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674, 684 (37: 1218, 1222); The City of Springfield, 29 Fed. Rep. 923, affirmed in 36 Fed. Rep. 568; The Beta, 40 Fed. Rep. 899; The Cyclops, 45 Fed. Rep. 122; The Intrepid, 48 Fed. Rep. 327; The Bal tic, 41 Fed. Rep. 603; The Titan, 44 Fed. Rep. 510. In addition to the obligation cast upon the Breakwater by the 19th Rule, the Pavonia had the right of way for her necessary course out of her slip, and the Breakwater was bound to observe and avoid her. The Relief, Olcott, 104, 109; The John S. Darcy, 29 Fed. Rep. 644; The West Brooklyn, 45 Fed. Rep. 60, affirmed in 49 Fed. Rep. 688: The Favorita, 8 Blatchf. 541, affirmed in 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 598 (21: 856); The Brooklyn, 62 Fed. Rep. 759; The C. H. Seuff, 32 Fed. Rep. 237. It is obvious that no authorities cited by the claimant have any bearing upon the question. The case is controlled by rules of navigation aptly expressed in The John Taylor, 6 Ben. 228. There was also an obligation imposed upon the Breakwater because she had the advantage of the tide to assist her in keeping out of the way by reversing. Robert v. The Galatea, 92 U. S. 439, 446 (23: 727, 729); The Volunteer, 49 Fed. Rep. 477, 478. The rules, as well as the agreement of signals and the exigency of the situation, required the Pavonia to keep her course and speed. 23d & 24th Rules of Navigation. She was bound by the provisions of the 23d Rule and would have been in fault if she had stopped and reversed, unless she could have | justified herself by proving clearly that she was in extremis. The Northfield & The Hunter, 4 Ben. 112, affirmed by this court, and reported only in U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 24 L. ed. 680; The General U. S. Grant, 6 Ben. 465; The Corsica v. Schuyler, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 630 (19: 804); The Cayuga v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 270 (20: 828); Sears v. The Scotia, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 170 (20: 822); Ludwig v. The Free State, 91 U. S. 200 (23: 299); Golding v. The Illinois, 103 U. S. 298 (26: 562); Marshall v. The Adriatic, 107 U. S. 512 (27: 497): The St. Johns. 34 Fed. Rep. 763; The Nacoochee v. Moseley, 137 U. S. 340 (34: 690); The Britannia, v. Cleugh, 153 U. S. 130 (38: 660); The Nutmeg State, 62 Fed. Rep. 847. After the Pavonia started she was required to keep her headway to avoid collision, and to rely upon the Breakwater's agreement to keep out of her way. The Greenpoint, 31 Fed. Rep. 231, 232; The Susquehanna, 35 Fed. Rep. 320, 323; The Britannia, 34 Fed. Rep. 546; The Memnon, 6 Asp. Mar. Cas. 488; The Favorita v. Union Ferry Co. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 598 (21: 856). If the master of the Pavonia erred in judgment in going ahead instead of stopping and backing, it was not a fault. New York & L. U. S. Mail SS. Co. v. Rumball, 62 U. S. 21 How. 372 (16: 144); Brown v. Slauson ("The Nichols") 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 656, 666 (19: 157, 159); The Carroll v. Green, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 302, 305 (19: 392, 393); Jones v. Slauson ("The Elizabeth Jones") 112 U. S. 514, 526 (28: 812, 816); The Bywell Castle L. R. 4 Prov. Div. 219. From any standpoint the navigation of the Pavonia was without fault. Liverpool, N. Y. & P. SS. Co. v. Simmons. ("The City of Paris") 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 634, 639 (19: 751, 753). A vessel which is primarily in fault for a collision cannot shift its consequences in part upon the other vessel, without clear proof of the contributory negligence or fault of the latter. Her own negligence sufficiently accounts for the disaster. The Comet, 9 Blatchf. 323; The John King, 49 Fed. Rep. 469, 474: The Clarion, 27 Fed. Rep. 128, 131; Alexandre v. Machan ("The City of New York") 147 U. S. 72, 85 (37: 84, 90). Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: The principal contention of the appellant is that the Pavonia was in fault for leaving her slip at the time she did, in view of the strong ebb tide, northerly wind, and the proximity of | intended to overrule that case within three the Breakwater. The facts were that, at the time the Pavonia left her bridge, the Break water was off Barclay street, about 880 feet down the river, pursuing her course up the river about 400 feet distant from the outer line of the piers. It is true that there was a strong ebb tide and a north-west wind, but although the effect of this was to swing the Pavonia's bow somewhat down the river, as it emerged from the slip, this swing, with the aid of her wheel, which was put hard-aport, was overcome before the collision, at which time her bow was on a swing up the river. While the wind and tide had the effect of setting her bodily down the river, this was an incident which the pilot of the Breakwater must or ought to have anticipated, and being warned by the Pavonia's whistle that she was about leaving her slip, ought also to have provided against. In view of the large number of ferryboats plying between New York and the opposite shores, sometimes as often as once in three or four minutes from the same slip, their departure at any moment is a contingency which ought to be reckoned upon and guarded against. There is a necessity that these transits be made with great frequency and regularity, not only in order that the public may be accommodated, but that ferry boats arriving from the opposite shores, shall not be compelled to lie in the stream, with a chance of encountering other vessels, to await the departure of their consorts from the New York slip. Steamers plying up 262] and down the river should, therefore, keep a sufficient distance from the dock, and hold themselves under such control, as to enable them to avoid ferryboats leaving their slips upon their usual schedules of time. The respective obligations of ferryboats and other steamers were fixed in accordance with this rule by Judge Betts as early as 1845, in the case of The Relief, Olcott, 104, in which he spoke of the rights of ferryboats "to an undis turbed passage between their landing places, in the performance of their duties in that capacity, as a species of privilege or immunity not accorded to other vessels," and declared it to be the duty of other steam vessels to keep as near as possible to the center of the stream in passing up and down, in order that the exit from the entrance into the ferry slips should not be checked or embarrassed by the presence of other vessels passing close to them. This practice has been acquiesced in for at least half a century, and has been repeatedly recog nized by the local courts. The Favorita, 8 Blatchf. 539; The Monticello, 15 Fed. Rep. 474; The John S. Darcy, 29 Fed. Rep. 644; The West Brooklyn, 45 Fed. Rep. 60, 49 Fed. Rep. 688; The Brooklyn, 62 Fed. Rep. 759. The Favorita, was also affirmed by this court upon a similar recognition of this rule. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 598 [21: 856]. It is hardly necessary to say, however, that it would not be applicable, if the circumstances were such as to indicate that it would be im possible for an approaching steamer to avoid the ferryboat. This seems to have been the case in The Columbus, Abb. Adm. 384, since it can hardly be supposed that the judge, who decided the case of The Relief, should have years, without, at least, calling attention to the fact. Perhaps, too, the practice here suggested might be subject to some modification in a harbor less crowded than New York, where the transits of the ferryboats are made with less frequency. As Mr. Justice Davis remarked in the case of The Favorita: "Manifestly the rules of navigation must vary according to the exigencies of business and the wants of the public. The rule which would be applicable in a harbor where the business was light, and the passage of vessels not liable to be *impeded, would be inapplicable in a [263 great thoroughfare like the East river." it is clear in this case that a collision might have been avoided by prompt and decisive action on the part of the Break water, after the Pavonia left the wharf, and that with proper management there was no risk of collision, we think that no fault can be imputed to the latter in leaving at the time she did. As Was she in fault for her manner of leaving? The finding is that as she began to move she sounded the usual long, single whistle to warn approaching vessels, and as her bow reached the outer end of the pier, she receives in reply a single whistle from the Break water. From this moment, at least, the statutory rules of navigation became operative, and required the ferryboat to keep her course and speed, and the Break water to keep out of her way. But that there might be no misunderstanding as to her intention, the Pavonia again gave a single whistle, in reply to that of the Breakwater, and the latter answered by another single whistle. Finding 8 indicates also that the same signals were exchanged the third time. Under these circumstances there certainly should have been no misunderstanding as to the proposed movements of each vessel, and no misapprehension as to their respective duties. The Pavonia fulfilled her obligation by keeping her wheel harda port, and her engine at full speed, to counteract the tendency of the wind and tide to carry her down the river. The Breakwater knew, or was bound to know, as well as the Pavonia, that the immediate effect of the wind and tide, striking the ferryboat broadside, would cause ber to sag down the stream as she passed the outer end of the pier, and was bound to provide against this contingency. This she failed to do effectively. As she sounded her first whistle her engine was stopped, but not until the Pavonia sounded her second whistle did she reverse. In this connection counsel for the Breakwater claims that Rule 19, requiring in the case of crossing steamers, that the one having the other upon her starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other, has no application. We think, however, the rule became obligatory from the moment the *Pavonia got under[264 way, when it became her duty to keep her course and speed, and that of the Break water to avoid her. The Britannia v. Cleugh, 153 U. S. 130 [38: 660]. __It was said by this court in the case of New York & L. U. S. Mail SS. Co. v. Rumball, 62 U. S. 21 How. 372, 384 [16: 144. 148], and Fraser v. The Wenona, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 41, 52 [22: 52, 58], that "rules of navigation, such as have been mentioned, are obligatory upon vessels approaching each other, from the time the necessity of precaution be. gins, and continue to be applicable as the vessels advance, so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain." Where rules of this description are adopted for the guidance of seaman who are unlearned in the law and unaccustomed to nice distinctions exceptions should be admitted with great caution, and only when imperatively required by the special cirumstances mentioned in Rule 24, which may exist in any particuliar case, rendering a departure from them necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. The moment the observance or non-observance of a rule becomes a matter of doubt or discretion. there is manifest danger, for the judgment of one pilot may lead him to observe the rule, while that of the other may lead him to disregard it. The theory of the claimant that a vessel at rest has no right to start from her wharf in sight of an approaching vessel, and thereby impose upon the latter the obligation to avoid her, is manifestly untenable, and would impose a wholly unnecessary burden upon the navigation of a great port like that of New York. In the particular case, too, the signals exchanged between the steamers indicated clearly that the Breakwater accepted the situation and the obligation imposed upon her by the starboard hand rule, and was bound to take prompt measures to discharge herself of such obligation. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 265-270). Master's finding as to damages-profits recoverable for violation of patent-when for the entire article-patented features. 1. The master's finding as to damages which is 2. 3. 4. concurred in by the court below, in the absence of obvious error or mistake, must be permitted to stand. Where a patent is for a particular part of an existing machine, the profits recovered must be due to the particular invention secured by the patent in suit. Where the patented invention is for a new article of manufacture, which is sold separately, the patentee is entitled to damages arising from the manufacture and sale of the entire article. The rule requiring that the profits arising from the patented features must be separated from those arising from the unpatented features has little application in a case where every feature is patented. [No. 60.] Dec. 3, 1894. Decided of the United States for the Northern APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court No fault is to be imputed to the Pavonia for District of New York, in favor of the plainher failure to stop and reverse, since it is quite tiff, William I. Keep, against John Hobert obvious that if she had slackened speed her Warren et al., defendants, for profits and tendency to sag down the river would have been greatly increased, and she would practic-damages for the infringement of letters patent. Affirmed. ally have been at the mercy, of the wind and tide. Her only safe course was to do precisely as she did: put her wheel hard-a-port and her engine at full speed. The duty to slacken speed 265] manifestly *does not apply where the effct would be to carry a steamer bodily down the current upon another vessel which is trying to avoid her. That the Breakwater did not reverse with sufficient promptness is evident from the fact that at the time the Pavonia started she was off Barclay street, a distance of nearly 900 feet, while the collision occurred abreast the slip immediately below the one from which the Pavonia started, or about 580 feet from where the Breakwater was when the Pavonia left her bridge; while, if the Break water had promptly reversed, she would have stopped within her own length (212 feet) or about 360 feet below the spot where the collision took place. Upon the whole notwithstanding the earnest argument of appellant's counsel, we think the decision of the circuit court was correct, and its decree is, therefore, affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. NOTE.-A8 to damages for infringement of patent; treble damages, see note to Hogg v. Emerson, 13: 824. As to distinction between inventions of mechanism, articles, or products and processes; when latter patented, see note to Corning v. Burden, 14: 683. As to including process and product in same patent; separate patents therefor, see note to Evans v. Eaton, 4: 433. As to what constitutes infringement of paten!; similarity of devices; designs; combinations; machines; construction of patent, see note to Royer v. Coupe, 36: 1073. nock v. Dialogue, 7: 327. For what patents are granted; when declared void, see note to Evans v. Eaton, 4: 433. As to patentability of invention, see notes to Thompson v. Boisseler, 29: 76, and Corning v. Burden, 14: 683. As to what reissue may cover, see note to O'Reilly v. Morse, 14: 601. As to assignment, before issuing and reissuing patent; recording; when assignment transfers extended terms, see note to Gayler v. Wilder, 13: 504. As to anticipation of patents; prior patents and publications; application and issue; claims and specifications, see note to Leggett v. Standard Oil Co. 37: 737. Mr. Esek Cowen for appellants. 266] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: On the 14th day of March, 1881, William I. Keep filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, against John Hobert Warren, Joseph W. Fuller, George A. Wells, and Walter P. Warren, alleging complainant's ownership of several letters patent and infringement by the defendants. The subject-matter of the letters patent was certain devices and designs for base-burning stoves and stove grates. a stove, was quite as favorable to the defendants as they had any right to claim. In finding the number of grates sold during the period in question, as separate articles, the master depended chiefly on the entries in the defendants' books, as testified to and explained on the part of the complainant by Keep, who had been engaged with the defendants for more than eight years, and claimed to be thoroughly acquainted with their methods of business, and, on the part of the defendants, by L. W. Drake, who was their assistant superintendent. There was a considerable amount of this evidence, and it was, to some extent, conflicting. The master acted in view of this evidence, and the court below concurred in his finding, except in some unimportant particulars. As no obvious error or mistake has been pointed The case was put at issue by an answer and replication, but on the 20th day of March, 1883, a decree was entered by consent, declar-out to us, their conclusions must be permitted ing the validity of the letters patent set forth in the bill, and infringement by the defendants of some of them. The decree directed that an account should be taken for profits and damages upon all the patents so declared to be infringed, but contained the following provision: "That such gains, profits, damages, and accounting shall not apply to any stoves made or sold by said defendants before February 1, 1876, nor to any grates made or sold by said defendants before that date, except as to grates covered by said letters patent No. 139,583, and supplied by defendants after January 1, 1876, to stoves originally sold by them without such grates." The master found that, between January 1, 1876 and January 1, 1882, the defendants sold, grates upon which the profits amounted to $11,363.54, and that amount, with six cents' damages and costs, were awarded by the master to and in favor of the complainant. Exceptions to this report were filed by the the defendants, alleging that the evidence did not sustain the master in finding the number of the infringing grates sold by the defendants, nor in finding the amount of profits which the defendants had realized from the infringement. 267] *The court below sustained an exception to the action of the master in allowing the sum of $348.00 as profits on four hundred grates made and sold by the defendants between January 1, 1879, and July 1, 1879, but overruled the other exceptions, and entered a final decree in favor of the complainant for the sum of $10,510.86 with costs, from which decree the defendants appealed to this court. The first error insisted upon is that the evidence did not justify the master in finding the number of grates sold by the defendants during the six years over which the accounting extended. The defendants' contention is not that due effect was not given to the evidence adduced on their behalf, but that the plain tiff's evidence, consisting chiefly of the testimony of Keep himself, did not clearly establish the number of the infringing grates sold. Our examination of this part of the subject has not enabled us to approve the defendants' contention. The master's action in restricting his finding to grates sold as separate and in dependent articles, and in excluding from the account all grates which were sold in or with 155 U.S. U. S., Book 39. to stand. Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136 [31: 664]; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585 [36: 552]; Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 132 [36: 649]. Assuming that the number of infringing grates sold by the defendants was correctly found, we have next to consider *whether[268 the master erred in awarding to the complainant the entire profits made upon the grates so sold. The appellant's contention is that there was no evidence tending to show how much of the profits was due to the complainant's invention, and that hence he was entitled to recover nominal damages only. It is, no doubt, well settled that where a patent is for a parti cular part of an existing machine, it is not sufficient to ascertain the profits on the whole machine, but it must be shown what portion of the profits is due to the particular invention secured by the patent in suit. Robertson v. Blake, 94 U. S. 728 [24: 245]; Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co. 114 U. 439 [29: 177]. But it is equally true that, where the patented invention is for a new article of manufacture, which is sold separately, the patentee is entitled to damages arising from the manufacture and sale of the entire article. Gould's Mfg. Co. v. Coring, 105 U. S. 258 [26: 989]; Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U. S. 456 [32: 1011]; Crosby Steam Gage & V. Co. v. Consolidated Safety Valve Co. 141 U. S. 441 [35: 809]. The grates, on whose sale the master assessed profits, were not sold as an incident to any particular stove, but as an independent, marketable article, and the infringers must pay the entire profits realized from the sale thereof. The statement that, at this late day, there can be a grate, for use in ordinary stoves, which is entirely new, and patentable in all its parts and as an entirety, is somewhat surprising; but that is what we learn from this record. The patent infringed contains eight claims, of which seven are for the several parts of the grate, and the eighth for the entire device, and the defendants are precluded by the decree, to which they consented, from contending that the plaintiff is to be restricted, in his demand for damages, to any one feature or part of the grate. It is further claimed that the master ought to have reported nominal damages only, because there was evidence before him to the effect that the defendants, at the time they made and sold the complainant's grate, likewise made and sold another kind of a grate, 10 145 |