Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, delivered the opinion of the court: George A. Pearce was arrested in the state of Texas on an executive warrant issued by the governor of that state, upon the requisition of the governor of the state of Alabama, to be delivered up to the state of Alabama, to answer two indictments against him in the city court of Mobile, Alabama, each charging him with embezzlement and grand larceny; and while in the custody of the agent of the state of Alabama, to be transported to Mobile for trial upon such indictments he sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the judge of the 42d dis312] trict of the *state of Texas, praying for the reasons therein stated, to be discharged. On the hearing of the petition the district judge refused to discharge Pearce, and remanded ness of a merchant in his own name, or that he did not engage in the performance of any manual labor except that necessary for the conduct of his business as such merchant, although he left the United States before the passage of such Act. Re Yee Lung, 61 Fed. Rep. 641; Re Loo Yue Soon, 61 Fed. Rep, 643. A person imprisoned under a judgment convict- | ing him of murder in the second degree, void because rendered without a plea or verdict of guilty, upon reversal of a conviction in the first degree, will not be discharged on habeas corpus, since he has an adequate remedy by appeal eventually, if need be, to the Supreme Court of the United States. Re Friedrich, 51 Fed. Rep. 747. An apparent defect of jurisdiction for lack of matter in a controversy of sufficient pecuniary value can be availed of only by appeal or writ of error, and not by habeas corpus. Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (37: 689). The writ of habeas corpus cannot be converted into a remedy for the correction on mere errors of judgment or of procedure in the court having cognizance of the criminal offense. Ex parte Frederich, 149 U. S. 70 (37: 653). Habeas corpus will not lie to release a prisoner committed by a justice of the peace on preliminary examination because the justice erroneously overruled a motion for a change of justices, where he had by law authority over the class of cases to which that of the petitioner belonged. Turner v. Conkey, 17 L. R. A. 509, 132 Ind. 248. Refusal to assign counsel at the expense of the state for the defense of the prisoner, or of compulsory process to secure absent witnesses, or to grant a continuance to procure such witnesses, is mere irregularity or error which cannot be considered or corrected by habeas corpus. Re McKnight, 52 Fed. Rep. 799. Bias of jurors does not render void the judgment of the court upon their verdict, so as to entitle the prisoner to discharge upon habeas corpus, although not discovered until after the judgment. Re King, 51 Fed. Rep. 434. him to the custody of the agent. Pearce thereupon appealed to the court of criminal appeals of the state of Texas, the court of last resort in criminal matters, where the judgment below was affirmed. 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 301. The grounds on which the relator contended that he was entitled to be discharged were, as stated by the court of appeals, that the indictments were insufficient to authorize his extradition, because it was not alleged therein that the offenses were committed in the state of Alabama, and in violation of her laws; that the indictments were wholly void in that no time or place were laid therein, and it did not appear where the offenses were committed, nor that they were not long since barred. Relator further showed that he had been a citizen of Texas for more than three years, and The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction to review, upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the judgment of the United States circuit court imposing a fine for contempt of that court. Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 (37: 689). Where the ground of the application for leave to file a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, or to an officer executing its judgment, does not go to the jurisdiction or authority of that court, the application will be denied. Mere error cannot be reviewed in such proceeding. Re Schneider, 148 U. S. 162 (37: 406). While the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state courts which are proceeding in disregard of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States may exist, the practice of exercising such power before the question has been raised or determined in the state court is one which ought not to be encouraged. Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183 (36: 934). The merits of the charge cannot be inquired into on habeas corpus in behalf of a United States marshal in custody under state process, but the sole inquiry is whether the acts charged as violations of state laws were done in pursuance of a law of the United States. Re Marsh, 51 Fed. Rep. 277. A prisoner held for removal to another district in which he has been indicted will be discharged on habeas corpus, where the indictment is demurrable. Re Terrell, 51 Fed. Rep. 213. The determination of state courts upon the questions of bias and misconduct of jurors is within their jurisdiction, and cannot be reviewed upon habeas corpus by a Federal court. Re King, 51 Fed. Rep. 434. The effect of the jury's going temporarily without the jurisdiction of a state court during a murder trial is within the powers of that court, and cannot be considered by a Federal court on habeas corpus. Re King, supra. On habeas corpus to obtain the discharge of a person held by a commissioner to await the action of the executive upon the demand of a foreign govFailure to prove the venue in a criminal case is ernment for his extradition, the court cannot not such a defect as to render the conviction void review the admission of evidence by the commisas without jurisdiction and open to attack collat- sioner, or the weight and sufficiency of the testierally by habeas corpus, since it can be shown only mony, but can only inquire as to his jurisdiction by bill of exceptions, which cannot be made part of the subject-matter and as to whether there was of the record for purposes of habeas corpus. Re legal evidence before him supporting his judgment. Haskell, 52 Fed. Rep. 795. Re Adutt, 55 Fed. Rep. 376. In the absence of special facts and circumstances, a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court violates his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States should be required to seek a view thereof by writ of error, instead of resorting to the writ of habeas corpus. Frederich, 149 U. S. 70 (37: 653). Ex parte The findings of a commissioner that a Chinese laborer is not exempt from the provisions of the Act of Congress excluding such laborers, because of residence in the United States prior to the passnge of the Act of 1892, cannot be reviewed on application for habeas corpus. Re Sing Lee, 54 Fed. Rep. 334. We cannot discover that the court of appeals, declining to pass upon the question raised in advance of the courts of Alabama, denied to plaintiff in error any right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or that the court in announcing that conclusion erroneously disposed of a Federal question. Judgment affirmed. that his whereabouts were known to interested | state from whence the petitioner had departed, parties in Alabama, this proof being made un- or in respect of the discharge of the duty imder the statute of limitations, presumably of posed by the Constitution and laws of the Texas, as it did not appear how long the United States on the executive authority of the offenses were committed prior to the February asylum state to cause the surrender. The term, 1889, of the Mobile city court, at which question resolved itself, therefore, into one of term the indictments were found, nor what the validity of the statute on the ground of was the statute of limitations in Alabama, *its repugnancy to the Constitution, and[314 if any, for embezzlement and theft. The re- the court of appeals declined to decide in favor lator did not deny that he was a fugitive from of its validity. And if it could be said upon the justice within the rule on that subject or raise record that any right under the Constitution any issue thereon. The record showed the re- had been specially set up and claimed by quisition made by the governor of Alabama; plaintiff in error at the proper time and in the copies of the indictments duly certified; the proper way, the state court did not decide warrant of the governor of Texas; and in ef- against such right, for the denial of the fect the reletor relied for his discharge entirely right depended upon a decision in favor of upon the invalidity of the indictments. the validity of the statute. What the state The district judge certified that, on the hear-court did was to leave the question as to ing below, he had examined the laws of the whether the statute was in violation of the state of Alabama, and found the indictments Constitution of the United States, and the insufficient thereunder, or "at least not void." dictments insufficient accordingly, to the deAn opinion was filed in the court of appeals manding state. Its action in that regard simply by Simkins, J., in which it was held that any remitted to the courts of Alabama the duty of indictment which, under the laws of the de- protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his manding state, sufficiently charges the crime, constitutional rights, and if any of those rights will sustain a requisition even though insuf- should be denied him, which is not to be preficient under the laws of the asylum state; sumed, he could then seek his remedy in this that in this case there was no question as to court. the nature of the crimes charged, and that they 313] were offenses against the laws of Alabama; that indictments dispensing with the allegations of time and venue in conformity with the code of Alabama had been sustained by judicial decision in that state (Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 693; Thompson v. State, 25 Ala. 41) and were not necessarily fatally defective in every state of the Union, whatever its statutes or forms of proceeding. The majority of the court did not concur in all the propositions stated in the opinion, but expressed their views as follows: "We desire to modify certain propositions stated in the opinion of Judge Simkins. It is intimated, if not stated directly, that the relater would have the right to show by proper evidence that the indictment in substance was not sufficient under the laws of the demanding state. Our position upon this question is that if it reasonably appears upon the trial of the habeas corpus that the relator is charged by indictment in the demanding state, whether the indictment be sufficient or not under the laws of that state, the court trying the habeas corpus case will not discharge the relator because of substantial defects in the indictment under the laws of the demanding state. To require this would entail upon the court an investigation of the sufficiency of the indictment in the demanding state, when the true rule is that if it appears to the court that he is charged by an indictment with an offense, all other prerequisites being complied with, the applicant should be extradited. We are not discussing the character of such proof; this must be made by a certified copy of the indictment, etc." It was not disputed that the indictments were in substantial conformity with the statute of Alabama in that behalf, and their sufficiency as a matter of technical pleading would not be inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642 [29: 250]. Nor was there any contention as to the proper demand having been made by the executive authority of the FREDERICK WEHRMAN, Appt., V. T. B. CONKLIN ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 314-333). Action to quiet title-U. S. Rev. Stat. § 723limitations-estoppel-remedy in equity-actual fraud-defects in title-writ not sealed— basis for suit-laches. 1. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 723, inhibiting suits in equity NOTE. As to estoppel by judgment, see note to Aspden v. Nixon, 11: 1059. As to estoppel in pais, see note to Stowe v. United States, 22: 144. As to estoppel as to contracts limiting the time within which action must be brought, see note to Southern Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 22: 556. drunkenness, duress, undue influence, fraud on marAs to deed avoided in equity, by fraud, insanity, riage, from ward to guardian, from heir to executor, cestui que trust to trustec, imbecility, see note to Harding v. Handy, 6: 429. As to equity jurisdiction, after trial at law, see note to Smith v. M'Iver, 6: 152. That time or excess of price may be dispensed with, when not essence of contract, equity will not enforce doubtful title, see note to Brashier v. Gratz, 5: 322. As to statute of limitations, in cases of fraud, in equity, see note to Stearns v. Page, 12: 9:28. As to statute of limitations, as applicable to equity cases, see note to Thomas v. Brockenbrough, 6: 287. As to cancellation of a deed of contract, in equity, for fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation, see note to Neblett v. Macfarland, 23: 471. in any case where a plain, complete, and adequate remedy may be had at law, is obligatory, and applicable to every form of action in the Federal courts, the laws of the several states to the contrary notwithstanding. 2. Laches is no defense at law, though a good defense in equity. If the plaintiff at law has brought his action within the period fixed by the statute of limitations, no court can deprive him of his right to proceed. 8. An estoppel in pais is an available defense to an action at law, in order to justify a resort to a court of equity, to enforce an equitable estoppel, it is necessary to show some ground of equity other than the estoppel itself. The bill, which was filed by T. B. Conklin and E. F. Conklin, whose Christian names are not given, but who appear from subsequent allegations to be husband and wife, set forth that they were the "absolute owners" of the property, which had been purchased of the United States on June 9, 1857, by one Adolph Wehrman, who received a patent therefor on December 1, 1859. Afterwards, and on December 17, 1859, Adolph Wehrman and wife conveyed the land in coutroversy with other lands—about 2060 acres in all-by deed of war 4. Where title to real property is concerned, equity has a concurrent jurisdiction in cases of actual fraud, because it may not only enjoin an action at law, but may order a cancellation of the fraudulant conveyance, and prohibit the bringing of further suits at law upon the fraud-ranty, to the defendant, Frederick Wehrman, ulent title, and thus afford a more complete relief than is possible in a court of law. 5. Where the bill is in the nature of a judgment creditor's bill, filed by plaintiffs who claim that they have acquired by successive assignments from the original creditors a lien upon certain lands, which the debtor has conveyed in fraud of the original creditors, and the plaintiffs have long been in possession of the land, and the records of the case, through which the original purchaser at the execution sale claims to have acquired the legal title, have been lost and their title, though good in equity, may be technically insufficient at law, they have a right to call upon a court of equity for relief against such defects. 6. A writ not impressed with such a seal as the law required, is not therefore void where the clerk affixed an ordinary private seal or scroll to the writ, with a statement that no seal had yet been procured. for an expressed consideration of $3000. This deed was recorded in the proper office for the county of Woodbury, to which the county of O'Brien, wherein the lands were situated, was then attached for judicial purposes. The bill further alleged that on January 14, 1861, a copartnership known as Greeley, Gale & Co. began an action at law, aided by an attachment in the district court of O'Brien county, upon a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Pierce county in the state of Wisconsin, against Adolph Wehrman, which judgment was based upon notes given prior to the date of the conveyance of said lands to the defendant by Adolph Wehrman. Such judgment was was rendered after personal service upon Adolph Wehrman in the state of Wisconsin. A writ of attachment was issued by the clerk of the district court of O'Brien county, and 7. Where the statutes of a state permit personal levied upon the lands in question, and notice service upon a defendant out of the state in an action for the sale of real property under a lien personally served upon the defendant in the or charge, a decree in an attachment suit ren-state of Wisconsin, although no service of dered upon personal service out of the state against the land attached, with long continued possession thereunder, is sufficient basis for a suit to quiet the title. 8. When one who now asserts a title to property, arising more than the lifetime of a generation ago, has during all these years neglected the property, and made no claim of title thereto, a reasonable presumption is that, were the full facts known, which cannot now be known by reason of the death of the parties to the transaction, it would be disclosed that no title was in fact obtained; or if, that be not true, that he considered the property of such little value that he abandoned it. [No. 45.] Argued Oct. 31, 1894. Decided Dec. 10, 1894. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa, in favor of the plaintiffs, T. B. Conklin et al., against the defendant, Frederick W. Wehrman, decreeing the adverse claims of the defendant to be invalid and groundless, and that the plaintiffs are the true and lawful owners of the land, and that their title be quieted against the claims of the defendant, and enjoining him from setting up the same, and from further proceedings at law to recover possession of the land. Affirmed. See same case below, 38 Fed. Rep. 874 Fed. Rep. 12. 43 summons or notice appears to have been had in the state of Iowa. At the time the writ of attachment was issued there was no time fixed by law for holding the term of the district court in O'Brien county, though subsequently the judge appointed a term to be held on the 3d day of June, 1861, to which day the writ of attachment was actually made returnable. The Venue of the cause having been changed to the county of *Woodbury, on September 17.[317 1861, a judgment was rendered by the district court of that county against the defendant Wehrman for $1809.40 damages and costs, and the lands described in the writ of attachment" were ordered to be sold in satisfaction thereof. A certified copy of this judgment was filed in the district court of O'Brien county. Afterwards, and prior to the June term of 1862, Greeley, Gale & Co. commenced a suit in equity in the district court of O'Brien county, against Adolph Wehrman and wife and Frederick Wehrman, for the purpose of setting aside and cancelling the deed from Adolph Wehrman and wife to Frederick Wehrman, as fraudulent and void against the creditors of the former, and subjecting the lands described in this deed to the payment and satisfaction of their judgment against Wehrman. The plaintiffs averred that they were unable to set out the proceedings in such suit for the reason that they had become lost and destroyed, but that there was personal service upon the defendants | scribed the action as having been brought upon in the state of Wisconsin; that, subsequently, and at the June term of 1862, a decree was rendered by default declaring the deed to be fraudulent and void, and ordering the lands to be sold in satisfaction of the judgment rendered by the district court of Woodbury county, and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of such judgment; that an execution was sub-mencement of that term was not fixed until sequently, and on June 16, 1862, issued from the district court of Woodbury county, directed to the sheriff of O'Brien county, by virtue of which the sheriff levied upon the lands described in the writ of the attachment, and sold the same on July 31, 1862, to Carlos S. Gree ley, one of the members of the firm of Greeley, Gale & Co., who thereupon acknowledged satisfaction of the judgment; and that on December 31, 1864, the land not being redeemed, the sheriff executed to Greeley a sheriff's deed, which was filed, whereby Carlos S. Greeley became the absolute owner of the land. That he subsequently acquired a tax title to such lands for the taxes of 1858 and 1859, and that said lands by conveyances from Greeley in 1981, 1882, and 1884, became the property of Conklin, who took immediate possession and 318] has since been in *full, open, notorious, and adverse possession of the same. That the plaintiffs and their grantors paid all the taxes upon such lands for thirty years, and have made valuable improvements by putting some six hundred acres under cultivation, by the erection of substantial buildings and fences, digging wells and otherwise improving the premises. That such improvements have been made at an expense of $1000 and in full reliance upon their title being good and valid. That in the meantime defendant has never asserted any right or title to the premises, or notified plaintiff of his interest in the same. That Webrman never asserted any claim to the premises, until the land became valuable by reason of the plaintiffs' expenditures; has never paid any taxes upon the property, and, though having actual knowledge of the proceedings taken by Greeley, Gale & Co. to subject the land to the payment of their judgment, for more than twenty-seven years took no steps to have the records corrected, or asserted any claim, or notified purchasers of such claim, until his action at law was commenced. The bill further averred the conveyance by Adolph Wehrman to be a cloud upon their title, and, being in actual possession and occupancy of the land, they prayed that the action in ejectment be stayed until the determination as to their rights to the land, and that Wehrman be enjoined from further proceedings at law. a judgment rendered May 12, 1860, when in fact the judgment was rendered September 12, 1860, and judgment was taken upon the attachment proceedings upon a judgment so rendered September 12, 1860; *(4) that the writ of [319 attachment was made returnable at a term commencing on June 3, 1861, when in fact the commore than a month after the writ was issued ; (5) that a change of venue was ordered from O'Brien county to Woodbury county, and the papers sent there without having been in any manner certified or verified by the seal of the court in which the suit was brought; (6) that the judgment was in personam, and ordered the property "described in the writ of attachment" to be sold to satisfy the same, when in fact no property was described in the writ, but | only in the return of the officer endorsed thereon; (7) that in the subsequent equity suit_to subject the lands to the payment of this judgment, there was no personal service or notice of process upon the appellant, Frederick Wehrman, in the state of Wisconsin; (8) that the tax deed was defective, inasmuch as the taxes on the lands for 1858 and 1859 were payable by law to the treasurer of Woodbury county, whereas the tax deed shows that the treasurer of O'Brien county attempted to sell the lands for taxes and give a tax deed. The case was argued upon pleadings and proofs, and the court made a final decree in which the adverse claims of the defendant Wehrman were adjudged to be invalid and groundless, the complainants decreed to be the true and lawful owners of the land, and their title to be quieted against the claims of the defendant, who was perpetually enjoined from setting up the same; and further, that defendant be enjoined from further proceedings at law. From this decree defendant appealed to this court. The opinion of the court upon demurrer is founded in 38 Fed. Rep. 874, and upon final hearing in 43 Fed. Rep. 12. Mr. Chas. A. Clark, for appellent: Appellant was entitled to a trial by jury to determine the validity of his title and that of Conklin. Equity has no jurisdiction to deprive him of his right. Equity has no jurisdiction to pass upon legal titles in possessory actions for real estate. Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U. S. 23 Wall. 466 (23: 70); Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550 (28: 993); Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568 (28: 246); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U. S. 19 How. 277 (15: 634); Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 373 (21: 174); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 151 (34: 874); Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578 (25: 618); Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 78 (26: 82). In an action in ejectment an equitable estoppel is a defense to the action. Bacon v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. 131 U. S. 264 (33: 131). Defendant interposed a demurrer to the bill for the want of jurisdiction and of equity, which was overruled; and he thereupon answered setting up certain defects in the proceedings under which Greeley, Gale & Co. sold the land upon execution, and by virtue of which proceedings plaintiffs claimed to have acquired a title, viz: (1) that the writ of attachment The equitable jurisdiction of Federal courts was not attested by the seal of the court in can be neither enlarged nor diminished by which the action was brought; (2) that no serv-state legislation. ice of summons or notice was had upon the defendant, Adolph Wehrman in the state of Iowa; (3) that such notice as was given de Whitehead v. Shattuck, supra; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 204 (37: 1053); McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 205 (30: 933); Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 110 (35: 358, 360); Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 458, 459 (37: 808). The complainants in this suit in equity being appellees herein, can avail themselves of everything they set up in their bill, as a defense to appellant's action at law. This being so, they cannot maintain their suit in equity and enjoin the legal proceedings. 1 High, Inj. (2d ed.) $ 89; Lambert v. Lambert, 5 Ir. Eq. 839; Peters v. Prevost, 1 Paine, 64; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Stewart, 18 N. J. Eq. 494. Where a title is being tested by an action of ejectment in a court of common law, having jurisdiction, the suit will not be enjoined when the different courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Stockton v. Williams, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 546; Brawner v. Franklin, 4 Gill, 463; Horner v. Jobs, 13 N. J. Eq. 19; Womack v. Powers, 50 Ala. 5; Clarke v. Clarke, 7 R. I. 45; De Groot v. Receivers of Washington Bkg. Co. 3 N. J. Eq. 199. The writ of attachment in the case at bar was void, because not under the seal of the court. The attachment and judgment were, therefore, absolutely void, and may be collaterally assailed. Foss v. Isett, 4 G. Greene, 77, 61 Am. Dec. 117; Shaffer v. Sundwall, 33 Iowa, 583; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Doe, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 556 (18: 948). In the absence of the seal of court the writ is void, and whatever an officer does thereunder is unjustifiable and void. Boal v. King, 6 Ohio, 11; Sweet v. Patrick, 11 Me. 177; Hutchins v. Edson, 1 N. H. 139: Shackelford v. McRae, 3 Hawks, 226; Searell v. Bank of Cape Fear, 14 N. C. 279, 22 Am. Dec. 22; Taylor v. Taylor, 83 N. C. 116; Roseman v. Miller, 84 Ill. 297. An execution issued on a void judgment and an execution issued without any judgment are alike invalid. Albee v. Ward, 8 Mass. 79; Nahours v. Cocke, 24 Miss. 44; Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502; Gelston v. Thompson, 29 Md. 595. Personal service of the original notice upon a non-resident defendant outside of the state of Iowa confers no jurisdiction to render judgment in personam against such defendant when he does not appear. Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa, 396; Bates v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 19 Iowa, 260; Mooney V. Union Pac. R. Co. 60 Iowa, 346; Weil v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa, 575; Hakes v. Shupe, 27 Iowa, 465. And where a suit is commenced by attachment upon service by publication only, and no property is attached, the judgment is a nullity. Judah v. Stevenson, 10 Iowa, 493; Cooper v. Smith, 25 Iowa, 269; Wells v. Sequin, 14 Iowa, 143. The decisions of this court as to decrees in equity against defendants served by publicacation, or extraterritorially served, are conclusive against the power to render such decrees in personam. Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151 (28: 101); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (24: 565); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (33: 918); Galpin v. Page, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 367 (21: 963); Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 449 (24: 1111); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 190 (30; 374). The decree subjecting properly is strictly limited by statute authorizing such proceeding in rem, and by allegations in bill on which such decree was founded. Fowler v. Doyle, 16 Iowa, 535; Smith v. Swan, 69 Iowa, 415; Foot v. Glover, 4 Blackf. 313; Glidewell v. Spaugh, 26 Ind. 322; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 608 (24: 215); Milwaukee & M. R. Co. v. Soutter, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 517 (20: 543); Barnes v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 122 U. S. 14 (30: 1132). | A former decree is an estoppel only as to the point or question actually litigated or determined, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. Nesbit v. Independent Dist. of Riverside, 144 U. S. 618 (36: 565); Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351 (24: 195). And where a court of equity is prayed to carry into effect a former decree, it will only do so where such former decree was warranted upon the facts of the entire record. Gay v. Parpart, 106 U. S. 699 (27: 263); Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415; Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 138 U. S. 561 (34: 1008). The tax deed under which the appellees claim title, is absolutely void. Where a tax deed is void for want of authority to make the sale, it is not cured or strengthened by the statute of limitations relating to such tax deed. Case v. Albee, 28 Iowa, 277; Patton v. Luther, 47 Iowa, 238; Early v. Whittingham, 43 Iowa, 162: Nichols v. McGlathery, 43 Iowa, 189; Grffin v. Bruce, 73 Iowa, 126. He who holds the legal title has seisin and constructive possession of land not actually occupied. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 741 (8: 565); Barrett v. Love, 48 Iowa, 103; Steel v. St. Louis Smelt. & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 456 (27: 229). Nothing in the character of adverse posses sion is shown, either by the fact of the assessment or payment of taxes for a series of years. Forey v. Biglow, 56 Iowa, 381; Brown v. Painter, 38 Iowa, 456; Peck v. Sexton, 41 Iowa, 566; Sioux City & I. F. Town Lot & L. Co. v. Wilson, 50 Iowa, 422; Raymond v. Morrison, 59 Iowa, 371. Title to another man's property cannot be acquired by the payment of taxes thereon. Keane v. Cannovan, 21 Cal. 303, 82 Am. Dec. 738. When in proceedings in rem, the property proceeded against is not, in fact, seized, when the judgment is a nullity, when the process is void, all acts and titles thereunder are absolute nullities, whenever and wherever assailed. Pike v. Wassell, 94 U. S.712 (24: 309); Mitchell v. St. Maxent, 71 U. S.4 Wall. 244 (18:328); Galpin v. Page, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 366 (21: 962); Gantly v. Ewing, 44 U. S. 3 How. 707 (11: 794); Gray v. Brignardello, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 627 (17: 693); Gaines v. Lizardi, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 719 (18: 967); Erwin v. Lowry, 48 U. S. 7 How. 172 (12: 655); Shriver v. Lynn, 43 U. S. 2 How. 43 (11: 172); Milwau kee & M. R. Co. v. Soutter, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 609 (17: 896); Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 125 (5: 222). One cannot avail himself of an estoppel |