where he had knowledge of the facts; in order | 40 Iowa, 78; Smith v. Callaghan, 66 Iowa, 553; to forfeit a land title on the ground of estoppel | State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340. the conduct of the party estopped must have A state has power to authorize actions to amounted to a fraud upon his adversary. quiet title on service by publication against non-resident owners.

Boggs v. Merced Min. Co. 14 Cal. 279; Martin v. Zellerbach, 38 Cal. 300, 99 Am. Dec. 365; Brant v. Virginia Coal & 1. Co. 93 U. S. 335 (23: 929); Viele v. Judson, 82 N. Y. 40; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 331; Kuhl v. Jersey City, 23 N. J. Eq. 84; Steel v. St. Louis Smelt. & Ref. Co. 106 U. S. 456 (27: 229); Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 251 (30: 1222); Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 374 (25: 856).

It being shown that appellant holds the strict legal title to the land, he can only be divested of that by evidence or averment which makes a clear, cogent and convincing case. Baldwin v. Starks, 107 U. S. 463 (27: 526); Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 49 (29: 570).

Mr. Ernest C. Herrick, for appellees: The court has jurisdiction to quiet title in one who claim title by judicial sale as against a fraudulent grantee.

Bridgman v. McKissick, 15 Iowa, 264; Judson v. Lyford, 84 Cal. 505: Reynolds v. First Nat. Bank of Crawfordsville, 112 S. U. 405 (28: 733).

Appellees claim title under the tax deed, and are entitled to have the title quieted, unless the tax deed is invalid.

Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (33: 918); Bennett v. Fenton, 41 Fed. Rep. 283.

The fact that a tax deed is void for want of power, does not prevent the title from passing under it sufficiently to require the owner to resort to this action in equity to redeem or set aside the sale.

Long v. Smith, 67 Iowa, 25.

The long laches and acqiescence of appellant in the judicial and tax proceedings, and the claims of appellees and their grantors now constitute a complete bar to the right of appellant to question appellees' right to the land.

Piatt v. Vattier, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 405 (9: 173); McKnight v. Taylor, 42 U. S. 1 How. 161, 168 (11: 86, 88); Boroman v. Wathen, 42 U. S. 1 How. 189 (11: 97); Wagner v. Baird, 48 U. S. 7 How. 234 (12: 681); Stearns v. Page, 48 U. S. 7 How. 829 (12: 932); Badger v. Badger, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 87 (17: 836); Crosby v. Beale, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 336 (21: 602); Marsh v. Whitmore, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 183 (22: 484); Kieley v. McGlynn ("Re Broderick's Will") 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 503 (22: 599); Sullivan v. Portland & K. R. Co. 94 U. S. 806 (24: 324); Brown v. Buena Vista County, 95 U. S. 157 (24: 492); Hayward v. Eliot Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 611 (24: 855); Godden v. Kimmel, 99 U. S. 201 (25: 431); Lansdale v. Smith,106 U. S. 391 (27: 219); Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377 (30: 718); Richards v. Mackall, 124 U. S. 183 (31: 396); Norris v. Haggin,136 U. S. 386 (34: 424); Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U. S. 556 (34: 776); Hanner v. Moulton, 138 U. S. 486 (34: 1032); Underwood v. Dugan, 139 U. S. 383 (35: 198); Martin Cramer v. Clow, 9 L. R. A. 772, 81 Iowa, v. Gray, 142 U. S. 236 (35: 997); Felix v. Pat255; Boling v. Clark, 83 Iowa, 481; Quinn v.rick, 145 U. S. 317 (36: 719); Ware v. Galveston, Quinn, 76 Iowa, 565; Tourtelotte v. Pearce, 27 City Co. 146 U. S. 102 (36: 904); Hammond v. Neb. 57; Bunce v. Bidwell, 43 Mich. 542; Brent Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224 (36: 134). v. Chapman, 9 U. S. 5 Cranch, 359 (3: 125); Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533 (36: 532.)

Under the Iowa statute a party who has but an equitable title, or whose interest in the land depends upon facts which estop the other party from setting up his claim or which would constitute a good defense in equity to such claim, can maintain his action to quiet that title.

Stark v. Starr, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 402 (18: 925); Rankin v. Miller, 43 Iowa, 20; Cole v. Des Moines Valley R. Co. 76 Iowa, 185. Action to quiet title may be maintained upon mere adverse possession.

In addition to having admitted the jurisdiction in the trial court, appellant is precluded from now questioning it by having answered to the merits of the bill and gone to trial.

Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354 (32: 934): Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505 (32: 1005); Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 134 U. S. 530 (33: 1021).

The statute did not require a seal to be at tached to the transcript, unless it can be called process." Jurisdiction did not depend on the form of the transcript, but on the order for transfer.

Campbell v. Thompson, 4 G. Greene, 415; Farr v. Fuller, 12 Iowa, 83.

That the sale was en masse cannot avail ap pellant as against innocent purchasers, nor is it subject to collateral attack.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a bill in equity not only to stay an action in ejectment at law, but to remove a cloud cast upon Conklin's title to the lands in question, created by a deed from Adolph Wehrman to Frederick Wehrman, appellant and defendant in the bill, and to quiet their own title thereto.

1. Defendant's principal contention is that equity has no jurisdiction of the case, for the reason that the contest concerns the legal title only, and that plaintiffs have a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. It is undisputed that Carlos S. Greeley, a member of the firm of Greeley, Gale & Co., bought the lands in question at a sheriff's sale which took place on July 31, 1862, and that for about twenty years thereafter, when the lands were sold to Conklin, he paid the taxes upon the land. That the Conklins upon their purchase of the several parcels took immediate possession, and that they have since been in full, open, and adverse possession and occupancy of Murdough v. McPherrin, 49 Iowa, 479; Fer- the same; have made large and valuable imguson v. Williams, 58 Iowa,717; Tilton v. Swift,provements thereon by putting some six hun

Williams v. Allison, 33 Iowa, 289; Lewis v. Whitten, 112 Mo. 318.

The lack of an engraved seal did not render the proceedings a nullity. This defect is one of mere form.

dred acres under cultivation, and by erecting substantial buildings and fences, digging wells and otherwise improving the premises, making the same more valuable, and have expended a thousand dollars in such improvements in good faith, and full reliance upon such title being good and valid. That the defendant during such time, and for more than twenty-seven years, has never done any act or taken any step to have the records corrected or to assert any claim on his part to such lands, or to notify purchasers of his interest in the same until he began his action of ejectment.

the jurisdiction of courts of equity in the following particulars:

1. It does not require that plaintiff should have been annoyed or threatened by repeated actions of ejectment.

2. It dispenses with the necessity of his title having been previously established at law. 3. The bill may be filed by a party having an equitable as well as a legal title. Grissom v. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 55 Am. Rep. 742; Stanley v. Holliday, 130 Ind. 464; Echols v. Ilubbard, 90 Ala. 309.

4. In some states it is not ever necessary that plaintiff should be in possession of the land at the time of filing the bill.

These statutes have generally been held to be within the constitutional power of the legislature; but the question still remains, to what extent will they be enforced in the Federal courts, and how far are they subservient to the constitutional provision entitling parties to a trial by jury, and to the express provision of Revised Statutes, section 723, inhibiting suits in equity in any case where a plain, complete, and adequate remedy may be had at law. These provisions are obligatory at all times and under all circumstances, and are applicable to every form of action, the laws of the several states to the contrary notwithstanding. Section 723 has never been regarded, however, as anything more than declaratory of the existing law (Boyce v. Grundy, 28 U. S. 3 Pet. 210 [7: 655]), and as was said in New York Guaranty & 1. Co. v. Memphis Water Co. 107 U. S. 205, 210 [27: 484, 486], "was intended to emphasize the rule, and to impress it upon the attention of the courts." It was not intended to restrict the ancient jurisdiction of courts of equity, or to prohibit their exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law in cases where such concurrent jurisdiction had been previously upheld.

The general principles of equity jurisprudence, as administered both in this country and in England, permit a bill to quiet title to be filed only by a party in possession against 322] *a defendant, who has been ineffectually seeking to establish a legal title by repeated actions of ejectment, and as a prerequisite to such bill it was necessary that the title of the plaintiff should have been established by at least one successful trial at law. Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 253, | 1394, 1396. At common law a party might by successive fictitious demises bring as many actions of ejectment as he chose, and a bill to quiet title was only permitted for the purpose of preventing the party in possession being annoyed by repeated and vexatious actions. The jurisdiction was in fact only another exercise of the familiar power of a court of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits by bills of peace. A statement of the underlying principles of such bills is found in the opinion of this court in Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 19 [28: 52, 54], in which it is said: "To entitle the plaintiff to relief in such cases the concurrence of three particulars was essential: He must have been in possession of the property; he must have been disturbed in its possession by repeated actions at law; and he must have established his right by successive judgments in his favor. Upon these facts appearing, the The question of enforcing these state statutes court would interpose and grant a perpetual was first considered in Clark v. Smith, [324 injunction to quiet the possession of the plain- 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 195 [10: 123], in which a bill was tiff against any further litigation from the filed by a party in possession to compel the desame source. It was only in this way that fendant to release a pretended title to certain adequate relief could be afforded against vex-lands claimed by him under patents from the atious litigation and the irreparable mischief which it entailed."

This method of adjusting titles by bill in equity proved so convenient, that in many of the states statutes have been passed extending the jurisdiction of a court of equity to all cases where a party in possession, and sometimes out of possession, seeks to clear up his title and remove any cloud caused by an outstanding deed or lien which he claims to be invalid, and the existence of which is a threat against his peaceable occupation of the land, and an ob stacle to its sale. The inability of a court of Jaw to afford relief was a strong argument in favor of extending the jurisdiction of a court of equity to this class of cases.

state of Kentucky. The conveyance asked by the bill was sought to be in conformity with the provisions of an act of the assembly of Kentucky giving jurisdiction to courts of equity in such cases. It was held that the legislature "having created a right, and having at the same time prescribed the remedy to enforce it, if the remedy prescribed is consistent with the ordinary modes of procedure on the chancery side of the Federal courts, no reason exists why it should not be pursued in the same form as in the state courts. On the contrary, propriety and convenience suggest that the practice should not materially differ, where titles to land are the subjects of investigation." This case was cited and approved in Parker v. The statute of Iowa, upon which this bill is Overman, 59 U. S. 18 How. 137 [15: 318], based, is an example of this legislation, and where a proceeding under a statute of Arkan323] provides ($ 3273) that "an action to de-sas, prescribing a special remedy for the contermine and quiet title to real property may be brought by any one having, or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession of the same, against any person claiming title thereto, though not in possession."

firmation of sales of land by a sheriff, was held to be enforceable in the Federal courts. In Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 [28: 52], the principle of this case was extended to one of wild land, of which neither plaintiff nor de

It will be observed that this statute enlarges | fendant was in possession. Plaintiff claimed

under a tax title, and the property was described in the bill as unoccupied, wild, and uncultivated land. The question was elaborately examined, and the jurisdiction sus tained upon the ground that an enlargement of equitable rights by state statutes may be administered in the Federal courts as well as in the courts of the state, citing Clark v. Smith, supra, and Re Broderick's Will, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 520 [22: 605]. The case was treated as one where the plaintiff had no remedy at law against the defendant, who claimed an adverse interest in the premises. In delivering the opinion, how. ever, it was intimated, page 25, that if a suit were brought in the Federal court under the Nebraska statute, against a party in possession, "there would be force in the objection that a legal controversy was withdrawn from a court of law; but that is not this case, nor is it of such case we are speaking." Another step in the same direction was taken in Reynolds v. First 325] Nat. Bank of Crawfordsville, 112 *U. S. 405 [28: 733], in which a bill was sustained upon an equitable title, although it would appear from the report of the case that such title was not fortified by an actual possession; and in Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158 [29. 83], a similar suit was upheld under a statute of Michigan permitting bills to quiet title to be filed by any person in possession.

reason of certain *irregularities in these [326 proceedings, it is doubtful whether the legal title ever became vested in the plaintiffs. The bill then sets up the long possession of the plaintiffs and their grantors, large outlays by them in improvements upon the land, the practical abandonment of the same by the defendant, all of which, it is claimed, constitute an estoppel in pais. Plaintiffs also rely upon the laches of Wehrman in bringing the action in ejectment, and allege a failure to bring his suit within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations. It is entirely clear that, if no action in ejectment had been begun at law, the long continued adverse possession of the plaintiffs, and the equitable title set up in the bill, would have been a sufficient basis for the maintenance of the suit; and it is not easy to see why the commencement of such action should place them in a worse position than they were in before or oust them of their remedy in equity.

If the only contest in this case were as to whether the legal title to these lauds was in the plaintiffs or defendant, it may be that a court of law would be the only proper forum for the settlement of this dispute; but the plaintiffs further claim that, by reason of certain defects in the proceedings by which they acquired title, such title is doutful at law; but that the long delay of the plaintiff at law in the assertion of his rights, establishes a defense of laches, and his failure to set up his title, and his long acquiescence in the Conklins' possession of the lands, estop him from proceeding either at law or in equity to oust them.

Subsequent cases, however, denied the power of the Federal courts to afford relief under such statutes where the complainant was not in possession of the land, and in Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 [34: 873], particularly, it was held that, where the proceeding is simply It is scarcely necessary to say that complainfor the recovery and possession of specific real ants cannot avail themselves as a matter of law or personal property, or for the recovery of a of the laches of the plaintiff in the ejectment money judgment, the action is one at law. suit. Though a good defense in equity, laches "The right which in this case the plaintiff is no defense at law. If the plaintiff at law wishes to assert is his title to certain real prop- has brought his action within the period fixed erty; and the remedy which he wishes to obtain by the statute of limitations, no court can deis its possession and enjoyment; and in a con- prive him of his right to proceed. If the stattest over the title both parties have a constitu- ute limits him to twenty years, and he brings tional right to call for a jury." The case of his action after the lapse of nineteen years and Holland v. Challen was distinguished as one eleven months, he is as much entitled as matter where neither party was in possession of the of law to maintain it, as though he had brought property, and it was further said that in the it the day after his cause of action accrued, case of Reynolds v. First Nat. Bank of Craw- though such delay may properly be considered fordsville, the question did not arise as to by the jury in connection with other facts[327 whether the plaintiff had a remedy at law, but tending to show an estoppel. As was said by whether a suit to remove the cloud mentioned Chancellor Green in Horner v. Jobs, 13 N. J. I would lie in a Federal court. The case of Eq. 19, 23: "Nor can the staleness of the United States v. Wilson, 118 U. S. 86 [30: 110], claim, or the lapse of time, or the statute of was really to the same effect, though not cited limitations, avail the complainant. The dein Whitehead v. Shattuck. See also Frost v. fendant is asking no relief at the hands of this Spitley, 121 U. S. 552 [30: 1010]. But nothing court. He was seeking to enforce his legal was said in either of these to disturb the har-rights in a court of law. The complainant is mony of the previous cases.

The real question, then, to be determined in this case is, whether the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. If they have, then section 723 is controlling, and, notwithstanding a local practice under the code, where no discrimination is made between actions at law and in equity, may authorize such suit, the Federal courts will not entertain the bill, but will remit the parties to their remedy at law. The bill under consideration alleges the plaintiffs to be the "absolute owners" of the premises, and then sets forth certain proceedings by which it is alleged they became such; but it is claimed and substantially admitted in the bill that, by

here asking the aid of this court. It is the claim of the complainant, not the title of the defendant, to which the equitable defense of a stale claim is applicable. No lapse of time can avail the complainant, unless it be a part of the defendant's title under the statute of limitations. This defense will avail the defendant at law as well as in equity, and constitutes no ground for enjoining proceedings at law." Had Wehrman seen fit to resort to a court of equity in assertion of his rights, undoubtedly the defendants to such suit might have interposed the defense of laches, but it is quite a different question whether it could be made the basis of a bill. It may, however, be considered

as one of the facts of the case tending to show | Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. an estoppel. 616 [20: 501], and Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347 [30: 451], there may be a doubt whether this remedy is available in personal actions, the law is well settled that where title to real jurisdiction *because it may not only en-[329 join an action at law, but may order a cancellation of the fraudulent conveyance, and prohibit the bringing of further suits at law upon the fraudulent title, and thus afford a more complete relief than is possible in a court of law. Dodge v. Griswold, 8 N. H. 425; Tappan v. Evans, 11 N. H. 311; Sheafe v. Sheafe, 40 N. H. 516; Miller v. Scammon, 52 N. H. 609; Traip v. Gould, 15 Me. 82; Cox v. Dunham, 8 N. J. Eq. 594; Sheppard v. Iverson, 12 Ala. 97; Planters & M. Bank v. Walker, 7 Ala. 926; Murphy v. Blair, 12 Ind. 184: Mohawk Bank v. Atwater, 2 Paige, 54; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1415.

Undoubtedly the facts set forth in this bill are such as tend to show an equitable estoppel on the part of Wehrman, and this court did hold in a very carefully considered opinion in Dicker-property is concerned, equity has a concurrent son v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578 [25; 618], that an estoppel in pais was an available defense to an action at law. This case was cited and applied in Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494 25: 1065], in Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68 [26: 79], and in Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 241 [30: 1219]; although, in the last case, the bill was supported upon the ground that a resort to a court of equity in the particular case was necessary in order to make the estoppel available. As was said by Mr. Justice Mathews: "All that can properly be said is, that in order to justify a resort to a court of equity, it is necessary to show some ground of equity other than the estoppel itself, whereby the party entitled to the benefit of it is prevented from making it available in a court of law." To the same effect is Gable v. Wetherholt, 116 Ill, 813, 56 Am. Rep. 774.

When analyzed, the bill under consideration is really in the nature of a judgment creditor's bill filed by the plaintiffs, who claim that they have acquired by successive assignments But even if it be assumed that the facts re- from the original creditors a lien upon certain lied upon as constituting an equitable estoppel lands, which the debtor has conveyed in fraud 328] in this case might be laid before *a jury of the original creditors. There are also, it is in a common law action, and if established oper- true, the additional reasons that the plaintiffs ate as a defense, yet it does not necessarily follow have long been in possession of the land; that that a bill in equity will not also lie to cancel the records of the case, through which the the outstanding deed from Adolph to Freder- original purchaser at the execution sale claimed ick Wehrman as fraudulent, or at least as un- to have acquired the legal title to the lands, available under the peculiar circumstances of have been lost, and that their title, though the case. There is a class of cases which hold perfectly good in equity, may be technically that where there is actual fraud no remedy at insufficient at law. In such case they have a law is complete and adequate, except that right to call upon a court of equity for relief which removes the fraudulent title. As early against such defects. Simmons Creek Coal as 1750, it was held by Lord Chancellor Hard- Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 449 [35: 1068, wicke, in Bennet v. Musgrove, 2 Ves. Sr. 51, 1075]; Stone v. Anderson, 26 N. H. 506; Conthat a bill would lie by an execution creditor roy v. Woods, 13 Cal. 626, 73 Am. Dec. 605; to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, whether | Robert v. Hodges, 16 N. J. Eq. 299. he could recover at law or not. Objection 2. Upon the merits, the case presents no difhaving been made to the bill upon the ground that the remedy at law was complete, the Lord Chancellor observed: "But be it as it may, whether he could recover or not, he is entitled to come into this court; the distinction in this court being, where a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration would recover the estate, and set aside or get the better of a precedent voluntary conveyance if that convey ance was fairly made without actual fraud, the court will say, take your remedy at law; but wherever the conveyance is attended with actual fraud, though they might go to law by ejectment, and recover the possession, they may come into this court to set aside that conveyance; which is a distinction between actual and presumed fraud from its being merely a conveyance." This is still the law in England. Blenkinsopp v. Blenkinsopp, 1 DeG. M. & G. 495. The leading case in the Federal courts upon this point is Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252, in which Mr. Justice Story held that, notwithstanding the restrictive clause of the Judiciary Act (Rev. Stat. § 723), a judgment creditor might file a bill in equity against his debtor to set aside a fraudulent convey ance since there is not, in the proper sense of the term, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

While, in view of our decisions in Phoenix

ficulty whatever. We do not find it necessary to examine in detail the several defects, which are claimed to invalidate the proceedings under which Greeley finally became the purchaser of the laud in question, since we are all of the opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree, whether these proceedings vested a legal title in Greeley or not. Greeley, Gale & Co. had a legal claim against Adolph Wehrman upon a judgment lawfully obtained against him in Wisconsin. Upon the basis of this judgment they brought suit against him in Iowa, sued out a writ of attachment, and levied it upon the lands in question.

*Admitting that the writ was not im [330 pressed with such a seal as the law required, it was not, under the circumstances, void upon that ground. O'Brien county was not organized as an independent county until February 6, 1860. The writ was issued January 14, 1861. The county offices being evidently not yet in a complete working condition, the clerk affixed an ordinary private seal or scroll to the writ, with a statement that no seal had yet been procured. Granting that a failure to use an engraved seal actually provided would avoid the writ, certainly the clerk was entitled to a reasonable time to procure such seal. In the meantime, however, the rights of suitors and of the public ought not to be prejudiced by the

lack of one. The whole civil and criminal | state of Iowa, there is greater reason why ju business of the county ought not to come to a risdiction of the present bill should not be stop simply through the failure of its officers declined, since the object of this bill is prac to provide it with a seal. As was justly ob-ically the same as the other, viz, to obtain the served by the learned judge of the circuit benefit of the attachment proceedings. If percourt: "The only purpose of the seal is to au- sonal service were obtained in the state of Wisthenticate the issuance of the writ. May not consin, we see no objection to the decree as such authentication be furnished in other rendered, since the Code of Iowa, sections ways, if for any reason the court is without an 2831 and 2835, permit personal service or servengraved seal for a time? Suppose that to- ice by publication upon defendants out of the day the engraved seal of O'Brien county should jurisdiction "in an action for the sale of real be destroyed or stolen, must all the judicial property under *a mortgage lien or other [332 proceedings therein be brought to a standstill, incumbrance or charge;" and such statutes have awaiting the procurement of another engraved been upheld by this court. Arndt v. Griggs, seal? Would not this be subverting substance 134 U. S. 316 [33: 918]. If no proper service to mere form? Would it not be permissible were obtained, then we are able to do in this for the court to continue the issuance of writs suit what was ineffectually attempted there. of attachment and execution, having attached thereto a scroll as a seal, the writ on its face showing the reason thereof?"

The salient and decisive facts of this case are that Greeley, Gale & Co. obtained, or at least attempted to obtain, a lien upon this land by virtue of their attachment; that personal service of such proceeding was made upon Adolph Wehrman in the state of Wisconsin, January 25, 1861; that they went through the form of obtaining a judgment against these lands, and

While the clerk does not seem to have used any great diligence in procuring a seal, his laches in that particular cannot be made the subject of inquiry here. The fact that no engraved seal had been procured is a sufficient excuse for the purpose of the case. The sher-selling them upon execution; that Greeley iff, by virtue of this writ, made a levy upon the lands in question, endorsed such levy upon the writ, and caused personal notice to be served upon the defendant Wehrman in the state of Wisconsin, January 25, 1861.

purchased these lands upon such sale, paid taxes thereon, acquired tax titles thereto, and subsequently sold the same, and that plaintiffs in this suit became the purchasers; that they immediately took possession of the same; and It is also true that the petition for the attach- that they and their grantors have been in open, ment described the judgment sued upon as hav-notorious, and undisturbed possession for 331]ing been rendered on May 12,*1860, when twenty-seven years; have built a house and in fact it was not rendered until September other buildings, and made other improvements 12; that the writ was made returnable upon a thereon; that Frederick Wehrman, the defendday which had not been fixed as the first day ant herein, took title to these lands December of the next term of the court, though it was 17, 1859, the very day that suit was originally snbsequently fixed upon that day; and that, in begun against Adolph; that the deed was made changing the venue of the action to Wood- to him under circumstances tending strongly bury county, the transcript of the record was to show that it was intended as a fraud upon sent to such county without being certified by the creditors of Adoiph Wehrman; that he the seal of the court in which the suit was took no steps to assert his title or right of posbrought. While these might have been good session to these lands, but practically abandefenses to the action, if seasonably interposed, doned the same until, by the increase of poputhey do not render the writ and all the pro-lation and the settlement of the country, they ceeding thereunder void. Indeed, it is at least had become of material value. Whether he doubtful whether, if no notice at all had been had actual notice of the chancery suit or not, served upon Wehrman, the lien of the attach- it is highly improbable that if he had been a ment would have thereby been lost. The ob- bona fide purchaser of these lands, lying in anject of the notice is to apprise the defendant of other state, for which he had paid, or agreed to the commencement of the suit, and to call him pay, $3000 (almost double their actual value) in to defend and prevent the plaintiff from ob- he would have taken no steps for nearly thirty taining judgment if he can. The object of the years to assert his right thereto. Particularly writ, which is issued ex parte, is to enable the is this so in view of the fact that he was only plaintiff to obtain a lien upon the land, which an ordinary day laborer at the time he took may be subsequently enforced by a sale upon the deed, having only a few farming impleexecution, if judgment be obtained. If notice ments and a meagre supply of household goods, were actually served upon the defendant in and, as one of the witnesses expressed it, could Wisconsin, as claimed, it is difficult to see why not have borrowed without security one tenth the judgment subsequently entered up was not of the sum he purported to have paid for the valid as against the land attached, though of property. Evidently he was not a man to[333 course not against the defendant in personam. invest $3000 in wild lands and turn his back Whether the subsequent proceeding by bill upon them for twenty-seven years. As was to set aside the deed from Adolph to Frederick said by this court in Underwood v. Dugan, 139 Wehrman was invalid or not, it is unnecessary U. S. 380, 384 [35: 197, 199], "ownership of to inquire. The attachment and subsequent property implies two things-first, attention to long continued possession thereunder vested an it; second, a discharge of all obligations, of interest in the present plaintiffs which was taxation or otherwise, to the state which proamply sufficient as a basis for this bill. If, as tects it. When it appears that one who now is claimed, the decree in the chancery court asserts a title to property, arising more than was void because no personal service was ob- the lifetime of a generation ago, has during all tained upon defendant Wehrman within the these years neglected the property, and made