versation between themselves, and they afterwards returned to me and said: We do not want your services for nothing. We are willing to pay you for it, if you will assist us to have this matter brought up. We will pay you five hundred dollars, and to secure you payment of it, will give you a note,' which they did, and I agreed to assist them and do what I could in the matter. That is about the conversation as I recollect it."

Now, in considering this testimony it must be borne in mind that Taylor denied on this hearing that he knew, and Buckley testified that he had no recollection of knowing, at the time of making the agreement, that the cases had, in fact, been decided by the court, although it was shown that Taylor had previously stated before a committee of the Bar Association that he was, at the time, aware of the fact. There is no pretense that Bonnet knew of the decisions at the time of the arrangement in the room of Buckley's saloon in the evening of the 10th of May, or that Buckley or Taylor informed him of them. If none of these parties knew that the cases had been decided, the inquiry naturally arises, Why should they at that time be arranging for a prosecution of the claims before the board of supervisors? Until the plaintiff's judgments should be affirmed by the court, there was nothing to be presented to the board. An affirmance of the judgments by this court was a condition precedent, without which there was nothing for the board to act on. From the stand-point of ignorance of the fact that the cases had been decided by the court, there was therefore no occasion whatever for any arrangement for the prosecution of the claims before the board of supervisors. But for another reason I cannot accept as true the statement that Buckley and Taylor had no notice. of the decisions in the cases of Bonnet and Parker at the time of the arrangement with Bonnet in the evening of the tenth day of May.

As has been said, it was shown on the hearing of this

matter that Taylor admitted before the committee of the Bar Association that he had such knowledge, but he attempted to explain away that fact in his testimony here by saying that he did not understand the questions asked him on those proceedings. An examination of the reporter's notes, however, shows that he could not have misunderstood the questions in that behalf, for they were perfectly simple and direct, and were several times. repeated and answered. Nor is ignorance on Buckley's part of the fact that the cases referred to had been decided by this court at the time of the arrangement in question consistent with Taylor's knowledge, or the still more pregnant fact that a telegram from the clerk's office of this court, advising him of the decisions, was delivered to one of his employees at his place of business prior to 11 o'clock A. M. of the tenth day of May. Apart from the presumption that a telegram so delivered reached him, all of the circumstances of the case point to the fact that it did. I must therefore find that both Taylor and Buckley knew of the decisions of this court, in the cases of Bonnet and Parker, at the time of the interview between Taylor, Bonnet, and Buckley, about 8 o'clock in the evening of the tenth day of May. Knowledge of the fact on the part of Taylor and Buckley, and ignorance of it on the part of Bonnet, is consistent with the statement of Bonnet, as to what the agreement between the parties really was, while it is inconsistent with Buckley's and Taylor's statement of it. Then, again, the acceptance of Bonnet's promissory note by Buckley is consistent with Buckley's and Taylor's knowledge of the decisions; for Taylor held an assignment of Bonnet's interest in the actions to secure the payment of certain advances he had made him. In case of the affirmance of the judgments in the cases of Bonnet and Parker, Bonnet would have money and the note would be good. But except his interest in these actions, the testimony shows Bonnet to have been wholly impecunious,

-

SO

much so, indeed, that about the time of the transaction in question he borrowed fifty dollars of Taylor, for which he gave him his (Bonnet's) note for one hundred and fifty dollars, and which was subsequently, and within a short time, paid out of the amounts collected upon the judgments in the actions of Bonnet and Parker; and for the sum of forty-five dollars borrowed of one Long, he executed to the latter his promissory note for three hundred dollars, which was also paid out of the proceeds of the same judgments. Still another consideration points to the same conclusion, and it is this: Buckley testified that shortly after Bonnet gave him the five-hundred-dollar note, he (Buckley) left California for, the East, but before doing so he turned the note over to his friend, M. J. Kelly, whom he said could do as much with the supervisors as himself. But it is not pretended that either Buckley or Kelly ever did or attempted to do anything in the matter before the board of supervisors, but it does appear that after the money had been collected from the city upon the settlement between Taylor and Bonnet, Taylor deducted from Bonnet's portion two hundred and fifty dollars, which he paid to Kelly on the note.

The fact that Taylor, who had in his hands all of the money collected on the judgments, only paid one half of the five-hundred-dollar note given by Bonnet to Buckley, strongly corroborates Bonnet's statement that at the time the note was given the agreement was that Taylor should pay one half of it and he (Bonnet) the other half.

I cannot at all agree to what is said in the prevailing opinion with respect to the five hundred dollars paid to Buckley by Taylor in the matter of procuring the advancement of the cases of Bonnet and Parker on the calendar of the court. In so far as that matter has any bearing upon the charge in question, it strengthens the conclusion to which I have come. To believe that Taylor paid Buckley five hundred dollars simply to go to some attorneys and ask if they had a case they did not

wish to try, and in lieu of which they would agree that the Bonnet and Parker cases might be placed, requires more credulity than I possess.

As a matter of fact the Bonnet and Parker cases were advanced on the calendar by stipulation of the attorneys in the respective cases. Taylor, who was a real party in interest in the Bonnet and Parker cases, and who, as appears, had frequent interviews with the attorney in them, either communicated the proposed arrangement with Buckley to the attorney, or he did not. If he did not, that circumstance of itself would strongly strengthen the suspicion that the arrangement was not of the peculiar character stated by Buckley and Taylor. If he did communicate the proposed arrangement to the attorney, can it be believed the latter would have advised or permitted his client to pay five hundred dollars to effectuate an advancement of the cases on the calendar, an advancement which if practicable at all could have been legitimately secured by the attorney. While, as has been said, the testimony is very conflicting, the circumstances corroborate the statement of Bonnet as to what the agreement was, and satisfies me that he told the truth about it. I therefore think the respondent should be adjudged guilty of the contempt charged, and should be punished accordingly.

MCKINSTRY, J., concurred with Mr. Justice Ross.

MCKEE, J., dissenting. This is a proceeding to punish Christopher A. Buckley and J. W. Taylor for contempt.

The charge is that, on the 10th of May, 1884, Buckley represented to one B. Bonnet, a party to a cause then pending in this court, that he could influence the court and the members thereof to give a favorable decision in the cause; and that he undertook and agreed, for a large sum of money to be paid to him by Taylor and Bonnet,

to influence the judges of the court to render a decision in the cause in favor of Bonnet.

The charge rests upon the testimony of Bonnet, Taylor, and Buckley, who were the principal parties to the transaction, which gave occasion for the charge. The testimony is very conflicting; but after a careful sifting of the testimony I find that the following constitute the facts and circumstances of the transaction :

In the year 1884 two cases were pending in this court, viz.: B. Bonnet v. The City and County of San Francisco, and C. H. Parker v. The City and County of San Francisco, in which appeals had been taken from judgments rendered in the Superior Court of said city and county. On the morning of Saturday, the 10th of May, 1884, opinions in both cases, affirmatory of the judgments, were sent down by the court, then in session at Sacramento. Immediately after the opinions were filed in the clerk's office, a telegraphic dispatch, in the name of the clerk of the court, was sent to the respondent, Buckley, as follows:

"TO CHRIS BUCKLEY, BUSH STREET, SAN FRANCISCO: Parker and Bonnet v. San Francisco, judgments affirmed."

At 10:48 o'clock of the same day the dispatch was delivered at respondent Buckley's saloon.

The only unusual thing in connection with the transmission of such a dispatch from the clerk's office of this court is, that neither of the respondents was an attorney or counselor, or party in either of the two cases; but both had connections with them. Taylor was assignee of the judgment appealed from in the Bonnet case, as security for payment of a large sum of money, bearing interest at a high rate, which he had advanced to Bonnet; and Buckley in his testimony states: "About a year before. . . . I was asked by Taylor to do something about the cases.

Taylor called upon me at my place of