Etting V. The Bank of elicit the note. All that was alleged was, that 1826. they had not communicated their intention of removing the cashier, when they were not asked respecting their intentions, and when it the U. S. was equally lawful for them to retain or to remove him. The effort on the other side is to induce the Court to establish a new rule of law, which, however analogous to other principles merely applicable to the contract of insurance, was admitted, even by the ingenious and learned author of the treatise which had been referred to, not to form a part of the jurisprudence of this country." Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the March 16th. opinion of the Court. If this case depended on the deservedly high character of the individuals who were engaged on the part of the bank in the transactions in which the suit originated; if elevation above the possibility of suspicion that they could have meditated any thing believed by themselves to be legally or morally wrong, could decide it, this cause would not have required the great efforts which have been bestowed upon it. which appear on this record can never be connected with actual fraud; nor would any difficulty be found in protecting them from the imputation, were it possible that it could be made. But judicial inquiries are into the rights of the par The names Etting V. The Bank of 1826. ties; and, although high and honourable character has, and ought to have, great influence in weighing testimony in which that character is in the U. S. any manner involved; yet, when the inferences from that testimony are drawn by others, and a Court is required to pronounce the law arising upon them, character is excluded from the view of the Judge, and legal principles alone can be acknowledged as his guide. At the trial several points of law were raised by both parties, on which opinions were given, to which exceptions were taken, and the correctness of those opinions constitutes the single inquiry in this Court. [Here the learned Chief Justice stated the case, as it is stated above.] As preliminary to the inquiry, whether the law arising on the facts, and on the inferences assumed in the bills of exceptions contained in the record, was correctly stated by the Court, a point has been made at the bar, which must be disposed of. It has been contended, that a Court is not bound to answer abstract or hypothetical questions of law, not growing out of the testimony in the cause, which may be propounded at the bar; and, to apply this principle, it has been also contended, that the testimony contained in the record, and referred to in the bills of exceptions, contains nothing from which the jury could possibly draw those inferences of fact upon which the Court was asked to declare the law. That the points made in the bill of exceptions constitute a distinct and totally different case from that made by the evidence. Etting V. The Bank of the U.S. That a Judge cannot be required to declare 1826. the law on hypothetical questions which do not belong to the cause on trial, has been frequently asserted in this Court, and is, we believe, incontrovertible." The Court may, at any time, refuse to give an opinion on such a point; and if the party propounding the question is dissatisfied with it, he may except to the refusal, which exception will avail him, if he shows that the question was warranted by the testimony, and that the opinion he asked ought to have been given. But, if the Judge proceeds to state the law, and states it erroneously, his opinion ought to be revised; and if it can have had any influence on the jury, their verdict ought to be set aside. It cannot, however, we think, be correctly af firmed with respect to the case now under consideration, that the points stated in the bills of exception have no relation to the testimony to which those bills refer. That testimony consists of various communications and reports, made to the bank, of their own transactions, and of the admissions of parties. It has been said, that this testimony is all in writing, and is to be construed by the Court; and from this proposition is deduced the corollary, that the jury was not at liberty to draw inferences from it. Were the fact as alleged, and were it true, that the testimony is all in writing, the consequence drawn from it cannot be admitted. Conceding it to be the province of the Court to construe any particular paper which was offered in a Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch's Rep. 309. 318. Etting V. The Bank of 1826. evidence, the report of the 30th of March for example, and to declare the meaning of every sentence, and of the whole instrument, yet this the U.S. report contains a great variety of extrinsic circumstances, suggests measures of deep interest, was followed by numerous successive acts which took place in the country, and which do not derive all their influence on the cause from the construction of the particular papers in which they are communicated, but, in a considerable degree, from their connexion with each other, from the motives in which they originate, and from the effects they were calculated to produce, and did produce, on others. These subjects are peculiarly proper for the consideration of a jury. If the testimony be examined, it will, we think, appear, that the counsel for the plaintiffs has not asked the Court to give its opinion on any inferences of fact which it was not at least possible for the jury to draw from the evidence. The knowledge of the bank is not questioned. The ignorance of Etting might be inferred from the absence of all testimony proving his knowledge that any fraud had been practised by M'Cullough. The original resolution of the bank to remove M'Cullough might be inferred from their knowledge of his unfitness for the office, and from the fact that they did remove him the instant the securities were obtained which they expected from him. The same facts might justify the inference respecting the motives which induced the bank to retain him in office until those securities were procured. We are far from saying that these inferences were Etting V. The Bank of all of them such as the jury ought to have drawn. 1826. It is not difficult to perceive, that the bank might have acted on motives equally unexceptionable in morals and in law. The jury might very well the U.S. have believed that the bank thought the 26,550 shares of stock were not worth more than the sums for which they were pledged, or, at any rate, were not a safe security, and might, therefore, think it advisable to relinquish that pledge, if other security could be substituted in its place. Others might estimate that stock more highly than they did, and might estimate it rightly. Friends, therefore, acting on their own judgment of the value of this stock, might be found willing to endorse the paper of Mr. M'Cullough on receiving it as a pledge. The motive, too, for retaining Mr. M'Cullough in office might be to induce him to do the bank all the justice in his power, not to induce others to endorse his notes. The whole subject was before the jury, and they might have drawn from the testimony either these inferences, or those which are stated in the bills of exceptions. The counsel for the plaintiffs, believing the law to be in their favour even upon that view of the testimony which is taken in the exceptions, and fearing that the jury, should they take that view, might find for the defendant, chose to refer the law to the Court. Whether his fears respecting the jury were well or ill founded, this cause must now be decided on the correctness of the opinion given by the Circuit Court. In the very elaborate arguments which have |