that country, and the maintenance of the "open door," are as futile and misleading as they are insincere and immoral. Our government, by the anxiety which it displayed, during the Boxer outbreak, in asking for and securing the assent of the powers to the equitable policy of maintaining China's political integrity, and by its sharp interrogation of and protest to Russia in the subsequent crisis in China, shows that it appreciates the gravity of the situation; and it is well that we should not underestimate the important part which we play in it. When the international situation is so acutely poised, we should have no difficulty, while acting in moral alliance with England and with the support which Japan would give to a combination so beneficial to her interests, in maintaining the "open door," and preserving a valuable sphere of commercial activity in China. On the other hand, we could never hope for freedom of trade, or even for an equal opportunity under the most-favored-nation clause, in those portions of China dominated by Russia or other European powers, all of whom, with the exception of Great Britain, are governed by selfcentred and exclusive protectionist policies.

Mr. Chamberlain was quite right when he spoke of "common interests and sentiment" as a bond between nations. Sentiment is not lacking in our relations with either England or Japan, and our interests in the Far East are practically analogous. At no time more than at the present, therefore, would it seem to be more necessary to our interests to support the equitable and liberal policy with which England is identified, of making Asia a free field to all nations within the bounds of legitimate commercial enterprise. While we should give to spheres of influence the respect they deserve, we should go straight for our own interest, which must insist upon the integrity of China and full rights and full freedom for our own enterprise wherever it shows itself able to acquire and control profitable undertakings. The danger of neglect should be always before our minds. To allow matters to drift is to jeopardize our entire interests in the Far East. To act independently by merely protesting from time to time would not be prudent in existing circumstances. There should be, so far as circumstances may seem to require it, intelligent co-operation with the powers whose interests are similar to our own.

For

many years to come, China will present the most elusive, complex, and important problems with which the civilized nations of the world will be compelled to grapple. Having swung out as a world-power of the first rank, we can no longer remain isolated in handling questions of international importance in which our interests are involved. Destiny has already forced us into a position which we did not dream of assuming a few years ago. And there will arise in the future unlooked-for contingencies which will impose upon us new responsibilities, and require us to adopt new ways and means of meeting the unexpected conditions. We have as much right in China, in the acquisition and exploitation of new markets and new fields for our commercial enterprise, as any other nation; and we should not neglect to seize upon any advantage, within the bounds of morality and justice, which will safeguard or promote this end. Whatever our attitude is to be, it ought to be immediately and unmistakably defined.

W. C. JAMESON REID.

THE PANAMA CANAL: THE TITLE AND CONCESSION.

THE

HE passage of the Act of Congress, approved June 28, 1902, "To provide for the construction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," was the first decisive action taken by the United States Government to secure an isthmian canal. The second important step was taken March 17, 1903, when the Senate ratified the treaty that had been negotiated with Colombia to secure for our country the concession necessary for the canal's construction and management. The action of the Senate promises to remove the third and last obstacle in the way of beginning the actual work of construction. Although the treaty has yet to be approved by the Colombian Congress soon to convene, Columbia has such strong reasons for favorable action that the early ratification of the treaty may be confidently expected. There is, then, a good prospect that the construction of the canal will be in progress under American supervision before the close of this calendar year.

The law of June 28, 1902, authorized the President to buy out the New Panama Canal Company, negotiate a treaty with Colombia for a concession, and proceed by means of a commission with the construction of the Panama Canal. If unable to secure a satisfactory title to the property of the Panama Canal Company, or "to obtain by treaty control of the necessary territory from Colombia," the President was empowered to negotiate with Costa Rica and Nicaragua for a concession, and having secured the privileges desired, to construct the canal by the Nicaragua route. The purchase price to be paid the Panama Canal Company was not to exceed $40,000,000 (the valuation which the Isthmian Canal Commission had placed on the company's entire assets, including the Panama Railroad), and before paying over the money to the company the President was required to assure himself of the validity of the title to the property to be transferred and to await the exchange of ratifications of a satisfactory treaty with Colombia.

The first duty of the President was to investigate the title held by the Panama Canal Company and to determine whether it was a good one, free of incumbrance, and transferable to the United States. The Attorney-General was promptly instructed to make this investigation, and his elaborate opinion, together with the data upon which his opinion was based, was laid before the President October 25, 1902. The subject intrusted to the AttorneyGeneral was one of great importance, and his report is fortunately comprehensive, thorough, and entirely convincing.

Before the Attorney-General made his inquiry, the validity and transferability of the Panama Canal Company's title had been investigated by the Isthmian Canal Commission and by the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals. One of the important duties imposed upon the Canal Commission was to "ascertain what rights, privileges and franchises" were held by the Panama Canal Company, and "the cost of purchasing all of the rights," and of placing the canal under the control of the United States. Accordingly, one of the five committees to which the several departments of the Commission's investigation were committed was the Committee on Rights, Privileges, and Franchises.' The Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission 2 contains a full historical and analytical discussion of the subject of concessions.3 The relations of the original Panama Canal Company to the New Panama Canal Company were set forth, and the opinion expressed that the New Panama Canal Company was able to sell its concession and property to the United States, provided the representative of the rights of the old company, the “liquidator,” gave his approval of the sale, and united with the new company in the offer to sell. Shortly after this report was made, the New Panama Canal Company offered to sell out to the United States, and the liquidator gave his consent to the sale. The Commis

1 The Chairman of this Committee was ex-Senator Samuel Pasco. The other members were Lieutenant-Colonel O. H. Ernst and Emory R. Johnson. RearAdmiral Walker, the President of the Commission, was ex officio a member of all committees.

2 Senate document No. 54, 57th Congress, 1st session. This report was submitted to the President November 30, 1902.

8 Seventy-one pages, over one-fourth of the report, were given to this question.

sion prepared a supplemental report' dealing with this offer, and came to the conclusion that the offer thus made was one that the New Canal Company was competent to make, and that Congress ought to accept.

The Chairman and a majority of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals disagreed with the conclusions of the Commission, but the report of the majority was criticised by the minority members of the Committee in an ably written report that supported the conclusions reached by the Canal Commission. The latter was accepted by the Senate.

The history of the Panama Canal concession may be briefly told: The Colombian government in 1876 granted a concession to Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse, who two years later, acting in behalf of the International Interoceanic Canal Association of France, secured from Colombia a new contract granting larger privileges. The following year this concession was transferred to Ferdinand De Lesseps, who in 1881 became President of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique de Panama, by which the construction of the canal was actually begun. The concession was for a period of ninety-nine years from the time of completion of the work of construction, for which twelve years were to be allowed, with the possibility of an extension of six years. Colombia was to receive five per cent of the gross receipts from tolls during the first twenty-five years, six per cent during the succeeding twenty-five years, seven per cent during the third period of twenty-five years, and eight per cent from the beginning of the seventy-sixth year. One-fifth of these annual payments was to go to the State of Panama, and four-fifths to the Republic of Colombia, whose share should in no case be less than $250,000 a year. The canal was to become the property of Colombia at the end of the period of the concession.

The Panama Canal Company, after spending a vast amount of money in completing about a third of the work to be done, became insolvent in December, 1888, and in February, 1889, was placed in charge of a "liquidator" appointed by the civil

1 Senate document No. 123, 57th Congress, 1st session.