from dealings with those against whom the grievance exists, or are themselves boycotted if they resist. In the opinion of the strike commission, "cruel and cowardly are terms not too severe by which to characterize" the boycott thus carried out. It is difficult for the present writer to see any element of unlawfulness in peacefully persuading persons not directly connected with a labor dispute to aid the side which they deem just by withholding patronage from the other, but where boycotters virtually compel others to take such action against their will, little can be said in their defence.

The strike commission does not directly discuss the important question whether it is legitimate for union men to refuse to work with non-unionists, but it apparently condemns that policy. The commissioners made it part of their formal award that "there shall be no discrimination against, or interference with, any employee who is not a member of any labor organization by members of such organization." Moreover, in the suggested scheme for permanent organization of the anthracite workers, they say that this does not mean that a minority of the employees in any colliery who may refrain from becoming members shall be "prevented from working or interfered with in their work. If they are willing to work under the conditions fixed for the colliery, their right to pursue their way unmolested should be guaranteed." If by interference and molestation the commission here refers to violence or to hindrance in buying the necessities of life, the justice of the principle is obvious. But if it means to maintain that union men ought, under no circumstances, to interfere with nonunion men by refusing to work with them, or that such refusal is per se unlawful, the position, though one which is held by many, is not so evidently just. Unionists feel that workingmen, if they share in the improved conditions which organization secures, ought likewise to share in the expense of maintaining organization. They know that the comprehensiveness of the union, on which its success so largely depends, can, at least in some cases, be promoted by making it difficult for those who refuse to join to get work. They have observed that, where a considerable minority of non-unionists continue to be employed, the master has a strong lever with which to overthrow the organ

ization when a dispute with it arises. They insist that every workman owes an obligation to his class, and that the interests of the class are intimately bound up with labor organization. Against the claim that by refusing to work with the nonunion man they are practically depriving him of his constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness, they reply that they have as much right to quit work for any cause they see fit as he has to continue working. They hold, too, that if a man, by taking a job at less than the union rates, tends to keep the great body of his fellows from bettering their lot, he is not exercising a moral right but is doing a moral wrong. These arguments of the unionists unquestionably have much weight. It is doubtless in some instances bad policy for unions to attempt to exclude non-unionists from employment. Some unions are too weak to succeed in it; others are so strong that they do not need to use this method, and only cause friction by doing so. But the practice seems neither morally nor legally wrong, and in some cases it serves really to strengthen organization.

V.

The method of settling the late strike, as well as the terms of the decision of the commission, are highly significant as regards the principles of collective bargaining, conciliation, and arbitration.

In the first place, the people virtually forced the contestants to arbitrate. The mediation of President Roosevelt had no legal authority, but it had the authority of an overwhelming public feeling that the business and comfort of a nation must not be sacrificed to the obstinacy of employer or employee. Not merely did the people demand investigation, as a basis for the formation of public opinion regarding the merits of the dispute; they insisted that the strike should cease, and that the parties should submit to the binding decision of arbitrators. The experience of the coal strike will almost certainly hasten the movement toward legally compulsory arbitration in the case of such serious and prolonged disputes. At the same time, the work of the commission showed clearly the difficulties that confront the arbitrator who is called upon to fix the general conditions of labor. Were

it the custom generally to refer questions of wages to outside arbitrators, we should find ourselves utterly lacking in standards to which the awards should conform. No one who reads the report of the strike commission will find it strong evidence of the virtue of arbitration. The strike commissioners themselves evidently considered that the real value of their work lay in bringing about a temporary peace, during which the foundations of the system of collective bargaining should be laid. They did not even suggest, as part of that scheme of collective bargaining, a uniform resort to arbitration in case of failure of the parties to reach an agreement regarding the fundamental terms under which labor should be employed. Furthermore, they specifically declined to recommend legislation for compulsory arbitration under any circumstances. They do suggest that Congress and the state legislatures pass laws providing for compulsory investigation of grave disputes between employers and employees, with the hope, apparently, that public opinion would in most cases serve to compel settlement in accordance with justice as thus revealed.

Despite the obvious and great difficulties and disadvantages of arbitration as a means of determining general labor conditions, there is much to be said in favor of legally compelling resort to it in the case of prolonged strikes or lockouts which inflict serious injury on the people. The point may be reached when any settlement is better than the continuance of a war which entails even greater suffering on non-combatants than on the parties themselves. The award of the arbitrators will establish a truce; it will give time for thought, and in many instances will pave the way for the future determination of labor conditions by voluntary agreement. Compulsory arbitration, of course, should be confined to rare and extreme cases. Perhaps the best plan would be to authorize the President, or the governor of a state in the case of local disputes, to use his discretion in ordering arbitration when convinced of its necessity, subject, perhaps, to certain general statutory restrictions.

The chief objection to governmental arbitration is the difficulty of enforcing awards, especially against the workmen. Penalties for violating awards, however, would be almost unne

cessary, so powerful would be the compelling force of popular opinion on behalf of a formal decision of arbitrators in an important dispute. Compulsory arbitration will, it must be admitted, have a firmer basis when labor organizations shall adopt the policy, voluntarily or under legal compulsion, of becoming incorporated bodies. The fear of the unions that, if incorporated, they would be more readily subject to attack before the courts, is not without foundation, for the courts are by no means always fair to labor. But ultimately we may anticipate such a change in conditions that unions will find it distinctly to their interest to incorporate; and when that time comes a great impetus will be given, not merely to arbitration, voluntary and compulsory, but to collective bargaining and conciliation as well.

The strike commission recognizes the important distinction between questions concerning the general terms of the labor contract, and questions having to do with the enforcement or interpretation of those terms. It sees that arbitration encounters much less difficulty in settling differences of the second class than those of the first. It accordingly provides in its formal decision for a joint board of conciliation for the adjustment of disputes arising under the award, with resort to the decision of a single umpire if this board fails to agree. This is quite in accordance with the generally approved practice in those trades, both in England and America, which have been most successful in maintaining peace between employers and employees.

It is here that the commission grants effective, though slightly veiled, recognition to the existing anthracite union, the United Mine Workers. The award declares that differences arising during its term must be adjusted, if possible, by conference between the miners directly interested and the mine managers. If this method fails, they are to be referred to a permanent board

to consist of six persons appointed as hereinafter provided. That is to say, if there shall be a division of the whole region into three districts, in each of which there shall exist an organization representing a majority of the mine workers of such district, one of said board of conciliation shall be appointed by each of said organizations, and three other persons shall be appointed by the operators, the operators in each of said districts appointing one person.

It is of course precisely the three existing anthracite districts of the United Mine Workers of America which correspond to the description quoted, and it was merely to avoid hurting the feelings of the operators that the organization was not specifically named.

This board of conciliation is to act by majority vote. In case it is evenly divided on any question, an umpire for that particular question is to be appointed by one of the circuit judges of the third judicial district of the United States (Judge Gray). The decision of this umpire is to be binding. No suspension of work is to take place pending the action of the board of conciliation or of the arbitrator. There was temporary friction at first between the operators and the miners regarding the manner of choosing the representatives of the latter upon the board, but eventually the union was virtually recognized. The work of the board has proceeded slowly, and many questions have been brought before it. Already Judge Gray has been called upon to appoint an umpire.

The country is certainly to be congratulated upon the work of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission. There is every promise that its award will be faithfully carried out by both employers and employees. While it cannot be hoped that friction will disappear, it is highly probable that, with the impetus which the commission has given to the movement, the system of formal collective bargaining between organized labor and organized capital will become established in the anthracite region as it has become established in the bituminous fields, and that strikes and lockouts will in considerable measure be done away with. The expressions of the commission will help to crystallize public opinion in behalf of the organization of labor, but against the unwise policies of some unions. Above all, the strike, and the work of the strike commission, have forced the people to give more thought to the great problems of labor than ever before, and that in itself may, in the long run, prove an advantage well worth the price which the people have paid.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. DANA DURAND.