Where the statute requires suit upon a claim which has been disputed or rejected by the executor or administrator to be brought within a specified time from the date of such dispute or rejection, a rejection, in order to put the statute in operation, must be one which would authorize the immediate bringing of a suit.9 Although the right to enforce the liability against the estate is barred by the statute of nonclaim, it may be set off against an indebtedness due the estate by the corporation.10 Whether statutes of nonclaim apply where it is sought to enforce the liability of deceased stockholders in national banks will be considered in a subsequent section.11 The statute of limitations does not commence to run against the liability of a devisee of a stockholder until the latter's death, nor, where the question of his liability is then being litigated, until such liability has been judicially determined.12 § 4242.- Liability of stockholders in national banks. Since the act of congress prescribing the liability of stockholders in national banks fixes no period of limitations within which actions for its enforcement must be brought, the statute of limitations of the state of the forum governs; 13 and it will operate as a bar both at law and in equity.14 While the liability is in a sense contractual, it does not setts, and the amount of such debts greatly exceeded the par value of the stock, it was held that a second assessment made after the stockholder's death and after his estate had been fully administered could not be collected from the heirs, since a claim therefor could have been presented to the probate court and provision made for its payment by the retention of funds or the taking of a bond from the distributees. Converse v. Nichols, 202 Mass. 270, 89 N. E. 135. 9 A presentation and rejection pending an appeal from the order levying the assessment will not start the running of the statute. Irvine v. Baker, 225 Fed. 834. 10 Coyle v. Taunton Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 216 Mass. 156, 103 N. E. 288. 11 See § 4242, infra. 12 Richards v. Gill, 138 N. Y. App. Div. 75, 122 N. Y. Supp. 620. 13 Rankin v. Barton, 199 U. S. 228, 50 L. Ed. 163, rev 'g judgment 69 Kan. 629, 77 Pac. 531; McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 49 L. Ed. 702, 3 Ann. Cas. 500, rev'g judgment 119 Fed. 110; McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, aff'g 101 Fed. 183; Rankin v. Miller, 207 Fed. 602; Thompson v. German Ins. Co., 77 Fed. 258, 76 Fed. 892; Butler v. Poole, 44 Fed. 586; Beckham v. Hague, 38 N. Y. Misc. 606, 78 N. Y. Supp. 79, aff'd 80 N. Y. App. Div. 626, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1129. See also Clark v. Ogilvie, 111 Ky. 181, 63 S. W. 429. An action in California to enforce the liability of a stockholder in a Kansas national bank is governed by the California statute. King v. Armstrong, 9 Cal. App. 368, 99 Pac. 527. 14 McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. arise wholly out of contract, but is rather a liability imposed by statute,15 and hence an action to enforce it is governed by the statute of limitations relative to actions to enforce a statutory liability rather than the statute relative to actions on contracts.16 Where the liquidation is involuntary, the statute commences to run from the time when the assessment made by the comptroller of the currency is payable.17 And this is true regardless of the local law on the subject, since the power of the comptroller is derived from the federal statutes, and cannot be controlled or limited by state laws.18 Where the liquidation is a voluntary one, and the liability is enforced by a receiver appointed by a court of equity in a suit for a judicial administration of the bank's affairs, the liability does not accrue and the statute does not commence to run until the court ascertains the necessity for enforcing the liability, determines the amount which the shareholder must pay, and fixes the time of payment. 19 Under such circumstances the statute does not run while the liquidation proceedings are pending.2 20 It has been held that state statutes limiting the time for presenting claims against decedents' estates and barring claims not presented within such time have no application to the collection of assessments 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, aff'g 101 Fed. 183; Thompson v. German Ins. Co., 77 Fed. 258, 76 Fed. 892. 15 See § 4176, supra. 16 McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 49 L. Ed. 702, 3 Ann. Cas. 500, rev'g 119 Fed. 110. In McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, aff'g 101 Fed. 183, it was held that the liability was not one upon a contract in writing, within the meaning of the Nebraska statute of limitations, but was either one upon an implied contract not in writing or upon a liability created by statute. The court did not decide which it was since the action was barred in either case. 17 Rankin v. Barton, 199 U. S. 228, 50 L. Ed. 163, rev'g 69 Kan. 629, 77 Pac. 531; McDonald v. Thompson, 184 U. S. 71, 46 L. Ed. 437, aff'g 101 Fed. 183; Rankin v. Miller, 207 Fed. 602; Deweese v. Smith, 106 Fed. 438, 66 L. R. A. 971, rev'g judgment 97 Fed. 309, judgment aff'd 187 U. S. 637, 17 L. Ed. 344 (mem. dec.); Thompson v. German Ins. Co., 77 Fed. 258, 76 Fed. 892; Clark v. Ogilvie, 111 Ky. 181, 63 S. W. 429; Beckham v. Hague, 38 N. Y. Misc. 606, 78 N. Y. Supp. 79, aff'd 80 N. Y. App. Div. 626, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1129. See also Bennett Thorne, 36 Wash. 253, 68 L. R. A. 113, 78 Pac. 936. V. The statute does not commence to run until after assessment has been made. McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 49 L. Ed. 702, 3 Ann. Cas. 500, rev'g judgment 119 Fed. 110. 18 Rankin v. Barton, 199 U. S. 228, 50 L. Ed. 163, rev'g 69 Kan. 629, 77 Pac. 531, where the Supreme Court reversed a holding of the Kansas court, based on local law, that the statute of limitations was put in motion by delay in making the assessment. 19 King v. Pomeroy, 121 Fed. 287. 20 King v. Pomeroy, 121 Fed. 287. on stock of an insolvent national bank; 21 but there is authority to the effect that a statute limiting the time within which to sue executors or administrators on claims against the decedent applies.22 Cases construing state statutes on this subject will be found in the note.23 A suit by the receiver against executors of a deceased stockholder to enforce the statutory liability is not an action on a testamentary bond within the meaning of a statute limiting the time within which such an action may be brought against either principal or sureties.2 24 § 4243.- Extension or reduction of time by the legislature. Where the liability of stockholders for corporate debts is contractual in its nature and secondary, in the nature of the liability of a surety, the legislature, although it has power to alter or amend the statute of limitations as to existing liabilities, has no power to extend the period during which the liability of a stockholder shall continue beyond that fixed at the time when the debts were incurred.25 The 21 Zimmerman v. Carpenter, 84 Fed. 747; Mortimer v. Potter, 213 Ill. 178, 72 N. E. 817, aff'g 114 Ill. App. 422. See also Rankin v. Herod, 140 Fed. 661, and Rankin v. Big Rapids, 133 Fed. 670, where the applicability of the statute was assumed, but the claims were held not to be barred. 22 Butler v. Poole, 44 Fed. 586. 23 In Nebraska a claim presented within the time limited by the statute is not barred, although not allowed until after the expiration of such time. Schaberg v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 493, 83 N. W. 737. The statute of Michigan providing for the presentation of contingent claims to the commissioners or to the probate court during the time limited for the presentation of claims, as construed by the courts of that state, is permissive merely, and hence a failure to file such a claim does not operate as a bar. It follows that where no assessment is levied until after the time for presenting claims has expired, the failure to present a claim based on the contingent liability of the deceased stockholder is not a bar to the subsequent enforcement of such liability against the heirs. Rankin v. Herod, 140 Fed. 661; Rankin v. Big Rapids, 133 Fed. 670. The further provisions for the presentation, allowance and payment of contingent claims which become absolute after the time fixed for presenting claims has expired do not apply to claims which become absolute after the estate has been closed, and hence not to a claim based on the liability of a deceased stockholder where no assessment is levied until after the estate has been closed. Therefore the failure to present such a claim does not bar a subsequent action by the receiver to enforce the liability against those to whom the estate has been distributed. Rankin v. Herod, 140 Fed. 661; Rankin v. Big Rapids, 133 Fed. 670. In Rankin v. Miller, 207 Fed. 602, it was held that a receiver was under no obligation to establish his claim before the Delaware register of wills within or after a year from its full maturity, before suing the executors on an assessment made after the estate had been closed. 24 Rankin v. Miller, 207 Fed. 602. 25 Close v. Potter, 155 N. Y. 145, 49 N. E. 686. legislature may reduce the period for enforcing the liability fixed by the statute of limitations and make the reduction apply to existing causes of action, provided it gives a reasonable time for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect, but not otherwise.26 § 4244. Conflict of laws. Where the statute imposing the lia. bility and creating the remedy does not itself limit the time within which an action to enforce it must be brought, but leaves the matter to be governed by the general statute of limitations, the laws of the forum will govern in determining whether an action brought in a state other than that by which the corporation was created is barred, since general statutes of limitation relate to the remedy and have no extraterritorial force.27 This rule does not apply, however, when 26 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 24 L. Ed. 365; Blackburn v. Irvine, 205 Fed. 217, aff'g 198 Fed. 360; Irvine v. Elliott, 203 Fed. 82; Lang v. Lutz, 180 N. Y. 254, 73 N. E. 24, aff'g 83 N. Y. App. Div. 534, 82 N. Y. Supp. 319; Smith v. Quale, 86 N. Y. Misc. 259, 148 N. Y. Supp. 448. It cannot reduce the time so as to deprive creditors of all remedy. Irvine v. Elliott, 203 Fed. 82. The constitutionality of provisions, in an act changing the remedy for enforcing the liability of stockholders, touching the running of limitations against the claims of creditors on which actions had been brought prior to its passage, cannot. be raised by a creditor whose rights are not af fected thereby. Bettendorf Axle Co. v. Field, 114 Md. 487, 79 Atl. 724; Pittsburg Steel Co. v. Baltimore Equitable Society, 113 Md. 77, 77 Atl. 255, aff'd 226 U. S. 455, 57 L. Ed. 297. See generally standard works on Limitation of Actions. 27 Irvine v. Elliott, 203 Fed. 82; Little v. Kohn, 185 Fed. 295; Ramsden v. Knowles, 151 Fed. 721, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, 151 Fed. 718; Hale v. Coffin, 120 Fed. 470, aff'g 114 Fed. 567; Lamson v. Hutchings, 118 Fed. 321; Whitman v. Citizens' Bank of Reading, 110 Fed. 503; Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, 48 L. R. A. 625, rev'g judgment 88 Fed. 607; Hutchings v. Lamson, 96 Fed. 720; Hobbs v. National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City, Missouri, 96 Fed. 396; Dexter v. Edmands, 89 Fed. 467; Schiffer v. Trustees of Columbia College in City of New York, 87 Fed. 166; Royal Trust Co. v. MacBean, 168 Cal. 642, 144 Pac. 139; Miller v. Lane, 160 Cal. 90, 116 Pac. 58; Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 Me. 438, 52 Atl. 921; Miller v. Connor, 177 Mo. App. 630, 160 S. W. 582. See also Hilliker v. Hale, 117 Fed. 220. "The general rule is that in respect to the limitation of actions the law of the forum governs, and while the courts will enforce a limitation established under the law of another state, when applicable, it does not do so to the exclusion of the law of the forum." Hutchings v. Lamson, 96 Fed. 720. New York Code Civ. Proc. § 394, requiring an action against a stockholder of a moneyed corporation or banking association to enforce a liability created by the common law or by statute to be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues applies to an action brought in a federal court of that state to enforce the statutes of the state by which the corporation was created and the liability is imposed prescribes a special limitation for actions to enforce the liability. In such a case the statutes of that state govern,28 and they will be given the construction which they have received by the highest court of that state.29 In some jurisdictions it is provided by statute that no action shall be brought in the state to enforce a cause of action arising in another state after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of the latter state for bringing an action upon it.30 The cause of action arises in the statutory liability of a stockholder of a foreign moneyed corporation. Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602, 48 L. Ed. 809; Ramsden v. Gately, 142 Fed. 912; Hobbs v. National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City, Missouri, 96 Fed. 396. Whether a foreign corporation is a moneyed corporation within the meaning of the statute is to be determined by reference to the meaning given that term by the legislature and courts of New York. Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652, 58 L. Ed. 1518, Ann. Cas. 1917 A 104; Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602, 48 L. Ed. 809; Hobbs v. National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City, Missouri, 96 Fed. 396. V. V. 28 Irvine v. Elliott, 203 Fed. 82; Ramsden v. Knowles, 151 Fed. 721, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, 151 Fed. 718; Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, rev'g judgment 88 Fed. 607; Dexter v. Edmands, 89 Fed. 467; Andrews Bacon, 38 Fed. 777; Pulsifer Greene, 96 Me. 438, 52 Atl. 921; Broadway Nat. Bank v. Baker, 176 Mass. 294, 57 N. E. 603; Halsey v. McLean, 12 Allen (Mass.) 438, 90 Am. Dec. 157. See also Hobbs v. National Bank of Commerce of Kansas City, Missouri, 96 Fed. 396; Miller v. Connor, 177 Mo. App. 630, 160 S. W. 582. of the corporation's domicile limiting the time for commencing actions accruing to individuals "under statutes, acts of incorporation, or by operation of law," was not, in its broader sense, the general statute of limitations, even though it was not contained in the particular enactment imposing liability on stockholders and providing for its enforcement, but was in the nature of a special statute applicable to liabilities of the character enumerated, and hence that it applied to an action to enforce such a liability brought in another state. 29 A federal court sitting in another state will follow the construction given by the highest court of the state creating the corporation to a statute of limitations of that state. Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, 48 L. R. A. 625, rev'g judgment 88 Fed. 607; Andrews v. Bacon, 38 Fed. 777. 30 Hayward v. Sencenbaugh, 158 Ill. App. 72; Guilbert v. Kessinger, 173 Mo. App. 680, 160 S. W. 17. New York Civ. Code, § 390a. Under this provision the limitation of 18 months for bringing actions to enforce the liability of stockholders prescribed by Ohio Act of April 29, 1902, (95 Ohio Laws, p. 312) is pleadable as a defense to an action in a federal court in New York to enforce the liability of a stockholder in an Ohio corporation. Irvine v. Baker, 225 Fed. 834. See also Shipman v. Treadwell, In Brunswick Terminal Co. v. National Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, 48 L. R. A. 625, rev'g 88 Fed. 607, it was held that a statute of the state |