In other words, "moneyed capital" does not include capital which does not compete with the business of national banks.19 It is clear, therefore, that the validity of a tax on shares in national banks is in no way affected, in so far as this provision of the act of Congress is concerned, by the mode of taxation resorted to by the state, or the rate of taxation, or exemptions from taxation, or the allowance of deductions on account of debts, in the case of the shares of stock or the property of railroad companies, mining companies, insurance companies, manufacturing companies and the like.20 The act does not prevent the taxation of shares of stock in the insurance companies on income instead of value, and the taxation of shares in national banks on value.21 Nor does it render a tax on shares in national banks invalid because of the exemption from taxation of deposits in savings banks, and moneys belonging to charitable and educational institutions.2 22 The act, said Mr. Justice Matthews, by the expression "moneyed capital in the hands of individuals," includes "shares of stock or other interests owned by individuals in all enterprises in which the capital employed in carrying on its business is money, where the object of the business is the making of profit by its use as money. The moneyed capital thus employed is invested for that purpose in securities by way of loan, discount, or otherwise, which are from time to time, according to the rules of the business, reduced again to money and reinvested. It includes money in the hands of individuals employed in a similar way, invested in loans, or in securities for the deen v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 41 L. Ed. 1069. See also New York v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373, 58 L. Ed. 274. 19 First Nat. Bank of Wellington, Ohio v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 43 L. Ed. 669. That the moneyed capital claimed to be given an unjust advantage does come into competition with the business of national banks must be satisfactorily made to appear by the evidence. Commercial Nat. Bank V. Chambers, 182 U. S. 556, 45 L. Ed. 1227. 20 Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 41 L. Ed. 1069; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438, 35 L. Ed. 210; Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. Ed. The right of a state to tax national 21 Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 41 L. Ed. 1069. 22 Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 41 L. Ed. 1069. And see supra, this section. payment of money, either as an investment of a permanent character, or temporarily with a view to sale or repayment and reinvestment." 23 Although trust companies created under the laws of New York were not "banks" in the commercial sense of the word, it was held that shares in such companies were moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, within the act.24 Bonds issued by a state, or under its authority by a municipal corporation, are from their nature not ordinarily the subjects of taxation, and, although they undoubtedly represent moneyed capital, they are not within the reason of the act of Congress relating to the taxation of national bank shares.25 § 4604. Tangible property of corporation in general. The right of a state to tax tangible corporate property, real and personal, is clear, provided, of course, it has not granted to the corporation an irrevocable exemption from taxation, and provided it does not violate any provision of the Federal Constitution in imposing the tax,26 23 Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 157, 30 L. Ed. 895. And see Evansville Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322, 26 L. Ed. 1053; Mercantile Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. Shields, 59 Fed. 952. 24 Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. Ed. 895. 25 Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. Ed. 895; Pollard v. State, 65 Ala. 628. 26 United States. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 50 L. Ed. 744. California. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69. Idaho. McConnell v. State Board of Equalization, 11 Idaho 652, 83 Pac. 494. Kentucky. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Com., 99 Ky. 623, 29 L. R. A. 73, 31 S. W. 486; Louisville v. Louisville City Ry., 27 Ky. L. Rep. 141, 84 S. W. 535. Minnesota. State v. Western U. Tel. Co., 96 Minn. 13, 104 N. W. 567. Missouri. State v. Western U. Tel. Co., 165 Mo. 502, 65 S. W. 775. VII Priv. Corp.-47 Montana. State v. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 27 Mont. 394, 71 Pac. 311. New Jersey. Jersey City v. State Board of Assessors, 73 N. J. L. 164, 63 Atl. 21; In re Erie R. Co., 65 N. J. L. 608, 48 Atl. 601. New York. People v. Miller, 94 App. Div. 564, 88 N. Y. Supp. 197. North Carolina. Wilmington, C. & A. R. Co. v. Brunswick County Com'rs, 72 N. C. 10. Texas. Galveston & W. R. Co. v. Galveston, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 384, 77 S. W. 269. As to tax upon good will, see Scollard v. American Felt Co., 194 Mass. 127, 80 N. E. 233; Nebraska Tel. Co. v. Hall County, 75 Neb. 405, 106 N. W. 471; People v. Feitner, 58 N. Y. App. Div. 555, 69 N. Y. Supp. 27; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. State, 128 Wis. 553, 108 N. W. 557. "Unless exempted in terms which amount to a contract not to tax, the property, privileges and franchises of a corporation are as much the legitimate subjects of taxation as any other and this is true even though the corporation be a foreign_one."7 Subject to such limitations, a tax may be imposed upon the earnings or receipts of a corporation.28 A corporation may be required property of the citizens which is within the sovereign power of the state." North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 46, 22 L. Ed. 287. The real estate owned by a corporation and necessary for its business is taxable. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558. Claim for taxes on partnership property passing to corporation which superseded partnership and assumed partnership's obligations and which is in hands of receiver, see Lamkin v. Baldwin & Lamkin Mfg. Co., 72 Conn. 57, 44 L. R. A. 786, 43 Atl. 593. 27 The power of a state to tax all of the property of a foreign corporation within its borders is not open to question. Pape v. Town & City of Hartford, 82 Conn. 406, 74 Atl. 751. While a foreign corporation cannot itself migrate from the jurisdiction by which it was created, yet it may through its agents act in other jurisdictions, and its property situated locally in such jurisdictions may be subjected to taxation. St. Louis V. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580. A foreign manufacturing company which ships certain of its products from its factory, which is without the state, to a customer, within the state, in its own tank cars, the freight rate being the same as it would be were such products shipped in hogsheads or barrels in cars belonging to the railroad company, excepting that the latter makes an allowance to the shipper of three-fourths of a cent per car for each mile traveled, less the cost of repairs on the cars, operates its cars for profit" within the meaning of a statute providing that "every other corporation or company not a railroad company * * # owning any cars operated for profit on any railroad in this state, shall pay to the state an annual tax," notwithstanding the fact that the repair charges are greater than the mileage earned, since, even assuming-probably contrary to fact-that the absence of all profit would exempt such cars from taxation under such statute, the difference between the mileage due and the cost of repairs is not the only element of profit, there being the saving of the expense which the shipper would otherwise have to incur for containers for its products and the gaining of trade by delivering such products in a manner making for the convenience of the purchaser. Vera Chemical Co. v. State, N. H. - 102 Atl. 463. 28 United States. Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 21 L. Ed. 888. Illinois. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Siders, 88 Ill. 320; Porter v. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co., 76 Ill. 561. Maryland. State v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 93 Md. 314, 48 Atl. 918; State v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 44 Md. 131. Massachusetts. McDonald v. Union Freight R. Co., 190 Mass. 123, 76 N. E. 655. Minnesota. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Koerner, 85 Minn. 149, 88 N. W. 430. Pennsylvania. Erie & P. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 208 Pa. 506, 57 Atl. 980. Texas. State v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 100 S. W. 146. With respect to taxation of moneys and credits, see Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Gilbertson, 129 Iowa 658, 106 N. W. 153; People v. Raymond, 117 N. Y. App. Div. 62, 102 N. Y. Supp. 85. to pay a tax upon dividends declared by it.29 And it may be taxed upon its undivided profits or surplus.30 § 4605. Corporate franchises and privileges. Corporate franchises are property 31 with a value which is susceptible of being esti As to federal taxes on income, see § 4659, infra. 29 Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Passenger Ry. Co., 102 Pa. St. 190. As to federal taxes on dividends, see § 4659, infra. 30 Pollard v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Kan. 406, 28 Pac. 202; People v. Feitner, 61 N. Y. App. Div. 129, 70 N. Y. Supp. 500. See also Appeal of Cutler, 74 Conn. 35, 49 Atl. 338. For the mode of determining the value of the surplus and undivided earnings of savings banks under the laws of New York, see People v. Miller, 177 N. Y. 461, 69 N. E. 1103. After a dividend is declared in good faith, and not as a mere subterfuge, and the amount of the same is credited to the stockholders, the money is not taxable to the corporation as part of its undivided profits or surplus, and cannot be taken into consideration in valuing the same. Pollard v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Kan. 406, 28 Pac. 202. 31 United States. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 18 L. Ed. 897. * * In granting to a telephone company the right to maintain its poles and wires on the city streets, a city ordinance grants something more than a mere license. "A license has been generally defined as a mere personal privilege to do acts upon the land of the licensor, of a temporary character, and revocable at the will of the latter unless, according to some authorities, in the meantime expenditures contemplated by the licensor when the license was given have been made. That the grant in the present case was not a mere license is evident from the fact that it was upon its face neither personal nor for a temporary purpose. The right conferred came from the state through delegated power to the city. The grantee was clothed with the franchise to be a corporation and to conduct a public business, which required the use of the streets, that it might have access to the people it was to serve. Its charges were subject to regulation by law, and it was subject to all of the police power of the city. That an ordinance granting the right to place and maintain upon the streets of a city poles and wires of such a company is the granting of a property right has been too many times decided California. San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614. Illinois. Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556. New Jersey. State Board of Assessors v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 4 Atl. 578. North Carolina. Worth v. Petersburg R. Co., 89 N. C. 301. Tennessee. South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 87 Tenn. 406, 2 L. R. A. 853, 11 S. W. 348. Washington. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Spokane County, 22 Wash. 168, 60 Pac. 132; Commercial mated,32 and, under the restrictions applicable to tangible property of a corporation,33 such franchises, including the franchise of being a corporation, are a proper subject of taxation, and for the purpose by this court to need more than a reference to some of the later cases: Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co., 184 U. S. 368, 395, 46 L. Ed. 592, 610, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Louisville v. Cumberland Telep. & Teleg. Co., 224 U. S. 649, 661, 56 L. Ed. 934, 939, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 572; Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City [230 U. S. 84, 57 L. Ed. 1400]. As a property right it was assignable, taxable, and alienable. Generally it is an asset of great value to such utility companies, and a principal basis for credit." * * 32 State Board of Assessors v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 4 Atl. 578. The corporate rights and privileges of a railroad company have value and constitute taxable property. Central Pac. R. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 40 L. Ed. 903. 33 See § 4604, supra. The fact that a corporation has invested its funds in United States securities, does not prevent a state from taxing its franchises. Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 594, 18 L. Ed. 897; Monroe County Sav. Bank v. Rochester, 37 N. Y. 365. See also § 4592, supra. A corporation is not exempt from a franchise tax because its capital stock is invested in patent rights. Marsden Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 61 N. J. L. 461, 39 Atl. 638. See for distinction between franchise of corporation to be such and franchise of corporation to do business, Chap. 31, supra. The franchise of corporate existence is taxable in the case of a banking company as well as in the case of any other corporation. Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276, 64 L. R. A. 918, 100 Am. St. Rep. 130, 75 Pac. 832. Thus holding, the court said: "Whenever a corporation is legally formed, the right to be and exist as such, and, as a corporation, to do the business specified in its articles, whether it be a banking business, grocery business, or the operation of a railroad, or any other business in which individuals may engage without grant from the state, is a grant by the sovereign power-a valuable right, which is generally known as the 'corporate franchise.' This corporate franchise, viz., the franchise to be and exist as a corporation for the purposes specified in the articles of incorporation, appertains to every corporation, for whatever purpose it may be formed; and there is no distinction in this regard between the banking or grocery corporation and the railroad, water or gas corporation. The right to engage in every such business is open to all citizens, independently of any grant from the sovereign, but it is available to no one to conduct any such business through the agency of a corporation without such grant. Certain occupations are, however, of such a nature that various privileges conferrable only by the sovereign power are convenient and in most cases absolutely essential to the suc cessful maintenance of the business to be carried on, whether it be car 34" According to the law of most states this franchise or privilege of being a corporation is deemed personal property and is subject to separate taxation. The right of the states to thus tax it has been recognized by this court and the state courts in instances without number." Horn Silver Min. Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 36 L. Ed. 164. |