ing a city to tax all real and personal property within the corporate limits of the city which is subject to state taxation, and another statute requiring personal property belonging to a nonresident which has a situs in the state to be taxed for state purposes, such city may impose a tax on sleeping cars owned by a foreign corporation to the extent of the number of such cars constantly within the city limits, notwithstanding the fact that no particular cars had a permanent situs in such city, and that all such cars were employed as vehicles of transportation in the interchange of interstate commerce.99 As far as the place of taxation within the state is concerned, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which precludes a state from using its own pleasure in the matter of fixing the situs of the rolling stock and other unlocated property of a railroad company.1 "The rolling stock of a railroad company, as a general principle, should be assessed and taxed," says the Supreme Court of Missouri, "where the corporation has its residence; but the principle of law may be modified by the legislature. The notion of the situs of personal property following the personal residence of the corporation is a legal fiction, but is not an unbending and uncontrollable principle of law. It may be modified by the legislature. The rolling stock of a railroad company has no more local existence in one county than another. This machinery by which the road is operated is constantly passing from one terminus to the other of the entire road, and to save all cavil and dispute in respect to it, it was perfectly competent for the legislature to say that it should become a part of Hall, 174 U. S. 40, 43 L. Ed. 899. 99 Covington v. Pullman Co., 121 Ky. 218, 89 S. W. 116. In this case the court said: "The taxation of cars used on railroads and moving continually from point to point is a subject of no little difficulty. No three particular cars have a permanent situs in the city of Covington; but there are all the time in the yards there three cars, which are being made ready to go out on their trips. This property enjoys the protection of the municipal government and should justly contribute to its maintenance. It would be manifestly unjust to the 1 Columbus Southern R. Co. V. A domestic railroad company has no inviolable right under the Federal Constitution to have its rolling stock and other unlocated personal property taxed only in the county wherein the company has its principal office. Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 38 L. Ed. 238. I I the road itself and become property the same as the road, and that for the purpose of taxation it should be equally distributed through the counties, cities or towns through which it passed in proportion to its length in these respective localities." 2 These matters are, as a general proposition, matters of purely local concern. To quote the Federal Supreme Court: "Various modes of taxing railroad property are adopted by the different states. In some, railroad companies are taxed upon their property as a unit. In others, the road and the property in each county are separately assessed, and in still other states, the whole road is assessed, and then the assessment apportioned among the several counties and towns. These and all similar modes of taxation are subject to the legislative discretion of the respective states, and do not ordinarily present any federal question whatever. But the mode of distribution of the unlocated or transitory personal property is a matter of regulation by the state legislature, which in no way involves a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 § 4614. Vessels. The general rule is that the domicile of the owner of vessels, engaged in the coastwise trade and plying between ports of different states, is the situs of the vessels for the purpose of taxation without regard to the place of the vessels' enrollment. This 2 State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378, 379, quoted in Columbus Southern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 38 L. Ed. 238, as stating a principle recognized by the Federal Supreme Court. "The rolling stock of a corporation, used in transporting passengers and freight over any and all parts of its line of road cannot be said to have a situs which would give a preference to any county through which the road may run over any other county in like situation." Franklin v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 12 Lea (Tenn.) 521, 538. 3 Columbus Southern R. Co. V. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 38 L. Ed. 238. Where a statute, apportioning the transitory and unlocated property of a railroad company among the sev eral counties through which the road extends for the purpose of taxation, subjects such property to the same * rule, however, is subject to the exception that, where a vessel has acquired an actual situs in a state other than the one of the owner's domicile, it may be taxed there notwithstanding the fact that it is engaged in interstate commerce. Where vessels, although employed in interstate commerce, are thus employed wholly within the limits of a particular state, they are taxable by such state even though they have been registered or enrolled at a port outside of the state.5 But an ocean vessel registered at a port of one 4 Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 50 L. Ed. 1082, 6 Ann. Cas. 205. "The owner has no power to give his vessel a taxable situs by the arbitrary selection of a home port which is neither his domicile nor the domicile of actual situs." Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 56 L. Ed. 96. 5 Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 49 L. Ed. 1059, 3 Ann. Cas. 1100 (aff 'g 102 Va. 576, 102 Am. St. Rep. 855, 46 S. E. 783), distinguishing Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471, 21 L. Ed. 303, and Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596, 15 L. Ed. 254. engaged in interstate commerce and enrolled at a port outside the state are employed wholly within the limits of the state, Mr. Justice Brewer said: "As stated by Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 139: The object of the registry acts is to encour age our own trade, navigation, and shipbuilding, by granting peculiar or exclusive privileges of trade to the flag of the United States, and by prohibiting the communication of those immunities to the shipping and mariners of other countries. These provisions are well calculated to prevent the commission of fraud upon individuals, as well as to advance the national policy. The registry of all vessels at the custom house, and the memorandums of the transfers, add great security to title, and bring the existing state of our navigation and marine under the view of the general government. By these regulations the title can be effectually traced back to its origin.' This object does not require, and there is no suggestion in the statutes, that vessels registered or enrolled are exempt from the ordinary rules respecting taxation of personal property. It is true by sec. 4141 there is created what may be called the home port of the vessel, an artificial situs, which may control the place of taxation in the absence of an actual situs elsewhere, and to that extent only do the two eases referred to go. In Hays v. Pacifie Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596, 15 L. Ed. 254, ocean steamers owned and "Registry and enrollment are prescribed by Rev. Stat., §§ 4141 and 4311 [7 Fed. Stat. Ann. 16, 56] for vessels of the United States engaged in foreign and domestic commerce. Section 4141 17 Fed. Stat. Ann. 16] reads: Every vessel, except as hereinafter provided, shall be registered by the collector of that collection district which includes the port to which such vessel shall belong at the time of her registry; which port shall be deemed to be that at or nearest to which the owner, if there be but one, or, if more than one, the husband or acting and managing owner of such vessel, usually resides. By sections 4131 and 4311 17 Fed. Stat. Ann. 10, 56] vessels registered or enrolled are declared to be deemed vessels of the United States." In considering the right of a state to tax vessels, which, though state, in which state its owners reside and are taxed, does not become part of the personalty of a foreign state, and taxable as such by that state, by calling at ports thereof while engaged in inter registered in New York, and regularly plying between Panama and San Francisco and ports in Oregon, remaining in San Francisco no longer than was necessary to land and receive passengers and cargo and in Benicia only for repairs and supplies, were held not subject to taxation by the state of California. In the course of the opinion, by Mr. Justice Nelson, it was said (p. 599, L. Ed. p. 255): 'We are satisfied that the state of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not properly abiding within its limits so as to be. come incorporated with the other personal property of the state; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid.' Clearly the ruling was that these steamers had acquired no actual situs within the state of California; that occasionally touching at ports in the state did not make them incorporated with the other personal property of the state. Hence, having no situs in California, they were not subject to taxation there, but were subject to state taxation at the artificial situs established by their registry. In Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L. Ed. 303, it appeared that a steamship was registered in New York, under the ownership of the plaintiff; that she was employed as a coasting steamer between Mobile and New Orleans; that she was regularly enrolled as a coaster in Mobile by her master, and received a license as a coasting vessel for that and subsequent years. It was held that she was not subject to taxation by the state of Alabama. Mr. Justice Hunt, in delivering the opinion of the court, said (pp. 474, 476, L. Ed. 304): 'The fact that the vessel was physically within the limits of the city of Mobile, at the time the tax was levied, does not decide the question. Thus, if a traveler on that day had been passing through that city in his private carriage, or an emigrant with his worldly goods on a wagon, it is not contended that the property of either of these persons would be subject to taxation, as property within the city. It is conceded by the respective counsel that it would not have been. On the other hand this vessel although a vehicle of commerce, was not exempt from taxation on that score. A steamboat, or a post coach, engaged in a local business within a state, may be subject to local taxation, although it carry the mail of the United States. The commerce between the states may not be interfered with by taxation or other interruption, but its instruments and vehicles may be. It is 铃 the opinion of the court that the state of Alabama had no jurisdiction over this vessel for the purpose of taxation, for the reason that it had not become incorporated into the personal property of that state, but was there temporarily only.' In other words, here, as in the prior case, there was no actual situs of the vessel. She had not become commingled with the general property of the state, and was therefore subject to taxation at the artificial situs,-the port of her registry. In Wheeling, P. & C. Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273, 25 L. Ed. 412, Mr. Justice Clifford concludes his discussion with this statement (p. 285, L. Ed., p. 416): 'From which it state commerce, and remaining at such ports long enough to transact its business connected therewith." Where the home port of ferryboats, owned by an Illinois company and operated by it on the Mississippi river between the city of St. Louis and the opposite Illinois shore on which shore they are laid up when not in use, is in Illinois, and such boats do not remain at their St. Louis wharf or landing, their stay at which at any one time is limited by city ordinance to ten minutes, long enough to become incorporated in the personal property situated in St. Louis, they cannot be taxed by the city." follows, as a necessary consequence, that the enrollment of a ship or vessel does not exempt the owner of the same from taxation for his interest in the ship or vessel as property, upon a valuation of the same, as in the case of other personal property.' Of course, if the enrollment does not exempt vessels from taxation as other personal property, the place of enrollment, whether within or without the state in which the property is actually situated, is immaterial, for other like property is taxable at its actual situs. So far as the state authorities are concerned, reference may be made to Lott v. Mobile Trade Co., 43 Ala. 578; National Dredging Co. v. State, 99 Ala. 462, 12 So. 720; Northwestern Lumber Co. V. Chehalis County, 25 Wash. 95, 54 L. R. A. 212, 87 Am. St. Rep. 747, 64 Pac. 909. Our conclusion is that where vessels, though engaged in interstate commerce, are employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a state, they are subject to taxation in that state, although they may have been registered or enrolled at a port outside its limits. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 49 L. Ed. 1059, 3 Ann. Cas. 1100, aff 'g 102 Va. 576, 102 Am. St. Rep. 855, 46 S. E. 783. See also Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 50 L. Ed. 1082, 6 Ann. Cas. 205; Com. v. Hays, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1; gaged in interstate or foreign com- Taxing a vessel at the domicile of the owner, where such vessel has not acquired an actual situs elsewhere, does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 56 L. Ed. 96. 7 St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423, 20 L. Ed. 192. |