tic appointment, transferred such certificates under authority of his foreign appointment.* § 4656. Stock owned by nonresident in foreign corporation. A state cannot collect an inheritance tax on shares of stock in foreign corporations, even though such corporations have property within its borders, when such shares, owned by a nonresident testator, were bequeathed to nonresident legatees.5 An inheritance tax cannot be imposed on shares of stock in a nonresident corporation which passes under the will of a nonresident testator and not by virtue of any law of the taxing state, since the court is without jurisdiction of the subject-matter. § 4657. Exemption of charitable, religious and educational corporations. In imposing a succession tax, "the legislature," says the erty until his death, are subject to the inheritance tax laws of Wisconsin (In re Bullen's Estate, 143 Wis. 512, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1114, 128 N. W. 109), and the collection of such tax does not violate either the contract clause of, or the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Federal Constitution. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 60 L. Ed. 830. That the mere physical presence within the state of certificates of nonresident-owned shares of stock in foreign corporations will not render such shares subject to the Massachusetts succession tax, see Clark v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 218 Mass. 292, 105 N. E. 1055. 4 Stock in a domestic corporation owned by a nonresident is subject to the Massachusetts succession tax, even though the certificates are in the state of the deceased's residence and are transferred by the executor under authority of his appointment in such state prior to his appointment in Massachusetts. Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205, 53 N. E. 372. 5 See Oakman v. Small, 282 Ill. 360, 118 N. E. 775. In a recent Idaho case, the court said: "From the foregoing discussion the following deductions may be [the decedent] made. First, was, at the time of his death, a resi VII Priv. Corp.-61 dent of the state of New York; second, the inheritance with respect to which the tax is sought to be exacted consists of stock in a foreign corporation which is the owner of the stock of another foreign corporation which is the owner of property in Idaho, and, as such, is personal property subject to descent and inheritance according to the laws of succession of the state of his domicile; third, our law provides for the collection of an inheritance tax only in cases where it is within the jurisdiction of the state to govern the transfer of property passing by will or by the intestate laws of Idaho; fourth, an inheritance tax is not a property tax, but is a bonus exacted by the state for the privilege granted by its laws of inheriting property on the death of its owner; fifth, the state of Idaho in this case granted no privilege of inheritance, nor has it been, nor will it be, necessary to ask its permission or invoke the aid of its laws to transfer the property in question by inheritance. We conclude that the state of Idaho is without right to exact an inheritance tax in this case." State v. Dunlap, 28 Idaho 784, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 546, 156 Pac. 1141. 6 Oakman v. Small, 282 Ill. 360, 118 N. E. 775. Supreme Court of Illinois, "may consider the relation which the person or corporation given the right of succession sustains to the deceased, to the property or to the state, and may regulate the amount of the tax to be required in view of such relation, and in exercising this power may lay a tax on the right of one class of persons or corporations to take and may deem it wise to impose no tax upon the right of other classes of persons or corporations to take. Embraced within the power possessed by the legislature to abrogate the right to take is the power to qualify that right and to impose conditions and burdens upon it. If a burden in the nature of taxation is laid upon the right, the constitutional principle that taxes must be uniform as to the classes upon which they operate must be observed. Subject to this restriction the legislature may lay taxes upon the right of one class of persons and corporations to succeed to property of deceased persons and exempt the right of other classes of persons or corporations from such taxation." foreign charitable corporations may be required to pay a collateral inheritance tax, even though charitable corporations of domestic origin are exempt therefrom, without violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. So, In the matter of the construction of an exemption clause in an inheritance-tax statute generally, the courts are not altogether in harmony, some holding that such clause should receive a liberal construction, and others, that it should be strictly construed.10 There is In re Speed's Estate, 216 Ill. 23, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189, 74 N. E. 809, aff'd 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. Ed. 314. A collateral inheritance tax not being a tax on property, an exemption from taxation of "all personal property of orphan asylums and other charitable institutions" is not an exemption of such institutions from such a tax. Miller's Ex'r v. Com., 27 Gratt. (Va.) 110. 8 Humphreys v. State, 70 Ohio St. 67, 65 L. R. A. 776, 101 Am. St. Rep. 888, 1 Ann. Cas. 233, 70 N. E. 957. 9 Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. Ed. 314, 8 Ann. Cas. 157, aff'g 216 Ill. 23, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189, 74 N. E. 809. 10The taxation of inheritances is a form of special taxation. In re Euston's Estate, 113 N. Y. 174, 21 N. * one rule of construction, however, which seems to be fairly well settled, and that one is to the effect that an exemption of religious, educational and charitable "corporations," without more, does not extend to foreign corporations of such character, but is limited in its operation to corporations created by the state enacting the statute." "It is a universally accepted rule of construction," says the 69 Atl. 779, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 733; In re Graves' Estate, 171 N. Y. 40, 63 N. E. 787; In re Harbecks' Estate, 161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 850; In re Mergentine's Estate, 195 N. Y. 572, 88 N. E. 1125; In re Kerr's Estate, 159 Pa. 512, 28 Atl. 354. It is held in other jurisdictions that the rule of strict construction should be applied (In re Bull's Estate, 153 Cal. 715, 96 Pac. 366; English v. Crenshaw, 120 Tenn. 531, 110 S. W. 210, 17 L. R. A. [N. S.] 753, 127 Am. St. Rep. 1025); and in still others that such statutes should be given a reasonable and liberal interpretation with a view to effectuate the intention of the legislature (State v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11, 106 N. W. 93, 6 L. R. A. [N. S.] 732, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056; State v. Vance, 97 Minn. 532, 106 N. W. 98; In re Gordon's Estate, 186 N. Y. 471, 79 N. E. 722, 10 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1089)." re Curtis' Estate, 88 Vt. 445, 92 Atl. 965. In A devise of realty to a Masonic lodge is not subject to a collateral inheritance tax under the Iowa statute when it appears that all money that the lodge receives is used either to meet its expenses or for charity; that a standing committee of charity is maintained, and that no member of the lodge receives back any of the money which he pays in unless he becomes a charity member, such lodge under these facts being a "charitable institution." Morrow v. Smith, 145 Iowa 514, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 696, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 1183, 124 N. W. 316. The estate of a decedent who has bequeathed all of his property to char ities is not relieved from payment of the inheritance tax by the fact that property held for charitable purposes is exempt from taxation, the inheritance tax being a tax not on the property passing but on the right of succeeding thereto. In re Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa. St. 72, 46 Atl. 269. It may be doubted whether a university's charter exemption of donations by its founder extends to the collateral inheritance tax based on such part of the founder's estate as, under his will, passes to the university. In re Packer's Estate (Appeal of Lehigh University), 246 Pa. 131, 92 Atl. 75. The Supreme Court of Vermont, the statute of which state in terms lays the tax on the beneficiary and not on the legacy or distributive share, has declared, in view of the favor with which the state has always regarded public charities, that it entertained "no doubt that exemptions from inheritance taxes, so far as they relate to public charities, should be regarded with favor. Reasons of public policy no less patent than those requiring strict construction of statutes exempting from general taxation demand liberality in dealing with exemptions relating to charitable legacies. The settled policy of the legislature to encourage such charities should not be defeated by an overtechnical and unnecessary construction, but such construction should be given, if consistent with the language of the statute, as will reasonably effectuate this policy." In re Curtis' Estate, 88 Vt. 445, 92 Atl. 965. 11 In re Speed's Estate, 216 Ill. Supreme Court of Illinois, "that an act of the general assembly of a state granting powers, privileges or immunities to corporations must be held to apply only to corporations created under the authority of that state over which such state has the power of visitation and control, unless the intent that the act shall apply to other than domestic corporations is plainly expressed in the terms of the act." 12 It has been held, however, that a religious corporation, chartered in different states, among them New York, is a domestic corporation in the latter state and as such exempt from the operation of the New York transfer law, notwithstanding the fact that the will, in naming the corporation, also names its principal office which is in one of the other states.13 23, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189, 74 N. E. 809, aff'd 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. Ed. 314; In re Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 18 L. R. A. 713, 32 N. E. 1091. See also In re Balleis' Estate, 144 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. 1007. The exemption in the New Jersey statute of charitable institutions does not extend to such institutions when they are of foreign origin. Alfred University v. Hancock, 69 N. J. Eq. 470, 46 Atl. 178, followed in In re Rothschild's Estate, 71 N. J. Eq. 210, 63 Atl. 615, aff'd 72 N. J. Eq. 425, 65 Atl. 1118. See also In re Gopsill's Estate, 77 N. J. Eq. 215, 77 Atl. 793. Boards and societies and auxiliaries thereto, which are incorporated and organized under the laws of other states, for "purposes of purely public charity or other exclusively public purposes," are not institutions" of that class in Ohio within the meaning of the Ohio statute; and where they are entitled to receive property within the jurisdiction of Ohio by deed of gift, bequest, or devise, such gift, bequest or devise is liable to a collateral inheritance tax, although some of the charitable work, operations, and enterprises of the institutions are carried on within the state. Humphreys v. State, 70 Ohio St. 67, 65 L. R. A. 776, 101 Am. St. Rep. 888, 1 Ann. Cas. 233, 70 N. E. 957. The exemption in the Massachusetts statute, imposing a tax on collateral legacies and successions, of "charitable, educational or religious societies or institutions, the property of which is exempt by law from taxation" is confined to societies the property of which is exempt from taxation by the laws of Massachusetts. Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 26 L. R. A. 259, 38 N. E. 512, followed in Rice v. Bradford, 180 Mass. 545, 63 N. E. 7. See also Batt v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 209 Mass. 319, 95 N. E. 784, following Rice v. Bradford, supra; Davis v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 208 Mass. 343, 94 N. E. 556. A bequest, nominally, to the Salvation Army, a foreign corporation, but, in effect, to an Iowa branch of such Army, is exempt under the Iowa statute. In re Crawford's Estate, 148 Iowa 60, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 992, 126 N. W. 774. 12 In re Speed's Estate, 216 Ill. 23, 108 Am. St. Rep. 189, 74 N. E. 809, aff'd 203 U. S. 553, 51 L. Ed. 314. See also, to the same effect, In re Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 18 L. R. A. 713, 32 N. E. 1091. 13 In re Lyon's Estate, 144 N. Y. App. Div. 104, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1004. § 4658. Valuation. The value of nonresident-owned shares of stock in a New York railroad company, for the purposes of the New York transfer tax, is to be determined by the value of the whole of the company's property even though more than half of such property is located without the state. 14 On the other hand, the distribution of the property of a railroad company incorporated in New York and also in a foreign state may be such as to render it proper to value the stock of a nonresident decedent, for the purposes of the New York transfer tax, as representing only the portion of the corporate property that is located in New York.15 14 In re Palmer's Estate, 183 N. Y. 238, 76 N. E. 16. 15 In re Cooley's Estate, 186 N. Y. 220, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1010, 78 N. E. 939. See also Gardiner v. Carter, 74 N. H. 507, 69 Atl. 939. the amount of it may be made dependent to a greater or less extent upon the value of property. It is very plainly shown in Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, 44 L. Ed. 998, that property which is not taxable as such may constitutionally be considered under a statute, in fixing the amount of an excise tax. Without deciding that the legislature could not constitutionally include, in the value of the stock for the purpose of fixing this tax all property of the corporation wherever situated, we are of opinion that its value for this purpose was intended to be limited by the value of the franchise and property which it specially represents within this commonwealth. In a sense, the stock in each state may be said to represent all the property of the corporation in different states. But the principal reasons for a local act of incorporation in each state relate only to the property in that state. As a domestic corporation, in a strict sense, it is confined to the state which gives it its charter, and when there is also a similar act of incorporation in another state where it has property and does business in the same way, the rights, privileges and obligations which belong peculiarly to domestic corporations should be only those which are recognized in the state where the franchise is granted. So far as the jurisdiction of a state to In Kingsbury v. Chapin, 196 Mass. 533, 13 Ann. Cas. 738, 82 N. E. 700, which involved the validity of the Massachusetts succession tax as applied to shares of stock in certain railroad companies, one of which was the same company whose shares of stock were involved in In re Cooley's Estate, supra, the court after quoting from such case and stating that "a similar view was taken in State v. Metz, 32 N. J. Law 199,'' said: "It is contended by the petitioners that, with any other construction, the statute, in its application to a case like this, would be unconstitutional, and they refer to the cases in which it is decided that, in assessing a property á tax upon a corporation, the property owned by it in another state and the franchise conferred by another state cannot be included in fixing its value. The collection of a tax levied on such a basis would be a taking of property without due process of law. The present case concerns the imposition of an excise tax upon the privilege of passing the title to property on the death of its owner. It is not a property tax, but strictly an excise or franchise tax, although |