the Presidency in the most sweeping and the most direct terms. Then I would state the presumption, as I stated it here with respect to legislation. I am not saying that the President doesn't have power to impound. But I am saying whatever power he has must derive from legislation.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congressman Eckhardt, for a brilliant and informative statement.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conte, would you come forward?

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVIO O. CONTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. CONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to express my appreciation to you and to the distinguished members of this committee for providing me with the opportunity to testify on the vital issue of impoundment of appropriated funds.

Lately, the press has been playing up what they call the "crisis in the Congress." They say that the Congress, often by its own inaction, has allowed a multitude of its powers and responsibilities to pass into the hands of the Executive. Two of the primary areas discussed are the warmaking power and the executive practice of impoundment. We are here today to discuss the latter.

In a sense, the press is right. Congress has allowed a very significant portion of its responsibilities and powers to slip away. The time has come for the Congress to sit up and take a hard look at itself. I believe that we are starting to do this. These hearings and the various impoundment bills are a step in this process.

One realization we must come to is that the Congress doesn't have to do that much to reassert itself. If we take some affirmative actions such as placing strict controls on the practice of impoundment, seriously scrutinizing the activities of the Office of Management and Budget, and working, at the same time, to put our own fiscal house in order, we will have come a long way toward making the Congress the coequal branch it is supposed to be.

As a member of the House Appropriations Committee, I am deeply concerned about the practice of impoundment. The Appropriations Committees in the House and in the Senate spend literally thousands of man-hours putting together the appropriations bills.

The President signs these bills into law, and then refuses to spend some of the appropriated funds. In the interest of economy, the Executive has assumed a selective veto over programs which he views as being ineffective or undesirable. I believe that you will all agree with me that these are judgments for the Congress, not the Executive, to make.

We in Congress have always refused to give the President a selective veto. Yet, by allowing the practice of impoundment to continue, we have effectively given him this power. The time has come for us to say, "No more!"

While the practice of impoundment is not unique to this administration, it is now becoming a problem of immense proportions. As

you are all aware, the early days of this Congress were punctuated with almost daily reports of programs being cut back or eliminated. This was all done and is still being done, without any consultation with the Congress.

The funds that have been impounded were authorized and appropriated by law. It is the President's job to execute these laws, not to frustrate the intent of the lawmakers.

Recently the Congress received OMB's report on the funds which the administration has impounded, Now that we have that report, the Congress has a choice of doing two things. One-sit and wring its hands proclaiming how terrible it is that the President is refusing to support these programs and activities funded by law. Or, two-act as quickly as possible to restrict Presidential impoundments. I believe that we must follow the latter course.

On January 3, I introduced the Congressional Spending Power Act (H.R. 415). My bill, which presently has 28 cosponsors, approaches the problem of restricting impoundments differently than other proposals which provides for congressional approval after the fact of impoundment.

My bill provides that the President shall not impound any funds unless and until he first obtains the specific approval of the Congress. However, it does provide for an expedited procedure for the President to have his request to impound funds considered by the Congress. There are several reasons for my adoption of a different approach. First, I wanted to insure that the entire Congress would have the opportunity to take affirmative action on proposed impoundments. When we speak of impoundments, we are speaking of appropriations which were enacted into law by the full Congress. The full Congress, therefore, is entitled to have a voice on the question of whether its earlier enactments should be reversed. We must not allow that reversal to result from a committee's failure to act, whether that failure be deliberate or the result of the press of other business.

Second, I wanted to include a prohibition against the reimpounding of funds after the 60-day period had expired, or after the Congress had specifically disapproved the impoundment. This would prevent the President from impounding funds for the entire year simply by reimpounding them.

The third major difficulty is related to those funds which are required to be obligated or spent by the close of the fiscal year. In such cases the Executive could impound funds so late in the fiscal year that the Congress may not have an opportunity to disapprove of the impoundment before the funds are lost.

As you know, the end of the fiscal year is a time when substantial expenditures, grants and obligations are made. My bill would insure that these funds are not lost by requiring the prior consent of the Congress to an impoundment. This would also cover those rare instances when Congress is in recess at the end of a fiscal year.

The fourth problem I saw with other proposals was that it might be possible to misconstrue the authority to impound funds, pending congressional action, as authority to reduce the expenditure of the appropriations pro rata for that portion of the year between Presidential impoundment and congressional disapproval.

To illustrate this last problem, suppose that $12 million was appropriated for a program. Let us also suppose that the President chooses to impound the funds and that the Congress rejects the impoundment at the end of the 60-day period.

At this time the President would have to spend the funds. The problem is that the President could argue that he would only have to spend $10 million of the appropriation because his 2-month impoundment was authorized by law.

These are the reasons I chose the approach that I did. By requiring that the President obtain congressional approval before he impounds any funds rather than afterward, the problems I have mentioned can be avoided. Further, the President will have his desire to impound funds considered by the full Congress on a priority basis.

I believe that my Congressional Spending Power Act is a reasonable and workable proposal. It places the power of the purse back in the hands of the Congress where it belongs, and it gives the President a reasonable means to have his views on the spending of Federal money considered without undue delay.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that I am not here as an advocate of irresponsible spending on the part of the Congress. Nor do I believe that impoundment is never appropriate. There are times when money should be impounded because the money cannot be used effectively during the fiscal year. There are times that money should no longer be spent on ineffective programs. However, we must also recognize that, with this power, come responsibilities.

This responsibility should not deter us, Mr. Chairman, but we must never forget that we do have it.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Conte, that is a brilliant statement. You seem to be advocating as nearly as possible a direct step toward solving this complex question. You are probably familiar with the Mahon bill and the other bills.

Considering your bill as compared to the other bills you are familiar with, would you classify your bill as a Conte-Mahon bill?

Mr. CONTE. NO.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a Conte-Pickle-Pepper bill, or a Conte-Eckhardt bill?

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Eckhardt is one of my cosponsors. I introduced the first bill in the 93d Congress on January 3. As I mentioned, I have 28 cosponsors. I testified before Senator Ervin's subcommittee. 3 or 4 weeks ago and, since that time, he changed his bill. He has taken some parts of our bill and incorporated them in his bill. The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "our bill”?

Mr. CONTE. The bill I filed with the cosponsors, H.R. 415. However, Senator Ervin still doesn't accept the requirement of prior affirmative action by the Congress. His bill calls for the congressional consent after the fact of impoundment.

I think this is very very important. I do not think the Mahon bill will adequately meet the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Young?

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the able gentleman from Massachusetts for a very fine statement.

Do you serve on the Joint Budget Committee?

Mr. CONTE. No; I do not.

Mr. YOUNG. It would be interesting to see what that approach would be, whether it would amount to establishing a ceiling by the Congress, whether it would amount to submitting a separate budget, separate and apart from the Executive's budget.

Mr. CONTE. I would like to digress a bit. I know this is not within the jurisdiction of this committee, but I hope that the Joint Committee on the Budget recommends the adoption of a unified budget similar to the one now used in California. I believe this would be far superior to the present practice of presenting 13 subcommittee bills. I don't see how the Congress can set a ceiling of $268.7 billion when each separate subcommittee brings in its own budget. If you had all 13 appropriations subcommittees meet in executive session to draft a full, unified budget which could be presented to the Congress, the Appropriations Committee could say: "This is our budget of $268.7 billion and we have to live within that ceiling."

Then if somebody wants to amend the bill, to add $1 billion for a program, the Congress would have to take $1 billion out of some other program. I think that is the only way Congress will ever be able to enact a spending ceiling.

Mr. YOUNG. I agree with the gentleman. You might set a ceiling but it wouldn't last very long.

Mr. CONTE. It wouldn't last very long at all. Many years ago, I nicknamed the chairmen of Appropriations Subcommittees "the 13 Cardinals." Each one feels that his little fiefdom shouldn't be touched by anyone. He takes a very paternal interest over his particular subcommittee.

I think it is just disastrous to present the Federal Budget in piecemeal as we do today.

Mr. YOUNG. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anderson.

Mr. ANDERSON. One question by way of clarification. You are suggesting, in other words, that the Appropriations Committee then be completely bypassed in voting on these impoundment questions, that it come directly to the floor? I am referring to your Congressional Spending Power Act, H.R. 415.

Mr. CONTE. Do you mean the impoundment?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes.

Mr. CONTE. Yes; it would go right to the floor.

Mr. ANDERSON. That would be a privileged resolution?

Mr. CONTE. Yes; a privileged resolution. It would be the fastest way of presenting the question for the consideration of the entire Congress. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pepper?

Mr. PEPPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish warmly to commend the able gentleman from Massachusetts. He has made a splendid statement. He has presented a more novel approach. I wasn't aware of the provisions of his bill.

You do not allow the President, under your bill, to impound any funds unless and until he first obtains a specific approval of the Congress.

Mr. CONTE. You are exactly right.

Mr. PEPPER. In your statement you say you have a brief method, an expeditious method, by which that permission may be obtained. Would you tell me briefly what that is?

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Anderson touched on it. It is a privileged resolution which could be considered immediately to the floor.

Mr. PEPPER. Did you fix any time in which the Congress must act? Mr. CONTE. Sixty days.

Mr. PEPPER. In other words, if the President finds that conditions have changed or there are circumstances which should cause him to ask the Congres if they wouldn't agree to modify the appropriations, for example, that he would otherwise be obligated to carry out, he would present that request to the Congress and if they don't act within that time, of course, he is not authorized to do it?

Mr. CONTE. That is exactly right.

Mr. PEPPER. I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Quillen.

Mr. QUILLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Conte, it is always refreshing to have the benefit of your views. Let me ask you this one question: If you had a Congress on a runaway spending binge, so to speak, how could the President reduce spending when the Congress appropriated the funds, authorized the various programs, and then it comes back immediately to the floor? How could the President refrain from spending any funds or prevent the spending?

Mr. CONTE. You are saying you don't have confidence in the Congress. The Congress goes to the people every 2 years. They are the closest thing to the people. If they are irresponsible and if they are going to waste the taxpayers' money, the taxpayers have the greatest vehicle in the world to repudiate their actions: the ballot box.

Mr. QUILLEN. I asked you a question, I am not saying.

Mr. CONTE. That is what I am saying. The President has the tool; he has the veto power. He did it twice with the Labor-HEW appropriations. We sent him two Labor-HEW appropriations bills. We still don't have one now in March. We sent the first one to the White House and he thought it was too big. The subcommittee sat down and drafted another Labor-HEW appropriations bill. This bill was passed by both the House and Senate. We then sent the second bill to the President. He vetoed that one too.

Now the Congress has sent him a continuing resolution. He has accepted the continuing resolution. The President has a number of tools. Believe me, he has many more tools than the House of Representatives. I feel very strongly about the House. I don't think this is a partisan issue. I don't think it is a political issue. This issue raises the question of whether you believe in the House of Representatives less than you believe in the executive branch of Government. I feel very strongly about this issue.

Mr. QUILLEN. Here is the thing. The situation I illustrated could occur under another administration.

Mr. CONTE. Certainly it could.

Mr. QUILLEN. I am not speaking particularly of this administration. Mr. CONTE. That is what I say.