majority of the House. Part of the rationale for my bill is to provide some flexibility.

Mr. LATTA. You are not saying as chairman of the Appropriations Committee that just because we pass an authorization bill of a number of dollars it is incumbent upon you and your great committee to appropriate every dollar of that money for expenditure?

Mr. MAHON. Certainly not.

We try to reduce appropriations wherever we can and we don't feel that it is required that the full authorization be provided. It rarely ever is.

Mr. LATTA. If we would spend what I have heard to be from $11 billion to $15 billion that has been withheld, as you know, the only way that we could pay for this would be to increase the national debt, borrow the money and pay interest on it, or raise taxes. Which are you suggesting today, Mr. Chairman, which course of action?

Mr. MAHON. In this legislation I am not suggesting any.

Mr. LATTA. I know you are not in this legislation, but we have to face up to the inevitable. I think that comes back to the statement you made this morning. "I am the first to plead guilty for the incompetence of the legislative branch." That is a pretty strong statement and that is your statement this morning.

Mr. MAHON. I didn't get what the gentleman said.

Mr. LATTA. I wrote this down because it really shook me up. You said this, not me. "I am the first to plead guilty for the incompetence of the legislative branch." Did you say that?

Mr. MAHON. No.

Mr. LATTA. Who said that? I wrote it down when the gentleman was testifying. Where did that statement come from?

Mr. MAHON. I don't know. I said that the Government, the legislative branch and the executive branch, have not done a good job in managing the fiscal affairs of the country. I said that.

Mr. LATTA. At the outset of your statement you made some preliminary remarks which shook me up. One thing you said was, "We must do a better job than we have done in the past," and then you followed it with this statement.

If you didn't make the statement, my ears deceived me and I will ask unanimous consent to strike it from the record.

Mr. MAHON. My memory is refreshed. Mr. Martin said the Congress was not doing its job, and I said I will not admit to the incompetence of Congress. Others may poor-mouth themselves but I would be the last to admit the incompetence of Congress.

Mr. LATTA. I am glad you set me straight on that. Mr. Chairman, because as a member of this body I didn't like that statement. I always like to feel like I am competent.

Let me ask you one question about something that is not in this bill. as to what we are going to have down the road, if we do go the course that you want us to take. Are we going to raise taxes or are we going to raise the national debt?

Mr. MAHON. I would hope that if we go down the road we will be sensible and sufficiently restrained and take whatever actions are necessary. This bill only gives us the vehicle to work our will. Why shouldn't we have the vehicle?

Under the present situation the debt is going up this year $34 billion, up next year, according to the budget, $30 billion. I just don't know how long the Executive wants to make recommendations of that kind, and whether or not it might be desirable to try to provide additional revenues or make reductions otherwise in certain programs. That is the matter to be worked out by the Congress and the Executive in their wisdom.

Mr. LATTA. In conclusion. let me just say in my humble judgment you have the best vehicle as chairman of the Appropriations Committee to work the will of this Congress and to hold down these expenditures. You have that vehicle. All you have to do is use it.

Mr. MAHON. In handling these bills for the last 20 years we have cut requested budget authority by about $100 billion.

Mr. LATTA. But we have put into that budget 75 percent mandated expenditures that we couldn't get around.

Mr. MAHON. The Appropriations Committee does not mandate spending, generally speaking.

Mr. LATTA. Right. Congress does that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the first time I have heard about raising taxes today. I didn't take up any time with questions so I am just going to make this statement: All they have to do is start working on closing some big, fabulous, fraudulent loopholes and we wouldn't have to raise taxes and we could take care of everybody.

Mr. Pepper.

Mr. PEPPER. Article I, section 7 of the Constitution, provides that every bill that shall pass the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President of the United States. It later provides an opportunity in the House and Senate to reconsider the bill in case of a veto.

Then it says if approved by two-thirds of both Houses. "it shall become a law."

That is the veto power that the President has under the Constitution. If both Houses overcome the veto, then the Constitution provides it shall become law.

In article II, section 3, of the Constitution, it provides of the President, "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

If the President's contention were justified would he ever need to veto a bill? He could just say, "I am not going to enforce it. Go ahead and pass it, if you want to." He wouldn't bother to veto it, he just wouldn't enforce it.

The President's prerogative is to recommend to the Congress that laws be changed. In article II of section 3, it talks about the President and says:

He shall from time to time give to the Congress information on the State of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

The Constitution provides that if the President doesn't like a law his prerogative is not to ignore it or terminate it, but to recommend to the Congress that it be changed, modified or repealed, or that it go to the court to ask the court to strike it down.

Does the able chairman agree with that?

Mr. MAHON. I don't think that any deep students of the Constitution would say that the President has the authority to repeal the acts of Congress or, as a general proposition, in a wholesale manner, fail to carry out the expressed will of Congress by legislation which has been enacted with his approval or by having been passed over his veto. Otherwise, the American system breaks down and you don't have the American system as we have traditionally thought of it.

Mr. PEPPER. Do we not find some hesitance on the part of Presidents that they recognize the superiority of the Congress in this area by the fact that they have relied upon and recognized authority under the Anti-Deficiency Act? Haven't they exercised the authority granted by Congress to impound funds, withhold and transfer funds under the Anti-Deficiency Act passed by the Congress?

Mr. MAHON. I would assume that consideration has been given to the authority provided in the Anti-Deficiency Act which provides and permits certain impoundments. But the bounds of reasonableness have been overstepped.

Mr. PEPPER. I know. Nevertheless, they have recognized the power of Congress to give them authority to impound. Therefore, they recognize the superiority of the Congress in that sphere by the very fact that they relied upon an act of Congress in impounding and transferring certain funds.

Mr. MAHON. The gentlemen makes a good point.

Mr. PEPPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clawson.

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Mahon, on page 3 of your statement this morning you indicated that the President was acting within the law and certainly constitutionally when he impounded funds, and you indicated that the President does have this, under certain, special circumstances. Mr. MAHON. When he impounded which funds?

Mr. CLAWSON. In your statement we find this comment :

Which provide for the impoundment of funds by the President under special or certain circumstances, and then you say,

I believe it is fundamentally desirable for the Executive to have limited powers of impoundment in the interest of responsible financial management.

In this connection, the bill before us that you have authored provides for the Congress to even override the President even in these limited areas where he has this power and responsibility for proper fiscal management, does it not?

Mr. MAHON. It gives Congress the authority to override any impoundment, I agree.

Mr. CLAWSON. Whether it is within this limited area that you confine the President or whether it is in the broad area?

Mr. MAHON. I believe that it would. I certainly don't believe that Congress would take any such action nor should it take any such action if he is within the limits of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Mr. CLAWSON. I wish I had that much faith in this Congress. Mr. Chairman, that they wouldn't act in this manner. I think they might do that very thing. You are taking away from the President one of the very limited powers where you restrict him in this area and giving it to Congress.

Mr. MAHON. He still has that power.

Mr. CLAWSON. But we have the power to veto.

Mr. MAHON. We have the power to veto an impoundment and we should have the last word in case of controversy over a matter involving the purse. That is our authority under the Constitution.

Mr. CLAWSON. That takes away, then, this limited and special power that has been given to the President under the acts you quote of 1905, 1906, and 1950.

Mr. MAHON. I don't consider it takes away the basic right that he has under existing law. In the exercise of that right if Congress desires to prohibit an impoundment that might be covered, it has that authority to do so. But it would not take away the right of the President to make the impoundment.

Mr. CLAWSON. It gives Congress the power to overrule that limited right that he has?

Mr. MAHON. In specific instances the right to overrule.

Mr. CLAWSON. It seems to me that the approach here is a very negative approach rather than a positive one in the legislation before us. I believe that we could use a positive approach by Congress taking the other direction, of controlling these expenditures rather than just having the power of veto.

Mr. MAHON. The President is required under the Anti-deficiency Act, when he is not going to spend funds, to submit a recision request to Congress. Past Presidents have not done this as a general rule. He has done it in a few instances, I believe, but that has not been the case normally. This bill is not going to solve all of our fiscal problems. It just faces one issue that should have been dealt with a long time ago. Mr. CLAWSON. I think it is going to aggravate our fiscal problems because there is no discipline, no restraint at all in this bill. There is no provision for restraints on the Congress. There is only a provision for making the President spend more money and no restraint or discipline on excessive spending.

Mr. MAHON. Discipline comes from the mind, from within, and from the attitudes of the Congress and the executive. You can't really enforce discipline in a bill very well. This bill, as I say, is procedural. It is not otherwise.

Mr. CLAWSON. It is more than just procedure, it seems to me, because you are going to discipline the President into mandatory spending.

Mr. MAHON. This bill does not mandate any spending at all. Mr. CLAWSON. It has the potential for it with the concurrent resolution that is to be provided later on.

Mr. MAHON. It can be used as the Congress might desire to use the legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Matsunaga?

DISAPPROVAL OF EITHER HOUSE VERSUS CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Mr. MATSUNAGA. You have asked for an open rule. Is it not true that under the Administration Reorganization Act any proposal of the President may be vetoed by one of the two Houses? What if we were to offer an amendment to change your bill to provide that the veto

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power be vested not in the Congress acting by the two Houses by concurrent resolution, but by disapproval of either of the two Houses? Would such an amendment be acceptable to the gentleman?

Mr. MAHON. When you come to the matter of resolving a problem between the legislative and executive branch you need the full weight of the Congress, which means the full weight of the House and the Senate. One body should not act for the Congress.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. But that is the case in the Reorganization Act, is it not, where one body can veto the action of the President? Why couldn't that be taken as the precedent for this bill?

Mr. MAHON. Disagreement in this area, to some extent, involves a showdown of the power of the Congress versus the executive over money. I don't want the other body speaking exclusively for me, and I don't think the other body wants us speaking exclusively for them in this very sensitive area of control and power of the purse. Money means almost everything in government.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. But in the case of money, the Constitution, I believe, vests the right in the Congress to appropriate, to authorize and appropriate funds, and it is within the jurisdiction of the President to carry out the laws as passed by the Congress.

In the case of the Administrative Reorganization Act we have a situation where the plan is delving into something strictly procedural, practically, that is, strictly within the workings of the executive and yet we retain for ourselves the power to veto any of his proposals in reorganization matters by the action of only one of the two bodies. Why should we not follow that pattern? I would think that we have a stronger case here for vetoing by one body only.

Mr. MAHON. The Legislative Reorganization Act, as I understand it, provides that the President can submit a reorganization proposal, and it affirmatively goes into operation unless one of the Houses votes to the contrary.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Yes. Isn't this the same proposition?

Mr. MAHON. I don't consider that this is on all fours with that kind of a situation.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. But we are saying, under your bill, Mr. Chairman, aren't we, that the President may go ahead and impound but needs to report to the Congress within 10 days and within 60 days the Congress may, by concurrent resolution, veto that proposal. That is the same thing as in the Reorganization Act. We authorize one body to veto in the case of matters pertaining strictly to the administration, the executive.

Here now we are dealing with matters of expenditure of authorization and appropriation of funds, which is a matter for the Congress to decide. Yet, you propose that we do it by concurrent resolution, not grant the power to one of the two bodies.

Mr. MAHON. Only the two bodies can act really for the Congress, in my opinion. I think every member should reserve to himself the right to participate in the fundamental issues confronting the country. Maybe we ought to have a look at the Reorganization Act under which we now operate.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Long?