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the bandits had their agents in Athens, and persons with whom they were to share the booty. Upon the body of one of the brigands, who was killed, was found a letter, signed, as is believed, in a feigned name, and dated a month or two before the event, upon the 27th of February, in which he speaks of himself as holding an office in the public service at Athens; and he is so spoken of in a letter from Colonel Theagénis to M. Zaïmis, the Prime Minister. He says, 'It evidently comes from some one in the public service.' The man speaks of himself as having been prevented from going to see the brigands by being called back to Athens, where MM. Coussei have nominated him to another post. This, as it appears to me, is an extraordinary state of things. The Minister is continually putting it forward that he finds there are two sets of people in Athens communicating with the brigands, the Government and their agents, and other people and their agents. All this is going on and nothing whatever is done, as far as I can see, to find it out and prevent it, or to get hold of the people who do it, and punish them; and all this ends, as the House will see, in the destruction of those unhappy Englishmen. There was a failure" he said, in the performance of those public duties which devolve upon a country like Greece, and he showed that "the concurrent judgment of our own Minister in Greece, of our own Minister at home, and of public opinion in Greece itself, all tended to fix the responsibility for this calamity upon the Government of Greece." And more that Government had virtually admitted their responsibility, and accepted the whole control and management of the measures for the release of the prisoners, undertaking, practically, to be answerable for the result. After referring to what he said was, perhaps, one of the most remarkable events which has happened in the communications of civilized nations, the fact that the brigands had absolutely written a letter addressed to the Minister of the two insulted powers, and obliged England and Italy to send them an answer, he urged that the Greek Government had really, by its blundering incapacity, and by precipitating a collision between the troops and the brigands-contrary to its solemn pledges-made itself doubly culpable for the event, which he described as a "wrong suffered by this country from the Greek Government." After some touching words on the character and conduct of the victims, he said, in conclusion, "If this terrible calamity which we to-day deplore should have the effect of producing a better state of things in Greece, we shall not be without consolation. I cannot but express my opinion that this is an opportunity which this country may most legitimately use this country which, even as one of the protecting powers, might well interpose-to urge on Greece the necessity of putting an end to this anarchy. And the rights which this opportunity gives us of remonstrance, and more than remonstrance, are such that I own that to me it will be a disappointment if, in the result, it should not happen that, in addition to those strict inquiries after the guilty, and the punishment of the guilty if they are detected, which have

already been demanded-in addition to that reparation which the Greek Government has offered to the only persons connected with this misfortune to whom, probably, any pecuniary reparation would be useful or acceptable-if our Government does not embrace this opportunity to impress on the Greek Government, in a manner that shall be effectual, the necessity and the duty of making the lives of British subjects and those in the employment of the British Crown safe hereafter in that country. I trust that her Majesty's Government will not think it amiss that the question should be publicly put to them which I now venture to ask— namely, whether they are able to state to the House what measures have been or will be taken to obtain from the Greek Government such satisfaction for this unprecedented outrage as her Majesty is entitled to claim according to the Law of Nations, and to ensure the due protection, for the future, of the lives of the diplomatic servants and other subjects of the British Crown within the kingdom of Greece."

Sir Henry Bulwer thought that Mr. Erskine might have been firmer, but attributed the massacre mainly to the rashness of Colonel Theagénis, the confidential agent of the Greek Government, who "was as much the murderer of the unhappy captives as if he had shot them dead with his own hand, which would have been a less cruel destiny. It may be said," he added, "that this officer had instructions with which Mr. Erskine was acquainted, and that if he did not act in the spirit of those instructions the Greek Government is not responsible. Nothing was easier than to give instructions to be shown to Mr. Erskine; but I am accustomed to look for the real instructions given to an agent in that agent's conduct. Besides, Colonel Theagénis has neither been disgraced nor reproved. There is nothing to disconnect him with those who employed him, and therefore I am justified in saying, that the real murderers of Mr. Herbert, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Vyner, and the Italian Secretary of Legation, were the Greek Ministers. In fact, it appears to me that, from first to last, two parties have been playing their small game of ambition with the lives of our countrymen. Those who were out of office have been endeavouring to compromise those in power by instructing the brigands to make demands which, if granted, might lead to a Parliamentary attack; those who were in office have been determined to avoid giving their opponents this advantage, while they were at the same time anxious to gain some increase of their own authority and prestige by a victory over the outlaws who had been consulting with their rivals, without caring that that victory could only be purchased by the lives of a few foreigners, whether Italians or English." Distinguishing between the Greek Government and the Greek nation, of whose "brilliant qualities" he spoke with admiration founded on personal experience, he said that what was wanted was a real Government in Greece, though he believed a number of small republics would have been the form of government the best suited to the development of the Greek character. "If," he concluded, "we had left Greeee' alone,

or could leave Greece alone, I should not be hasty in advising us again to meddle with it. But we created it, we undertook its guardianship, and the result of our management of one of the most intelligent people on the face of the earth is, after forty years' experience, a complicated machinery of intrigue and plunder, in which the place-hunter and the bandit live alternately on the State and the traveller, and into which we are compelled to inquire by a massacre which the conscience of the Greek Ministers did not permit it to prevent, and a short-sighted view of their interests led them, I apprehend and believe, to connive at. It is under these circumstances that I say-let us not suppose it a duty as the friends of constitutional government to support a Government which is a mockery on Constitutions, but rather let us endeavour, with the sanction of European opinion, to found some system which may not destroy the germs of liberty, but leave them under the shelter of order and law, without the protection of which they can never develope themselves."

Mr. Gladstone, while acknowledging the gravity of the situation, and expressing his belief that there was no great likelihood of any difference of opinion in the House upon the subject, pleaded the necessity for further information before any decided steps could be taken. He defended Mr. Erskine's conduct in the matter, and trusted that redress might be obtained without charging all the mischief on the popular institutions of Greece. "This would have been," he said, "under any circumstances, an event filling us with grief and horror, and that grief and horror have been quickened in the minds of the Government and people of this country by the circumstances of deep and touching interest connected with the persons and characters of the victims of this outrage. But while to us it is a grievous and shocking tragedy, it appears likely to be a great event in the history of Greece. It must tend to an opening-up of circumstances connected with the condition of that country such as probably former times have never afforded an adequate occasion for bringing up. The nature and root of brigandage in Greece is of itself a subject of the utmost interest, because it connects itself with the political position of that country and with the unfortunate and, as it appears on occasions, the almost irresistible temptation, arising, perhaps, from the prevalence of national sympathies, to mix itself in quarrels in which it has no title to interfere that can be recognized by any principles of International Law. Then again comes the question as to what are the institutions of Greece, and I hope my right honourable friend will forgive me if I venture still to cherish a desire that we may be able to discover some other remedy for these mischiefs, and other guarantees against their recurrence in the future than that most unsatisfactory one, which I can only regard as a rough and ready proceeding to which many may be tempted who are friends of constitutional principles, and to which the enemies of constitutional principles will have the strongest predisposition—namely, that of

charging these faults upon the popular institutions of the country. I do not pretend to give any opinion as to the nature of the measures to be taken; but this I must say that, so far as I have ever been able to consider, the difficulty of Greece lies in the fact that the Turkish domination, which so long subsisted there, erased and effaced from Greek society all the natural influences of superior intelligence, education, rank, descent, and property, and left little but poverty on the face of the land. The consequence is that it is the class called upon to govern that is defective in Greece, far more than the class which is to be governed, and, consequently, the problem is a most difficult one, and will require the most grave consideration from the representatives of this country, which has peculiar obligations in respect of freedom in the face of Europe and the world, before they arrive at the conclusion that it is to popular institutions that this internal disorganization is to be ascribed." The first duty of the Government was to ascertain the facts absolutely, and then it would become their further duty carefully and comprehensively to consider what obligations arose out of a clear view of the facts. In acting on these obligations the safety, honour, and happiness of Greece must be consulted as well as the wounded feelings of England, and whatever served one end should serve both. "It is," he said in conclusion, " a consolation in these circumstances to think there are no selfish purposes to pursue, and no vengeful purposes, because the condition of Greece is such as to make it impossible that she should be, in the body of her people, a fitting object of punishment for the miscarriages or misconduct of her Government, provided we find ourselves in a condition to be able to obtain that best reparation which would consist in securities against the recurrence of similar evils."

In the House of Lords Lord Carnarvon whose cousin, Mr. Herbert, was among the victims, maintained that the Greek Government was in every way responsible for the tragedy. If they had not given the travellers assurances of safety, or if they had granted the amnesty, or if they had not moved troops, the catastrophe would not have occurred. As to Mr. Erskine he regretted that he should have ever given even a qualified consent to the movement of the troops; but he admitted that his position, "left alone and single-handed in the midst of a semi-barbarous people," was one of peculiar difficulty; and he had certainly exerted every effort to secure the release of the captives. If then the Greek Government were responsible, and took the wrong course, was there any motive for their action? "On the first blush," he said, "there is a great mystery. Here are Englishmen and an Italian taken by brigands. An enormous ransom is asked-25,0007.-enough to make this small band of twenty-one, rich men for the rest of their lives. The cash is absolutely there, all told out ready for their acceptance. The conditions offered to them are most reasonable, and, on the other hand, brigand law is perfectly well understood. The result of an attack upon brigands is certain, as Colonel Theagénis himself

acknowledged-and yet two days afterwards he makes that attack. Now, I say, on the first blush there is a mystery, and we are not altogether unjustified in asking what motives can be assigned for the course pursued by the Greek Government? Can you say that it was an error of judgment on their part? I wish I could reasonably think so. My belief is that whatever other merits or defects an Eastern people may have, stupidity is not generally one of them. They generally know pretty well what they are doing and what they mean to effect. Consider what the position of the Greek Government was. At the beginning of the month they had formally announced that brigandage through their exertions had been suppressed. They had staked their credit on this fact. A fortnight afterwards their statements are falsified by the capture of these unfortunate persons. We see by the papers that they were already being attacked on all sides. The Opposition threatened a violent attack. The English and Italian Ministers told them in so many words that they would be held responsible for all the consequences; and what did they see before them? They saw as the only probable solution of their difficulties that an English ship of war would transport the brigands elsewhere, and that they would ultimately be called upon to pay the ransom. They must have felt that they would be discredited; that the moment the Legislature met they would lose their places; but, on the other hand, that they would recover their reputation if by a sudden stroke they succeeded in restoring the prisoners to liberty, while they would avoid the payment of money under any circumstances, even if they failed and even if the prisoners fell victims to the brigands. These are strong inducements to men who are actuated by no high principle." He then proceeded to show how, in his opinion, the whole character and conduct of the Government gave colour to this explanation; and, after expressing his respect and sympathy for the King, alone "amid all the wretched scene of political devilry and social corruption," he ended by demanding what he believed the English people desired and claimed-" a full, clear, perfectly just trial of every single person, no matter what his rank or class, against whom there could be any fair suspicion of complicity with these foul murders."

Lord Clarendon, who made his last public appearance in connexion with this painful question, deprecated debate at the moment on the same grounds as Mr. Gladstone. The Government had made all possible exertion, and every information had been laid upon the table at the earliest moment. That very day he announced that a telegram had been received, with the news that seven of the brigands had that morning been condemned to death-investigations of great importance were being conducted at Athens-in Mr. Erskine's opinion as speedily as possible. Therefore, while the evidence was yet incomplete and the case not made up, he was not in a position to make to the House what must be a premature communication as to the course intended to be pursued. He defended his demand for