the affair is now, beyond all controversy, one between France and the King.

The French Government would, M. de Gramont went on to say, defer for a short time longer (for 24 hours, for instance) those great ostensible preparations for war (such as calling out the reserves) which would inflame public feeling in France. All essential preparations must, however, be carried out unremittingly. The French Ministers

would be unwise if they ran any risk of allowing Prussia to gain time by dilatory pretexts.

Finally, M. de Gramont told me that I might report to your Lordship that if the Prince of Hohenzollern should now, on the advice of the King of Prussia, withdraw his acceptance of the Crown, the whole affair would be at an end.

M. de Gramont did not, however, conceal from me that if, on the other hand, the Prince, after his conference with the King, persisted in coming forward as a candidate for the Throne of Spain, France would forthwith declare war against Prussia.

LORD LYONS TO EARL GRANVILLE.

(Received July 13.)
(Extract.)

Paris, July 12, 1870.

I have only time to report briefly to your Lordship, what passed at an interview with the Duc de Gramont, from which I have just returned.

The Duke said that the King of Prussia was neither courteous nor satisfactory. His Majesty disclaimed all connexion with the offer of the crown of Spain to the Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, and declined to advise the Prince to withdraw his acceptance. On the other hand, Prince Leopold's father had formally announced in the name of his son that the acceptance was withdrawn. In fact, the Prince had sent a copy of a telegram which he had despatched to Marshal Prim, declaring that his son's candidature was at an end.

M. de Gramont said that this state of things was very embarrassing to the French Government. On the one hand, public opinion was so much excited in France, that it was doubtful whether the Ministry would not be overthrown if it went down to the Chamber to-morrow, and announced that it regarded the affair as finished without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia. On the other hand, the renunciation of the Crown by Prince Leopold put an end to the original cause of the

dispute. The most satisfactory part of the affair was, M. de Gramont said, that Spain was, at all events, now quite clear of the dispute. The quarrel, if quarrel there was, was confined to France and Prussia.

I did not conceal from M. de Gramont my surprise and regret that the French Government should hesitate for a moment to accept the renunciation of the Prince as a settlement of the affair. I reminded him pointedly of the assurance which he had formally authorized me to give to Her Majesty's Government, that if the Prince withdrew his candidature the affair would be at an end. I urged as strongly as I could all the reasons which would render a withdrawal on his part from this assurance painful and disquieting to Her Majesty's Govern

ment.

I pointed out, moreover, that the renunciation wholly changed the position of France. If war occurred now, all Europe would say that it was the fault of France; that France rushed into it without any substantial cause-merely from pride and resentment. One of the advantages of the former position of France was that the quarrel rested on a cause in which the feelings of Germany were very little concerned, and German interests not at all. Now Prussia might well expect to rally all Germany to resist an attack which could be attributed to no other motives than illwill and jealousy on the part of France, and a passionate desire to humiliate her neighbour. In fact, I said France would have public opinion throughout the world against her, and her antagonist would have all the advantage of being manifestly forced into the war in self-defence to repel an attack. If there should at the first moment be some disappointment felt here in the Chamber and in the country, I could not but think that the Ministry would in a very short time stand better with both if it contented itself with the diplomatic triumph it had achieved, and abstained from plunging the country into war, for which there was certainly no avowable motive.

After some discussion, M. de Gramont said a final resolution must be come to at a Council which would be held in presence of the Emperor to-morrow, and the result must be announced to the Chamber immediately afterwards. By three o'clock to-morrow, then the public would know what course France would take. He should not, he said, be able to see me between the Council and his appearance in the Chamber, but he would assure me that due weight should be

given to the opinion I had given on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

LORD LYONS TO EARL GRANVILLE.
(Extract.)

M. de Gramont said he would explain to me in a few words the position taken up by the Government of the Emperor.

The Spanish ambassador had formally announced to him that the candidature of Prince Leopold had been withdrawn. This put an end to all question with Spain. Spain was no longer a party concerned. But from Prussia France had obtained nothing, literally nothing.

M. de Gramont here read to me a telegram from General Fleury, who stated that the Emperor Alexander had written to the King of Prussia to beg him to order the Prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw his acceptance of the Crown, and had, moreover, expressed himself in most friendly terms to France, and manifested a most earnest desire to avert a war.

The King of Prussia had, M. de Gramont went on to say, refused to comply with this request from his Imperial nephew. The King had not given a word of explanation to France.

His Majesty had, he repeated, done nothing, absolutely nothing. France would not take offence at this. She would not call upon His Majesty to make her any amends. The King had authorized the Prince of Hohenzollern to accept the Crown of Spain; all that France now asked was, that His Majesty would forbid the Prince to alter at any future time his decision to withdraw that acceptance. Surely, it was but reasonable that France should take some precautious against a repetition of what had occurred when Prince Leopold's brother went off to Bucharest. It was not to be supposed that France would run the risk of Prince Leopold suddenly presenting himself in Spain, and appealing to the chivalry of the Spanish people. Still, France did not call upon Prussia to prevent the Prince's going to Spain; all she desired was, that the King should forbid him to change his present resolution to withdraw his candidature. If His Majesty would do this, the whole affair would be absolutely and entirely at an end.

I asked him whether he authorized me categorically to state to Her Majesty's Government, in the name of the Government of the Emperor, that in this case the whole affair would be completely over.

He said, "Undoubtedly ;" and he took

a sheet of paper and wrote the following memorandum, which he placed in my hands:

"Nous demandons au Roi de Prusse de défendre au Prince de Hohenzollern de revenir sur sa résolution. S'il le fait tout l'incident est terminé."

I observed to M. de Gramont that I could hardly conceive that the French Government could really apprehend, after all that had occurred Prince Leopold would again offer himself as a candidate, or be accepted by the Spanish Government if he did.

M. de Gramont said that he was bound to take precautions against such an occurrence, and that if the King refused to issue the simple prohibition which was proposed, France could only suppose that designs hostile to her were entertained, and must take her measures accordingly.

Finally, M. de Gramont asked me whether France could count upon the good offices of England to help her in obtaining from the King this prohibition.

I said that nothing could exceed the desire of Her Majesty's Government to effect a reconciliation between France and Prussia, but that, of course, I could not take upon myself to answer offhand, without reference to Her Majesty's Government, a specific question of this kind.

EARL GRANVILLE TO LORD LYONS.

(Extract.)

Count Bernstorff called upon me this morning, and informed me that he had received a telegram from Count Bismarck, in which he expressed his regret that Her Majesty's Government should have made a proposal which it would be impossible for him to recommend to the King for His Majesty's acceptance.

Prussia had shown, under a public menace from France, a calmness and moderation which would render any further concession on her part equivalent to a submission to the arbitrary will of France, and would be viewed in the light of a humiliation, which the national feeling throughout Germany would certainly repudiate as a fresh insult.

Public opinion in Germany proves that, under the influence of the menaces of France, the whole of Germany had arrived at the conclusion that war, even under the most difficult circumstances, would be preferable to the submission of the King to the unjustifiable demands of France.

The Prussian Government, as such, has nothing to do with the acceptance of the candidature of Prince Leopold of

Hohenzollern, and had not even been cognizant of it. They could not, therefore, balance their assent to such acceptance by their assent to its withdrawal.

A demand for interference on the part of a Sovereign in a matter of purely private character could not, his Excellency considered, be made the subject of public communication between Governments, and as the original pretext for such a demand was to be found in the candidature itself, it could no longer be necessary now that the candidature had been renounced.

LORD A. LOFTUS TO EARL GRANVILLE,

(Received July 15.)

Berlin, July 13, 1870.

I had an interview with Count Bismarck to-day and congratulated his Excellency on the apparent solution of the impending crisis by the spontaneous renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern.

His Excellency appeared somewhat doubtful as to whether this solution would prove a settlement of the difference with France. He told me that the extreme moderation evinced by the King of Prussia under the menacing tone of the French Government, and the cour teous reception by His Majesty of Count Benedetti at Ems, after the severe language held to Prussia, both officially and in the French Press, was producing throughout Prussia general indignation.

He had that morning, he said, received telegrams from Bremen, Königsberg, and other places, expressing strong disapprobation of the conciliatory course pursued by the King of Prussia at Ems, and requiring that the honour of the country should not be sacrificed.

Count Bismarck then expressed a wish that Her Majesty's Government should take some opportunity, possibly by a declaration in Parliament, of expressing their satisfaction at the solution of the Spanish difficulty by the spontaneous act of Prince Leopold, and of bearing public testimony to the calm and wise moderation of the King of Prussia, his Government, and of the public Press.

His Excellency adverted to the decla. ration made by the Duc de Gramont to the Corps Législatif, "that the Powers of Europe had recognized the just grounds of France in the demand addressed to the Prussian Government ;" and he was, therefore, anxious that some public testimony should be given that the Powers who had used their "bons offices" to urge on the Prussian Government a renunciation by Prince Leopold, should likewise express their appreciation of the

peaceful and conciliatory disposition manifested by the King of Prussia.

Count Bismarck then observed that intelligence had been received from Paris (though not officially from Baron Werther) that the solution of the Spanish difficulty would not suffice to content the French Government, and that other claims would be advanced. If such be the case, said his Excellency, it was evident that the question of the succession to the Spanish Throne was but a mere pretext, and that the real object of France was to seek a revenge for Königs. gratz.

The feeling of the German nation, said his Excellency, was that they were fully equal to cope with France, and they were as confident as the French might be of military success. The feeling, therefore, in Prussia and in Germany was that they should accept no humiliation or insult from France, and that if unjustly provoked they should accept the combat.

But, said his Excellency, we do not wish for war, and we have proved, and shall continue to prove, our peaceful disposition; at the same time we cannot allow the French to have the start of us as regards armaments. "I have," said his Excellency, "positive information that military preparations have been made, and are making, in France for war. Large stores of munition are being concentrated, large purchases of hay and other materials necessary for a campaign are making, and horses are being collected." If these continued, said his Excellency, we shall be obliged to ask the French Government for explanations as to their object and meaning.

After what has now occurred we must require some assurance, some guarantee, that we may not be subjected to a sudden attack; we must know that this Spanish difficulty once removed, there are no other lurking designs which may burst upon us like a thunderstorm.

Count Bismarck further stated that unless some assurance, some declaration, were given by France to the European Powers, or in some official form, that the present solution of the Spanish question was a final and satisfactory settlement of the French demands, and that no further claims were to be raised; and if, further, a withdrawal or a satisfactory explanation of the menacing language held by the Duc de Gramont were not made, the Prussian Government would be obliged to seek explanations from France. It was impossible, added his Excellency, that Prussia could tamely and quietly sit under the affront offered to the King and to the nation by the

menacing language of the French Government. I could not, said his Excel. lency, hold communication with the French Ambassador after the language held to Prussia by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the face of Europe.

From the foregoing observations of Count Bismarck, your Lordship will perceive that unless some timely counsel, some friendly hand, can intervene to appease the irritation between the two Governments, the breach, in lieu of being closed by the solution of the Spanish difficulty, is likely to become wider.

It is evident to me that Count Bismarck and the Prussian Ministry regret the attitude and disposition of the King towards Count Benedetti, and that in the view of the public opinion of Germany they feel the necessity of some decided measures to safeguard the honour of the nation.

The only means which could pacify the wounded pride of the German nation, and restore confidence in the maintenance of peace, would be by a declaration of the French Government that the incident of the Spanish difficulty has been satisfactorily adjusted, and in rendering justice to the moderate and peaceful disposition of the King of Prussia and his Government, that the good relations existing between the two States were not likely to be again exposed to any disturbing influences. I greatly fear that if no mediating influences can be successfully brought to bear on the French Government to appease the irritation against Prussia, and to counsel moderation, war will be inevitable.

EARL GRANVILLE TO OUR AMBASSADORS AT PARIS AND BERLIN:Foreign Office, July 15, 1870.

My Lord,-Her Majesty's Government deeply regret that, according to present appearances, the breaking out of war between France and Prussia seems imminent. They deplore the possibility of this great calamity, not only as regards the two Powers themselves, to whom they are bound by intimate ties of friendship, but also as regards Europe at large.

But, being anxious not to neglect the slightest chance of averting it, they appeal to the 23rd Protocol of the Conferences held at Paris in the year 1856, in which "les Plénipotentiaires n'hésitent pas à exprimer, au nom de leurs Gouvernements, le vœu que les Etats entre lesquels s'éleverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances admettraient, aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie;" and they feel themselves the more warranted in doing so, inasmuch as the question in regard to which the two Powers are at issue is brought within narrow limits.

Her Majesty's Government therefore suggest to France and to Prussia, in identical terms, that before proceeding to extremities they should have recourse to the good offices of some friendly Power or Powers acceptable to both; and Her Majesty's Government, your Excellency will say, are ready to take any part which may be desired in the matter. I am, &c., (Signed)

GRANVILLE.

His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, judging it useful to bind closer the ties of friendship which unite them, and so confirm the relations of good neighbourhood which happily exist between the two countries, and being besides convinced that to attain this result, which is, moreover, of a kind to insure the maintenance of the general peace, it is for their interest to come to an understanding on the questions concerning their future relations, have resolved to conclude a Treaty to the following effect, and have in consequence nominated as

their representatives the following persons, viz. :

His Majesty, &c.

His Majesty, &o. Who, after exchanging their full powers, which have been found in good and due form, have agreed on the following Articles :

"Art. I.-His Majesty the Emperor of the French acquiesces in and recognizes the gains made by Prussia in the course of the last war waged by her against Austria and that Power's allies.

"Art. II.-His Majesty the King of Prussia engages to facilitate the acqui