deed, equally explicit and unambiguous, that description must control which best expresses the intention of the parties, as manifested by the whole instrument. A deed is to be construed according to the intention of the parties as manifested by the entire instrument, although such construction may not comport with the language of a particular part of it. Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. 458, 463; Worthington v. Hyler, 4 Mass. 196; White v. Gay, 9 N. H. 126; Johnson v. Simpson, 36 id. 91; Lane v. Thompson, 43 id. 320, 324; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 id. 212. If there is an explicit and unambiguous grant of a thing, any exception or reservation which is manifestly contradictory will be rejected. Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 104; Herrick v. Hopkins, 23 Me. 217; Pike v. Munroe, 36 id. 309; Ela v. Card, 2 N. H. 175. Driscoll v. Green. Opinion by Clark, J.

EXEMPTION NOT AFFECTED BY TEMPORARY ABSENCE FROM STATE-EXEMPT TOOLS.-Mere temporary absence from the State does not deprive a debtor of the benefit of the exemption laws. Wilkinson v. Alley, 45 N. H. 551; Caswell v. Keith, 12 Gray, 351; Pierce v. Gray, 7 id. 69; Webster v. Orue, 45 Vt. 40.

Whether chattels are exempt from attachment as tools of the debtor's occupation is a mixed question of law and fact, to be determined upon consideration of the debtor's employment, and the nature, character, and use of the chattels claimed as exempt. A team, wagon, sled, and harness of a person engaged in the business of teaming are exempt. They are as much tools of his occupation as the plow, cart-wheels, and chains of a farmer (Wilkinson v. Alley, 45 N. H. 551); a fisherman's net and boat (Sammis v. Smith, 1 N. Y. 444); a music teacher's piano (Amend v. Murphy, 69 Ill. 337); a musician's cornet (Baker v. Willis, 123 Mass. 194); a printer's press, cases, and types (Patten v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450); or mechanics' tools used by a farmer in repairing his farming implements (Garrett v. Patchin, 29 Vt. 248). Rice v. Wadsworth. Opinion by Clark, J.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

AGENCY-SALE OF LAND BY AGENT-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-It is not necessary, under the Statute of Fraud where an agent is intrusted with the sale of land, that he should sign the name of his principal. If he signs his own name, parol evidence is admissible to show the agency and charge the principal on the contract. Dykers v. Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57; Manufg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 447-455; Curtis v. Blair, 26 Miss. 309-324; Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220; McConnell v. Brillhart, 17 Ill. 354; Johnson v. Dodge, id. 433; Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray, 387; Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns, 102; 2 Smith Lead. Cas. (6th ed.) 316. McWilliams v. Lawless. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided Nov. 13, 1883.]

lowing them, on this question of damages to the remaining estate after the carving of a right of way for a railroad out of it. In Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch R. Co., 6 Allen, 115, the court bases its decision partly on some time-honored usage of that Commonwealth, and partly on "necessity and obvious propriety." On the other hand, the courts of Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and other States have adhered to that which is confessedly the general rule, and the safe one, of confining the testimony of witnesses to facts, including values, and leave it to the jury to find the measure of damages from all the facts proved. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co. v. Campbell, 4 Ohio St. 583; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 id. 568; Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N. Y. 514; Dunham v. Simmons, 3 Hill, 609; Paige v. Hazard, 5 id. 603; Troy & Boston R. Co. v. Northern Turnpike Co., 16 Barb. 100; Lincoln v. Saratoga & Schen. R. Co., 23 Wend. 425; Montgomery & W. P. R. Co. v. Varner, 19 Ala. 185; Alabama & F. R. Co. v. Burkett, 42 id. 83; Evansville, I. & C. S. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120; Baltimore, P. & C. R. Co. v. Johnson, 59 id. 480; Same v. Stoner, id. 579; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. S. & N. W. R. Co., 67 Ill. 142; Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 36 Iowa, 323; Prosser v. Wapello Co., 18 id. 327; Heury v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 2 id. 288; Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 id. 437; City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kan. 430. Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Co. v. Beebe. Opinion by Cobb, J. [Decided Oct. 9, 1883.] MORTGAGE-SECURING NOTE, TRANSFERRED WITH NOTE BY MERE DELIVERY.-A note payable to order was indorsed by the payee, and with a mortgage securing it delivered to the indorsee. Held, that this transferred title to the mortgage. A mortgage of real estate may be assigned orally by mere delivery, for a valuable consideration; and the same rule applies to any chose in action. Ford v. Stuart, 19 Johns. 342; Briggs v. Dorr, id. 95; Dawson v. Cole, 16 Johns. 51; Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 id. 534. The rule in such cases is stated by a late writer as follows: "If no writing passed, the assignment of a debt may be proved by parol, even though there was an agreement, unperformed, to give a written transfer. It is sufficient proof of a parol assignment that some evidence of the debt, such as a bond or mortgage, or a transcript of a judgment, or a note, for the debt, or a part of it, was delivered by the assignor to the assignee, with intent to transfer the title to the demand." Abb. Tr. Ev. 2; Hooker v. Eagle Bank, 30 N. Y. 83; Doremus v. Williams, 4 Hun, 458; 12 Am. Law Reg. 61. The assignment of a negotiable promissory note, secured by mortgage, carries with it the security. Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, and cases cited. And in Daniel Neg. Inst. 557, it is said: "The assignment of a debt, by whatever form of transfer, carries with it any bill or note by which it is secured; and the converse of the proposition is equally true, that the transfer by indorsement or assignment of a bill or note carries with it all securities for its payment, whether a mortgage or otherwise." Kuhns v. Bankes. Opinion by Maxwell, J.

MORTGAGE-SECURING NEGOTIABLE NOTE PASSES FREED FROM EQUITIES WITH NOTE.-A bona fide purchaser for value of a negotiable promissory note, secured by mortgage, before maturity, and without notice, takes the mortgage as he does the note, discharged of all equities which may exist between the original parties. Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308; Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271; Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507; Potts v. Blackwell, 4 Jones Eq. 58; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chand. 78; Reeves v. Scully, Walk. Ch. 248. Cheney v. Cooper. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided July 17, 1883.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

MORTGAGE-INTERFERENCE BY COURT WITH MORTGAGEE'S POWER OF SALE-SOLICITOR-MORTGAGEE.

Although the court will not, except in a very strong case, interfere at the suit of a mortgagor to restrain an ordinary mortgagee from exercising his power of sale, except on the terms of the mortgagor paying into court what the mortgagee swears is due on the mortgage; where a solicitor acting for a client buys up securities given by the client, he is not entitled to sell until he has rendered to the client an account of what is due in respect of the advances made by him. The plaintiff, a lady, having given mortgages to several persons, was advised by the defendant, her then solicitor, that the best way to settle her affairs would be for the defendant to buy up and consolidate the mortgages. The plaintiff consenting, the defendant bought up the mortgages for a less sum than the total amount secured, and took transfers to himself. After the defendant had ceased to be the plaintiff's solicitor, her solicitors applied to him for information as to the amount of his claim. In reply the defendant stated that the amount due for principal, interest, and costs was between 3,500l. and 4,000l., and that he was willing to take 2,000l. if paid at once, but declined to give further information unless an undertaking to pay his costs was given. He also threatened to sell the mortgaged property, unless the 2,000l. was paid at a short date. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the sale until after a proper account had been given of the amount due in respect of the defendant's advances, on the terms of the plaintiff paying into court a sum sufficient to cover the amount probably due. Ct. of Ap., July 17, 1883. Mac Leod v. Jones. Opinions by Brett, M. R., and Cotton and Bowen, L. JJ. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 321.)

SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY DEALINGS WITH PRINCIPAL. -The rule that a surety is discharged by the creditor dealing with the principal, or with a co-surety, in a manner at variance with the contract, does not apply to the case of co-sureties who have contracted severally. The appellant agreed to guarantee advances made by the respondent bank to one K.to the amount of 1,000l.; M. had previously guaranteed advances to K. to the amount of 600l. The bank afterward released M. from his liability in consideration of a new guaranty given by him. Held, that such release constituted no defense in an action by the bank against the appellant on his guaranty, it not being averred that his right of contribution against M., if any, was injuriously affected. Privy Council, July 11, 1883. Ward v. National Bank of New Zealand. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 315.)

AGENCY-WHEN AGENT TO SELL MAY WARRANT.A servant intrusted by his master with the sale of a horse at a fair may have an implied authority to give a warranty to the purchaser. Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 592, commented on and distinguished. Q. B. Div., December 4, 1883. Brooks v. Hassell. Opinions by Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Stephen, J. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 569.)

CRIMINAL LAW CONSTRUCTION — LARCENY.-The prisoner and another person went to an inn. The prisoner asked the barmaid for whisky. He put down half a sovereign, and received 9s. 6d. in silver in change. He then asked for the half-sovereign back, saying he thought he had change. She gave it back. His companion then asked for a cigar. She served him with it. The prisoner then put down 10s. in silver and a half-sovereign, asking the barmaid to give him a sovereign for it, which she did. His companion kept on engaging the barmaid's attention. The

prisoner never returned the 9s. 6d. which the barmaid gave him in the first instance. The barmaid never intended to part with her master's money except for full consideration. The prisoner having been convicted on an indictment for larceny of the money, the court sustained the conviction. Crown Cases Reserved, Nov. 21, 1883. Regina v. Hollis. Opinion by Lord Coleridge, C. J. (49 L. T. Rep. 572.)

OBITUARY.

SIR JOHN BYLES.

HE famous author of "Byles on Bills," and one of

in 1801, died on the 3rd ult. The following is from the London Law Journal:

The career of Sir John Byles was that of a most successful advocate at the bar, and a very learned lawyer as barrister and judge in one branch of legal study. Bills " for accuracy "Byles on and clearness books is among the best law in the English language. Lawyers and judges have for years turned to it for information with absolute confidence. It is not too much to say that without it the codification of the law of bills of exchange would have been impossible. Sir John Byles took an interest in this book up to a very few weeks of his death. A question whether its copyright had not been infringed was referred to him to decide whether any and what proceedings should be taken. We believe the matter was amicably arranged, but the incident is curious as showing that one of his last acts was in vindication of the book which in the future will be his chief title to fame. Sir John was thirty years of age before he was called to the bar, and up to that he had been in business. His business experiences, perhaps, suggested to him the production of a book on one of the most important branches of commercial law. The success of the book still further determined the bent of his legal studies and practice. He became a good commercial lawyer, but he never gained any great reputation in other branches of the law. His mind wanted that breadth and clearsightedness which are essential to the intellectual equipment of a great lawyer, who is to lay down propositions of universal application. He will never take the place filled by James, Willes or Jessel, but will always be known as Byles on Bills, a result to which the "artful aid of alliteration conduces. "Many are the stories told of Sir John Byles when at the bar and on the bench. His horse figures in several of them. When he was at the bar he had a horse, or rather a pony, which used to arrive at King's Bench Walk every afternoon at three o'clock. Whatever his engagements, Mr. Byles would manage by hook or by crook to take a ride, generally to the Regent's Park and back, on this animal, the sorry appearance of which was the amusement of the Temple. This horse, it is said, was sometimes called "Bill" to give oppor tunity for the combination "there goes Byles on

Bills; " but if tradition is to be believed, this was not the name by which its master knew it. He, or he and his clerk between them, called the horse " Business; and when a too curious client asked where the Serjeant was, the clerk answered with a clear conscience that he was 66 out on Business." When on the bench, Mr. Justice Byles' taste in horseflesh does not seem to have improved. It is related of him that in an argument upon section 17 of the Statute of Frauds he put to the counsel arguing a case, by way of illustration. Suppose Mr. So and So," he said, "that I were to agree to sell you my horse, do you mean to say that I could not recover the price unless," and so on." The illustration was so pointed that there was no way out of it but to

say, "My lord, the section applies only to things of the value of 10.," a retort which all who had ever seen the horse thoroughly appreciated. Instances of his astuteness in advocacy were numerous. His mode of winning cases was not by carrying juries with him by a storm of eloquence, or cross-examining witnesses out of court, but by discovering the weak point in his adversary's case and tripping him up, or by the nice conduct of such resources as his own case possessed. On one occasion he was retained for the defendant with Mr., afterward Mr. Justice, Willes, whom he led at the bar, but who was afterward his senior in the Court of Common Pleas, in a case of some complication tried before Chief Justice Jervis. At the end of the day (Saturday), Mr. Byles submitted that there was no case, and the judge rose to give his decision next week. In the interval Willes asked Byles why he did not take a particular point which both had agreed in consultation to be fatal to the plaintiff's case. "I left that to the chief justice," said Byles; "I led up to it, and walked round it, so that he cannot miss it, but if I had taken it he would have decided against us at once." And so it proved, for on Monday morning the chief justice gave an elaborate judgment overruling all the points taken, but nonsuiting the plaintiff on a ground which he said he was astonished to find had not been taken by either of the very learned counsel for the defendant, but which in his opinion was conclusive. In another case Byles was for the plaintiff, and Edwin James for the defendant, in an action on a bond tried before Chief Justice Tindal. Byles was a long time in opening his case and examining his witnesses, until the chief justice became restless. Still more restless was Edwin James, who wanted to go elsewhere. Byles, seeing his impatience, whispered to him, "give me judgment for the principal, and I will let you off the interest." Accordingly a verdict was taken for the plaintiff for the amount of the bond without interest. Afterward Edwin James asked Byles why he had foregone the interest? "You need only have put in the bond," said he, "and you would have had both." "That was just the difficulty," said Byles, "the bond was not in court." In those days adjournments were not so easily granted as now, and in any case the costs of the day would have exceeded the interest. A reputation for successes like these made Byles a formidable adversary. On one occasion at Norwich he had for an opponent a counsel whose strong point was advocacy rather than law. Byles, who was for the defendant, went into the court before the judge sat, and in the presence of his opponent he called to his clerk, "What time does the midday train leave for London?" "Half-past twelve, sir." "Then mind you have everything ready; and meet me in good time at my lodgings." "But, Serjeant," said the plaintiff's counsel, "this is a long case; it will last at least all day." "A long case!" said Byles; "it will not last long; you are going to be non-suited." The advocate, who stood much in awe of his opponent's legal skill and knowledge, spoke to his client. The result was that the case was settled for a moderate sum, and Mr. Byles caught his train.

Mr. Justice Byles was a strong Tory, and he had a horror of Judicature Acts, the fusion of law and equity, and other modern innovations which were floating in the air in 1873. He declared that he would not remain an hour longer on the bench than his fifteen years. Ou the first day of Hilary Term, 1858, he took his seat on bench of the Court of Common Pleas, and on the first day of Hilary, 1873, his resignation arrived. The moment was inconvenient for the appointment of a new judge, but the judge could not resign before, and he would not wait a moment. Of his career on the bench it is enough to say that he was acute, courteous, and upright, as he was kindly in private life. His

66

name is not connected with many great decisions, but he took part in the case of Chorlton v. Lings, in which it was decided that women did not obtain Parliamentary votes by the representation of the people act, 1867, in virtue of the new franchise conferred on every man." His judgment is an example of his rather quaint and old-fashioned judicial style. "No doubt," he says, the word "man" in a scientific treatise on zoology or fossil organic remains would include men, women and children as constituting the highest order of vertebrate animals. It is also used in an abstract and general sense in philosophical or religious disquisitions. But in almost every other connection the word " man " is used in contradistinction to woman. ** * Women for centuries have always been considered legally incapable of voting for members of Parliament, as much so as of being themselves elected to serve as members. In addition to all which, we have the unanimous decision of the Scotch judges. And I trust their unanimous decision and our unanimous decision will forever exercise and lay this ghost of a doubt, which ought never to have made its appearance." The following anecdote is also floating around: "A learned counsel on one occasion was pleading a cause before Sir John Byles and made a quotation from a work, which,' said he, 'I hold in my hand, and is commonly called 'Byles on Bills.' Sir John Byles: Does the learned author give any authority for that statement? Counsel, referring to the work: No, my lord, I cannot find that he does. Sir John Byles: Ah! then do not trust him; I know him well."

NOT ALL A DREAM.

A lawyer by his well-worn desk
Sat silent and alone,

The fire athwart the office hearth,
In fitful flashes shone.

The night was dark, the pelting storm Beat 'gainst the window pane; Before him lay his latest brief,

Each point and ref'rence plain.

On broken chairs, huge piles of books
An ample fortress made;
His trusty pen, all charged with ink,
Within his reach was laid.

A sput'ring candle burning dim Could ne'er dispel the gloom, That like a pall in dusky folds

O'er hung the silent room.

The bell tolls out the hour of twelve,

The watchman cries, "all's well." His ear seems deaf to earthly sounds, They ne'er can break the spell.

Tired nature may have yielded sway
To sleep's enchanting thrall,
While busy fancy roams elate

Thro' mem'ry's pictured hall.

He sees perchance his dear old home
The fount of purest joys,
Lives o'er again his halcyon days,
With romping girls and boys.

A hoidenish youth away at school,
In hot pursuit of knowledge,
He solves the problem of his life,
And graduates from college,

Now flush'd with manhood's vig'rous bloom,
That sheds a sweet aroma,

He marches forth to fight for fame,
The weapon his diploma.

He enters now the district school,
To be a famous teacher,

But soon concludes 'twere better far,
To be a noted preacher.

But when compelled a choice to make,
Among the many roads,

He finds that one and only one,
Can reach the blest abodes.

While on the guide-board of each creed
Is marked man's destination,
Each preacher claiming his own road,
Secures the soul's salvation;

While all the rest lead straight to hell,
Tho' with the best intention,
Where souls immortal suffer pains,
No human tongue should mention.
The risk so great of being wrong,
"Tis truly most appalling.
He then resolves without delay
To seek some other calling.

He turns to law, and straightway reads,
Blackstone and Kent and Chitty,
Then crams himself with precedents,
Prosy and wise, and witty.
The Code of eighteen forty-eight,
He masters ev'ry section,

And feels that now he has made sure
His calling and election.

At Gen'ral Term he then applies,
Is readily admitted,

To practice law in all the courts,
His license thus permitted.

An office then is sought and found,
And outside hung his shingle,

He's now prepared to serve the world,
With eye to business single.

For weeks he walks his office floor,
Both bold and self reliant,
And lo! his heart begins to sink,

For he has found no client.

He visits then the city courts,
Both civil and police,
And wisely talks of suits-at-law,
And breaches of the peace.

A month rolls by, his rent's to pay,
His board bill's in arrears,
And not one dollar in his purse-
His heart gives way to fears.

His honor pledged is now at stake,
He deems it worth redeeming;
But how to do it is the thing

Without resort to scheming.

He chances in the higher court, While prisoners are pleading, The judge assigns him to defend, A woman charged with stealing.

He hears her story to the end,

How loved, ruined and slighted, By her false lover's perjured oath, Imprisoned and indicted.

His manhood's roused, his soul on fire,
'Tis not for gold or glory,

His noble heart then pleads her cause,
Tells her pathetic story.

The judge and jury are in tears,

And hardened men are weeping,

While all thank God her cause was placed
In such a worthy keeping.

The judge delivers next his charge,
The jury now retire,

And our young lawyer's manly speech,
The people all admire.

The jury quick returns to court,
And soon are in their places,
The verdict's read by ev'ry one,
Upon their glowing faces.
"Not guilty," the foreman says;
The people all are cheering,
The advocate has won their hearts,
And praises most endearing.

His office soon is overrun,

No waiting now for clients,

His mark he's made, and he's prepared

To tussle with the giants.

He earns an honest livelihood,

Is honored and respected,

Of fraud or wrong his skirts are clear,
He never is suspected.

Long years he leads a busy life,

Down to the present moment,
And here he sits with harness on,
Apparently somnolent.

And can it be with thoughts like these,
His busy brain is teeming,

Or with that cold and vacant stare,
He now is only dreaming?

I call his name, he answers not,
Then proffer a retainer;

His hand is still, he must be dead,
Nothing can be plainer.

The coroner sat on the case,

A jury was selected,

And soon the cause of his demise

Was easily detected.

The doctors a post-mortem made,

And found-tho' loath to tell 'em,

Three thousand sections of Throop's Code Lodged in his cerebellum.

And out of mercy to the bar,

They made the wise suggestion, Which by the jury was indorsed, "He died from indigestion."

ALBANY, Feb., 1884.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A. B. PRATT.

THE TERM OF THE NEW JUDGES. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Notwithstanding the strictures of J. K., the conclusions of D. would seem to be in accordance with the law.

The Constitution says that the official term of the judges elected after its adoption "shall be fourteen years from, and including the 1st day of January next after their election." Had the Constitution left out the words" and including," it might be argued that this clause simply defined the limit of the term but with these words in it seems to leave no room for argu

ment that the term can commence at any other period than thereby fixed, the term includes all that period commencing the 1st of January following the election down to the end of the fourteenth successive year.

The addition to the Constitution providing for the election of additional justices simply provides that "the justices so elected shall be invested with their offices on the first Monday of June next after their election." Burrill defines "invest as follows: "To give possession, to put into possession, to put one in possession of a fee, estate or office newly acquired. To clothe with possession, to clothe possession with the solemnities of law." Investing a person with office therefore simply means formally and officially conducting him into the office he has acquired. This formal ceremony, this investing with office, generally takes place at the commencement of the term, hence the one is apt to be confounded with the other. But the distinction is obvious. Take for instance two men, both of whom claim to have been elected to a certain office. The one is invested therewith, the other attacks the title of the occupant, succeeds and ousts him; he in turn becomes invested with the office. In such a case can there be any question as to when his term of office commences, and yet he is invested with it at a subsequent date. Again on the death of the president of the United States, the vice-president, eo instanter, becomes president thereof, but the formal ceremony of investing him with his office is postponed until a subsequent date. Section 4 of article 14, recognizes this distinction by providing for the first election of judges thereunder, and further providing that they shall enter on their duties the first Monday of the following July "but the term of office shall be deemed to commence on the first day of January, 1848." What the idea was in deferring the time of investiture for some months after the commencement of the term it is unnecessary to consider. We have only to deal with the law as we find it.

And if this view of the law as it stands is correct, in what position does it place the two gentlemen who were elected to the position in the first department last fall? At the time of their election they each held a public office which they have not yet resigned, but are still holding and performing the duties thereof. Have they not elected to retain the same? The Constitution provides that "the justices of the Supreme Court shall not hold any other office or public trust." If these gentlemen are able to hold a public office during any part of their term of justiceship, then what is the use of this clause in the Constitution? Here is a question for the corporation counsel to argue and for Judge Van Brunt to decide.

THE

HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, February 26, 1884.

Judgment of General Term so far as it reverses or modifies the decree of the surrogate reversed, and the decree of the surrogate in all respects affirmed, costs of contestants and of Martin Brimmer at General Term and in this court to be paid out of the estateCornelia W. Adair, et al., appellants, v. Martin Brimmer et al., respondent.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Casendania Sanford and another, respondents, v. Thomas D. Elithrop and others, appellants; Thomas S. Sutherland, appellant, v. John J. Olcott and another, exrs., respondents; Robert A. Snyder and another, exrs., etc., respondents, v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., appellant: William E. Leavitt, exr., etc., respondent, v. Henry G. Wolcott and another, exrs., etc., appellants.-Jud

ment affirmed with costs against the appellant-Ann Reese, respondent, v. William Smyth, Acting Superintendent of Insurance, appellant.-Judgment of General Term and decree of surrogate reversed and case remitted to surrogate for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, costs of both parties to be paid out of the estate-In re Account of James Hughes, admr., etc.-Order reversed and judgment of Special Term affirmed-Jacob K. Lockman, exr., etc.. appellant, v. Thomas J. Reilly, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Mary Jane Peek, ex'x, appellant, v. Patrick Callaghan, respondent; Martin Cain, admr., etc., appellant, v. City of Syracuse, respondent; Nassau Bank, appellant, v. John J. Jones, exr., etc., respondent; Wm. H. Crossman and others, appellants, v. Henry C. Crossman and others, respondents; Ida Mabie, respondent, v. Lewis H. Bailey, exr., etc., appellant; Henry Heinrich and another, exrs. etc., respondent, v. Wm. T. A. Hart, appellant; Paul Callaghan, admr., etc., respondent, v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg R. Ro., appellant; John L. Sutherland, exr., and another, respondent, v. Lauren C. Woodruff, appellant (two cases).-Judgment of Special and General Terms reversed, and the decree of the court below modified so as to deelare the tenth clause of the will to be void and direct payment of bequest to the defendant as residuary legatee, costs of both parties to be paid out of the estate-Wm. M. Prichard and another, exrs., respondents, v. John B. Thompson, individually and another, exr., appellants. - Judgment below modified in accordance with opinion, and as modified, affirmed without costs to either party-Elizabeth M. Cook, an infant, respondent and appellant, v. Alex. M. Lowry, appellant and respondent.- -Order affirmed with costs-People ex rel. Walter E. Smith, respondent, v. Charles Geetum and another, impld., etc., appellants. Judgment of General Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed with costs-In re Application of Emily P. Woolsey and another, etc., respondent, v. W. Remsen Taylor and others, comrs., etc., appellants. Judgment of General and Special Terms reversed and judgment ordered for the defendants, dismissing the complaint with costs-Mary N. Johnson, x'ex, etc., respondent, v. John I. Lawrence and another., surv's, etc., and others. Judgment modified by reducing the rate of interest one per cent from June 1, 1880, to September 14, 1881, and as modified affirmed with costs-Farlin Bull, exr., etc., respondent, v. Russell B. Biddlecom and ano., ex'rs, etc., applts. Affirmed on opinion in Tillman v. Davis, with costs to both parties out of the estate Frederick Loomis, trustee, v. G. Byron Doud, adm'r, appellant, and George A. White, and another, respondents. - Judgment affirmed with costs against the appellant personally -Albert F. Gladding, exr., tr., appellant, v. Louisa F. Follett, respondent.-Judgment of General Term reversed; that of Special Term modified so as to conform to the opinion, costs of all parties upon appeals to the General Term and to this court to be paid out of the estate-Louisa J. Hollis, ind., and as exr., respondent, v. Georye Hollis and others, appellants.

--

-Judgment affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered for the respondent, on the stipulation for $7,669.43 with interest from June 25, 1879, and $3,799 with interest for the same time, with costs-Josephine Todd, respondent, v. Albert Weber, Jr., et al. exrs., appellants -Judgment affirmed-The People, respondents, v. John M. Meyers, appellant.-Judgment of General Term affirmed; costs of both parties to be paid out of the fund-Nancy Watts and another, respondents v. James Ronald, exr., appellant.--Judgment of General Term and decree of surrogate reversed and a new hearing ordered before the surrogate, costs of the party finally prevailing to be paid out of the estateBenjamin Wooley, exr., appellant, v. Sarah E. Wooley and another., respondents.