LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2, 5. In this state it is held that a statute of limitations, when it has fully run, takes away the right as well as the remedy. [Whether or not there is any presumption that the law of a foreign country not subject to the constitutional limitations which form the basis of such holding, or of a country operating under the civil law, is the same as our own, not determined.] Hite v. Keene, LOCAL STATUTE. See JUDGES, 5. LOGS AND LOGGING. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 3. 207 A logging contract provided that during a certain season plaintiff should cut, haul, and load on cars all the timber on certain lands; that defendant should furnish a continual service of fifteen cars each day as might be required by plaintiff, and in case of failure to deliver said cars plaintiff should deck all logs not loaded on cars at track; that when said logs were so decked plaintiff should be deemed to have fulfilled his contract the same as though they were loaded on cars; and that if it should be necessary, on account of defendant's failure to provide cars as aforesaid and the accumulation of a surplus of logs which must be decked, defendant should have the option either itself to load the logs so decked or to allow plaintiff to load them at the price of ninety cents per thousand feet. Held, (1) that defendant was under no obligation to furnish more than fifteen cars per day, even though that number was insufficient to take care of the logs as fast as plaintiff found it necessary to haul them in order to complete the contract during the season; and (2) that the obligation to pay plaintiff ninety cents per thousand feet for loading decked logs was confined to logs decked by reason of defendant's failure to furnish the specified service of fifteen cars per day, and therefore, that number of cars having been in fact furnished, plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything under the last mentioned provision of the contract for the extra work in loading logs which it had become necessary to deck by reason of the insufficiency of such stipulated service. Hammond v. John H. Kaiser Lumber Co. 189 MACHINERY. See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 9-11. MASTER and Servant, 6-10, 13, 15. MANDAMUS. See APPEAL, 7. MANDATORY STATUTES. See NEW TRIAL, 5. MASTER AND SERVANT. When the relation exists. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 16. 1. If a servant voluntarily and unnecessarily leaves his employment and assumes a position of peril merely for his own pleasure or convenience he ceases to be an employee for the time being and becomes either a trespasser or at best a mere licensee. Charron v. Northwestern Fuel Co. 240 2. But a workman employed in hard physical labor who, while stopping for a moment's respite of the ordinary and usual nature, steps a few feet from his line of travel, is not thereby divested of his character as an employee. Ibid. Master's liability for injuries to servant: General rules. See COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT, 2. RAILROADS, 2-7. STATUTES, 2. Same: Pleading. 3. In an action for personal injuries to a servant, the complaint, liberally construed, is held sufficiently to show that skids upon which plaintiff was piling logs for defendant were insufficient and defective; that defendant failed in its duty to furnish reasonably safe skids suitable for the purpose for which they were to be used; and that plaintiff was not necessarily chargeable with knowledge of their defective and dangerous condition. Platteter v. Paulson-Ellingson Lumber Co. 186 Same: Duty of master. 4. Where a railway company places a freight car, with brakes set, on a sidetrack to serve the business of a proprietor whose employees are expected, according to custom, to move the car to the particular point for loading, such proprietor has a right to presume that it is in suitable condition for use, unless the contrary appears without particular or technical inspection, in the absence of obvious defects or knowledge of some fact or circumstance, actually or constructively brought home to such proprietor, which would ordinarily put an ordinarily careful person on such inquiry as to lead to knowledge of a contrary condition existing. So held in an action against the proprietor by an employee alleged to have been injured by reason of defects in the brake of such car. Gager v. Stolle-Barndt L. Co. 154 5. The proprietor in such case is bound to observe defects which would naturally and ordinarily attract the attention of a person so circumstanced, having no duty to look particularly or search for such difficulties. Ibid. Same: Machinery. See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 9-11. MASTER AND SERVANT, 13, 15. 6. In an action by an employee in an establishment for manufacturing structural steel work, for injuries received while helping to move a heavy viaduct arch by reason of the slipping of the chain by which the arch was being lifted, a finding by the jury that the employer negligently allowed an unsafe and improper method of shortening the lifting chain to be used in its shop is held to be sustained by the evidence. Flynn v. Modern Steel Structural Co. 457 7. If in such a case the employer had knowingly permitted the customary use in the shop of a method of shortening the chain which it knew or ought to have known to be unsafe, it was guilty of negligence, even though it had promulgated formal orders to adopt some other method. Ibid. 8. The question whether plaintiff was struck and injured by the governor belt of an engine, held one for the jury. Yanike v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 554 9. To render a person liable for the consequences of a negligent act it is not necessary that such consequences should have been specifically contemplated by him; it is sufficient that they are within the field of reasonable anticipation. Ibid. 10. The question whether or not an injury was reasonably to be anticipated from the defective condition of the belt was for the jury; as were also the questions of plaintiff's assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. Ibid. Same: Places to work. See MASTER And Servant, 14. 11. The work of unloading freight from a vessel being accompanied by risks and hazards springing from the constantly changing and shifting conditions which arise as the work proceeds, and it being impossible for the employer to keep the changing working place of the employees engaged in such work free from the hazards and dangers incident thereto and created by themselves, such employees are presumed to know and assume them as risks of the employment. Brown v. Conners, 403 12. So held, where an employee was injured by the fall of a pile of sheet steel which he with others was engaged in unloading from the deck of a vessel, the situation and arrangement of the pile, its relation to the working place, and the danger of its falling over being obvious and as readily comprehended by the employee as by the foreman in charge of the work. Ibid. Same: Rules and regulations. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 7. Same: Warning servant. 13. Plaintiff, a member of a gang of carpenters who were repairing defendant's coal dock, was required, in the performance of his duties, to cross a platform underneath a rig upon which a suspended clam-shell bucket was operated. His line of travel crossed the path of the bucket at right angles. In one of his trips across this platform he stopped a minute or two to rest and had stepped to the edge of the platform, about eight feet from his line of travel, and was looking down upon a vessel at the dock, when the bucket, which had been started without warning, swept him off the platform, injuring him severely. Held, that the jury were justified in finding that defendant's failure to give warning before starting the bucket constituted a want of ordinary care, and that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in stopping upon the platform as he did. Charron v. Northwestern Fuel Co. 240 Same: Fellow-servant. 14. Members of a carpenter's repair gang engaged in making repairs and changes on the premises of the master, in the discharge of the latter's duty to provide a safe place to work, are not fellow-servants with ordinary employees who are simply employed to carry on the employer's business. Charron v. Northwestern Fuel Co. 240 Same: Risks assumed by servant. See INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 4. MASTER AND Servant, 10, 11. RAILROAds, 3. Same: Contributory negligence. See Master and SerVANT, 10, 13, 15. RAILROADS, 3. 15. Failure of an employee in a sawmill either to notify his superior that a board guarding a gearing was off or to repair it himself with the tools at hand, during an interval of ten minutes when the mill was not running, cannot be said as a matter of law to have been contributory negligence, it appearing that he had nu merous duties to perform during such interval. West v. Bayfield Mill Co. 145 Liability for injuries to third persons: Acts and omissions of servant. 16. A chauffeur employed at a public garage and sent out in charge of a hired car to operate and manage it is, while so engaged, the servant of the keeper of the garage and not of the hirer of the car. Gerretson v. Rambler Garage Co. 528. 17. If such chauffeur, while acting within the scope of his duty, is guilty of a want of ordinary care in driving the car which results in injury to the occupants, the master is liable. Ibid. 18. In such case the cause of action is based upon the tort or negligence and not upon the contract of hiring, and it is therefore immaterial whether or not the contract was void because made and performed on Sunday. Ibid. MAXIMS. Expressio unius exclusio alterius, 489. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands, 255, 256. Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest, 256. Noscitur a sociis, 514. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. See ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL, 4, 5. Damages, 2-7. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 16. MENTAL ANGUISH. See TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES, 1, 4. MILWAUKEE CITY CHARTER. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 4-6, 11. MINORS. See PARENT AND CHILD. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. MISSISSIPPI RIVER. See STATES, 3. MISTAKE. See APPEAL, 8-10. INSURANCE, 5, 6. LANDLORD AND TEN ANT. MORTGAGES. Requisites and validity. See DEEDS, 6-9. PARTNERSHIP, 4, 5. Extension of time of payment: Oral agreement: Rights of assignee. 1. An agreement by which, for a valuable consideration paid by the mortgagor, the time for payment of a note and mortgage is extended, is valid though not in writing. Phillips v. Holland, 524 2. Such agreement is binding upon one to whom the note and mortgage were assigned after the due date of the note but before the extended time had expired, although such assignee was assured by the assignor that the note was then past due. Ibid. Foreclosure: Agreement to notify: Findings: Judgment. See PLEADING, 2. 3. An agreement not to bring a foreclosure action without giving. prior notice to the mortgagor is void where no time of forbearance is agreed upon and there is no consideration. Radford v. Smith, 163. 4. In a foreclosure action the court found that the mortgaged premises were homestead and could not be sold in parcels without injury to the interests of the parties. The judgment provided that the premises "or so much of them as may be sufficient to raise the amount due . . . and which may be sold separately without material injury to the parties interested, be sold," etc. Held, that there was no prejudicial variance from the finding. Ibid. 5. In a foreclosure action, inclusion in the judgment of the amount paid by plaintiff for delinquent taxes cannot be held error in the absence of any bill of exceptions. Ibid. 6. No power of sale is imported into the statutory form of mortgage by sec. 2209, Stats. (1898), and that statute authorizes the foreclosure of such mortgages only in the manner that other mortgages which do not contain a power of sale are foreclosed. Dawson v. Bauch, 144 7. A statutory form of mortgage cannot be foreclosed by advertisement, such foreclosure being restricted by sec. 3523, Stats. (1898), to mortgages containing a power of sale. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Incorporation: Charter. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4-11. Ibid. Ordinances. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 10-13, 28. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES, 5–7. 1. In a municipal ordinance prohibiting any person from leasing or letting, "as landlord," any house, room, or other premises in the city to be used for the purpose of prostitution, the word "landlord" includes a person who lets a room for said purpose in a building occupied by him, although he himself occupies such building only as a tenant under an oral lease from month to month. Milwaukee v. Beatty, 349 2. Where a municipal ordinance provides that any person violating it shall upon conviction "be fined," but does not make the prohibited acts punishable "by fine and imprisonment," or "by fine or imprisonment," nor specially declare them to be misdemeanors, a civil action may be maintained by the city under sec. 3294, Stats. (1898), to recover the money penalty provided. Ibid. 3. Within the meaning of ch. 218, Laws of 1899, as amended by ch. 72, Laws of 1907,-providing that every person "convicted" before the district court of Milwaukee county "may appeal from the sentence or judgment against him to the municipal court,”— the word "convicted" applies to a person against whom a judgment has been recovered in a civil action for the money penalty for violation of a city ordinance. Ibid. Contracts. See PUBLIC UTILITIES. Public improvements: Streets: Change of grade: Damages. See APPEAL, 2. 4. Sec. 8 of ch. VII of the Milwaukee city charter does not limit the right of the lotowner, in the case of a change of a street grade, to damages only for the purpose of reducing benefits or as an offset against benefits. Schmidt v. Milwaukee, 367 5. Lots fronting on the improvement, with respect to which an assessment of benefits and damages is provided for in secs. 7, 8, ch. VII, Milwaukee city charter, are not limited to lots designated on the plat which actually abut upon the street in question; but such a "lot" may consist of parcels forming a distinct |