site qualification of assessment, an omission from which deprives one entitled to be on it of the right of voting. It may not be, in the estimation of counsel, a list of voters, but it has this great significancy of being such a list that any man not found upon it is deprived of his right to vote.

Thus these lists have a dual aspect, and are as much a list of voters as of assessed persons. This supposed difficulty does not apply to the lists of voters made out by the clerks of the peace.

The learned attorney general, whose opinion is entitled to great respect by reason of his official position and well known ability as a lawyer, has insisted that it would be impossible to enforce the criminal proceedings of the sections of the United States Revised Statutes regarding obstruction or hindrance of supervisors so appointed; holding that no indictment to cover such an offence could be drawn because the warrant claimed for the authority of these supervisors cannot be found in the United States Statutes. With all respect to the learned attorney general, this is begging the whole question. If there is substantially a registration of voters in this state within the true meaning and intent of the act of congress, as we have already indicated there is, there would be no difficulty in framing an indictment against any state officer charged with the duties of registration of voters, either under the section in question or under section 2005, for any obstruction or hindrance to supervisors in the performance of the duties imposed on them by congress.

I have thus at some length argued the novel and interesting questions which have been presented for my solution. I may have erred in the conclusion at which I have arrived. If I entertained doubts of the correctness of my conclusion which were not of the gravest character, I should feel bound to give the benefit of those doubts in favor of that construction which was in good faith intended to purify and protect the elective franchise rather than that which would curtail

and diminish the opportunity of doing the same. If I am right in my conclusion I would do a great wrong in not making these appointments, while, if I err in my legal judgment,

no injury is done to any one-no man's rights are invaded or affected injuriously by the appointments-and ample opportunity will be given, before a full bench, on full argument, to have this disputed question finally determined. I shall therefore make the appointments of supervisors of election as suitable names shall be presented to me by the chief supervisor of elections for this district.

MICON, Administratrix, etc., v. LAMAR, Executor, etc.

(Circuit Court, 8. D. New York. January 2, 1880.)

GUARDIAN AND WARD-CIVIL WAR.-A guardian appointed by a surrogate court in the state of New York, who, together with his ward, was subsequently domiciled in a southern state during the waging of the civil war, was bound in good faith to keep his ward's money and its accumulations safely during the war, and to account for such property at its close.

SAME-REMOVAL OF TRUST FUND-CONFISCATION.-A guardian cannot lawfully remove the property of his ward in order to save it from confiscation by the United States government.

SAME-NEW GUARDIAN-RELEASE. -A new guardian may be appointed before a former guardian has been discharged, where such guardians are resident in separate state jurisdictions. A release from such new guardian will not, however, relieve the former guardian from liability, where such former guardian has unlawfully invested the funds of the ward. SAME RATIFICATION BY WARD.-The ratification by a ward must be made with a full knowledge of all the facts, and a full understanding of all legal rights, and the same must be clearly established by the evidence.

SAME-NEXT OF KIN-ESTOPPEL.-The acts and admissions of the next of kin of the ward, made during the life-time of the ward, are not subsequently binding upon such next of kin when she becomes the administratrix of such ward.

SAME-INVESTMENT-INTEREST WITH ANNUAL RESTS.-Where a guardian unlawfully invests trust funds, he is liable to make good the amount invested, together with interest and annual rests.

S. P. Nash and G. C. Holt, for plaintiffs.

E. N. Dickerson and C. C. Beaman, for defendant.

CHOATE, J. This was a suit brought by the plaintiff's testatrix, Ann C. Sims, in the supreme court of the state of New

mar.

York, against the defendant, as executor of Gazaway B. LaThe case was removed into this court by the defendant, and the plaintiff having died, the suit was revived in the name of the present plaintiff, her administratrix.

The complaint alleges that on the twenty-first day of December, 1855, the defendant's testator, Gazaway B. Lamar, was duly appointed, by the surrogate of Richmond county, guardian of the said Ann C. Sims, then an infant of about four years of age, and then residing in said county of Richmond; that he accepted said trust and gave bond as required by law; that on or about January 1, 1856, he took into his possession all the property of said infant, being more than $5,000 in cash and other property; that he never, during his life-time, rendered an account of said guardianship to the surrogate of Richmond county, or to any court having cognizance thereof, or to the plaintiff; that the said infant has become of full age and has demanded an account, which the said guardian and his executor have neglected to give. The prayer of the complaint is for an account and payment of the balance found due.

The answer of the defendant avers that the said Gazaway B. Lamar was a citizen of Georgia, and said infant was a citizen of Alabama, having a temporary residence in the city of New York, when the said Lamar was appointed guardian of said infant, as alleged in the complaint; that in the year 1861 the states of Georgia and Alabama declared themselves to have seceded from the United States, and to constitute members of the so-called Confederate States of America, whereupon a state of war arose between the United States and the Confederate States, which continued to be flagrant for more than four years after the spring of 1861; that the said Lamar and Ann C. Sims were, in the spring of 1861, citizens and residents of Georgia and Alabama, respectively, and citizens of the Confederate States, and were engaged in aiding and abetting the state of Georgia and the Confederate States in their rebellion against the United States, and so continued till January, 1865; that the United States, by various public acts, declared all the estate and property of

the said Lamar and the said Ann C. Sims to be liable to seizure and confiscation, and they were outlawed and debarred of any access to any court of the United States, whereby it was impossible for the said Lamar to appear in the surrogate's court of Richmond county, to settle and close his accounts there, and to be discharged of his liability as guardian, in consequence whereof the relation of guardian and ward ceased and determined, so far as the same depended upon the order or decree of said surrogate's court; that, for the purpose of saving the money and property of said Ann C. Sims from seizure and confiscation by the United States, the said Lamar, at the request of said Ann C. Sims and of her natural guardians, all citizens of Alabama, withdrew the funds belonging to her from the city of New York, where they were declared to be forfeited and confiscated, and invested the same, for her benefit and account, in such securities as, by the laws of Alabama and Georgia and of the Confederate States, he might lawfully do; that on the fifteenth day of March, 1867, at the written request of said Ann C. Sims and of her natural guardians, one Benjamin H. Micon was appointed her legal guardian by the probate court of Montgomery county, in the state of Alabama, where she then resided, and that said Lamar accounted with and paid over to said Micon, as guardian, all the estate with which he was chargeable, as guardian, and received from the said Micon, as guardian, a full release therefrom, and that the said Ann C. Sims ratified and confirmed the same when she became of age.

A similar suit was brought by Ann C. Sims, as administratrix of Martha M. Sims, her sister, of whom the said Lamar was at thesame time appointed guardian. Martha M. Sims died in 1864, at the age of 15 years, unmarried and intestate, leaving the said Ann C. Sims her next of kin. The complaint in this second suit states a cause of action similar to that stated in the suit of Ann C. Sims. The answer in this case states the same defences of the dissolution of the relation of guardian and ward by the war; the withdrawal of the funds to save them from confiscation. It also avers that

all the rights of Martha M. Sims vested at her death in Ann C. Sims, and that the settlement with Micon as guardian, and his release, discharged the said Lamar from all liability as guardian of Martha M. Sims.

After the revival of these suits in the name of the present plaintiff, cross suits were commenced in this court by the defendant against the present plaintiff, setting up the same defences as in his answer to the original complaints, and further averring that the present plaintiff is the sole legatee under the will of Ann C. Sims, and entitled to receive in her own right whatever shall be recovered in these actions, and that the present plaintiff, as one of the natural guardians of said infants, approved and ratified all the acts of said Lamar as their guardian, and is therefore estopped to deny that those acts were in all respects legal and proper. The present plaintiff, in her answers in the cross suits, denies that she was one of the natural guardians of said infants, and denies the approval and ratification of the acts of the guardian.

The four suits have been tried together upon an agreed statement of facts.

The appointment of defendant's testator as guardian of the two infants by the proper court of the place of their domicile at the time of the appointment, and his receipt soon afterwards of moneys belonging to his wards, are admitted. The condition of his bond, which is made a part of the complaint is, that he "will faithfully in all things discharge the duty of a guardian according to law, and render a true and just account of all moneys and property received by him, and of the application thereof, and of his guardianship in all respects, to any court having cognizance thereof, when thereunto required." The letters of guardianship appoint the general guardian of the person and estate of said minor "until she shall arrive at the age of fourteen years and until another guardian shall be appointed," and requires him "to safely keep the real and personal estate of said minor, and not to suffer any waste, sale or destruction of the same, etc., and to deliver the same to her when she becomes of full age, v.1,no.1-2