CHAPTER XI.

TA YLOR—(Continued.)

Description of Monterey — Dissatisfaction in regard to the convention—Taylor's explanation—Advance to Victoria — Scott takes command—March to Saltillo—Battle of Buena Vista—Victims of the battle—Taylor's forced inactivity.

General Taylor immediately established his headquarters in Monterey, and took steps for the protection of the Mexican people. The city was found to be far stronger even than had been imagined, and to have been fortified with the most consummate art. The population of the city was about fifteen thousand, and their condition was far better than that, probably, of any other part of Mexico.

Through the city ran the river San Juan, dividing it, crossed by the bridge La Purissima, leaving the larger part between it and the lofty ridge of La Sierra Madre. Towards the east was a gentle swell, covered with fields of cane and corn, and here and there chapparal. The army ascended this slope, and saw from afar the preparations made to welcome them. The city, surrounded by trees which half hid its white walls, recalled the old Moresco cities of Spain. At the foot of this slope was a fort of large size, of solid masonry; a work, the engineers said, only to be taken by regular approaches.

On the west, peak above peak, towered the Sierra Madre; such a range as in all other lands has nourished a race of hardy mountaineers not to be conquered. On the other side, through a deep gorge commanded by the Bishop's Palace, extended the road to Saltillo and Mexico. This was the only route through which the Mexican army could hope to receive aid or to retreat, and was the point against which General Worth's efforts were directed by General Taylor. Such was the city, every crossing of which was barricaded, defended by its population and ten thousand troops.

On the evening of the surrender, General Taylor had carried every approach to the plaza, in which, however, yet was collected a large and formidable force. Even then the city was not captured, and if in an attack the assaulting columns were beaten back, all the advantages gained were lost. With General Taylor the possession of the city was a necessity ; if repulsed, the whole population of Northern Mexico would have risen on him, and not one of his command would have escaped. The Mexican troops had fought well; they had been driven before the veteran soldiers of the army, and the men who had won the liberty of Texas, assisted by the resolute and chivalric citizen soldiers of the nation; but had lost not one jot of honor. They were the veterans of a hundred battles, who would have won and earned immortality, but for the fact that all their triumphs had been over their country's liberties.

The result was doubtful, and Taylor was right in accepting the surrender of the city as it stood. Had he insisted on an unconditional surrender, he must have fed his prisoners with an impoverished commissariat or turned them adrift. All his officers coincided with him; but there were found persons who censured him, and this surrender became the subject of an angry dispute. All now, however, coincide with him or are silent. Men a thousand miles from a battle-field, Bar calmly

scrutinize the conduct of generals and point out tauhs, but a great, true-hearted people never see anything but the result and the valor by which victory is von.

The secretary of war, and eTen a higher personage, became mingled in this cabal, and the surrender was discussed on the floor of the house of representatives. It may not be improper, in relation to this matter, to quote General Taylor's own account of the circumstances which led to the capitulation.

A letter from the general, dated October 13th, contains the following passages:

«•••*•• The convention presents two distinct points:

First, the permission granted to the Mexican army to retire with their arms, &c. Secondly, the temporary cessation of hostilities for the term of eight weeks. I shall remark on these in order.

The force with which I marched on Monterey was limited by causes beyond my control to about six thousand men. With this force, as every military man must admit, who has seen the ground, it was entirely impossible to invest Monterey so closely as to prevent the escape of the garrison. Although the main communication with the interior was in our possession, yet one route was open to the Mexicans throughout the operations, and could not be closed, as were also other minor tracks and passes through the mountains. Had we, therefore, insisted on more rigorous terms than those granted, the result would have been the escape of the body of the Mexican force, with the destruction of its artillery and magazines, our only advantage being the capture of a few prisoners of war, at the expense of valuable lives and much damage to the city. The conVol. n. 6

sideration of humanity was present to my mind daring the conference which led to the convention, and outweighed in my judgment the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack upon the town. This conclusion has been fully confirmed by an inspection of the enemy's position and.means since the surrender. It was discovered that his principal magazine, containing an immense amount of powder, was in the cathedral, completely exposed to our shells from two directions. The explosion of this mass of powder, which must have ultimately resulted from a continuance of the bombardment, would have been infinitely disastrous, involving the destruction not only of Mexican troops, but of non-combatants, and even our own people, had we pressed the attack.

Iu regard to the temporary cessation of hostilities, the fact that we are not at this moment, within eleven days of the termination of the period fixed by the convention, prepared to move forward in force, is a sufficient explanation of the military reasons which dictated this suspension of arms. It paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, we could not possibly move. I desire distinctly to state, and to call the attention of the authorities to the fact, that, with all diligence in breaking mules and setting up wagons, the first wagons in addition to our original train from Corpus Christi (and but one hundred and twentyfive in number), reached my head-quarters on the same day with the secretary's communication of October 13th, viz: the 2d inst. At the date of the surrender of Monterey, our force had not more than ten days' rations, and even now, with all our endeavors, we have not more than twenty-five. The Task Of Fighting And Beating

THE ENEMY IS AMONG THE LEAST DIFFICULT THAT WE

- Encounter—the great question of supplies necessarily controls all the operations in a country like this. At the date of the convention, I could not of course have foreseen that the department would direct an important detachment from my command without consulting me, or without waiting the result of the main operations under my orders.

I have touched the prominent military points involved in the convention of Monterey. There were other considerations which weighed with the commissioners in framing and with myself in approving the articles of the convention. In the conference with General Ampudia, I was distinctly told by him that he had invited it to spare the further effusion of blood, and because General Santa Anna had declared himself favorable to peace. I knew that our government had made propositions to that of Mexico to negotiate, and I deemed that the change of government in that country since my last instructions, fully warranted me in entertaining considerations of policy. My grand motive in moving forward with very limited supplies had been to increase the inducement of the Mexican government to negotiate for peace. Whatever may be the actual views or disposition of the Mexican rulers or of General Santa Anna, it is not unknown to the government that I had the very best reason for believing the statement of General Ampudia to be true. It was my opinion at the time of the convention, and it has not been changed, that the liberal treatment of the Mexican army and the suspension of arms, would exert none but a favorable influence in our behalf.

The result of the entire operation has been to throw the Mexican army back more than three hundred miles to the city of San Luis Potosi, and to open the