55. "What can this intend?" asked Mr. Canning, in a personal note to Mr. Rush. "Our northern question is with Russia, as our southern with the United States. But do the United States mean to travel north to get between us and Russia? and do they mean to stipulate against Great Britain in favor of Russia; or to reserve to themselves whatever Russia may not want?" Mr. Rush answered that it was even so; that the line of 55° was supposed to be the southern limit of Russia, it being the boundary within which the Emperor Paul granted certain commercial privileges to his Russian-American Company in 1799; that 51° was taken as the northern limit of the United States in order to include all the waters of the Columbia River, and that the United States did not intend to concede to Russia any system of colonial exclusion above 55° or to deprive themselves of the right of traffic with the natives above that parallel. Mr. Canning acknowledged the receipt of this explanation by saying that he would take it, "like the wise and wary Dutchman of old times, ad referendum and ad considerandum." Subsequently to this informal discussion, President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, was published, in which it was announced that the American continents would not be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers. Mr. Canning inquired of Mr. Rush as to the precise nature and extent of this principle, of which he said he had not previously been aware. Mr. Rush replied that he had had no instructions on the principle since it was proclaimed in the message, but that he would be prepared to support it when the negotiations came on. Mr. Canning then said he would be under the necessity of addressing to Mr. Rush an official note on the subject, prior to writing to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, or else of declining to join the United States in the negotiation with Russia, as the United States had proposed; and that he would prefer the latter course, since he did not desire to bring that part of the message into discussion for the present, as England must necessarily object to it. Mr. Rush replied that he was entirely willing that the negotiation should take that course, so far as he had any claim to speak. To this position Mr. Rush was impelled, as he explained to his own government, chiefly by the consideration that, if a negotiation between the three nations as to the northwest coast should take place at

1 Residence at the Court of London, II. 84, 86.

St. Petersburg, the non-colonization principle, from which he understood Russia also to dissent, might cause that power to take the side of England against the United States. In consequence, Mr. Rush entered upon a separate discussion with Great Britain. The British plenipotentiaries, Messrs. Huskis son and Stratford Canning, denied the validity of the claims of Spain, as well as that of the claim of the United States based on the alleged discovery of the Columbia River by Captain Gray, and declared that Great Britain considered the whole of the unoccupied parts of America as being open to her future settlement, including that portion of the northwest coast lying between the forty-second and the fifty-first degree of north latitude. The discussions proceeded to a great length, and they were ended on the part of Great Britain by her plenipotentiaries offering as the boundary the fortyninth parallel of north latitude to the point where it strikes the northeasternmost branch of the Columbia, and thence along the middle of the Columbia to the Pacific Ocean, the navigation of that river to be free to the subjects and citizens of both nations. Mr. Rush, while rejecting this offer, consented to alter his proposal so as to shift its southern line to the parallel of 49 in place of 51°. The British plenipotentiaries, after considering this modification for a fortnight, rejected it, and made no new proposal in return. This rejection was not, however, in terms entered on the protocol.4

By the treaty between the United States Line of 54° 40′. and Russia concluded April 17, 1824, the northern limit of the claims of the United States was fixed at 54° 40′ north latitude, it being agreed that the citizens of the United States should not thereafter form, under the authority of their government, any establishment on the coast or the adjacent islands north of that line, and that in the same manner Russian subjects should form no establishment south of it. Thus Russia left it to the United States and Great Britain to contest the territory south of 54° 40', and the United States left it to Russia and Great Britain to divide the territory to the north. This Great Britain and Russia did by the convention of February 28 (March 16), 1825.

Residence at the Court of London, II. 86, 88.

2 Id. II. 257.

3 Id. II. 270-271.

4 Id. II. 272-273.

In 1826 Mr. Canning suggested to Rufus Gallatin's Negotia- King, who was then minister of the United tions: Joint Occu- States at London, that the negotiations be

pation.

tween Great Britain and the United States should be resumed. Mr. King, who was on the point of leaving England, transmitted Mr. Canning's note to Washington.' Mr. Clay was then Secretary of State. He substantially reaffirmed, for the guidance of Mr. Gallatin, who had succeeded Mr. King in the mission to England, the instructions of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush; but, while authorizing Mr. Gallatin to announce the line of 49° as an ultimatum, said he might agree that British subjects should have the right to navigate the Columbia if that line should cross any of the branches of the river which were navigable from the point of intersection to the ocean.3 The British plenipotentiaries, Messrs. Huskisson and Addington, rejected this proposal on the ground, among others, that the straight line had no regard to convenience, and mentioned particularly that its cutting off the southern portion of Quadra and Vancouver's Island was quite inadmissible. Mr. Gallatin, while not announcing 49 as an "ultimatum,” said that the United States would adhere to that line as a basis. In er. ploying this form of expression he had in view the possible "exchange of the southern extremity of Nootka's Island (Quadra and Vancouver's), * for the whole or part of

the upper branches of the Columbia River north of that parallel." The British plenipotentiaries adhered substantially to the line of the Columbia River, offering the United States above that line merely a detached portion of territory bounded on the west by the ocean, on the north by Fuca's Straits, on the east by the entrance of Admiralty Inlet and the peninsula between that and Hoods Inlet, and on the south by a line drawn thence to Gray's Harbor on the ocean. The British plenipotentiaries dwelt on the excellence of the harbor of Port Discovery, defended by Protection Island, which would thus be secured to the United States. Mr. Gallatin rejected this proposal at once, saying that it did not admit even of discussion as to its details, as its principle was inadmissible. As the nego

1 Am. State Papers, For. Rel. VI, 645–646.

2 Treaties and Conventions of the United States, 1776-1887, p. 1331, notes. 3 Am. State Papers, For. Rel. VI. 611-645. Am. State Papers, For. Rel. VI. 651,

tiators were unable to reach a settlement, they concluded on August 6, 1827, a convention indefinitely extending the joint occupation, subject to its termination by either party on twelve months' notice. The conclusion of this convention "was rather hastened than retarded by the death of Mr. Canning in August, and the elevation of Lord Goderich to the post of Prime Minister."

Calhoun-Pakenham
Negotiations.

The continuance of the joint occupation proved to be inconvenient and dangerous. Settlers were beginning to occupy the territory in large numbers, and they naturally looked to their respective governments for protection. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which was concluded on the 9th of August 1842, did not provide for the adjustment of the dispute, and a proposal made by the British minister at Washington later in the year for the renewal of negotiations remained without result, though President Tyler at one time contemplated sending a special mission to England for the purpose of effecting a settlement.3 In 1844 Mr. Richard Pakenham arrived in the United States as minister of Great Britain, and renewed in behalf of his government the proposition to resume negotiations. Action on this proposal was delayed by the killing of Mr. Upshur, who was then Secretary of State, by the explosion of a gun on board the United States man-of-war Princeton.1 After the lapse of several months the negotiations were resumed by Mr. Calhoun, who had succeeded Mr. Upshur as Secretary of State. The propositions respectively advanced by the negotiators were substantially the same as those discussed in London in 1827, Mr. Calhoun offering the line of 49°, however, as an ultimatum. In January 1845, no agreement seeming to be possible, Mr. Pakenham proposed to submit the dispute to arbitration. This proposition Mr. Calhoun declined, saying that it was the opinion of the President that it would be inadvisable to consider any other mode than negotiation, so long

Adams's Life of Albert Gallatin, 626.

2A select committee of the United States Senate on June 6, 1838, reported a bill to authorize the President to employ such parts of the Army and Navy as he might deem necessary for the protection of the persons and property of those who might reside in the territory. (S. Rep. 470, 25 Cong. 2 sess.)

3 Curtis's Life of Daniel Webster, II. 172.

+ Benton's Thirty Years' View, II. 567.

5627-14

as there was a hope of arriving at a satisfactory settlement in that way.'

Fight."

Meanwhile the controversy was daily grow"Fifty-four Forty or ing more acute. A movement was made in Congress to erect a Territorial government without defining the domain over which its jurisdiction should be exercised. The Democratic convention that assembled at Baltimore in May 1844 adopted a declaration popularly interpreted as meaning "fifty-four forty or fight," to the effect that the title of the United States "to the whole of the territory of Oregon" was "clear and unquestionable," and that "no part of the same ought to be ceded to England, or any other power." President Polk in his inaugural address made "the same declaration in the very same words, with marks of quotation." The declaration was answered in England in indignant tones. The cry became general that war was "inevitable." 3

Under the circumstances President Polk, Mr. Buchanan's "in deference to what had been done by his

Proposals. predecessors, and especially in consideration that propositions of compromise had thrice been made, by two preceding administrations, to adjust the question on the parallel of forty-nine degrees," deemed it to be his duty to make another effort to settle. Accordingly Mr. Buchanan on the 12th of July 1845 proposed to divide the territory "by the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, * offering at the same time to make free to Great Britain any port or ports on Vancouver's island, south of this parallel, which the British Government may desire." This proposition, which did not include the free navigation of the Columbia, Mr. Pakenham, without referring the matter to his government, on the 29th of July rejected, saying that he hoped the American plenipotentiary would be prepared to offer some further proposals more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government."

*

1S. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong. 1 sess. 161, 162.

On

2 Webster's Works, II. 321. See Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, I. 51-56.

3 Will there be War? Analysis of the Elements which constitute, respectively, the Power of England and the United States. By an Adopted Citizen (L. Bonnefoux), New York, February, 1846.

4S. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong. 1 sess. 10.

Id. 169.

6 Id. 176.