and Enterprise, engaged in the coasting trade, but which were forced by shipwreck and stress of weather into the ports of those islands." To this resolution the President replied on the 13th of the same month, transmitting the correspondence.' In 1840 the Senate adopted a resolution declaring that, where a vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, engaged in a lawful voyage, was forced by stress of weather or other unavoidable circumstance into the port of a friendly power, the country to which she belonged lost none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas, either over the vessel or the personal relations of those on board.”

On the 19th of October 1840 the American schooner Hermosa, bound from Richmond, Virginia, to New Orleans, with a cargo of 38 slaves belonging to a citizen of the United States, was wrecked on the key of Abaco. Wreckers came alongside and took off the master and crew and the slaves, and against the wishes of the master, who desired to go to a port in the United States, proceeded to Nassau, where certain magistrates in uniform, who represented themselves as officers acting under the orders of the civil and military authorities, and who were accompanied by armed soldiery, came out to the vessel, and taking forcible possession of the slaves transported them in boats to the shore, where after some judicial proceedings they were set free, against the remonstrance of the master of the Hermosa and of the American consul.

The excitement created by these incidents Case of the "Creole." culminated in the case of the brig Creole, which sailed from Hampton Roads for New Orleans on the 27th of October 1841, having on board 135 slaves. On the night of the 7th of November a portion of the slaves revolted, wounded the master, chief mate, and two of the crew, and murdered one of the passengers, and having secured possession of the vessel ordered the mate, under pain of death, to steer for Nassau, where the brig arrived on the 9th of November. At first the governor, on the request of the United States consul, sent a file of soldiers on board for the purpose of preventing the escape of the slaves and securing the murderers. But soon afterward he summoned the consul to attend him, and in the presence of the council, who were then in session, announced that they had come to the conclusion (1) that the courts of law had no juris

1S. Ex. Doc. 174, 24 Cong. 2 sess.

diction over the alleged offenses; (2) that, as an information had been lodged before him charging that a murder had been committed on the vessel on the high seas, it was expedient that the charge should be investigated, and that any persons found to be implicated should be detained at Nassau to await the instructions of the British Government; and (3) that, so soon as the examination should be completed all persons on board the vessel not implicated in the alleged offenses must be released from further restraint. An examination was begun on the 9th of November, but on the 10th it was postponed till the 12th, when without any explanation it was abruptly terminated. On the morning of that day the consul received information that an attempt would be made to liberate the slaves by force. The Americans in port had determined to furnish the necessary aid to send the Creole and negroes to New Orleans, and the officers and crews of two other American vessels had united with her officers, men, and passengers for that purpose; but, in the presence of a great concourse on shore, a large number of colored persons armed with bludgeons went out in boats to the brig and anchored near by, and some of the clubs were passed on to the slaves. At this conjuncture the attorney-general, accompanied by other colonial officers, went on board. The slaves identified as implicated in the mutiny were sent ashore, and the rest being called on deck were told by the attorney-general that they were free and at liberty to go wherever they pleased. Assisted by the magistrates, they were transported to the shore and conducted to the superintendent of police, by whom their names were registered. They were thus forcibly taken from the custody of the master and liberated.

In the cases of the Comet and Encomium, which respectively occurred in 1831 and February 1833, Great Britain in the latter part of President Van Buren's administration paid an indemnity of $116,179.62. But in the cases of the Enterprise, Hermosa, and Creole, which occurred after August 1, 1834, when the act of Parliament of August 28, 1833,2 for the abolition of slavery in the British colonies took effect, the British Government refused to acknowledge any liability on the ground that the slaves on entering British jurisdiction became free. The United States, on the other hand, maintained that if a vessel

1 H. Ex. Doc. 242, 27 Cong. 2 sess.; Act of Feb. 18, 1843, 5 Stats. at L.

23 and 4 William IV. ch. 73.

were driven by necessity to enter the port of another nation the local law could not operate so as to affect existing rights of property as between persons on board, or their personal obligations or relations under the law of the country to which the vessel belonged. In the case of the Creole this argument was emphasized by the fact that the vessel was brought into British jurisdiction by means of a crime against the law of the flag. The case gave rise to animated discussions in the British Parliament as well as in the Congress of the United States, and came near breaking up the negotiations between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton in 1842.1 The decision of the umpire sustained the position of the United States.

British Claims.

Of the 75 British claims against the United States, 19 were allowed, 52 dismissed, and 4 withdrawn. On the claims that were allowed, 9 awards were made by the commissioners and 10 by the umpire. Of the claims that were dismissed, 43 were disallowed by the commissioners and 9 by the umpire. The total amount of the awards against the United States was $277,102.88, or £57,252 13s. 4d.

In most of the British cases in which the commissioners concurred, the grounds of their decisions, in allowing or rejecting claims, were not disclosed; but where the umpire was required to decide, his opinions were almost always formally stated. Some of these opinions, just as in the case of the American claims, related to important cases and important questions. Among these may be mentioned the Florida and Texas bonds cases, the case of Alexander McLeod, whose ar rest and trial in New York in connection with the destruction of the steamer Caroline had created serious complications,2 and the case of the Messrs. Laurent, involving the question of domicil as affecting the right to governmental intervention. It has been seen that no claim "arising out Comprehensiveness of any transaction of a date prior to December 24, 1814," was admissible under the convention. Beginning with this date as a starting point, the high contracting parties by Article V. of the convention engaged

of the Settlement.

Curtis's Life of Webster, II. 54, 99, 104, 119, 120-122; Benton's Thirty Years' View, II. 409; Phillimore, International Law, IV. 14; Webster's Works, VI. 303; Opinion of Legaré, At. Gen., 4 Op. 98; Br. and For. State Papers (1841-42), XXX. 181; Wheaton, Revue Française et Étrangère, IX. 315; Calvo, Droit Int., 3d ed. II. 269; Abdy's Kent (1878), 149.

2 Curtis's Life of Webster, II. 53, 61, 62, 64, 69, 85.

to consider the result of the commission "as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim upon either government arising out of any transaction of a date prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention;" and further engaged "that every such claim, whether or not the same may have been presented to the notice of, made, preferred, or laid before the said commission, shall, from and after the conclusion of the proceedings of the said commission, be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and thenceforth inadmissible." The result of these stipulations was that every claim against either government, whether presented to the commission or no, arising out of any transaction between December 24, 1814, and July 26, 1853, was either settled and determined or rendered inadmissible as a subject of future international action.

Case of the Schooner "Lord Nelson."

Among the claims submitted to the commission was one of the Hon. James Crooks, owner of the schooner Lord Nelson. It appeared that the Lord Nelson was on June 5, 1812, thirteen days before the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, seized on Lake Ontario by the United States brig Oneida for an alleged breach of the embargo laws and taken to Sacketts Harbor, where after war was declared she was condemned and sold as a prize and the proceeds paid into court. After peace, Mr. Crooks claimed his property as having been captured in time of peace, and the court in 1818 ordered the proceeds to be paid over to him, when it was found that the clerk in whose custody the money was had absconded, leaving no assets. The claimant sought to bring his demand within the period covered by the convention by founding it, not on the original seizure of the vessel, but on the failure of the United States to make effective the judicial decree of 1818. The umpire held that the claim was not within the jurisdiction of the commission, the transaction in which it originated having taken place at a time not covered by the convention.1

The commission had jurisdiction of all claims Presentation of Claim which may have been presented to either by one Government to the Other Unnec-government for its interposition with the other" between December 24, 1815, and the expiration of the period prescribed by the convention for the presentation of claims to the commissioners; and by one of the standing rules of the commission it was declared that

essary.

MSS. Dept. of State.

claims "presented to the commissioners by the agents of either government will be regarded as presented by their respective governments, in accordance with the provisions of the convention." Under these provisions the commission exercised jurisdiction without regard to the fact that the claim had or had not been presented by one government to the other. In the Texas bond cases the agent of the United States argued that the claim was legally against the State of Texas, and as such was not intended by the two governments to come within the jurisdiction of the commission; and as moral evidence in support of this contention he adverted to the fact, as also did the American commissioner, that the claim had not been brought to the notice of either government, or made a matter of correspondence between them, or included in any list of unsettled claims at the date of the convention, but was presented by the claimants to the foreign office in London after the commission met, and was transmitted by the foreign office to the British agent. The cases were ultimately refered to the umpire, the commissioners having differed on the various questions involved. In the printed report of the proceedings the awards of the umpire in these cases are not given; but it is stated that he dismissed the claims on the ground "that cases of this description were not included among the unsettled claims that had received the cognizance of the governments, or were designed to be embraced within the provisions of the convention." Had this language been used by the umpire it could hardly have been construed, in direct opposition to the explicit provisions of the convention, to mean that a claim must have been presented by one government to the other in order to bring it within the jurisdiction of the commission. But the printed report of the umpire's decision in these cases is inaccurate. His formal awards are on file, and in the one case, that of the Executors of James Holford, No. 14, British docket, he held that the claim could not be entertained, "it being for transactions with the Independent Republic of Texas, prior to its admission as a State of the United States;" while in the other, No. 15, British docket, he held that the claimants, the Messrs. Dawson, of Baltimore, had "no right to claim before this commission, being according to the law of nations citizens

1 S. Ex. Doc. 103, 34 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 396, 426.