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assurances that the two more urgent controversies previously mentioned can be put under process of adjustment in the manner which I have indicated."

Mr. Johnson's Negotiations.

Mr. Johnson arrived in England in August, and conducted his negotiations with Lord Stanley with so much energy that on the 9th of October they signed a protocol on the subject of naturalization,' on the 17th of the same month a protocol for the arbitration of the San Juan boundary dispute,2 and on the 10th of November a convention concerning claims.3 Only one of these instruments was destined to survive. The protocol on naturalization was substantially preserved in the convention on that subject, concluded by Mr. Motley and Lord Clarendon at London on the 13th of May 1870. The protocol touching the San Juan boundary provided for the reference of the controversy to "some friendly sovereign or state," and proposed to invest the arbitrator with power, in case he should be unable to reach a precise conclusion as between the claims of the contracting parties, to "determine upon some other line," which would "furnish an equitable solution of the difficulty" and would be the "nearest approximation that could be made to an accurate decision of the point in dispute."

On the 26th of November Mr. Seward teleObjections to Claims graphed to Mr. Johnson: "Claims convention Convention. unless amended is useless." This convention provided for the submission of all claims of British subjects against the United States, and of all claims of citizens of the United States against Great Britain, to a tribunal of four commissioners, two to be appointed by each government, which was to sit in London. Though Mr. Johnson had not understood that this question of place was important, Mr. Seward now declared that in view of "highly disturbed national sensibilities" Washington was "indispensable." 4

The convention also provided for the determination of all claims by a majority vote, except the Alabama claims. In regard to these it was stipulated that in case the commission should be unable to come to a "unanimous decision," they should be referred to "some sovereign or head of a friendly

Dip. Cor. 1868, part 1, p. 358.

2 Id. 361.

3 Id. 371.

4Id. 374.

state," who should be chosen for that purpose by the two governments before any of this class of claims should be taken into consideration by the commissioners. In respect of all other claims, the commissioners, if equally divided in opinion, were authorized themselves to select an umpire; and it was provided that if they should be unable to agree upon any such person the commissioners on either side should name an umpire, and that from the two persons so named an umpire should be designated by lot in each particular case in which the commissioners might be unable to come to a decision. To these provisions Mr. Seward objected, on the ground that they discriminated against the Alabama claims, first, in that they required the decision of the commissioners upon any of those claims to be unanimous; second, in that they prescribed a different mode for the choice of an umpire for the Alabama claims from that provided in respect of all other claims; third, in that they required the umpire chosen for the Alabama claims to be a sovereign or the head of a friendly state, while no such limitation was made in regard to any other class of claims. To the provision authorizing the choice of an umpire by lot for the decision of claims other than the Alabama claims Mr. Seward did not object.

The convention also provided that neither government should make out a case in support of its position touching the Alabama claims, and that no person should be heard for or against any such claim; but that the official correspondence already exchanged on the subject should alone be laid before the commissioners, and, in the event of their not coming to a unanimous decision, before the umpire, without arguments written or oral, and without the production of any further evidence. Mr. Seward objected to this provision, on the ground that its precautions against allowing as full a hearing and examination of the Alabama claims as of all other claims, American or British, would have the mischievous effect of exciting unnecessary distrust among the people of the United States, as well as among those of Great Britain.1

Johnson-Clarendon
Convention.

Before Mr. Johnson could act upon the amendments required by Mr. Seward Lord Clarendon had succeeded Lord Stanley as foreign secretary. But a new convention, framed in accord

Dip. Cor. 1868, part 1, p. 381.

ance with Mr. Seward's instructions, was signed by Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon January 14, 1869; and on the same day a convention was formally concluded for the reference of the San Juan boundary question to the President of the Swiss Confederation, on the lines laid down in the protocol of the 17th of the preceding October.'

The claims convention as it now stood, though it provided for a board of four instead of two commissioners, followed in its general outlines the convention of February 8, 1853, which Mr. Johnson was instructed to use as a model. The Alabama claims were not expressly referred to, and the modes prescribed for the choice of an umpire applied uniformly to all claims. The provision for the appointment of an umpire by lot, in each particular case of difference, in the event of the commissioners' being unable to agree on one umpire for all cases, remained. A similar provision may be found in the convention of 1853;2 but it did not become necessary, in the proceedings under that convention, to resort to it, since the commissioners were so fortunate as to agree upon one umpire. For this reason its unsatisfactory character was not demonstrated; but it is scarcely necessary to point out that the vibration of a tribunal between two umpires is likely to produce an undesirable variety in decisions, and that the haphazard method of casting lots for an umpire in each case, without reference to the principles involved in it, makes this tendency irremediable. The Johnson-Clarendon convention, however, contained the further provision that if the commissioners, or any two of them, should think it desirable that a sovereign or head of a friendly state should be umpire in any claim, the commissioners should report the fact to their respective governments, who should within six months agree upon some such person, who should be invited to decide upon such claim, and before whom should be laid the official correspondence which had taken place between the two governments, and the other written documents or statements which were presented to the commissioners in respect of such claim. This provision, while not expressly referring to the Alabama claims, was obviously designed to take the place of the stipulation which the Johnson-Stanley convention contained in relation to the umpirage of those claims.

1 Dip. Cor. 1868, part 1, p. 400.

2 Supra, p. 391.

Mr. Seward's Satisfaction.

Mr. Seward conveyed to Mr. Johnson "the assurance of the President's high satisfaction” with the manner in which he had conducted the negotiations, and Mr. Johnson confidently expressed the opinion that if the claims convention should become operative "every dollar duc" on the Alabama claims would be "recovered." Nevertheless it soon became evident that the convention would not be ratified. A premonition of its fate may be read in a letter to Mr. Johnson of the 10th of February 1869, in which Mr. Seward said: "The confused light of an incoming administration is already spreading itself over the country, as usual rendering the consideration of political subjects irksome if not inconvenient. With your experience in legislative life, you will be able to judge for yourself of the prospects of definite action upon the treaties during the remainder of the present session."2

Dip. Cor. 1868, part 1, pp. 406, 418.

Mr. Seward's attitude toward the negotiations is shown in the following letter:

"DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
"Washington, 26 October, 1868.

"REVERDY JOHNSON, Esq., etc., etc., etc.:

“MY DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I thank you for your note of the 7th of October, giving explanations of the circumstances attending your speeches at Sheffield, Leeds, and Worcester. I have laid it before the President.

"Those speeches have fallen upon the ear of the American people in an hour when party spirit is raging very high. The country, unadvised of your power and instructions, and uninformed of the improved disposition of the British Government, has been entirely unprepared for success in the objects of your mission. As you may have noticed, an active criticism was inaugurated by the press under a belief that to the failure of your negotiations would be added the humiliation of your having unnecessarily lowered the national attitude by your speeches. The cable reports have already broken this delusion in part. Your success in negotiating the claims convention ought to remove it altogether.

"In the event of that success, however, you may look out for another change. Political adversaries, finding your negotiations crowned with complete success, contrary to their own predictions, will begin to cavil at the several treaties which you will have made, on the ground that they fall short of what might and ought to have been secured. This is the habitual experience of diplomacy.

"It was so with our German naturalization treaties; it was so with the St. Thomas and Alaska treaties; it was so with Jay's treaty, and with the treaty of Ghent. Nevertheless, I think that you may take all needed encouragement.

Unpropitious Coditions.

There were, however, other difficulties than those occasioned by "the confused light of an incoming administration." Though Mr. Seward was not unconscious that the conditions were not propitious, his hopeful nature had led him to believe that the negotiations would in the end be successful, and it is not improbable that this hopefulness, reinforced by the wish to close an important diplomatic chapter which he had himself so largely written, in a measure accounts for the lack of preparation and preconcert which the course of the negotiations in London betrays. But, apart from these circumstances, a new class of claims, generically known as "national claims" or "indirect claims," of which Mr. Sumner became the chief exponent, had begun to assume a definite form in the United States. To these claims the Johnson-Clarendon convention did not refer.

Rejection of the Convention.

On the 29th of March 1869 Mr. Johnson tendered his resignation of the office of minister to England, to take effect at such time as might be designated. Before taking this step, however, he had proposed to Lord Clarendon, with a view to meet objections in the United States, to include in the claims convention all claims of either government, as well as of their citizens or subjects. This proposal was made by Mr. Johnson under his

"The treaties will prove satisfactory in the end, and the wisdom of the speeches you have made will thus be fully vindicated by the achievements which follow them.

"I am, my dear Mr. Johnson, very sincerely yours,

(MSS. Dept. of State.)

"WILLIAM H. SEWARD,"

In the London Times of March 26, 1872 (page 10, column 5), while the controversy was pending as to the competency of the tribunal of arbitration under the treaty of Washington to entertain the indirect claims, of which much will be said hereafter, there is an extract from a conversation with Mr. Seward, published in the New York Herald, in which, referring to the controversy in question, he is reported to have said: "Well, sir, I do think that the Johnson-Clarendon treaty was the best treaty that could have been negotiated, and having rejected that, they ought to be precluded from making any more treaties for the settlement of the Alabama claims. My opinion is that the treaty which I negotiated failed because of the pas sions and prejudices engendered between the two countries. The settlement of the Alabama claims is reserved for the future. The time has not yet arrived, because those passions and prejudices have not yet sufficiently subsided."

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