understanding each other," or of "their looking into each other's hearts.”'

At the beginning of this interview Lord Clarendon referred to Mr. Sumner's speech on the rejected claims convention, and it is not improbable that his lordship assumed, as the conference progressed, that the views expressed in that speech had been adopted as the basis of Mr. Motley's instructions. The tone of these instructions was, however, wholly conciliatory. In preparing them Mr. Fish had kept three objects in viewfirst, to show that the rejection of the claims convention was not an act of unfriendliness; second, to suggest a suspension of discussion till the prevailing irritation should subside; and third, to make it clear that the government of the United States did not base its claims against Great Britain on the latter's concession of belligerent rights to the Confederate States. Of these three points the last was the most important, as well as the most troublesome. It was the most im portant not only because it vitally affected the course of future negotiations, but also because it involved a sovereign right which it was the interest of all nations to preserve, and for the exercise of which the Government of the United States now foresaw a possible occasion in the insurrection prevailing in Cuba. It was the most troublesome, because it brought the adminis tration into conflict with those who considered the concession of belligerency as a ground of claim.

It is not to be supposed that Mr. Motley willfully departed from his instructions. He has declared-and his declaration should be decisive-that he sincerely endeavored to carry them out. But it is evident that Mr. Motley treated the questions at issue as an historian, rather than as a diplomatist. Instead of refraining from discussion, he precipitated it, suggesting "the contingencies of war and peace," and confessing to a "despondent feeling" as to the "possibility of the two nations ever understanding each other." In describing the Queen's proclamation of May 13, 1861, as the "fountain head of the disasters which had been caused to the American people, both individually and collectively," he stated the position of Mr. Sumner instead of that of Mr. Fish on the recognition of belligerency; nor does he appear to have been conscious of the radical difference between the views expressed by these statesmen on that subject.

1 S. Ex. Doc. 11, 41 Cong. 3 sess. 5-10.

tiations from London.

When President Grant became acquainted Withdrawal of Nego- with the character of Mr. Motley's interview he requested Mr. Fish to recall him. Mr. Fish, however, advised the course, which was taken, of attracting Mr. Motley's attention to his departure from his instructions and directing him to inform the minister for foreign affairs that the negotiations on the subject of the Alabama claims, whenever they should be renewed, would be. conducted in the United States. Even before the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon convention, but when it was seen that it was doomed to defeat, Mr. Fish expressed to the President the opinion that a pause must be taken in the discussion with Great Britain, and that when the excitement and agitation which would follow the rejection of the convention had subsided the United States should insist that any new negotiations should be held in Washington. Mr. Motley's interview with Lord Clarendon confirmed the wisdom, if it did not reveal the necessity, of carrying out Mr. Fish's plan. A year later Mr. Motley was recalled.

Unofficial Negotia

tions.

*

Meanwhile unofficial negotiations were in progress. In the summer of 1869 Sir John Rose, “who was then a member of the ministry in Canada, and also a commissioner on the part of Great Britain to settle the claims of the Hudson's Bay Company and of the Puget Sound Company against the United States, came to Washington professedly to make some commercial arrangements between the United States and Canada, but really to sound our government as to the possibility of settling the Alabama claims."2 Indeed, Sir John seems to have acted as a confidential intermediary of the British foreign office not only to sound the government, but also to ascertain the state of public feeling and to gather the opinions of leading members of different political parties in the United States on that subject. In an interview with Mr. Fish in the summer of 1869, Sir John Rose suggested the Duke of Argyle and Mr. Forster as special envoys to the United States to treat on the pending differences. Mr. Fish, however, though he had himself suggested the idea of sending a special envoy to the United

Mr. Fish to Dr. Lieber, May 30, 1871, Memorial Proceedings of the New York Legislature, 1894, 45.

2 Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 44.

3 Speech of Earl Granville, London Times, June 13, 1871.

States, "said the time had not arrived; that the British people were too much irritated by the rejection of the treaty and by Mr. Sumner's speech," and that the American people "were too much carried away with the idea of paying off the cost of the war with the amount of damages that Mr. Sumner's speech had made out against Great Britain." Mr. Fish said “that when the excitement subsided the appointment as special envoy of some man of high rank, authorized to express some kind word of regret, would pave the way for a settlement; and he outlined to Sir John the exact scheme for settlement which was adopted a year and a half later.”2

Annual Message of 1870.

On the 25th of September 1869 Mr. Fish addressed to Mr. Motley an extended instruction, in which he fully set forth the injuries which the United States felt they had sustained. This instruction Mr. Motley was told that he was at liberty to read to Lord Clarendon, but in a separate and confidential instruction of the same day he was informed that he was to consider this permission as a command. This step was followed by others. The British minister at Washington, Mr. Thornton, under the instructions of his government, conferred with Mr. Fish at the Department of State, and efforts were made to find a common ground of negotiation. This end, however, was not easily attained. More than a year passed, and the two governments were apparently still far apart in their views. In his annual message to Congress of December 5, 1870, President Grant referred, with an expression of regret, to the fact that no conclusion had been reached. The cabinet of London, he said, so far as its views had been expressed, did not appear to be willing to concede that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence, or did or permitted any act during the war by which the United States had a just cause of complaint. "Our firm and unalterable convictions," said President Grant, "are directly the reverse;" and he then made a recommendation

1 Mr. Fish, in a letter to Dr. Lieber, May 30, 1871, said: "The sending a special mission-some person of high official rank-was suggested by me in May 1869, and was the subject of close confidential conversation and correspondence with influential persons in England as early as the 1st of June 1869. The correspondence was continued in this mode until the fruit ripened."

2 * Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 45-46.

3 For. Rel. 1873, part 3, p. 336.

4 MSS. Dept. of State.

which could not fail to be impressive of the gravity of the situation. "I therefore recommend to Congress," said the President, "to authorize the appointment of a commission to take proof of the amounts, and the ownership of these several claims, on notice to the representative of Her Majesty at Washington, and that authority be given for the settlement of these claims by the United States, so that the government shall have the ownership of the private claims, as well as the responsible control of all the demands against Great Britain. It can not be necessary to add that, whenever Her Majesty's Government shall entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjustment of these claims, the United States will enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of both nations."

Sir John Rose's Second Visit.

On the 9th of January 1871 Sir John Rose again arrived in Washington on a confidential mission. On the evening of the same day he dined with Mr. Fish, Mr. Bancroft Davis, then Assistant Secretary of State, being the only other guest. After dinner a conference was held, which lasted till between two and three o'clock in the morning. Mr. Davis has preserved the following contemporaneous memorandum of it:

"MEMORANDUM OF POINTS TAKEN IN A CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY FISH AND SIR JOHN ROSE AT MR. FISH'S HOUSE JANUARY 9, 1871.

"Sir John Rose stated that he had been requested by the British Government informally, unofficially, and personally, as one-half American, one-half English, enjoying the confidence of both governments, to ascertain what could be done for settling the pending questions between the two governments; and that he was authorized to say that, if it would be acceptable to the Government of the United States to refer all those subjects to a joint commission framed something upon the model of the commission which made the treaty of Ghent, he could say that the British Government was prepared to send out such a commission on their part, composed of persons of the highest rank in the realm. He dwelt upon the importance of settling these questions now. Mr. Fish replied that before agreeing to go into such a commission there should be a cer tainty of success-for failure would leave things much worse than they were before-and he asked whether, in going into a commission, the British Government would be prepared to admit a liability for what were known as the Alabama claims.

1 Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, 59.

"Sir John said that he would be wanting in frankness if he did not state that such a concession would not be made; that, in his own judgment, the Government of Great Britain would be found to be liable for the damage committed by the Alabama, and as to the other vessels it would be doubtful; that the government was prepared to agree to a submission to arbitration, either to continental jurists, or to a mixed court composed of English and American jurists or to any other tribunal that the two governments might agree upon; but that the feeling in England was such that the government would not be sup ported in Parliament in agreeing to admit the liability for the acts of the Alabama.

"Mr. Fish replied that with equal candor he must say that this government would not, in his judgment, be supported by the Senate or by the country in making a treaty which did not recognize that liability; that under our Constitution one third of the Senate and one Senator in addition could defeat a treaty; that most of the present Senators had voted against the Johnson-Clarendon treaty, and were committed as to the liability of England as to the Alabama; that the discussion made at that time had left a feeling among the people which would tend to prevent any change in the vote of the Senate; that the changes which were to be made in the Senate on the 4th of March would probably not make much change in this respect; that he thought that the nation might possibly be satisfied with a recognition of liability for the acts of the Alabama, and be reconciled to the submission of the liability as to the other vessels; and that therefore unless Great Britain could concede that point it would be useless to go into a commission.

"Sir John Rose endeavored at great length to combat these views, and urged in a forcible way his own conviction that, if the two nations once met in commission, the commissioners would not part without agreeing to a settlement. He also argued, quoting Mr. Lowe, that the people who furnished the money for and superintended the fitting out of the Alabama, who were Americans, were now in the full enjoyment of their rights as citizens of the United States, and that the question was a domestic one between this government and its citizens. "Mr. Fish replied that the British Government was estopped, by the recognition of the South as belligerents, from denying their character as public enemies. He repeated the necessity for a recognition of liability as to the Alabama as a prelimi nary. He said that he did not ask England to humiliate herself-to say that her laws were inefficient, or her government unfaithful to its duties; that it seemed to him that England might very well feel that, owing to the negligence or unfaithfulness of a local officer, this vessel had been allowed to escape against the directions of the government, and that thereby the government had become liable; and should couple this statement with an expression of regret for what had taken place to disturb the relations of the two countries,—that less