25. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Highways-Runaway Teams.-
A municipal corporation is liable only to those using the highways
in the ordinary manner for the purposes of travel, and a runaway
team is not within that use. (Wis.) Ehleiter v. Milwaukee, 1027.
26. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Driver's Momentary Loss of
Control. While a municipal corporation is not liable for injury due
to a runaway team, this rule does not apply where the driver's loss
of control is momentary only. (Wis.) Ehleiter v. Milwaukee, 1027.
Licenses and Taxes.
27. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—Taxation for Street Sprink-
ling-Power to Contract.-A municipal corporation having power
to levy and collect a tax for street sprinkling purposes may con-
tract with another to do the sprinkling and pay him therefor from
the fund arising from such taxation. (Ky.) Maydwell v. Louisville,
245.
28. TAXATION-Public Purpose-Sprinkling City Streets.-A city
may legally levy and collect a tax for street sprinkling purposes,
under a constitutional provision that taxes shall be levied and col-
lected for public purposes only. (Ky.) Maydwell v. Louisville, 245.
29. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-License Fees, Power of to Ex-
act.-A city, notwithstanding it has enacted an ordinance author-
izing an electric company to erect and maintain poles and to string
wires thereon in the public streets, and has provided rules and
regulations for the government of those maintaining such poles and
wires, may by a subsequent ordinance require the owners of every
electric light or street railway having poles standing upon a street,
avenue or alley of the city to pay an annual license of twenty-five
cents per pole, and such ordinance will be construed as imposing
a license for paying the expenses of enforcing rules and regulations
already in force. (Ark.) Fort Smith v. Hunt, 51.
30. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-The Power to License and
Regulate, granted by the state, is deemed to be conferred solely
for police purposes, and cannot be used as a means of increasing the
municipal revenue. The license fee may be sufficient to cover all
expenses of issuing the license and to pay all expenses which may
be incurred in the enforcement of such police inspection and super-
intendence as may be lawfully exercised over the business. (Ark.)
Fort Smith v. Hunt, 51.
31. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-License Fees When will not
be Regarded as in Excess of Municipal Power.-If a license fee ex-
acted by a municipality is not apparently unreasonable, the courts
will not interfere with the discretion of the city council in fixing
it, and, unless the contrary appears on the face of the ordinance or
is established by proper evidence, such fee will be presumed to be
reasonable. (Ark.) Fort Smith v. Hunt, 51.
Municipal Bonds-Limitations.
32. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Limitation of Action on.-If a munici-
pal bond is made payable at a certain time and place upon presen-
tation, the statute of limitations begins to run against it from ma-
turity, although there is no presentation or demand for payment.
(Ky.) Wurth v. Paducah, 225.
33. MUNICIPAL BONDS Limitation of Action on Pleading.—
In an action upon the original promise of a city to pay its bonds,
a complaint which fails to allege the recognition by the city of the
validity of such bonds and its promise to pay them, made before
the bar of the statute of limitations attached and within the statu-
tory period, and at a time when it was legally bound to pay them,
is insufficient to take the case out of the bar of the statute of limi-
tations. (Ky.) Wurth v. Paducah, 225.
MUNICIPAL BONDS-Limitation of Action on.-The officers
of a city cannot, without legislative authority, extend the liability
of the city for its indebtedness on bonds beyond the express terms
thereof, so as to remove the bar of the statute of limitations. (Ky.)
Wurth v. Paducah, 225.
35. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Limitation of Action on.-The Levy
and Collection of a Tax by a city to pay its bonds do not extend the
statutory limitation in which a suit may be maintained thereon.
(Ky.) Wurth v. Paducah, 225.
MUNICIPAL BONDS—Limitation of Action on.-The Levy
and Collection of a Tax by a city to pay its bonds do not constitute
the taxes collected a trust fund for the payment of the bonds, if suit
thereon is barred by limitation. (Ky.) Wurth v. Paducah, 225.
Municipal Corporations, judgments against their officers, when do
not bind, 211.
judgments against, when conclusive on residents and taxpayers,
National Banks are quasi public institutions, 671.
attachment against out of a state court, 671.
Congress, right of to determine the jurisdiction of state courts
over, 671.
NEGLIGENCE cannot be Presumed because a wall cracks or
(Md.) Serio v. Murphy, 316.
2. LOSS, by Whom must be Borne.-Where a loss has happened
which must fall upon one of two innocent persons, it must be borne
by him who has occasioned the loss, even without positive fault
committed by him, but more especially if there has been any care-
lessness which has caused or contributed to the misfortune. (Md.)
National Bank v. Baltimore etc. R. R., 321.
3. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Whether Question of
Law.-Contributory negligence is generally a question of fact, and
becomes one of law only when the evidence so clearly fails to es-
tablish due care that all reasonable minds would reach the con-
clusion that there was such negligence. (Ill.) Chicago etc. R. R. Co.
v. Crose, 135.
4. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-When a Question of Fact.
If the evidence on the question of contributory negligence is in con-
flict, or if there is evidence fairly tending to support the verdict,
or if reasonable minds might arrive at different conclusions, the
question is one of fact for the jury, and its verdict, and the judg
ment of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court, are final
and conclusive. (Ill.) Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Crose, 135.
5. NEGLIGENCE, CONTRIBUTORY, When does not Prevent
a Recovery. Where a plaintiff suing to recover for personal injuries
is shown to have been himself guilty of contributory negligence, he
may, nevertheless, recover, if he can show that after his contributory
negligence, the defendant, in view of the entire situation, was cul-
pably negligent, and such culpable negligence was the latest in the
succession of causes resulting in the plaintiff's injury. (Me.) Butler
v. Rockland etc. St. Ry., 267.
6. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE Continuing Up to the Time
of the Accident precludes the plaintiff's recovery, although the de-
fendant was culpably negligent after discovering such contributory
negligence of the plaintiff. Such negligence of the defendant is not
subsequent to, and independent of, but is contemporaneous with, the
plaintiff's contributory negligence, and where contributory negligence
is an operative cause to the last moment and contributes to the in-
jury as a proximate cause, it precludes recovery, although the plain-
tiff's negligence contributes up to the same moment. (Me.) Butler
v. Rockland etc. St. Ry., 267.
7. NEGLIGENCE.-The Doctrine of Contributory and Subse-
quent Negligence is not applicable when the negligence of the plain-
tiff and that of the defendant are practically simultaneous. (Me.)
Butler v. Rockland etc. St. Ry., 267.
8. NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause.-A Cause is not Too Re-
mote merely because it produces the damages by means of an inter-
mediate agency. Where the injury was the immediate consequence
of some peril to which the injured person was obliged to expose him-
self to avoid the peril arising from the defendant's negligence, it is
proximate enough. (Pa. St.) Cohn v. May, 840.
NEGLIGENCE.-The Test of Proximate Cause is whether the
facts between the negligent act and the final result constitute a con-
tinuous succession of events so linked together that they become
a natural whole. (Pa. St.) Cohn v. May, 840.
10. NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-If a Lower Tenant in a
building negligently obstructs a stairway, so that when a fire occurs
the upper tenant cannot escape by the stairway, and is injured while
escaping from a window, the obstruction is the proximate cause of
the injury. (Pa. St.) Cohn v. May, 840.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See Bills and Notes.
PRACTICE. A New Trial will be Granted where the pre-
ponderance of evidence is against the verdict, and all the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction in question show the improb-
ability of the proposition which is necessary to sustain the verdict.
(Me.) Phillips v. Laughlin, 253.
NICKLE-IN-SLOT MACHINE.
See Gaming, 2.
NOTICE.
NOTICE to One of Two or More Comortgagees that the title
of the mortgagor is subject to an outstanding equity is not notice to
the other. (R. I.) Babcock v. Wells, 848.
NUISANCES.-A Fireworks Exhibition on an Extensive Scale,
in a great thoroughfare, in the midst of a large city, where a vast
multitude of people is assembled, if not a nuisance as a matter of
law, may properly be found such as a matter of fact. (N. Y.)
Landau v. New York, 709.
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS, Power to Appoint is not Necessarily
Executive. The general power to appoint officers is not inherent
in the executive, nor in any other branch of the government. (Ark.)
Cox v. State, 17.
2. PUBLIC OFFICERS, Power in the Legislature to Appoint.—
The legislature has power to make appointments to office, unless its
powers are restricted by the constitution expressly or by implication.
(Ark.) Cox v. State, 17.
3. PUBLIC OFFICERS, Power to Appoint, When not Conferred
on the Governor by the Constitution.-Provisions in the constitution
of a state declaring that when any office becomes vacant, and no
mode is provided by the constitution for filling the vacancy, the
governor shall have the power to fill the same by granting a com-
mission which shall expire when the person elected to fill the office
at the next general election shall qualify, and that the governor
shall, in case a vacancy occurs in any state, district, county, or
township office, either by death, resignation, or otherwise, fill the same
by appointment to be in force until the next general election, relate
solely to elective offices, the incumbents of which are selected at
regular intervals, and do not authorize the governor to appoint
officers created by laws which provide for their selection by the
legislature. (Ark.) Cox v. State, 17.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Public Officers, Appointment or
Selection of, by the Legislature.-A statute providing for state cap-
itol commissioners, and that they shall be elected by the two Houses
of the legislature is not unconstitutional, on the ground that the
constitution does not permit of the appointment or selection of public
officers by the legislature. (Ark.) Cox v. State, 17.
PARENT AND CHILD-Custody of Illegitimate Child.-The
putative father of an illegitimate child is entitled to its custody as
against all but its mother, and, if she is dead, and the father is a
suitable person, he is entitled to the custody of such child as against
its maternal uncle. (Miss.) Aycock v. Hampton, 424.
1. PARTNERSHIP, Goodwill of, Right of Administrator of De-
ceased Partner in.-On the dissolution of a partnership by the death
of one of its members, the goodwill of the firm is part of its assets,
which the administrator of the decedent has the right to have sold
as such, but a sale thus forced on a surviving partner does not stand
on the same footing as a voluntary sale by a sole trader of the good-
will of his business. (Mass.) Hutchinson v. Nay, 390.
2. PARTNERSHIP, Goodwill of, Effect of Compulsory Sale of as
Against Surviving Partner.-If a sale of the goodwill of a partnership
is forced upon the surviving partner by the administrator of a de-
ceased partner, the former is not bound to retire from, but may con-
tinue in, business and solicit trade from customers of the old firm.
(Mass.) Hutchinson v. Nay, 390.
3. PARTNERSHIP, Voluntary Sale of Goodwill of by Surviving
Partner, Representatives of a Deceased Partner, When not Entitled
to an Accounting for.-If a surviving partner, for nearly two years
after the dissolution of the firm by the death of one of its members,
continues business at the old stand, dealing with customers of the
old firm, there being but little change in the personnel of the cus-
tomers, and then voluntarily sells the goodwill of the business, with
a covenant to continue in the employ of the purchaser for six months
and to do all in his power to hold the customers for the purchaser,
and not to engage for five years in the business conducted by the
old firm in the district covered thereby, the goodwill thus sold is not
the goodwill of the old partnership, and the surviving partner is
under no obligation to account to the administrator of the decedent
for the proceeds. (Mass.) Hutchinson v. Nay, 390.
4. IN A DORMANT PARTNERSHIP the funds of the visible
partner, and those appearing to be his, although actually belonging
to the partnership, are, with respect to the rights of innocent third
persons, to be regarded as his sole property. (Me.) White v. Farn-
ham, 261.
5. PARTNERSHIP, DORMANT, Who can Assert Claim Against
Property of. If there is a dormant partnership of which the public
has no notice, one cannot, under a mortgage purporting to be executed
for the partnership by the dormant partner, assert title to property
against a trustee in bankruptcy of the other partner, who, without
notice of such partnership and without knowledge that the property
did not belong wholly to the estate of the bankrupt, sold it as such
trustee. (Me.) White v. Farnham, 261.
See Carriers, 29-38; Street Railroads, 9-18.
See Corporations, 5-8; Statutes, 2.
PERPETUITIES.-A Forbidden Perpetuity is not Created
where property is devised and bequeathed for a public charity, though
the trustees are required to hold the property and accumulate a fund
for a period extending beyond the time prescribed in the rule against
perpetuities. (Mass.) Codman v. Brigham, 394.
PHOTOGRAPHS.
See Evidence, 1.
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