COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by T. W. SAUNDERS and J. SHORTT, Esqs,, Barristers-at-Law. Nov. 28, 1868, and June 8, 1869. REG. v. WOOD. Bread-Sale of otherwise than by weight-Fancy bread 6 & 7 Vict, c. 37, s. 4. The proviso in sect. 4 of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37 (Bread Act), which exempts from the penalty of the section the selling of bread "usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread," otherwise than by weight, applies to such bread as now sold, and the penalty attaches to a sale of bread otherwise than by weight, if such bread be not at the time of the sale such as is usually sold under such denomination, although it was so sold at the time of the passing of the statute. Where, therefore, a baker sold bread not by weight, which bread the sessions found as a fact was such as at the time of the passing of the Act was usually sold as fancy bread, but was not so sold at the time of actual sale: Held, that the sale was not within the proviso of the section, and that the baker was properly convicted. At a petty sessions holden at Epsom, in and for the county of Surrey, on the 28th Oct. 1867, William Wood, hereinafter called the appellant, was summoned before the justices upon an information exhibited by William Cook, of Cobham, inspector of weights and measures, hereinafter called the respondent, for that he, the said William Wood, on the 22nd Aug. 1867, being then a baker out of the city of London and the liberties thereof, and beyond the weekly bills of mortality, and ten miles of the Royal Exchange, unlawfully did sell at Ewell aforesaid, beyond the limits aforesaid, to one Alfred Cook, a certain loaf of bread otherwise and in another manner than by weight, the said loaf not being such bread as is usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread, or rolls, contrary to the provisions of sect. 4 of stat. 6 & 7 MAG. CAS.-VOL. VI. [Q. B. Will. 4, c. 37. On the hearing of the case, the appellant was convicted by the justices, and ordered to pay and forfeit the sum of 20s. as a penalty, and also the sum of 17s. 6d. for costs in that behalf; from this conviction the said William Wood appealed to the court of quarter sessions of the county of Surrey, holden at Newington, on the 31st Dec. 1867. The court of quarter sessions affirmed the said conviction subject to the following case stated by consent of both parties for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench. CASE. Upon the hearing of the appeal, it was found as a fact that a loaf of bread was sold by the appellant to the said Alfred Cook otherwise than by weight, such loaf of bread not being such as at the time of such sale is usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread. the passing of the said Act (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37), This court also found as a fact that at the time of such bread was usually sold under the denomination of fancy bread. It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, that the words "as is usually sold," &c., in the 4th section of the said Act refer to the passing of the Act. On the part of the respondents, it was argued that those words refer to the time at which the bread is sold. The question for the opinion of the court is, whether the appellant's or respondent's construction of the Act is the correct one? If the former, the conviction ought to have been quashed; if the latter, the conviction is rightly affirmed. If the Court of Queen's Bench shall be of opinion that the conviction ought to have been quashed, it is agreed by both parties that judgment for the appellant, with costs of the appeal taxed at 681. 6s. 2d. shall be entered at the next quarter sessions after the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench. If the Court of Queen's Bench shall be of opinion that the court of quarter sessions were right in affirming the conviction, the judgment of the quarter sessions to stand, and the respondent's costs of the appeal taxed at 451. 13s. 2d. to be added to such judgment. It is also agreed that the costs of this case shall abide the event. B From and after the commencement of this Act all bread sold beyond the limits aforesaid (the metropolis) shall be sold by the several bakers or sellers of bread respectively beyond the said limits by weight; and in case any baker or seller of bread beyond the limits aforesaid shall sell, or cause to be sold, bread in any other manner than by weight, then and in such case every such baker or seller of bread shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding forty shillings which the magistrate or magistrates, justice or justices, before whom such offender or offenders shall be convicted, shall order and direct; provided always that nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent or hinder any such baker or seller of bread from selling bread usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread or rolls without previously weighing the same. [Q. B. By sect. 4 of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, it is enacted the proviso might well have been read as if the that words had been "now usually sold under the denomination of fancy bread." But the Act is a perpetual one, intended to regulate the sale of bread for all time. A similar Act had been in operation in London and within the Bills of Mortality since 1822 (3 Geo. 4, c. 106), and in 1838 an Act was passed for Ireland in terms precisely similar as regards the present question (1 & 2 Vict. c. 28). The same construction must of course be put upon the same words in each Act, and what is the proper reading of them now must be the reading a hundred years hence. We cannot suppose that the Legislature meant to stereotype a particular article, or to say that because it was then an article of luxury it should be so regarded in all time, no matter what changes food of the country. So to hold would be, in course or improvements may take place in the common of time, to neutralise the Act instead of making it Legislature in passing the Act was to liberate the one of perpetual obligation. The object of the trade from the restrictions of the Assize Acts, and leave the baker at liberty to make bread of any size and shape he pleased, and to charge his own price imposition, it required the baker to sell by weight. for it; but in order to protect the customer from He is no longer at liberty to sell at so much per loaf ; is to be supplied with so many pounds of bread, he must sell at so much per pound; and the customer unless he chooses to have an article of exceptional quality-something that is not ordinary bread; and if he buys that, the baker is to be at liberty to sell it without reference to its weight. But, unless it article of consumption, the baker must sell it as is of an exceptional character, if it is the common such. It is obvious that if what is now ordinary bread is to be treated as exceptional and an article of luxury because it was so at the date of the Act, the enactment becomes a dead letter. Moreover this construction of the Act places the customer at know what was fancy bread in 1822 or 1836? Nor the mercy of the baker, for how can the customer does it concern him to know. By the hypothesis, he asks for that which is the staple of the neighbourhood, and he loses all the benefit of the Act in Mellish, Q. C., and Thompson, appeared in support of the order of sessions. If the contention of the appellant is correct, it will be necessary in all such cases to ascertain what was considered to be fancy bread at the time of the passing of the statute. What was then fancy bread is now very common. [LUSH, J.-According to the appellant's contention, if a new kind of fancy bread were to be invented, it must be sold by weight, because it was not fancy bread at the time when the Act passed.] The justices have found that, at the time of the sale, the bread so sold was not such as is usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread. [HANNEN, J.-When did it cease to be fancy bread?] That is immaterial; it was not fancy bread at the time of the sale, and it is with reference to that time which the statute speaks. Denman, Q. C. and Oppenheim for the appellant. The Legislature must be understood as speaking of things as they were at the time. It is not because it has an altered name that it loses its exemption. It is found by the case that at the time the Act passed it was fancy bread. [LUSH, J. -How is a customer to know what may have been fancy bread in the time of George III.?] The customer has a right to say he will have household bread. [LUSH, J.-The baker may say he will sell only fancy bread.] Many bakers, especially at the West-end, do only sell fancy bread. [LUSH, J. -The bakers may combine to give up selling common bread, and so defeat the Act.] The requirements of the public would prevent this. [HANNEN, J.-It seems strange that a man who has been selling, say a twist, for many years as fancy bread, and continues to sell it, can be said to commit an illegal act because it at last becomes a common article, and other bakers sell it as common bread.] The words "usually sold" evidently refer to the time when the Act passed; if the words had been "from time to time," it would have been otherwise. That which was legal once cannot become illegal by lapse of time. Cur, adv. vult. 8th June, 1869.-LUSH, J., delivered the following judgment as that of himself and Hayes, J. (a) We understand the justices to have found as a fact that bread, which at the passing of the Act in 1836 was of an exceptionable quality, and known as fancy bread, has now become the common article of consumption in the neighbourhood; and the question submitted to us is, whether bread of that description is within the enacting part of the 4th section, or within the proviso, and we are of opinion that it is within the enactment. The section is as follows. [His Lordship read the section.] If the Act had been passed for a limited period only, there might have been reason for supposing that the Legislature thought there would be no change in the staple article during that period, and in that case (a) Cockburn, C. J., was not present at the argument. tended for him if he does not have that bread supplied to him by weight. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conviction must be affirmed. should be for the appellant, and that the conviction HANNEN, J.-I am of opinion that our judgment should be quashed. By the 4th section of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37 it is enacted that, from and after the commencement of that Act, all bread sold beyond certain limits out of London shall be sold by weight, provided that nothing in the said Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent or hinder any baker or seller of bread from selling bread usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread or rolls without previously victed of selling without previously weighing it, weighing the same. The appellant has been conbread which at the time of the passing of the Act was usually sold under the denomination of fancy bread, but which at the time of sale had ceased to be sold under that denomination. It is not stated in this case under what denomination the bread in question is now sold. It may be sold by some other name which indicates equally with fancy bread that it is the kind which the Legislature at the time of the passing of the Act intended to and did exempt from being sold by weight, but because in course of years it has changed its name, and name only, the magistrates have held that it has ceased to be exempted. I think that this construction of the In the first place the language of the proviso in its strict grammatical construction means, which is usually sold. The proper mode of Act is erroneous. expressing the sense which the magistrates have put | upon the section would have been, "which shall rom time to time be usually sold ;" and, secondly, it seems to me, the objects which the Legislature must have had in view will be obtained by construing the words of the proviso as including bread usually sold at the time of the passing of the Act as fancy bread. The main object of the Legislature was to protect the general public in the purchase of ordinary household bread. This bread, whether baked in large loaves or in batches, has a smaller surface exposed from which evaporation and consequent loss of weight can take place; but it was not thought to be necessary to protect in the same way those persons who desired to have a more costly bread, and therefore the baker was exempted from selling by weight that kind of loaves which, by being baked apart, occupy more space in the oven, and lose more of their weight by evaporation. These reasons equally apply to the kind of bread which was sold under the name of fancy bread, now that its name but not its character is changed. It is a more expensive and uncertain article for the baker to make, and why should the Legislature be supposed to have intended that on a mere change of name in the article the law as to the baker's exemption should cease, though the reason for it continued? There can be no doubt that the name has changed because the habits of the people have changed. So many more persons now indulge in fancy bread, that it has lost that designation which belonged to it as an article of luxury; but it is very improbable that the Legislature contemplated such a change of habits, and intended that the baker's liability should depend, not indeed on that change, but on the purely accidental conse quence following of an alteration of the name. Suppose in the course of time "rolls" should cease to be so called according to the contention of the respondent, they must then be sold by weight. Another inconvenient result of this construction would be that the operation of the statute would vary both as to time and place. There must be many parts of England in which the names of French or fancy bread and rolls have not been introduced. The argument for the respondent leads to the conclusion that in such places French bread and rolls, if sold at all, must be sold by weight. This construction also leaves the time at which a baker may become subject to a fine for selling fancy bread otherwise than by weight wholly uncertain. He may have conducted his business for thirty years previously as he did at the passing of the Act, and suddenly find himself by reason of a change of the language only of other bakers and their customers liable to a fine for continuing to sell his bread as before. A construction which leads to such results appear to me unreasonable, and should, I think, be rejected. Conviction affirmed. [Q. B. Although bread which is now sold as fancy bread may not be such as it was at the time when the statute passed; yet, if it be now of a fancy character and differently baked, it is still fancy bread. At a petty session held at Fareham, in and for the county of Southampton, on the 12th Oct. 1863, Fanny Kennett, hereinafter called the first appellant, and Elizabeth Saunders, hereinafter called the second appellant, were summoned upon separate informations exhibited by Thomas Drew, hereinafter called the respondent, under sect. 4 of the statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, before two justices of the peace for the said county, for that the said Fanny Kennett did on the 29th Sept. 1863, and the said Elizabeth Saunders did on the 1st Oct. 1863, they respectively being then and there bakers, sell, or cause to be sold respectively, a loaf of bread otherwise bread as is usually sold as French or fancy bread or than by weight, the said loaves not being such rolls, contrary to the statute in that case made and provided. On the hearing of the cases, both appellants were convicted by the justices and ordered to pay respectively 11. as penalty, and 12s. 6d. for costs. From these convictions they severally appealed to the court of quarter sessions for the County of Southampton, holden at Winchester, on the 4th Jan. 1864, The sessions affirmed both convictions with costs, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench on the following CASE. Both the appellants are bakers, residing at Fareham. It was proved, in support of the conviction of the first appellant, that Henry Hawkins, a policeman, went to her shop on the 29th Sept. 1863, and asked for a 4lb. loaf; the loaf for selling which the first appellant was convicted by the petty sessions was handed to him across the counter by the first appellant. Neither the first appellant nor any other person in her shop weighed the said loaf in the presence of the said Henry Hawkins. No request, express or implied, was made by him that the loaf should be weighed. The said loaf was carried by him to the superintendent of police, by whom it was weighed, and found 6oz. 4drs. deficient in weight. It was proved in support of the conviction of the second appellant that the said Henry Hawkins went to her shop on the 1st Oct. 1863, and asked for a 21b. loaf, a loaf which is the loaf for selling which the second appellant was convicted by the petty sessions was supplied to him across the counter by the second appellant. Neither she nor anyone in her shop weighed the said loaf in the presence of the said Henry Hawkins. No request, express or implied, was made by him that the said loaf should be weighed. The said loaf was carried by him to the superintendent of police, by whom it was weighed and found to be loz. 13drs. deficient in weight. It was contended, on behalf of the appellants, that in each case the loaf of bread sold was of that description which is exempted from being weighed under the proviso in the 4th section of the statute 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 37, as coming within the denomination of "fancy bread." It was proved that the loaves in question were made of the same materials as household or batch bread, but were made up and baked separately from other loaves, and not in batches; that loaves baked separately undergo a greater diminution in weight than loaves baked in batches, by reason of the increase of the evaporation; that they become entirely crusty and assume a different form and solidity from ordinary batch bread. It was further contended by the appellants that the mere omission to weigh bread when sold, in the presence of the purchaser, no request having been made by him that such bread should be loaf."] [Q. B. Mellish, Q. C. (Bullen with him.)-The question really intended to be raised was, whether this cottage loaf was fancy bread or not? The officer well knew that he was taking away a cottage loaf. [COCKBURN, C. J.-But the question is, what would a poor ignorant person do or know about its being fancy bread? It may be a guide for the future to say that if a party comes for a 4lb. loaf, and the baker has not any household bread, but only fancy bread, he should say so. MELLOR, J.-I think the baker may well sell those loaves as fancy bread, for it is just that he should not be a loser by the mode of baking, but he should declare at the time that they are fancy bread. COCKBURN, C. J.What the statute intended was, to make a distinction between the two descriptions of bread, and, although the bread which is sold to-day as fancy bread may not be what it was at the time the statute passed, yet, if it is now of a fancy character and differently baked, it is still fancy bread.] I should be quite satisfied with the opinion of the court, but the sessions have held that fancy and French bread are synonymous. [COCKBURN, C. J. -Perhaps what we now say will answer every purpose, and prevent any further doubt.] The present difficulty is as to the costs of these proceedings; the appellants ought not to bear them. weighed, is not an offence under the said statute. | but if you want bread you must take a cottage It was in evidence that a loaf baked separately was sometimes called a crusty loaf and sometimes a fancy loaf, and it was stated by fifteen witnesses, some of whom were bakers and others not, that they had been in the habit of respectively selling and purchasing such loaves by the name of "fancy loaves." There was no evidence that this was French bread. It was contended, on behalf of the respondent, that the terms French and fancy were synonymous, and that the loaves in question not being French bread or rolls, the conviction was good under the 4th section of the 6 and 7 Will 4, c. 37. This section, upon which the case mainly turns is as follows: "And be it enacted, that from and after the commencement of this Act, all bread sold beyond the limits aforesaid, shall be sold by the several bakers or sellers of bread respectively beyond the said limits by weight, and in case any baker or seller of bread beyond the limits aforesaid, shall sell or cause to be sold bread in any other manner than by weight, then and in such case every such baker or seller of bread shall for every such offence forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding 40s., which the magistrate or magistrates, justice or justices before whom such offender or offenders shall be convicted, shall order and direct; provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent or hinder any such baker or seller of bread from selling bread usually sold under the denomination of French or fancy bread or rolls without previously weighing the same." The questions for the opinions of the court are, first, whether bread of the description given by the. evidence in the case is included in the proviso of the 4th section of the above statute, and consequently exempted from being weighed? Secondly, whether an omission to weigh bread in the presence of the purchaser, no request having been made by him that the same should be weighed in his presence, renders the seller liable to be convicted under the above statute? If the court shall answer the first question in the affirmative, or the second question in the negative, then the appeal is to be allowed and the conviction quashed. Maule, Q. C. and Russell appeared in support of the convictions.-There are two questions for consideration. First, was this bread exempt from being sold by weight; secondly was an offence committed by an omission to weigh, no request to weigh having been made? [COCKBURN, C. J.-What the statute intended was to protect a person who takes household bread in having his proper weight. When you come to fancy bread there is a difference. The real question is, whether this was substantially fancy bread? That was a question of fact for the justices. The Act was passed for the protection of the purchaser. He says he wants a 4lb. loaf, and a loaf is given him which is not a 4lb. loaf. [Mellish. Q. C.-What the sessions have held is that French bread and fancy bread are the same thing, that fancy bread is in fact French bread. MELLOR, J. The baker has this in his favour, that if a person will have a fancy loaf, he should pay a higher price. COCKBURN, C. J.-The way it strikes me is this. In making what is called a fancy loaf, or if you like to call it so, a cottage loaf, there is more expense incurred, and so the baker may fairly charge more for it than for the ordinary household bread. The question then arises, when a person goes and asks for a 4lb. loaf, does not that indicate that he requires a loaf weighing that weight? Here the baker gives a loaf weighing less than 4lb. without saying that it weighs less. If he has not got any more household bread, should he not say, "I can't let you have it, COCKBURN, C. J.-We will consider what our Judgment should be. Cur adv vult. Judgment having been given in the case of Reg. v. Wood, COCKBURN, C. J. delivered the following judgment in the present case :-There are two other cases Reg. v. Kennett and Reg. v. Saunders, which were argued before my brothers Mellor, Hayes, and myself, and which turn on the same statute, and in which a similar question was raised by the justices, the parties having been convicted on the informations before them. It does not appear to us necessary to go into the distinction between common breadthe ordinary bread-and fancy bread in this case. The facts were that in both cases the party applying to purchase bread asked for bread by weight. In 21b. loaf. The loaves were delivered as such, and one case for a 4lb. loaf, and in the other case for a being taken away, and afterwards weighed in each instance, it turned out they were substantially asks for bread by weight, that clearly is a case in deficient in weight. We think when a customer which, whether the baker chooses to give him ordinary bread or fancy bread, he is bound to weigh. Under the circumstances, we by no means say that he was bound to weigh in the presence of the customer; but he was bound to weigh the bread at some time or other before he sold it, and to sell it by weight instead of by denomination. We think, therefore, having been bound to sell by weight, and the loaves having turned out to be deficient in weight, we must take it that they had never been weighed. We think the magistrates were warranted in coming to the conclusion that the bread had never been weighed. That being so, we are of opinion that the baker ought to have sold by weight, and, not having sold by weight, the case is within the statute, and the conviction is right. Convictions affirmed. Attorney for appellants, Wallis, Portsmouth. Q. B.] Saturday, May 29, 1869. REG. v. BRIDGEHouse. REG. v. BRIDGEHOUSE. Poor rate-Occupation by one of the County A cottage was let by the owner to the chief constable of a county, as yearly tenant, at 6l. 4s. per annum. This cottage the chief constable underlet to one of the County Constabulary, whom he appointed and had power to dismiss, as a weekly tenant at 2s. per week (deducted from his wages) as long as he continued such constable, or until he should be removed to another district, determinable upon a week's notice. The constable being assessed to the poor rate as occupier of the said cottage: Held, that he was properly rated, there being nothing in the nature of the occupation to create exemption. Upon the hearing of an appeal against a poor rate for the township of Warely, in the Halifax Poor Law Union, the Court of Quarter Sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire confirmed the rate, subject to the following CASE. The West Riding of Yorkshire has a County Constabulary, established and regulated under the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 88, and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 69. The Riding is divided into twenty-one police districts, in some of which including the police district in which the cottage hereinafter mentioned is situate, station houses and strong rooms have been built and provided under the statute 3 & 4 Vict. c. 88. The appellant, Bridgehouse, a police constable, is a member of the County Constabulary, having been appointed by the chief constable, who has the power of appointing and dismissing all the subordinate members of the force. In the rate appealed against, which was made on the 24th Jan. 1868, the appellant was rated at the sum of 4s. 9d., in respect of a cottage in the township of Warely, occupied by him in the manner, and under the conditions hereinafter mentioned. The owner of the said cottage Ishmael Ogden, by an agreement dated the 1st July 1867, the chief constable of the West Riding agreed to take the said cottage of Ishmael Ogden as yearly tenant at the rent of 67. 4s. per annum, payable half-yearly. By an agreement of the same date the chief constable agreed to let the said cottage to the appellant for the purpose of his occupation as a constable, as a weekly tenant, so long as he should continue a constable, or until he should be removed to another district, at the weekly rent of 2s., to be deducted from his wages. Copies of both agreements accompany and form part of the case. The appellant immediately entered upon the occupation of the cottage, under his said agreement with the chief constable, and gave notice on or about the 27th Jan. 1868 to the overseers of Warely that the cottage was occupied by him solely and exclusively in his official capacity as a member of the West Riding Constabulary, and that he was not liable to be rated to the relief of the poor. A copy of this notice accompanies, and may be referred to if necessary. It is the practice of the chief constable of the West Riding to select houses suitable for the residence of constables, to rent them himself, and to sub-let them to the constables of the force. In every case, before a house is taken, the expediency of taking it is submitted to the justices of the petty sessional division in which the house was situated. That was done in the present case. The houses are chosen with regard to the fitness of their situation for the requirements of the district. There is an order of Quarter Sessions empowering the chief constable to take houses for constables at [Q. B. rent not exceeding 81. per annum. The rent of 2s per week, which, according to the agreement with appellant, is deducted from his wages, and is paid to the district police fund; and the difference between the rent paid by the appellant and the actual rent paid to Ogden, the owner, is paid out of the funds of the police district. The West Riding Constabulary force is inspected annually by a Government inspector. If he reports favourably, a grant to the extent of one-fourth of the outlay for pay and clothing is made by the Treasury in aid of the police rate, by virtue of the statute 19 & 20 Vict., c. 69, section 16. The grant has always been made since the establishment of the force. The appellant was placed in the said cottage by the chief constable, and had no voice in its selection as a residence. He is a married man with two children, his wife and children reside with him, and the cottage which only contains a kitchen, a cellar, a bedroom, and an attic, is not larger than necessary for the accommodation as a place of residence for himself and family. Affixed to the front of the cottage is an iron plate surmounted by a Crown with the words "W. R. constabulary" in raised letters. Persons requiring the services of a police constable frequently come to the cottage. If a person charged with an offence is brought to the cottage, when the constable is at home, he first takes him to Sowerly-bridge police station, which is the nearest police station to and within 200 yards of the cottage, and thence conveys him to the head quarters of the district at Halifax. The question for the opinion of the court is whether the appellant is liable to be rated to the relief of the poor in respect of the cottage occupied by him as above described. If the court should answer this question in the affirmative, the rate and the order of sessions confirming it are to stand; if in the negative, the order of quarter sessions is to be set aside, and the rate amended by striking out of it the appellant's name and amount at which he is rated. J. B. GREENWOOD, Chairman of the Court of Quarter Session for the West Riding of the County of York. The following was the agreement referred to. An agreement entered into the 1st July 1867, between Charles Augustus Cobbe, of Wakefield, in the West Riding of the County of York, chief constable of the said West Riding of the one part, and James Bridgehouse, of Wharfe-street, Sowerby Bridge, in the said West Riding, a constable of the said Riding (hereinafter called the said constable) of the other part, whereby the said Charles Augustus Cobbe, as such chief constable as aforesaid agrees to let, and the said constable agrees to take for the purpose solely and exclusively of occupation by the said constable in his official capacity of constable as aforesaid, and for the execution of his duty as such constable, all that cottage or tenement situate at Wharfe street, Sowerby Bridge, in the said riding, now or lately occupied by James Bridgehouse, together with the appurtenances, for the term of one week, and so on from week to week, so long as the said constable shall continue such constable as aforesaid, or until he shall be removed to another district at a weekly rent of two shillings, to be deducted from his wages as such constable as aforesaid. And the said constable hereby agrees that he will at any time, upon receiving a week's previous notice in writing from the said Charles Augustus Cobbe as such chief constable as aforesaid, or the chief constable for the time being of the said Riding, to quit and deliver up possession of the said cottage or tenement and appurtenances, or upon ceasing to act as such constable as aforesaid, quit and deliver up quiet and peaceable possession of the said cottage or tenement and appurtenances to the said Charles Augustus Cobbe as such chief constable as aforesaid. Witness the hands of the parties. CHARLES AUGUSTUS COBbe. JAMES BRIdgehouse. Manisty, Q. C. and Underdown appeared in support of the order of sessions.-The police officer was clearly rateable for the house he occupied. It will be said on the other side that this case falls within the decision in the case of Reg. v. The Inhabitants of |