res judicata, but the quarter sessions will hear on the merits and decide as may be.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. When I find that the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27, in its fifth section, referring to licensing meetings to be held under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, says that "certificates shall be granted at those meetings, or at some adjournment" thereof, and when I consider the reasons of the adjournment, I cannot help seeing that it is not an ordinary adjournment of quarter sessions that is contemplated, which only operates on the business then before the court, but that it is intended that original applications shall be made at such adjourned meetings. Therefore, Mr. Hannay brings his client within the terms of this section; he has given twenty-one days' notice before making his application; that seems the only condition imposed by the Legislature, and I entirely agree with my brother Blackburn that there is nothing to prevent an applicant making his application at the adjourned meeting, provided the twenty-one days' notice be given previously. I think the rule should be made absolute.

LUSH, J.-I quite concur, and will only add with regard to the second point that if the magistrates' decision had turned on the unfitness of the character of the applicant or of the house, I should have thought they could not be required to adjudicate again. But their decision was not on that ground. This is analogous to an application to transfer a licence. If the holder of a licence wishes to transfer it to A. B., the magistrates exercise a discretion as to whether they will license the holder of that house.

Attorneys for prosecution, Bower and Cotton. Attorneys for defendants, Edward, Layton, and Jaques.

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by M. W. MCKELLAR and H. H. HOCKING, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

REGISTRATION APPEAL.

Wednesday, Nov. 17, 1869.

SMITH (app.) v. LANCASTER (resp.) Tenant of chambers in the Temple-Part of chambers in occupation of under-tenants-Occupier of a house, -The Reform Act (2 Will. 4, c. 45), s. 27. The appellant held as tenant an entire set of chambers consisting of three rooms not communicating together, and a vestibule into which the rooms respectively opened, in the Temple, under a demise from the benchers. The appellant occupied and used one of these rooms for the purposes of his profession, which was that of a barrister, and demised the other two rooms, unfurnished, each to another barrister respectively. By the lease or agreement between the appellant and each of these under-tenants, the appellant agreed to let the room at the rent of 30l., the rent to include attendance of clerk and laundress, rates, taxes, and coals; there were no poor rates, but the appellant paid all other rates and taxes; no one resided in any part of the chambers:

Held, that the appellant was the occupier of a house within the meaning of the 27th section of the Reform Act 1832, and was entitled to a vote for the City of

London.

At a court for the revision of voters for the City of London, before the barrister duly appointed to revise the lists of voters for the said city, Christopher Lancaster, of 28, Union-street, Little Moorfields, Cripplegate, on the list of voters for the parish of Saint Giles Without, Cripplegate, duly

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objected to the names comprised in the schedule hereto of the persons who are hereinafter called the said voters, being retained or inserted as the case might be on the list of persons entitled to vote for the election of members for the city of London in respect of the occupation of chambers; when the barrister decided that the said voters were not entitled to have their names retained or inserted as the case might be in such list.

The said voters having respectively given due notice of their intention to appeal from such decision, and it appearing that the validity of the objections as to the said voters being so retained as aforesaid, depended on a like state of facts, mutatis mutandis, and the same points of law, the barrister declared that the appeals against such decisions ought to be consolidated, and George James Philip Smith, of 55, Gloucester-place, Hyde-park, barristerat-law, being one of the persons interested, and consenting for or on behalf of himself and all other persons in like manner interested in such appeals, to be the appellant, and to prosecute the said appeal, he named the said George James Philip Smith to be the appellant in such consolidated appeal, and the said Christopher Lancaster to be the respondent.

Whereupon the barrister stated the following case for the opinion of Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas at Westminster:

George James Philip Smith, hereinafter called the appellant, was on the list of voters for the Inner Temple, in respect of his occupation of chambers, at No. 1, King's Bench Walk, in the Inner Temple.

The appellant held, as tenant, an entire set of chambers, at No. 1, King's Bench Walk aforesaid, so structurally severed from the rest of the building as to be of themselves a house, under a demise from the Benchers of the Inner Temple, the owners thereof, at a yearly rent of 70%. These chambers consisted of three distinct rooms, not communicating together, and a vestibule, into which the rooms respectively opened. One of these rooms was occupied by the appellant and used by him in transacting the business that came to him in the exercise of his profession as a barrister.

The appellant demised each of the other two rooms to two persons respectively.

The following is a copy of the lease or agreement for lease entered into by the appellant with one of

his tenants:

1, King's Bench Walk, 15th Dec. 1867. Mr. G. J. P. Smith agrees to let, and Mr. Lister agrees to take, the north back room of these chambers, from the 29th Oct. last, at the rent of 301, payable quarterly on the 29th Jan., the 29th April, the 29th June, and the 29th Oct. in each year, the rent to include attendance of clerk, laundress, rates, taxes, and coals; the teuancy determinable at any time by either party giving one quarter's notice.

The other agreement was, mutatis mutandis, similar to the above agreement.

The two tenants entered under the said agreement into the occupation and possession of the several rooms so let to them as aforesaid, and used them in transacting the business that came to them in the exercise of their profession as barristers. They had the services of the clerk and laundress who were engaged by the appellant, and were supplied with coals, according to the terms of the agreement. the Inner Temple; but all other rates and taxes There are no rates for the relief of the poor in were paid by the appellant. No one resided in any part of the said chambers. Both of the rooms so

demised as aforesaid were let unfurnished. The appellant and each of his two tenants had a key to the outer door.

It was not the practice to lock the doors of the rooms, but it was admitted that the tenants had the right to do so at all times.

All other requisites for entitling the appellant to

be retained on the list of voters in respect of the above qualification were duly proved.

The appellant claiming to be retained on the list in respect of his occupation as tenant of the entire set of chambers, it was objected that having regard to the above facts the appellant ought to be struek off the list on the ground that, by virtue of the aforesaid demises to his under-tenants, the landlord the appellant had divested himself of all right of occupation of the parts demised, and thereby the tenants had acquired an independent occupation of the parts demised to the exclusion of the appellant.

On the appellant's part it was argued that, notwithstanding the said demise he retained such an occupation of the entire set of chambers as to make him a tenant occupying a house within the meaning of the Act to amend the representation of the people in England and Wales, passed in the second year of the reign of his late Majesty King William IV.

The barrister decided that the objection was good, holding that at law, in the absence of any express reservation to the appellant of some control over or occupation of the parts demised, the sub-tenants, under or by virtue of the aforesaid agreement, acquired an independent occupation, and to the exclusion of the appellant, of their holdings; and that it could not be inferred at law, having regard to the facts herein before stated, and more particularly to the fact that the appellant did not reside, that he retained any occupation of the parts so demised as aforesaid. And the revising barrister accordingly struck off or refused to insert on the register of voters the names of the said voters.

The question upon which the judgment of Her Majesty's Court of Common Pleas is requested is whether the occupation of the appellant of the said chambers was sufficient to entitle him to have his name retained on the register of voters for the city of London.

Prentice, Q. C. for the appellant.-In the case of Cuthbertson v. Butterworth, argued last year (L. Rep. 4 C. P. 523; 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 140), it was decided that the tenant of one room, holding under a person in the same position as the appellant here, had no right to a vote; in this case the revising barrister has gone further, and disfranchised the immediate tenant of the society. Bovill, C. J., in his judgment last year, said: "The cases have decided that, where the subject of occupation is structurally severed from the rest of the premises, and substantially used as a separate dwelling, or as a shop, counting-house, or warehouse, the occupier may be registered." The appellant here has the constructive occupation of the whole set of chambers, which constitutes a house within the meaning of the Act of 1832. [BRETT, J.-If this be not an occupation of a house under the 27th section, why should not the appellant be a joint occupier under the 29th section?] It is sufficient for me to rely on the 27th section, and the matter of residence is of no consequence. There is a case in the Queen's Bench, in which, upon an agreement very like this, it was held that a person, although letting some rooms in a house, was the beneficial occupier of the house, so as to be liable for poor rates: (Reg. on the prosecution of the Overseers of St. Michael, Cambridge, v. Henry Smith, L. J. 30, M. C. 74.) Hill, J., in delivering the judgment of the court, said: "We think that we must look, not so much to the words as to the substance of the agreement; and taking the whole together, we think it must be construed, not as a demise of the five rooms, but as an agreement, by which the appellant, retaining possession of these rooms and keeping his servant there, bound himself to supply the other party there with fire and gas, and attendance. It is true that the exclusive enjoyment of the rooms is to be given; but

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that is the case where a guest in an inn, or a lodger in a house, has a separate apartment, or when a passenger in a ship has a separate cabin, in which case it is clear that the possession remains in the innkeeper, lodging-house keeper, or shipowner." So in Wansey v. Perkins, 8 Scott N. R. 978, where a landlord resided in the house, and a claimant had exclusive occupation of a floor, with a key to the outer door, Tindal, C. J. said: "In this case the landlord remains the occupier of the house." [Stopped by the court.]

F. M. White for the respondent.-I contend that the appellant has failed to make out his right to the franchise upon the facts stated in the case. The premises which he occupies exclusively are only a part of a house. Under the 27th section it is necessary to have the exclusive occupation of a whole house, whilst the necessary inference from these facts is that he has the exclusive occupation only of his own room; he may perhaps be a householder under 11 Geo. 1, c. 13, as decided by Lord Hardwicke in Fludier v. Sir Thos. Lombe, Lee's Cas. 307; but he cannot be an occupier under this section. He is in the same position as the other occupiers of the chambers. [BRETT, J.-The servants are his, and he has the management of the chambers.] In Cook v. Humber, 11 C. B., N. S., 33, Erle, C.J. lays down the principle that the subject of occupation, not the kind of occupation, is the test for forming a judgment upon such a point as this; the appellant cannot here be said to be the exclusive occupier of a whole house, for he is found to have excluded himself from the occupation of part of the house. In the case of R. v. The Inhabitants of St. Nicholas, Colchester, 2 A. & E. 599, it was held that if a person hiring a tenement underlet any part of it, he has not the actual occupation of the tenement within the terms of stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 18, s. 1 if there be any exclusive occupation given by such underletting. The fact that the tenants in this special case had a right to lock their rooms is sufficient to show that the appellant had divested himself of the occupation of those rooms.

mere

BOVILL, C. J.-It is clear that the set of chambers rented by the appellant constituted a house structurally divided within the meaning of the 27th section of the Reform Act 1832; and it is clear that if he kept the whole set of chambers to himself, he would be the occupier within the meaning of that statute. The only question for us now is whether he ceased to be an occupier by letting two of his rooms. It was held by this court last year, in the case of Cuthbertson v. Butterworth, that neither of those tenants could be occupiers of a tenement within this 27th section. The case of Fludier v. Sir Thomas Lombe, Lee's Cases, temp. Lord Hardwicke, 307, shows that persons who are lodgers are not joint occupiers, nor do they prevent the landlord from being in the occupation of his house. The question arises, would the appellant be an occupier for the purposes of poor rates? Upon the authority of Reg. v. Smith, 30 L. J. 74, M. C., I am of opinion he would be. And it seems to me that he is also an occupier for the purpose of the franchise. The fact of letting out a portion of a house has never been considered to deprive a person who has the management of the sole occupation; and there is no pretence here that the other persons using these chambers were joint occupiers. The case of Reg. v. St. Nicholas, Colchester, was cited by Mr. White. That case was decided upon the authority of previous decisions, but the reasons for the conclusions were based upon the peculiar language of a particular Act of Parliament, and the circumstances of the actual occupation in that case. Although the court arrived at a decision adverse to

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was gone into, but he failed to obtain any relief. The Midsummer Quarter Sessions for the county of Bedfordshire were also held on the 30th June. Lawes lived about twenty-five miles from the place where the sessions were held.

WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. If it were necessary to find special reasons for our judgment, it might be said to be obvious from the business of all the people concerned in this case that, upon an agreement of this kind, the appellant can use the premises as he thinks proper; this document in its practical effect would resemble a licence rather than a lease, so that in popular estimation, as well as in law, the two tenants could not interfere with the sole occupation of the appellant. But the special circumstances are not necessary as a ground for this judgment, because I am of opinion that the letting out a portion of a house does not prevent the occupier of the rest of the house from having a vote, provided that he reserves the mastership of the house and the control of the outer door. The appellant has been found to have retained the general control of his chambers, and I cannot share in the doubts of the revising barrister.

KEATING and BRETT, JJ. concurred.

Judgment for appellant.

Attorneys for appellant, Harper, Broad, and Manby.

At the succeeding Michaelmas Quarter Sessions, Lawes appealed against the rate. It was objected, on behalf of the union assessment committee, that the appellant ought to have appealed to the Midsummer Sessions, these being the next sessions after the publication of the rate; and that, as he had not done so, the sessions ought not to entertain the appeal. The court, however, decided that it was not too late for Lawes to appeal, and accordingly the appeal was then entered and respited.

A rule was granted, on the motion of the respondents, calling on the appellant and the justices of Bedfordshire to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue to stay all further proceedings in the matter of the appeal. Against this rule

Tuesday, Nov. 30, 1869.

REG. v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE BIGGLESWADE UNION.

Poor rate-Appeal-Next quarter sessions-Prohibition-17 Geo. 2, c. 38, s. 4-27 & 28 Vict., c. 39,

s. 1.

A poor rate was made for the parish of 4. in the county of B., and published on May 30. On the 11th of June L. gave notice of objection to the union assessment committee. The committee at its next meeting on the 30th of June refused to grant him relief. The Midsummer Quarter Sessions for the county of B. were held on the same day. L. appealed to the Michaelmas Sessions, and the justices allowed the appeal to be entered.

Held, on a motion for a writ of prohibition against L. and the justices of B. to stay all further proceedings in connection with the appeal, that L. could not be said to have failed to obtain relief from the union assessment committee until June 30, when the committee heard his case, and refused to allow his objections. Held also, that L. would not have been right in giving notice of appeal to the sessions until he had so failed before the union assessment committee.

Held also, that as L. was, under the circumstances, prevented by the provisions of the Union Assessment Committee Act Amendment Act 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 39) from appealing to the Midsummer Sessions, it was not too late for him to appeal to the Michaelmas Sessions.

A poor rate made for the parish of Arlsey, in the county of Bedford, was published on Sunday, May 30, 1869.

On June 11 next, one Lawes gave notice of objection to the union assessment committee. The committee did not hold a meeting from the 30th

A. Wills showed cause.-The appellant only took twelve or thirteen days to consider whether he should object to the rate or not. That was a reasonable time. The court of quarter sessions has held it to be reasonable. If he had given notice to the assessment committee earlier, the result would have been the same, and the committee would not have heard his objections any sooner. The Act 12 & 13 Vict., cap. 45, s. 1, requires that fourteen days' clear notice shall be given before appealing to the sessions. It would be absurd to hold that Lawes ought to have given such notice of appeal before his appli cation was rejected by the assessment committee. Amendment Act 1864 (27 & 28 Vict., c. 39), s. 1, a person aggrieved is forbidden to appeal to the quarter sessions until he shall have given notice of objection to the assessment committee, and have "failed to have obtained such relief in the matter as he shall deem just." But how can he be said to have failed until he has been decided against? The words in the 17 Geo. 2, c. 38, s. 4, mean the next sessions that, under the circumstances, are reasonably practicable. The court of quarter sessions is the proper tribunal to decide which are the next sessions that are reasonably practicable. That court has taken all the circumstances of the case into consideration, and has decided that the Michaelmas Sessions were the next practicable sessions.

Graham in support of the rule. The Acts relating to the union assessment committee do not affect the time of appealing to the quarter sessions. That

time is fixed by the 17 Geo. 2, c. 38, s. 4, as the next sessions. Under the old law then this appeal would have been too late. The Acts relating to the union assessment committee do not expressly extend the time for appealing to the sessions, and the time for appealing cannot be extended by impli cation. On the latest day for the appellant to have given notice of his intention to appeal to the sessions, he may have been said to have "failed to obtain relief" from the assessment committee, so as to entitle him to appeal to the sessions. If the committee has not met, then he has failed to obtain relief from it. He cited

R. v. Coode, Cald. 464; 1 Bott. 276 ·

R. v. Worcestershire (Justices) 5 M. & Selw. 457.

BOVILL, C. J.-It has been plausibly argued in support of this rule that the appellant was bound to lodge his appeal against this rate at the next practicable sessions, independently altogether of the provisions of the Union Assessment Acts; and it is contended that he ought to have appealed to the next sessions, even although he would have had

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just." It seems to me that this is an express Parliamentary enactment, and prevents a party from appealing to the sessions until he has failed to obtain relief from the union assessment committee. That failure must be, not by reason of the committee not happening to sit, but on its refusal, after hearing, to grant the relief claimed. It is idle to say that this provision was intended to prevent parties from appealing to the sessions. It is true that 17 Geo. 2, c. 38, says that a person aggrieved must appeal to the next sessions, which has been held to mean the next practicable sessions. But if a subsequent statute interposes an intermediate step before the appeal can be made, the first Act must be construed with reference to the second. It is just as though the first statute had said that a party should have a fortnight for appealing, and the second statute had said that he should have a month. The notice to the assessment committee was given on the 11th June, the rate having been published on May 30. The committee held its first meeting on the 30th of June, the same day as the Midsummer Sessions were held. At Michaelmas the court of quarter sessions held that, under the circumstances, the Michaelmas Sessions must be considered the next practicable sessions; and now the parties come here with dates to ask us to reverse this finding. It is difficult to ask us to say that the appellant in this case took more than a reasonable time before taking any step. We have no grounds given us for arriving at such a conclusion, even if we had power to enter into the question. On these grounds I think that this rule ought to be discharged with costs.

KEATING, J.-Mr. Graham shapes his argument in two ways. First he says that the Union Asses

ment Acts do not affect the time for appealing to

the sessions. But it seems to me difficult to think of words that could more clearly prohibit a man from appealing to the sessions until he has been to the assessment committee. Next he says, that if the committee does not assemble in sufficient time after the publication of the rate, and notice of objection given by the person aggrieved, the person aggrieved may be said to have failed to obtain relief within the meaning of the Act. But I think that this is a very wrong construction of the Act. On these grounds I also am of opinion that this rule must be discharged with costs.

M. SMITH, J.—I am of the same opinion. The Union Assessment Committee Act of 1862 has interposed a kind of intermediate appeal, which, if it gives relief, renders it unnecessary to go to the sessions. In order to prevent parties from going to the sessions until they have failed to get relief from the assessment committee, the Act uses strong prohibitory terms. It is argued that the committee may not meet for some time. We, however, cannot assume that the committee will fail in its duty. If it does not meet within a reasonable time, means may be taken to compel the members to meet, for the Act says that, after such notice, "the committee shall hear," &c. It is, therefore, their duty to fix a reasonable time for meeting after receipt of the notice of objection. Mr. Graham says that the proper course for the present applicant to have taken was to give notice of appeal to the sessions, just as though MAG. CAS.-VOL. VI.

Attorneys for the respondents, Iliffe and Co.; for Hooper and Raynes, Biggleswade.

Tuesday, Nov. 23, 1869.

REGISTRATION APPEAL.

KIRTON V. Dear.

County vote-Incumbent of district church-Fees on marriages, baptisms, and churchings performed within the church-Stipend paid by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and the treasurer of Queen Anne's Bounty -8 Hen. 6, c. 7.

K., as incumbent of the district church of St. A., in the parish of B., in the county of M., had a freehold for life in the said church and churchyard. By orders in council the sums of 150l. and 50l. were ordered to be paid annually to the incumbent of the said church by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of England and the treasurer of the governors of Queen Anne's Bounty respectively. Under and by virtue of an order in council, K., as such incumbent, was entitled to and in receipt of the fees paid in respect of marriages, baptisms, and churchings performed in the said church, and the income arising from these fees exceeded 40s. per annum. It was proved that K., as incumbent, was in receipt of fees paid in respect of burials of persons dying within the district attached to the said church, though the said burials took place in another parish; these fees amounted to more than 40s. a year. No evidence, however, was given of his right or title to these fees. No assignment of pew rents had been made, nor was K. in receipt of any income from pew rents :

Held, that K. was not entitled to a vote for the county of M. in respect of the church, as the church was not itself worth, nor could K. make it worth, 40s. a year to him, and the fees and other emoluments, which he was as incumbent entitled to and in receipt of, could not be considered as giving the church a value.

On appeal from the decision of the revising barrister for Middlesex, the following case was stated for the opinion of the court :

Charles Kirton duly claimed to have his name inserted on the list of voters for the county of Middlesex, and Dear duly objected to his name being inserted therein.

The facts of the case are as follows: The said Charles Kirton duly claimed in respect of a freehold benefice situate in the polling district of Bethnalgreen, in the parish of St. Matthew, Bethnal-green, in the said county, such freehold benefice being known or distinguished by the name or title of St. Andrew, Bethnal-green.

It was proved before the revising barrister that the said Charles Kirton was duly appointed by licence of the Bishop of London, dated the 10th June 1864, to the office of perpetual curate or incumbent of the church of the perpetual curacy of St. Andrew, Bethnal-green, in the said county, and he was by the said licence authorised to receive and enjoy all and singular the stipends, profits, and advantages whatsoever belonging to the said office.

The district chapelry attached to the said church of St. Andrew was assigned to the said church by an order of Her Majesty in Council, dated the 3rd

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