CHAP. LVII.-OF GLORY THERE is the name and the thing: the name is a voice which denotes and signifies the thing; the name is no part of the thing, or of the substance; 'tis a foreign piece joyn'd to the thing; and without it, God, who is all fulness in himself, and the height of all perfection cannot augment or add any thing to himself within; but his name may be augmented and increas'd by the blessing and praise we attribute to his exteriour works. Which praise, seeing we cannot incorporate it in him, forasmuch as he can have no accession of good, we attribute it to his name; which is the part out of him that is nearest to us. Thus is it, that to God alone glory and honour appertain; and there is nothing so remote from reason, as that we should go in quest of it for our selves; for being indigent and necessitous within, our essence being imperfect, and having need of melioration, 'tis to that, that we ought to employ all our endeavour. We are all hollow and empty: 'tis not with wind and voice that we are to fill our selves; we want a more solid substance to repair us: a man starv'd with hunger, would be very simple to seek rather to provide himself of a gay garment, than a good meal: we are to look after that whereof we have most need. As we have it in our 66 ordinary prayers, "Gloria in excelsis Deo, in terra pax hominibus.”St. Luke, chap. 2. Glory be to God on high, and in earth peace," etc. We are in great want of beauty, health, wisdom, vertue, and such like essential qualities: exteriour ornaments should be look'd after when we have made provision for necessary things. Divinity treats amply and more pertinently of this subject, but I am not much vers'd in it. Chrysippus and Diogenes were the first and the most constant authors of the contempt of glory: and maintain'd, that amongst all pleasures, there was none more dangerous, nor more to be avoided, than that which proceeds from the approbation of others. And in truth, experience makes us sensible of many very hurtful treasons in it. There is nothing that so poisons princes, as flattery, nor any thing whereby wicked men more easily obtain favour with them. These philosophers said, that all the glory of the world was not worth an understanding mans holding out his finger to obtain it; Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est ?—Juven. Sat. 7. What's glory in the high'st degree If it no more but glory be? I say for it alone: for it often brings several commodities along with it, for which it may justly be desir'd: it acquires us good will, and renders us less subject and expos'd to the injuries of others, and the like. It was also one of the principal doctrines of Epicurus; for this precept of his sect, "Conceal thy life," that forbids men to incumber themselves with offices and publick negotiations, does also necessarily presuppose a contempt of glory, which is the world's approbation of those actions we produce in publick. He that bids us conceal our selves, and to have no other concern but for our selves, and that will not have us known to others, would much less have us honour'd and glorify'd. He advises Idomeneus also, not in any sort to regulate his actions by the common reputation or opinion; if not to avoid the other accidental inconveniences that the contempt of men might bring upon B B 386 ARISTOTLE GIVES TO GLORY THE FIRST PLACE. 66 him. Those discourses are in my opinion very true and rational; but we are, I know not how, double in our selves, which is the cause that what we believe we do not believe, and cannot disengage our selves from what we condemn. Let us see the last, and dying words of Epicurus; they are great, and worthy of such a philosopher, and yet they carry some marks of the recommendation of his name, and of that humour he had decried by his precepts. Here is a letter that he dictated a little before his last gasp. Epicurus to Hermachus, Health, —Whilst I was passing over the happy, and last day of my life, I writ this; but at the same time, afflicted with such a pain in my bladder and bowels, that nothing can be greater. But it was recompens’d with the pleasure, the remembrance of my inventions and doctrines suggested to my soul. Now, as the affection thou hast ever from thy infancy born towards me, and philosophy does require, take upon thee the protection of Metrodorus his children." This is the letter. And that which makes me interpret, that the pleasures he says he had in his soul, concerning his inventions, has some reference to the reputation he hop'd for after his death, is the manner of his will. In which he gives order, that Aminomachus and Timocrates, his heirs, should every January defray the expence for the celebration of his nativity, that Hermachus should appoint; and also the expence that should be made the twentieth of every moon in entertaining of the philosophers, his friends, who should assemble in honour of the memory of him and Metrodorus. Carneades was head of the contrary opinion: and maintain'd that glory was to be desir'd for it self, even as we embrace our Posthumes for themselves, having no knowledge nor enjoyment of them. This opinion was more universally follow'd, as those commonly are that are most suitable to our inclinations. Aristotle gives it the first place amongst eternal goods; and avoids, as too extream vices, the immoderate either seeking or evading it. I believe that if we had the books Cicero has writ upon this subject, we should there find fine stories, for he was so possess'd with this passion, that if he had dar'd, I think he could willingly have fallen into the excess that others did, "that vertue it self was not to be coveted, but upon the account of the honour that always attends it." Paulum sepultæ distat inertiæ Celata virtus.-Hor. l. 4. Ode 9. Which is an opinion so false, that I am vex'd it could ever enter into the understanding of a man that was honour'd with the name of a philosopher. If this was true, men should not be vertuous but in publick, and he should be no further concern'd to keep the operation of the soul, which is the true seat of vertue, regular and in order, than as they are to arrive at the knowledge of others. Is there no more in it than but only slily, and with circumspection to do ill? "If thou knowest," says Carneades, "of a serpent lurking in a place, where, without suspicion, a person is going to sit down, by whose death thou expect'st an advantage, thou dost ill, if thou dost not give him caution of his danger; and so much the more because the action is to be known by none but thy self." If we do not take up of our selves a rule of well-doing, if impunity passes with us for justice, to how many sorts of wickedness shall we every day abandon our selves? I do not find what Sp. Peduceus did, in faithfully restoring the treasure that C. Plotius had committed to his sole secrecy and trust (a thing that I have often done myself) so commendable, as I should think it an execrable baseness had we done otherwise. And think it of good use in our days to introduce the example of P. Sextilius Rufus, whom Cicero accuses to have enter'd upon an inheritance contrary to his conscience, not only not against law, but even by the determination of the laws themselves. And M. Crassus, and Q. Hortensius, who, by reason of their authority and power, having been call'd in by a stranger to share in the succession of a forg'd will, that so he might secure his own part; satisfied themselves with having no hand in the forgery, and refus'd not to make their advantage, and to come in for a share; secure enough if they could shrowd themselves from accusations, witnesses and the cognizance of the laws. "Meminerint Deum se habere testem, id est (ut ego arbitror) mentem suam."-Cicero de off. l. 3. "Let them consider they have God to witness, that is (as I interpret it) their own consciences." Vertue is a very vain and frivolous thing, if it derives its recommendation from glory. And 'tis to no purpose that we endeavour to give it a station by it self, and separate it from fortune; for what is more accidental than reputation? "Profecto fortuna, in omni re dominatur? Ea res cunctas ex libidine, magis quam ex vero celebrat, obscuratque." -Salust. "Fortune rules in all things, and does advance and depress things more out of her own will, than right and justice." So to order it that actions may be known and seen, is purely the work of fortune; 'tis chance that helps us to glory, according to its own temerity. I have often seen her go along with merit, and often very much exceed it. He that first liken'd glory to a shadow, did better than he was aware of. They are both of them things excellently vain. Glory also, like a shadow, goes sometimes before the body, and sometimes in length infinitely exceeds it. They that instruct gentleman only to employ their valour for the obtaining of honour, "Quasi non sit honestum, quod nobilitatum non sit."-Cic. de off. l. I. As though it were not a vertue unless enobled ;" what do they intend by that, but to instruct them never to hazard themselves if they are not seen, and to observe well, if there be witnesses present, who may carry news of their valour: whereas a thousand occasions of well-doing present themselves, when we cannot be taken notice of? How many brave actions are buried in the crowd of a battel? Whoever shall take upon him to censure anothers behaviour in such a confusion, is not very busie himself; and the testimony he shall give of his companions deportments, will be evidence against himself. "Vera, et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud quod maxime naturam sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria judicat."Cic. de off. l. I. "The true and wise magnanimity judges, that the bravery which most follows nature, more consists in act than glory." All the glory that I pretend to derive from my life, is that I have liv'd it in quiet. In quiet, not according to Metrodorus, Arcesilaus, or Aristippus, but according to my self; for seeing philosophy has not been able to find out any way to tranquility that is good in common, let every one seek it in particular. To what do Cæsar and Alexander owe the infinite grandeur of their renown, but to fortune? 388 EVERY MAN'S CONSCIENCE IS A SUFFICIENT TRUMPET TO HIM. How many men has she extinguish'd in the beginning of their progress, of whom we have no knowledge; who brought as much courage to the work as they, if their adverse hap had not cut them off in the first sally of their arms? Amongst so many and so great dangers, I do not remember I have any where read, that Cæsar was ever wounded; a thousand have fallen in less dangers, than the least of those he went through. A great many brave actions must be expected to be perform'd without witness, and so lost, before one turn to account. A man is not always on the top of a breach, or at the head of an army in the sight of his general, as upon a scaffold. A man is oft surpris'd betwixt the hedge and the ditch, he must run the hazard of his life against a hen-roost, he must bolt four rascally musketeers out of a barn, he must prick out single from his party, and alone make some attempts, according as necessity will have it. And whoever will observe, will, I believe, find it experimentally true, that occasions of the least lustre, are ever the most dangerous: and that in the wars of our own times, there have more brave men been lost in occasions of little moment, and in the dispute about some little paltery fort, than in places of greater importance, and where their valours might have been more honourably employ'd. Who thinks his death unworthy of him, if he do not fall in some signal occasions; instead of illustrating his death, does wilfully obscure his life, suffering in the mean time many very just occasions of hazarding himself to slip out of his hands. And every just one is illustrious enough: every mans conscience being a sufficient trumpet to him. "Gloria nostra est, testimonium conscientiæ nostræ."-Corin. 2. chap. I. ver. 12. "For our rejoycing is this, the testimony of our conscience." Who is only a good man that men may know it, and that he may be the better esteem'd when 'tis known; who will not do well, but upon condition that his vertue may be known to men is one from whom much service is not to be expected. A man must go to the war upon the account of duty, and expect the recompence that never fails brave and worthy actions, how private and conceal'd soever, not so much as vertuous thoughts; 'tis the satisfaction that a well-dispos'd conscience receives in it self, to do well. A man must be valiant for himself, and have his courage seated in a firm and secure place against the assaults of fortune. Virtus repulsæ nescia sordidæ, Intaminatis fulget honoribus, Vertue, that ne'er repulse admits, In taintless honours glorious fits, Nor takes, or leaveth dignities Rais'd with the noise of vulgar cries. Hawkins. It is not for outward shew that the soul is to play its part, but for our selves within, where no eyes can pierce but our own; there she defends us from the fear of death, of pains, and shame it self: she there arms us against the loss of our children, friends, and fortunes: and when opportunity presents it self, she leads us on to the hazards of war. "Non emolumento aliquo, sed ipsius honestatis decore.”—Cicero. "Not for any profit or advantage, but for the decency of vertue." A much greater advantage, and more worthy to be coveted and hop'd for 66 66 "Nil than honour and glory; which is no other than the favourable judgment is given of us. A dozen men must be cull'd out of a whole nation to judge of an acre of land, and the judgment of our inclinations and actions, the hardest, and most important thing that is, we refer to the voice, and determinations of the rabble, the mother of ignorance, injustice, and inconstancy. Is it reasonable that the life of a wise man should depend upon the judgment of fools? An quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, eos aliquid putare esse universos?". Elian. Varro. Can any thing be more foolish, than to think that those you despise single, can be any other when join'd together?" He that makes it his business to please them, will have enough to do, and never have done : 'tis a mark that never is to be reach'd or hit. tam inæstimabile est, quam animi multitudinis." "Nothing is to be so little esteem'd, as the minds of the multitude." Demetrius pleasantly said of the voice of the people, that he made no more account of that which came from above, than of that which fum'd from below. Cicero says more, "Ego hoc judico, si quando turpe non sit, tamen non esse non turpe, quum id à multitudine laudatur."-Cic. de Fin. "I am of opinion, that though a thing be not foul in it self, yet it cannot but become so when commended by the multitude." No art, no activity of wit could conduct our steps so as to follow so wandering and so irregular a guide. In this windy confusion of the noise of vulgar reports and opinions that drive us on, no way worth any thing can be chosen. Let us not purpose to our selves so floating an wavering an end; let us follow constantly after reason, let the publick approbation follow us there, if it will, and it wholly depending upon fortune, we have no reason sooner to expect it by any other way than that. Though I would not follow the right way because it is right, I should however follow it for having experimentally found, that at the end of the reckoning 'tis commonly the most happy, and of greatest utility. "Dedit hoc providentia hominibus munus, ut honesta magis juvarent." "This gift providence has given to man, that honest things should be the most delightful." The mariner said thus to Neptune," O God, thou mayest save me if thou wilt, and if thou wilt thou mayest destroy me; but however I will steer my rudder true." I have seen a thousand men of ambiguous natures, and that no one doubted but they were more worldly wise than I, throw themselves away, where I have sav'd one. Risi successus posse carere dolos.—Ovid. Ep. Penult. To see cunning want success. I have laught I must confess, Paulus Æmylius, going in the glorious expedition of Macedonia, above all things charg'd the people of Rome, not to speak of his actions during his absence. O, the licence of judgments is a great disturbance to great affairs! Forasmuch as every one has not the constancy of Fabius against common, adverse and injurious ways: who rather suffer'd his authority to be dissected by the vain fancies of man, than to go less in his charge with a favourable reputation and the popular applause. There is, I know not what natural sweetness in hearing a man's self commended; but we are a great deal too fond of it. I care not so much what I am in the opinions of others, as what I am in my own. I would be rich of my self, and not by borrowing. |