The general principles which have been kept in view in framing the Articles of this Division, and which are discussed in more detail in various notes, may be indicated as follows:

1. Each nation ought to be allowed to regulate all transactions affecting the ownership of its own soil. According to some authorities, the capacity of the person, as to taking or conveying, depends on the law of his nationality,—(Fœlix, Droit Intern. ;) but this does not seem reasonable. 2. Each nation ought to be allowed to regulate all transactions had within its limits, whether between citizens or foreigners, except such as affect the ownership of the soil of another nation.

These principles are commended alike by their recognition of the fundamental doctrine of the territorial sovereignty of nations, by their affording individuals convenient means of knowing what the law is to which they must conform in every case, and by their being in harmony in these respects with the progress and tendency of modern jurisprudence. The ancient rule, of oriental origin perhaps, maintains the sovereignty of the laws of a nation over the personal capacity, and, therefore, over the transactions of its own members, even when they are within the territory of another nation, opposing in this respect the territorial sover

eignty of others. This claim, which even the nations asserting it do not reciprocally yield to other nations, has necessarily given rise to much conflict and uncertainty, for it requires a citizen dealing with a foreigner to ascertain at his peril the fact of the foreigner's alienage, the nationality he bears, and the law of that nationality respecting the personal capacity of the foreigner.

The general rule demanded by modern commerce, and which is gradually forcing its way into recognition in all civilized countries, is, that contracts, and other acts not affecting the soil of a foreign nation, are valid everywhere, if valid by the law of the place where they are made or are to be performed, subject to certain simple restrictions necessary to guard against the use of the law of one place to sanction wrongful evasions of the law of another, or prejudicing creditors in another. This is the only rule which alike satisfies the sovereignty of the State, and puts it in the power of every person to ascertain. the rules of law to which he is bound to conform.

In the application of these principles, it is to be observed that, as to any transaction constituted by several acts done in different jurisdictions, the Code must furnish a test to determine which place shall be considered the one where the transaction is had, and that uniformity of rights and remedies should be secured as far as may be, without respect to the difference of forum.

The exceptions and qualifications of these leading principles will be considered as they arise, in the Articles of the Division.

TITLE XXIV.

CONDITION OF PERSONS.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. General provisions.
XXXIX. Marriage.

XL. Guardianship and mental alienation.

539. Man is not the subject of ownership. Every human being is a person, that is to say, a being capable of acquiring rights and exercising them; and no one is subject to slavery or involuntary servitude except in punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, § 360; Constitution of the United States, 13th Amendment. As to the duty of nations to persons coming within their jurisdiction from states which maintain slavery, see Chapter XXIV., on the PERSONAL CONDITION OF FOREIGNERS.

Foreign slaves become free by entering free nation. 540. If, by the law of any nation not a party to this Code, the slavery of human beings is permitted, such slavery is local, and the slaves become free on coming within the jurisdiction' of any free nation or state, and such nation or state is bound to respect and defend their liberty.

Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, §§ 361, 362.

1 This, by Article 309, includes the region within the lines of an army or fleet, as it should. Lieber's Instructions, § 2, ¶ 43.

Rank and social condition.

1

541. The privileges of rank or social condition are local, and confined to the places within the jurisdiction of the nation by the laws of which they exist, and

affect only acts done and rights acquired within such jurisdiction.

This article does not apply to the rank or privileges of foreign sovereigns; nor to those of agents of international intercourse; nor to such privileges of foreign rank or social condition as a nation may recognize by special regulation.'

1 They are not confined to the territory, but exist in the places which, by Article 309, are subject to extra-territorial jurisdiction.

* See Article 15, concerning the subjection of the sovereign or chief officer of a nation to the jurisdiction of another nation.

3 See Chapters XII. and XIII., concerning PUBLIC MINISTERS and CONSULS.

Of course, it is competent for any nation to recognize foreign rank or privilege.

542. The civil capacities and incapacities of an individual in reference to a transaction with living persons,' except so far as it affects immovable property, and subject also, in the case of public funds, corporate stocks and shipping, to the provisions of articles 572 and 573, are governed by the law of the place where the transaction is had, whatever may be his national character or domicil, or the place of his birth.

This is the American rule, as laid down in the case of Polydore v. Prince, Ware's Rep., 402, (U. S. Dist. Ct., Maine, 1837,) on a review of many authorities; and it is submitted as the plain and reasonable rule, which will solve many vexed questions. See, also, Story, Confl. of L., §§ 79, 82. It is not, however, the rule now recognized by European international law, although the tendency of opinion is in this direction.

The conflicting rules laid down by other authorities upon this point, may be stated thus:

1. The capacity of a person is governed by the law of the nation of which he is a member, even when he is resident in a foreign country. This is the rule declared by the French Code Civil, Art. 3, as governing the status of Frenchmen, but there seems to be no corresponding rule as to the status of foreigners in France. (Westlake, Private Intern. Law, p. 381.) It is to be sustained, if at all, by the principle that every nation is the best judge of the capacity or want of capacity of its native subjects. But it is a sufficient objection to the recognition of any such rule in international relations, that, although a nation can within its own jurisdiction maintain the rule over its members, it would involve grave