others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property.'

This and the eight following Articles are from the Civil Code, reported for New York, § 159, &c.

1 In another sense, property is the right of a person or persons, public or private, to appropriate a thing (tangible or intangible) to the exclusion of its promiscuous use by others. This has been also called domain. The word is here used, however, in its more general sense.

What things are property.

561. There may be ownership of all inanimate things which are capable of appropriation, or of manual delivery; of all domestic animals; of all obligations; of such products of labor or skill, as the composition of an author, the good will of a business, trade-marks and signs; and of rights created or granted by statute. Wild animals.

562. Animals wild by nature are the subjects of ownership while living, only when on the land of the person claiming them, or when tamed, or taken and held in possession, or disabled and immediately pursued. Real and personal property.

563. For the purposes of this Code, property is designated as either,

1. Real or immovable; or,

2. Personal or movable.

Real property.

564. Real or immovable property consists of,

1. Land;

2. That which is affixed to land; and,

3. That which is incidental or appurtenent to land. The existing rule of international law is, that the question whether an article of property is or is not an immovable, is to be determined by the law of the place where such article of property is locally situated. Story, Conf. of L., § 447; Fælix, Droit Intern. Privé, vol. I., p. 121. The above Article, and the four following, which are taken from the Civil Code, reported for the State of New York, are proposed here in order to secure a uniform rule for all cases arising under this Code.

Land.

565. Land is the solid material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether soil, rock, or other substance.

Fixtures.

566. A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines, or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of nails, bolts or screws.

Appurtenances.

567. A thing is deemed to be incidental' or appurtenant' to land, when it is by right used with the land for its benefit; as in the case of a way, or watercourse; or of light, air or heat, from or across the land of another.

1 Smyles v. Hastings, 22 New York Rep., 217, 222.

9 Lampman v. Milks, 21 New York Rep., 505, 511.

3 Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 Common Bench Rep., 164, 187.

Personal property.

568. Every kind of property that is not real, or immovable, is personal, or movable.

Property in possession, or in action.

569. Personal property is of two kinds :

1. Property in possession; and,

2. Property in action.

Property in possession can only be such as is capable of manual delivery.

Law of immovables.

570. The law of the place where immovables are situate, exclusively regulates and determines the rights of parties, the modes of transfer, or of charging or otherwise disposing thereof, whether between living persons or by will, and the formalities to accompany them.

As to the extent to which this rule is adopted on the Continent of Europe, and among other States which have followed the French Code, see Felix, Droit Intern. Privé, vol. I. p. 119.

The form in which the rule is stated in Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Vesey's Rep., 536 (approved in Oakey v. Bennett, 11 Howard U. S. Supreme Ct. Rep., 33, 45, as a clear and precise statement of a doctrine uniformly recognized by the American courts), is as follows:

The validity of every disposition of real estate depends upon the law of the country in which that estate is situated.

It was held in the case of Hutcheson v. Peshine (16 New Jersey Chan. Rep., 167), that the courts of a State will not recognize conveyances of real property within its jurisdiction, in trust for creditors, made within the jurisdiction and under the laws of another State. The rule was stated to rest not only on the acknowledged principle of law applicable to all assignments, voluntary or involuntary, that the title and disposition of real estate are exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated, which alone can prescribe the mode by which title to it can pass; but upon the further reason, that the laws of one State will not be permitted to control the trust, the action of the trustee, and the disposition of the trust property in another, the subject of the trust being real estate. Citing Lessee of McCullough's Heirs v. Roderick, 2 Hammond's (Ohio) Rep., 380; Rogers v. Allen, 3 Id., 488; Osborn v. Adams, 18 Pickering's (Massachusetts) Rep., 247.

A mortgage of immovables can only be made according to the law of the place of the property. Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige's (New York) Rep., 220; and see Goddard v. Sawyer, 91 Massachusetts (9 Allen) Rep., 78.

Law of movables.

571. Subject to the provisions of this Part,' movables are deemed to follow the person of their owner;' and the validity and effect of any transaction by him affecting the same, whether by acts between living persons, or by will, depend exclusively upon the law of the place where the transaction is had.'

The rule that movables follow the person, says Story (Confl. of L., § 550,) is a legal fiction, and yields whenever it is necessary for the purpose of justice, that the actual situs of the thing shall be examined. It does not authorize the exception to the general rule, that a nation within whose territory any personal property is actually situate has entire dominion over it while therein. Compare, to the same effect, Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 139. See Articles 581,582, and 583. The indorsements of negotiable paper will be, according to Chapter XLVI., another exception.

Felix, (Droit Intern. Privé, vol. 1, p. 127), cites an almost universal concurrence of authority for the rule that the personal statute governs the movables; and he shows, in note 2, on page 133, that where there is a difference between the domicil and the nationality, the law of the domicil must apply. This interpretation of the rule is more clearly enforced by Demangeat, in notes, on page 127 a, 58 b, 53 a, and 132 a.

The rule is universally recognized in the United States. See Civil Code reported for New York, § 364. The doctrine is commonly stated substantially as follows:

Personal property has no situs, and a title acquired to it, if good by the law of the domicil, is good everywhere, and will be recognized and enforced in every State, unless it conflicts with its laws or the rights of its citizens. Marcy v. Marcy, 32 Connecticut Rep., 308.

Story, in discussing the origin of this doctrine, says: "If the law rei

sita were generally to prevail in regard to movables, it would be utterly impossible for the owner, in many cases, to know in what manner to dispose of them during his life, or to distribute them at his death; not only from the uncertainty of their situation in the transit to and from different places, but from the impracticablity of knowing with minute accuracy, the law of transfers inter vivos, or of testamentary dispositions and successions in the different countries in which they might happen to be. Any change of place at a future time might defeat the best considered will; and any sale or donation might be rendered inoperative, from the ignorance of the parties of the law of the actual situs at the time of their acts. These would be serious evils, pervading the whole community, and equally affecting the subjects and interests of all civilized nations. But in maritime nations, depending upon commerce for their revenue, their power, and their glory, the mischief would be incalculable. A sense of general utility, therefore, must have first suggested the doctrine; and as soon as it was promulgated, it could not fail to recommend itself to all nations by its simplicity, its convenience, and its enlarged policy." Story, Confl. of L., § 379.

3 The place of domicil is usually the place of the transaction, but where there is a difference between the domicil and the place of the transaction, the tendency of recent opinion seems to be that the law of the place of the transaction should be held to apply in preference to that of the domicil.

"It does not follow," says Story, in explaining the rules, that movables are governed by the law of the domicil, "that a transfer made by the owner according to the law of the place of its actual situs, would not as completely divest his title; nor even that transfer by him in any foreign country, which would be good according to the law of that country, would not be equally effectual, although he might not have his domicil there. For purposes of this sort his personal property may, in many cases, be deemed subject to his disposal wherever he may happen to be at the time of the alienation. Thus, a merchant, domiciled in America, may doubtless transfer his personal property according to the law of his domicil, wherever the property may be. But, if he should direct a sale of it, or make a sale of it in a foreign country, where it is situate at the time, according to the laws thereof, either in person or by an agent, the validity of such a sale would scarcely be doubted. If a merchant is temporarily abroad, he is understood to possess a general authority to transfer such personal property as accompanies his person wherever he may be, so always that he does not violate the law of the country where the act is done. The general convenience and freedom of commerce require this enlargement of the rule; for otherwise the sale of personal property actually situate in a foreign county and made according to the forms prescribed by its laws, might be declared void in the country of the domicil of the owner. In the ordinary course of trade with foreign countries, no one thinks of transferring personal property according to the forms of his own domicil; but it is transferred according to the forms prescribed by the law of the place where the sale takes place." Story, Confl. of L., § 384. See also Westlake, Private Intern. Law, §§ 266–267.

It may, therefore, be deemed a more correct statement of the rule, to refer, as in the Article above presented, to the law which governs the person of the owner wherever he may be, rather than that of the domicil, or that of his nation, from which he may be absent at the time of the transaction in question.

Westlake, (Priv. Intern. Law, § 267,) inclines to favor the rule referring to the situs of the property, admitting, however, the inconvenience in the case of property, the exact situation of which is unknown. It should seem that the more serious inconvenience of compelling parties to conform to laws which they have no present means of ascertaining, and which they will not, as in the case of ships and lands, generally suppose to apply, is decisive in favor of the rule which refers to the place of the act. The real grounds of the rule referring to the situs, namely, the protection of subsequent purchasers or creditors there, are provided for by the Articles of the next Chapter on TRANSFER.

If the rule of the situs should be recognized, it might perhaps be defined sufficiently to secure its real object, by provisions like the following:

1. Movable property of a foreigner imported into any nation, during its presence in that nation, is with reference to the assignability between living persons, or mode of charging such property, subject to the regula tions of the country in which such foreigner has placed it, and which, in these respects, affects the personal property of the members of such nation; and any such assignment inter vivos, or charge, will retain its original validity and effect, although the property be subsequently removed to another country. See Olivier v. Townes, 2 Martin's (Louisiana) Rep., (N. S.,) 93; Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vermont Rep., 581; Westlake, Priv. Intern. L., p. 257, § 272, note (d.) See also, generally, Story, Confl. of L., ch. IX. It was held in Martin v. Hill, (12 Barbour's (New York) Rep., 631,) that a mortgage upon movables valid where it was made, was valid in another state to which the movables were subsequently carried and by the laws of which such a mortgage would be void as against attaching creditors. The protection of such charges will be fully secured by the Articles of this and the next Chapter.

2. If any lien, hypothecation, or other charge has attached to movables by the law of any country where the movables are situated, at the time it attached, so as to affect them in the hands of the owner, the same charge will attach to them in the hands of any transferee, although it has not attached to them according to the previous provisions of this chapter. See Story, Confl. of L., §§ 386-389.

Local character of public funds and corporate shares.

572. Public funds or stocks, and shares or other interests in, or obligations of, nations or states, or of bodies politic or corporate, or other artificial bodies owing their existence to local laws, are governed in re