Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, April, 1915. facts, and, although the controversy turns entirely upon the tenancy, the opposing counsel totally disagree as to the tenancy. Counsel for the appellant rejects the claim that the tenancy was shown to be from month to month. While the opinion of the court below refers to another and prior proceeding involving the rental for August, 1914, there is nothing before this court alleging, or even indicating, any occupation or agreement prior to September. The statement of facts merely alleges the occupation of the premises in September at an agreed rental of twelve dollars per month, due and payable for the month of September on the 1st day of September, 1914. True, it is also alleged that "it was agreed between the landlord and the tenant that the said monthly rental of $12 shall be due and payable on the first day of each and every month in advance," but it is not alleged that the agreement was made prior to August fourth or that the tenant occupied the premises in August pursuant to such an agreement. On the face of the statement of facts, it appears that the tenant hired the premises for the month of September, and from month to month thereafter. Such a hiring is a monthly one (People ex rel. Aldhause v. Goelet, 14 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 130). "A renting of premises by the month, and which is to be from month to month, can bear but one interpretation, viz: that, to be continued, it must be renewed monthly, and to terminate the tenancy no notice is necessary." McAdam Landl. & Ten. (4th ed.), § 179, p. 672. Upon the agreed statement of facts submitted, concerning which counsel so radically disagree, it is impossible to spell out any obligation on the part of the tenant existing on August 4, 1914, to pay the rent that accrued on September 1, 1914. While the tenant fails in this proceeding, upon the statement of facts presented, the legal question of importance to all de Supreme Court, Appellate Term, April, 1915. [Vol. 90. positors who were tenants of Mandel is decided, so far as may be done herein, in favor of the contentions made in behalf of the depositors, to wit: tenants of Mandel who occupied the premises on August fourth pursuant to antecedent agreements, either for a fixed term or from month to month as distinguished from a mere monthly hiring, are entitled to set off their deposits, pro tanto, against rent subsequently accruing, until the termination of the tenancy by thirty days' notice. The decision heretofore rendered is adhered to and the final order appealed from reversed, with costs, but without costs upon reargument and a final order is directed to issue in favor of the landlord against the tenant, with costs in the court below. GUY and PENDLETON, JJ., concur. Final order reversed, with costs, and directed to issue in favor of landlord against tenant, with costs. CHARLES KURLAN, Respondent, v. EUGENE GUTMAN, SIDNEY GUTMAN and ALEXANDER NICHOLSON, Appellants. (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department, April, 1915.) - when exclusion of evidence prejudicial error - contracts question of fact. Evidence Where a contract of employment bound plaintiff to devote his entire time to defendant's business, the exclusion of evidence in an action to recover damages for a wrongful discharge, tending to show plaintiff's activities in the interest of a partnership of which he was the financial man and that he furnished the signed statement of its affairs to a commercial agency during business hours, is prejudicial error. It was also error to exclude testimony offered by defendants tending to show that said partnership, the total capital of which was contributed by plaintiff, was in financial difficulties and Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, April, 1915. judgments had been recovered against it before he was discharged from defendants' employ as such evidence was clearly. relevant, for the facts sought to be proved would naturally interfere seriously with the services to be rendered by plaintiff to defendants. It was also error to exclude testimony offered by defendants tending to show that the contract of employment was induced by the false representations of plaintiff as to the amount of goods sold by him for a prior employer. The contract of employment being in writing, a charge is erroneous which left it to the jury to determine what the agreement was. Whether the plaintiff on becoming a member of said partnership could be lawfully discharged by defendants was not a question of fact. GUY, J., dissents. APPEAL from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York for $1,245.36, entered upon the verdict of a jury and from an order denying a motion for a new trial on the minutes. Seligsberg & Lewis (Clarence M. Lewis and Walter N. Seligsberg, of counsel), for appellants. Malcolm Sundheimer, for respondent. SHEARN, J. This action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract of employment by wrongful discharge. The contract contained a covenant binding the plaintiff to devote his entire time to the business of the defendants. It appeared without contradiction that shortly after plaintiff entered the defendants' employment in the city of New York, without the consent of the defendants he entered into a general partnership with another firm engaged in a different line of business in the same city, and contributed $10,000 to the capital thereof. It is contended by the defendants that plaintiff's entering into and carrying on a general partnership with another firm Supreme Court, Appellate Term, April, 1915. [Vol. 90. during the term of his contract with the defendants, containing a covenant for exclusive service, was a breach of the express and implied terms of his contract of employment, and justified his discharge. Plaintiff contends that the evidence showed that he devoted his entire time during business hours to the business of the defendants and that there is no evidence that the plaintiff gave any of his time or attention during business hours to his partnership business or that his relations as a partner involved anything other than a mere financial investment on his part. Assuming that plaintiff's entering into this general partnership did not constitute per se a violation of the covenant for exclusive service, the case discloses numerous prejudicial errors requiring a reversal. The defendants should have been permitted at least to introduce all available evidence tending to show what services plaintiff rendered his partnership and whether he did anything more than make a mere investment of $10,000 in another business. Defendants sought but were not permitted to show that the plaintiff was the financial man of his general partnership and furnished statements to a financial agency showing the firm's assets and liabilities for a credit rating. This statement showed that plaintiff called at R. G. Dunn & Co's on March 29, 1913, four weeks after entering defendants' employment, and made a statement concerning his contribution of capital and concerning the business of the concern. Yet the court refused to permit the plaintiff to answer, on crossexamination, a question whether he had furnished a signed statement of the firm's affairs to the commercial agency. This would have tended to show that during business hours, when according to his contract and according to the testimony, plaintiff was devoting Misc.] Supreme Court, Appellate Term, April, 1915. himself exclusively to the business of the defendants, he was spending time at the commercial agency promoting the business of the partnership. Furthermore, the court refused to permit the defendants to show on plaintiff's cross-examination that he hired one Sturman for the business of the partnership. Certainly if plaintiff was attending to such details of the partnership business as making contracts of employment, the defendants were at least entitled to bring the fact out and not rest under plaintiff's general testimony that he did nothing whatever for the partnership. Testimony along this line went to the very issue that the court submitted to the jury and the exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial error. The court also erred in refusing to permit the defendants to show that the partnership, the total capital of which was contributed by the plaintiff, was in financial difficulties and a number of judgments were recovered against it. This testimony was clearly relevant, for it would naturally interfere seriously with the services to be rendered by the plaintiff to the defendants as their salesman if at the time he was worried and harassed by having so considerable a sum as $10,000 jeopardized by the financial troubles of a firm in which he was a general partner. Error was also committed in preventing the defendants from proving the defense that the contract of employment was induced by fraud. Defendants pleaded that plaintiff in order to induce them to enter into the contract of employment represented that he had sold over $140,000 worth of goods for Louis Siegbert & Brother, his prior employer. On cross-examination plaintiff was asked the amount of his sales for Siegbert & Brother during 1912 and plaintiff's objection to the question was sustained. Defendants called a competent witness connected with the firm of Siegbert & Brother to prove plaintiff's sales for Siegbert |