rectly repugnant to the terms of the contract as finally written, and cannot, under the well-settled rule, be permitted to overthrow it, for that would be the inevitable accepted the agreement as finally expressed in the bond, and must abide by it. This ruling renders it unnecessary to consider the other exceptions. The court erred in giving judgment for the plaintiff upon the report of the referee for the amount of the account against Goorman. The judgment should have been the other way, and will be so entered. Reversed. Plaintiff's Appeal. The legal effect of a final instrument which defines and declares the intentions and rights of the parties cannot be modified or corrected by proof of any preliminary negotiations or agreement, nor is it permissi-result. The plaintiff must be held to have ble to show how the parties understood the transaction in order to explain or qualify what is in the final writing, in the absence of an allegation of fraud or mistake, or unless the terms of the instrument itself are ambiguous and require explanation. Meekins v. Newbury, 101 N. C. 17, 7 S. E. 655; Merchants' & F. Nat. Bank v. Mc Elwee, 104 N. C. 305, 10 S. E. 295; Taylor v. Hunt, 118 N. C. 168, 24 S. E. 359; Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C. 457, 9 S. E. 399. The case of Dellinger v. Gillespie, 118 N. C. 737, 24 S. E. 538, is much like our case in principle. It is there said that when the defendant received the contract he should have repudiated it at once, if it did not conform to the real agreement of the parties, and have acted upon it with full knowledge of its contents; that, if he did not read it, it was his own fault, and the law will not relieve him from the consequences of his neglect; and that the case, therefore, must be considered and decided as though he had read it, and knew and understood what was in it. The construction of a contract is to be determined, not by what either one of the parties may have understood, but by what they both agreed. Brunhild v. Freeman, 77 N. C. 128; Pendleton v. Jones, 82 N. C. 249; J. L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Elizabeth City Lumber Co. 137 N. C. 431, 49 S. E. 946. Here we have a solemn instrument embodying the final intention and agreement of the parties, without any allegations of mistake, and we are to construe the same according to the legal import of its terms, and upon such legal import there is no room for doubt as to what is the meaning of the writing. We must therefore decide, according to the general rule of law, that all preliminary negotiations and agreements are to be deemed merged in the final settled instrument of the parties, when there is no reasonable showing of mistake. Van Ness v. Washington, 4 Pet. 232, 7 L. ed. 842; Potomac S. B. Co. v. Upper Potomac S. B. Co. 109 U. S. 672, 27 L. ed. 1070, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15. It is not admissible to add to or ingraft upon the contract, as thus ascertained by the law, any new stipulation, nor to contradict those which we find are plainly set forth in it, and the meaning of which is wholly free from any doubt. Oelricks v. Ford, 23 How. 49, 16 L. ed. 534; Davis v. Glenn, 70 N. C. 427. If the construction of the letter and statement, as insisted upon by the plaintiff's counsel, is the correct one, it is di This action was brought to recover the amount of accounts for goods sold and delivered to Leopold Goorman and to Lewis Pelton. The referee found in favor of the plaintiff as to the account of Goorman, and against it as to the account of Pelton. We have disposed of the case, so far as it relates to the Goorman account, in the decision rendered in the defendant's appeal. We are now to consider the plaintiff's exception to the ruling in regard to the Pelton account. There is no substantial difference between the two cases. Whatever difference there may be is unfavorable to the plaintiff. The main question having been decided in the other appeal, it only remains to say, with reference to the Pelton account, that the referee found the defendant had no notice as to how the plaintiff construed the bond, and that the transaction between the plaintiff and Pelton was not within the scope of the contract of the defendant with the plaintiff. In all other respects the two appeals are substantially alike, and, if the ruling in favor of the plaintiff in the other appeal was wrong, the ruling against it in this appeal must be right. an infant to arbitration by parties act- 5. A judgment entered on an award in ing on his behalf is absolutely void. 2. A life estate, not an estate tail, is created by a will bequeathing real estate to be and inure to the use of a certain person during his natural life, not subject to be sold and conveyed by him, but, in case he shall have legitimate children, it is to belong to them. On Rehearing. 3. An agreement by an infant to submit his cause to arbitration is voidable. 4. Equity will not recognize a pretended arbitration in a suit by infants to set aside deeds by a life tenant purporting to convey property to which they claim title, by which an amount is fixed which shall be paid to them to complete the consideration for the transfer, upon payment of which the title shall be established in the grantees. I. In general. While the decisions show a lack of harmony, the rule which has the largest following is that the submission of an award upon an infant's cause of action is voidable at his election, and not absolutely void. A number of early English decisions are to this effect. Thus, it was declared by Noy in Stone v. Knight, Latch, 207, Noy, 93, that submission to arbitration by an infant is voldable only; that the Infant may waive the arbitrament during minority if prejudiclal to him, but if at full age he does any act which amounts to an agreement to it, that shall bind him. The court, in Knight v. Stone, Wm. Jones, 164, with one voice were of the opinion that an infant might submit a cause to arbitration, since it might be for his benefit, with the right, however, upon his part, at his option. to avoid the award upon coming of age, or before. If trespass be done to an infant, and he submit it to arbitration, he will not be bound by the award. but upon his election. Rolle, Abr. Enfants, (D), 5. A submission, bond, and award may be voidable as to an Infant, who is one of the parties, but valid and binding as to his father, who is also one of the parties thereto. Gill v. Russell, Freem. C. L. Rep. 62, 139. The court recognized, in Roberts v. Newbold, Comb. 318, that there had been several earlier cases holding the submission of an infant not vold, but voldable. Where part of the plaintiffs in a submission to arbitration were infants, the award was declared voidable on their part, rather than vold, in Dowse v. Coxe, 3 Bing. 20, 10 J. B. Moore, 272. Where an infant plaintiff verbally agreed to submit a cause to arbitration, and then refused to abide by the award which was rendered against him, the defendant was allowed to proceed to trial by proviso. Godfrey v. Wade, 6 J. B. Moore, 488. So, it has been held in this country that an agreement by minors to arbitrate, followed by judgment in their favor, especially when it is beneficial to them, is not void, but at most only voidable. Chambers v. Ker, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 24 S. W. 1118. Where an infant, upon reaching full age, a proceeding by which an attempt is made to submit to arbitration the title to land claimed by infants is subject to attack by them where there was no one to protect their rights in the proceeding. 6. The rule governing innocent purchasers of real estate does not apply where the chain of title discloses a judgment attempting to quiet the title against Infants, which is based upon arbitration to which neither the infants, their next friend, nor their attorneys, could consent. 7. Infants who seek to avoid a judgment attempting to validate a conveyance of real estate claimed by them must restore whatever of value they have received under at. (March 21, 1904.) ratified a submission to arbitration by receiving the proceeds of the award from his guardian, who was appointed subsequent to the making of the award. he thereby becomes bound by it, notwithstanding at the time of the submission he was an infant, and could not consent to the arbitration. Jones v. Phoenix Bank, 8 N. Y. 228. These decisions above shown, together with other decisions hereinafter set out, wherein the voidability of the award at the option of the infant, while not the chief point decided, is indirectly upheld, amply support the conclusion reached upon the rehearing in MILLSAPS V. ESTES. There are some decisions, however, both English and American, which seem to lean towards the doctrine that an award in an arbitration of an infant's cause of action is void, rather than voidable. In 10 Hen. VI., 14, the conclusion was reached that a plea of under-age at the time of a submission to arbitration for a trespass done by the infant is sufficient to invalidate the award. An exception to this rule was recognized, however, when the submission was for something for which the law holds the infant bound, as for necessaries. In such a case, it was declared that he would be bound by the award. Fitzherbert, Abr. Arbitrament, pl. 4. So, the decision in the English case of Rudston v. Yates, March, N. C. 141, is based upon the ground that arbitration of an infant's cause of action is entirely void. the court set aside an award and bond of submission when it appeared that the infant was thereby required, upon arriving at full age, to convey lands in question, on the ground that it was not reasonable or natural; that the infant might die, or, upon arriving at full age, refuse to convey. The Lord Chancellor said that he would never decree an award that should bind an infant. The submission to arbitration by an infant is a defective proceeding, that cannot be cured by the arbitrators appointing a guardian ad litem, since, the arbitrators not having been legally chosen, they have no power to act in any way. Jones v. Payne, 41 Ga. 23. And in Britton v. Williams, 6 Munf. 453, the court says: "Although infants are bound by judgments had under the superintendence and protection of the court, yet, where the case is APPEAL by plaintiffs from a judgment of the Superior Court for Swain County in favor of defendants in an action to cancel certain conveyances and quiet title to real estate. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinions. Messrs. Shepherd & Shepherd and F. C. Fisher for appellants. Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436, 3 L. ed. 396; Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. 83, 12 L. ed. 60; Beliveau v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. 68 N. H. 225, 44 L. R. A. 169, 73 Am. St. Rep. 577, 40 Atl. 734; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 956; Davis v. Page, 9 Ves. Jr. 350; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa, 17. 74 Am. Dec. 291; Biddell v. Messrs. K. Elias and A. M. Fry, for ap- Dowse, 6 Barn. & C. 255; Jenkins v. Gillespellees: pie, 10 Smedes & M. 31, 48 Am. Dec. 732; Eidam v. Finnegan, 48 Minn. 53, 16 L. R. A. 507, 50 N. W. 933; Williams v. Tracey, 95 Pa. 308; Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410; Morse, Arbitration & Award, § 4; Bartlett v. Batts, 14 Ga. 539; Wade v. Powell, 31 Ga. 22; Tuberville v. Whitehouse, 1 Car. & P. 94; Albee v. Winterink, 55 Iowa, 184. 7 N. W. 497; Re Janaway, 7 Price, 680: A submission of an infant's case to arbi- | tration with the consent of the court in which it is pending, or by order of that court, is within the power of such court, and regular, valid, and binding upon said infant to the same extent as if he had attained his majority in years, and were sui juris. referred to arbitrators, whereby they are deprived of that protection, a submission by infants, even by rule of court, ought not to be sanctioned; for, as awards are in the nature of judgments, and are to be final and conclusive, which cannot be where one party has a right to avoid them, it follows that a submission by infants, although with adults, cannot be obligatory on either party." It was argued in Bowyer v. Blorksidge, 3 Lev. 17, where a submission was entered into by a father and minor son, that the award was void in toto because a submission by an infant is void but the court, giving no opinion as to the validity of the award as to the son, held it binding as to the father at least. A number of the decisions of this class are obscure, and it is difficult to determine just what the court meant to decide in regard to the binding effect of awards upon infants. Thus, if an infant suffer an assault and battery, an award on this does not bind him. Rolle, Abr. 268, p. 2,730, pl. 5. So, if an infant suffer trespass done to his land, an award on this does not bind him. Ibid. If an infant submit his rights to arbitration, he will not be bound by the award, from a presumed incompetency to choose suitable arbitrators. Baker v. Lovett, 6 Mass. 78, 4 Am. Dec. 88. An infant is not bound by the award rendered on a submission to arbitration. Hanks v. Deal, 3 M'Cord, L. 257. A few cases, decided with reference to statutory provisions, hold the submission to arbitration of infant's interests a void proceeding. Thus, neither an infant, nor his guardian, has a right to submit a controversy concerning the infant to arbitration, under § 372 of the New York Code, providing for an agreement as to the truth of facts and a submission of the same to any court which would have had jurisdiction if an action had been brought; since an infant is not competent to make such an agree ment, and the guardian has no power to make it in his behalf, since he might, by such an agreement, sacrifice the infant's rights. Lathers v. Fish, 4 Lans. 213. So, an infant has no power to consent to the submission of a controversy without action as provided by the Code, and there is no authority for the appointment of a guardian for an infant to appear for him in a controversy without action. Fisher v. Stilson, 9 Abb. Pr. 33. The statute in regard to arbitration does not give minors the power to agree to submission to arbitration, and such a submission by them is void. Handy v. Cobb, 44 Miss. 699, obiter. In a very few instances there is a leaning towards the view that the arbitration of an infant's cause of action is a valid proceeding. and that awards rendered therein are binding. If an infant submits to arbitrament, and an award is made, this shall bind him, for it is for his avail to excuse him of trespass whereof he is impeachable by law. Brooke, Abr. Arbiterment, pl. 43. In Bishop of Bath & Wells v. Hippesley, cited in Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 607, there was a submission to arbitration by a bishop, as plaintiff, and by an infant and his guardian, as defendant. The court, being of the opinion that the infant was bound by the award, confirmed it. A contract of hiring and service was regarded as binding upon an infant, because beneficial to him, notwithstanding the fact was brought to the court's attention that it contained a clause for submitting disputes to arbitration. Wood v. Fenwick, 10 Mees. & W. 195. Another class of cases wherein awards in the arbitration of infants' interests have been held binding is when the arbitration is entered into under the direction of the court. These cases will be found in III., infra. II. Power to submit for infant. a. Of parties binding themselves for performance of award. There is considerable authority to the effect that, if a guardian, attorney, or other surety. binds himself for the performance of the award. he may then submit an infant's interest to arbitration, since the award will be binding upon him, although it is voidable as to the infant, and the necessary mutuality of obligation as to the performance of the award rendered will thus be provided for. This principle appears in Roman law: Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate compromiserit, non est arbiter cogendus pronunciare; quia si contra eum pronuntietur, poena non tenetur. Praeterquam si fidejussorem dederit a quo poena peti possit. Ff. 1. 4. t. 8. s. II, art. I. (V.). It is intimated in an early English case, Bacon v. Dubarry, Comb. 439, that one may bind himself as attorney to an infant, to stand liable for an award over all differences between the Daniels v. New London, 58 Conn. 156, 7 L. R. A. 563, 19 Atl. 573; Alton v. Gilmanton, 2 N. H. 520; Buckland v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa. 315; Hairston v. Garwood, 123 N. C. 348, 31 S. E. 653; Henry v. Hilliard, 120 N. C. 479, 27 S. E. 130; Jones v. Payne, 41 Ga. 23; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Md. 619; Porter v. Robinson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 253, 13 Am. Dec. 159; Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484; Bunton v. Lyford, 37 N. H. 512, 75 Am. Dec. 144; Guild v. Cranston, 8 Cush. 506; Pike v. Emerson, 5 N. H. 393, 22 Am. Dec. 468; Campbell v. Drais, 125 Cal. 253, 57 Pac. 994; Adams, Eq. 192. Bispham, Eq. §§ 34, 543, 545; Tyson v. Belcher, 102 N. C. 114, 9 S. E. 634; Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N. C. 712, 24 S. E. 124; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 556, 12 L. ed. 1196; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C. 200, 41 Am. Rep. 455; Doe ex dem. Marshall v. Fisher, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 111; Tate v. Mott, 96 N. C. 19, 2 S. E. 176; Ward v. Lowndes, 96 N. C. 376, 2 S. E. 591; Stump v. Long, 84 N. C. 619. At most the judgment could only be voidable, and not void. Syme v. Trice, 96 N. C. 246, 1 S. E. 480; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 633, note 1; England v. Garner, 90 N. C. 201; White v. Albertson, 14 N. C. (3 Dev. L.) 242, 22 The court is the guardian of infants, and Am. Dec. 719; Tipton v. Tipton, 48 N. C. the infants are bound by its orders. infant and another; and that, if the infant does not perform the award, the attorney forfeits his bond. So, one may submit a matter to arbitration in behalf of an infant if he makes himself liable to perform the award, although the submission would not be binding upon the infant. Smith v. Van Nostrand, 5 Hill, 419. Although an infant cannot submit, his guardlan or other person may submit for him; and the person submitting shall be bound by the award in the ordinary way, as one man is bound when he binds himself for the acts of another. Strong v. Beroujon, 18 Ala. 168. And so, although conceding that an infant cannot submit to arbitration, it was held that his guardian might do so for him, binding himself that the infant shall perform the award. Roberts v. Newbold, Comb. 318. In holding that the guardian of an infant may submit to arbitration matters on behalf of his ward, giving a bond binding himself for the faithful performance of the award, it is said: "It is difficult to conceive how it should ever have been doubted whether guardians had this power, or whether they were not bound by their bond, or whether an award, under these circumstances, did not put an end to all controversies submitted between the infant and other party. That an infant himself should not bind himself in this way is right, but for this very reason a power should be lodged elsewhere, and where can it be so properly instructed as to the very person who has the care of all his property? With this, also, agrees the civil law, by which, although an infant cannot bind him self by a submission, yet, if anyone will become his surety, a remedy may be had against the latter for the infant's nonperformance." Weed v. Ellis, 3 Caines, 253. So, in holding a submission to arbitration by a guardian of a matter affecting the interest of his wards, allowable, and the award thereupon rendered, valid and binding upon the parties, the court says: "It was formerly much doubted whether a guardian could even bind himself by submitting for his ward. The point is now settled, that, although the infant cannot submit, the guardian may, and thus bind himself. Then if the submission be mutually binding on the parties who enter into it, it would seem that the award should be good." Goleman v. Turner, 14 Smedes & M. 118, Confirmed in McComb v. Turner, 14 Smedes & M. 119. (3 Jones, L.) 552. An arbitration entered into by two parents, on behalf of their infant children, was held valid, when each parent bound himself, by penal bond, to comply with the conditions of the award rendered. Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 58 Ind. 254. In one case it seems that a next friend may so bind himself, and thus proceed to arbitration; for, in Biddell v. Dowse, 6 Barn. & C. 255, 9 Dowl. & R. 404, in holding that the consent of an attorney representing infants suing by their next friends, to submission of their interests to arbitration, was insufficient, the court admitted that, if it had been shown that the attorneys were acting for the next friends of the infants, then it might be that they could bind their principals to become personally liable for the infants' performance of the award, but that the court could not, by inference only, regard this as having been done. Guardians who had submitted matters to arbitration on behalf of their infant ward were relieved from liability upon showing that the infant had died, in Burslem v. Burns, 1 L. J. K. B. 155. So, an award, so far as it related to trustees who appeared in behalf of an infant, was held not binding upon them, when it appeared that the infant died before the award was made. Bristow v. Binns, 3 Dowl. & R. 184, 26 Revised Rep. 607. But in one early English case, however, Rudston v. Yates, March, N. C. 141, notwithstanding that one bound himself that another, who was an infant, should perform the award in a submission to arbitration in which the infant was defendant,-in an action upon the bond, after a lengthy discussion of the question, judgment was rendered against the plaintiff upon the ground that the submission to arbitration by an infant was entirely void, and, in consequence, the bond also. This decision was placed upon numerous grounds, some of which were that an infant has not sufficient discretion to chose a competent arbitrator: that he might have lost by a submission to arbitration because the arbitrator might give greater damages than the cause required; that the infant should not be allowed to submit himself to that which is final against him, with no available remedy. b. Of general guardians. There are a number of broad statements by courts, in the nature of dicta, and a few deci The plaintiffs, notwithstanding their in- | Taylor, 99 N. C. 511, 6 Am. St. Rep. 547, fancy, are estopped by judgment. 6 S. E. 788; Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N. C. 130, 38 S. E. 292. On petition for rehearing. An infant's submission of his controversy which is not the subject of litigation, to arbitration, is nothing different from a contract on his part. But a contract of an infant is voidable, and not void. Grantham v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 151; Syme v. Trice, 96 N. C. 246, 1 S. E. 480; Brittain v. Mull, 99 N. C. 491, 6 S. E. 382; Brickhouse v. Sutton, 99 N. C. 103, 6 Am. St. Rep. 497, 5 S. E. 380; Bissell v. Bozman, 17 N. C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 160; Kerchner v. McEachern, 93 N. C. 456; Coffin v. Cook, 106 N. C. 376, 11 S. E. 371; Doyle v. Brown, 72 N. C. 395; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C. 198, 41 Am. Rep. 455; Gay | Rel. § 403; Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. v. Stancell, 76 N. C. 369; Williamson v. Hartman, 92 N. C. 240; Ward v. Lowndes, 96 N. C. 376, 2 S. E. 591; Tyson v. Belcher, 102 N. C. 112, 9 S. E. 634; Knott v. sions, to the effect that a guardian has authority to submit his ward's interests to arbitration. Thus, a guardian has a general authority to submit to arbitration controversies respecting the interests of his ward. Weston v. Stuart, 11 Me. 326. So, a guardian has power to submit to arbitration the rights of his ward. Thomas v. Bennett, 56 Barb. 197, obiter. A guardian may submit for his ward. Bean v. Farnam, 6 Pick. 269, obiter. At common law, a guardian could agree to an arbitration. Kelley v. Adams, 120 Ind. 340, 22 N. E. 317. The submission to arbitration, by a father on behalf of his infant child, of a claim for injuries to her person, is authorized, and an award made thereon will bind the infant. Merritt v. Williams, Harp. L. 306. A submission to arbitration, by a father, of the damages done by trespass upon the body of his infant son, was upheld, notwithstanding the damages were blended with those to which he himself was entitled as natural guardian, in Beebe v. Trafford, Kirby, 215. It seems, however, that, in connection with the above statements and decisions, which are true as far as they go, must be considered two principles which have heretofore appeared herein (I., II., a), and each of which is consistent with the other and with the statements and decision above set out, and each of which has been followed and advocated sufficiently to be come a controlling principle, viz., that awards upon the arbitration of infants' Interests are voidable at the election of the Infants (I.), and that a guardian, or anyone, binding himself as surety for the performance of the award, may submit the interests of his ward to arbitration. (II, a.) This last limitation is recognized in Re Hurley, 1 Hayes & J. 160, holding that a guardian. entering into a submission to arbitration on behalf of his ward, binds himself only. With these limitations, it seems to be true that a guardian may submit his ward's interests to arbitration. In the following decisions the voidability of the award as to the infant is recognized, even when the submission is made by general guardian. Thus, the award given upon a submission to arbitration by a guardian may be avoided by the infant upon his coming of age. Barnaby v. Barnaby, 1 Pick. 221. And, where, by family arrangement, an ob Lawson, Contr. § 130; Bishop, Contr. § 925; Clark, Contr. 229; Schouler, Dom. 45; Wilson v. James, 79 N. C. 349; State v. Howard, 88 N. C. 650; Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Wilkes County, 111 N. C. 317, 16 S. E. 314. scure will was submitted to arbitration, and expense thereby saved, it was declared to be for the benefit of infants' interests therein, who were represented by guardian; and was therefore held a valid act, unless avoided by them upon their coming of age. Hume v. Hume, 3 Pa. St. 144. So, where a guardian had submitted his ward's liability to arbitration, it was held that he could avail himself of the award as a defense; that it was not void, but merely voidable at his election, if at all. Wiley v. Heard, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. (White v. Willson) 686. And the submission to arbitration, by a mother, of a matter in which she and her minor heirs are interested, is without force as to the minors. Snow v. Walker, 42 Tex. 156. A father interested adversely to his children cannot submit their claims to arbitration. Fortune v. Killebrew. 86 Tex. 172. 23 S. W. 976. On account of technical irregularities in the order of submission, an award was set aside In arbitration proceedings brought upon the consent of heirs by their guardian, in Galloway v. Hill, 4 Bibb, 475. In two instances the general guardian's right to arbitrate for his ward is not upheld. It is apparent, however, that these decisions were rendered with reference to the binding effect of the award upon the infant, and not with reference to the right of the guardian to submit after binding himself for the performance of the award. Thus, a general guardian has no power to submit a cause of action either on behalf of, or against, an infant, so as to give the court jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the infant. Coughlin v. Fay, 68 Hun, 521, 22 N. Y. Supp. 1095. And so, a guardian has no power to consent to a reference involving matters concerning his ward. If the result is beneficial to the infant, it may be ratified by the court, but, when prejudicial, it is otherwise. Fowler v. Lewis, 36 W. Va. 112, 14 S. E. 447. The question is affected by statutes in some states. Thus, under the Georgia statute regulating submission to arbitration, a guardian may make the submission, and the award will be binding upon the ward. Jones v. Bond, 76 Ga. 517. But the statute only allows guardians to submit to arbitration matters of controversy with third persons touching the property of their wards; and therefore, where a guardian was a party to the arbitration in her individual right, |