been less than he was,-less eminent for talent,-less amiable in character,-less distinguished for integrity,-less pure in deportment,-less influential in society,-his errors might have slept in that sepulchre, in which, alas! he reposes too early for us, although not prematurely as to the admeasurement of human life! Had his principles been generally licentious, their tendency would have been their antidote. We might have left them to their own fermentation, and the poison would have floated upon the surface. Had they professedly, like some other modern systems, set at defiance the decencies and the habitudes of life; had they openly struck at the existence and the weal of society; had they commenced with questioning all that was venerable for antiquity, sublime in sentiment, powerful in the concurrent suffrages of mankind, -tried by a long and universal experience-they would have presented themselves in such a questionable shape, that virtue and truth would have stood upon their guard; and although "the lover of change" might have hailed whatever innovation upon established customs the imagination might propose, philosophy, so warned, would have subjected the unknown elements presented to her to the test of experiment, and have learned the effect of their combination before she would venture to pronounce upon their character, or to adopt them as her own. But when Paley's good and enlightened mind submitted a proposition, it was admitted without suspicion, almost without examination. The general accuracy of his reasoning, the unquestionable purity of his mind, the evident tendency of his labours, the comprehensive character of his powers, all recommended whatever sentiments he might advance; we were secure as to his motive; we were satisfied as to his abilities; we knew his great principle of founding morals upon religion and revelation. I submit, that, upon these grounds-to him so honourable, and at the same time so just-his errors become of correspondent importance. When it is remembered that his treatise on "Moral and Political Philosophy" is the standard work on ethics used in our English universities; when it is observed that his principle of expediency, so false in itself, and so dangerous in its consequences, pervades that otherwise beautiful system; that it is so attractively stated, so ably supported, and so judiciously blended with sentiments the most elevated and the most just; not assuredly because the writer intended to deceive, but because he was himself convinced of the accuracy of the basis, because he did not calculate the results to which, if pursued to its consequences, it must lead, because he did not imagine the abuses which would arise out of it, nor could possibly foresee how dangerous a weapon it would become in

the hands of men whose interest it is to subvert all morals; when the character of Dr. Paley, his celebrity, the influence which his opinions must have, the construction of which they are capable, are all taken into the account, it becomes a paramount duty, without forgetting, even for a moment, what is due to such a man, to point out whatever is inconsistent as to principle or dangerous as to results; and both of these appear to me to be censurable in his celebrated doctrine of expediency.

It will be necessary to state the principle as he lays it down, and to add the rules by which he is willing it should be applied, that we may neither misapprehend nor misrepresent his meaning. The principle is nakedly-that whatever is expedient, is right, (vol. 1. p. 70). Such a proposition assumes something of merit from its apparent simplicity; but he was too correct a reasoner not to be aware that this principle, as it must be made to bear upon all moral points, must be rendered capable of an infinity of application. Among the circumstances that would necessarily arise, some, which were individual, might militate against the ultimate harmony and advantage of the whole. Accordingly he proceeds to guard this general principle, and to establish a standard for its application. That which he pronounces right, "must," he says," be expedient upon the whole, at the long run; in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way, or at what distance, they ensue :" (vol. 1. p. 78). He further affirms, that he intends this rule to apply to all possible cases, and in effect to make it the basis of morals. "It is," said he, "the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it:" (vol. I. p. 70.) Having seen the principle, and listened to the exposition of its proper application, and ascertained that it is presented alone, and offered as the grand rule of morality, it can be only necessary to ask further, who is to be the judge in its practical employment? To this momentous inquiry Dr. Paley answers, "Every man for himself:" (vol. 11. p. 142.) He foresees, indeed, the danger of error and abuse," maintains that every rule is liable to the same or greater, and settles the appeal at once by establishing, that this, in common with every other moral rule which has been, or "can be propounded on the subject," "must in the application depend upon private judgment:" (vol. 11. p. 143.) This is the principle defined, guarded, enforced, and applied, by this great writer, to all possible moral subjects, private, social, or public. We need not look further, the detail is complete; the sentiments are conveyed in no doubtful terms;

and we are in possession of the principle, with all its series of effects and consequences lying before us. It ought, however, to be premised, that the defence of it, which Dr. Paley sets up, and the consideration which probably seduced him into the adoption of it, is the very plausible (and even in itself pious) argument, that God proposes the universal good for his object. "God Almighty," he argues, "wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and consequently, those actions which promote that will and wish must be agreeable to him, and the contrary." This truth must be undisputed by every mind admitting the being of God: for Deity is the same with all his perfections taken together; and all his purposes regard human felicity. But will the general expediency, to which the Divinity successfully directs his providence, prove therefore a safe standard for human operation? "Have we an arm like God? or can we thunder with a voice like him?" He who takes the purposes of Deity as his own standard, ought himself to be a God: he who assumes the plans of infinite wisdom, ought himself to be infinite; he should sit upon the circle of the earth, as the sovereign disposer of events: enthroned in eternity, and unmoved by all the revolutions of time-out of the reach of accident; and, placed beyond the possibility of mistake, he should comprehend, at one glance, the past, the present, and the future, with all their dependencies, and the remotest contingency. Nothing should escape him, to the fall of a sparrow, or the numbering of a hair. In his calculations not an atom should be omitted, since any error may lead to a series of incalculable evils. Any thing overlooked, or unprovided for, may disturb the grand march of his designs to their completion, and defeat the object ultimately of general expediency. He should have the control of all circumstances, the command of all instruments, the power not merely. to pursue a plan which shall probably tend to the general benefit, but to secure it against all possible hazard. When man is possessed of such faculties, of such a grasp of intellect and power, such an infallibility of end and of means; when he has no interest of his own as possibly apart from the general weal, and is no more liable to error or caprice,—we may trust him with expediency as the principle of his moral operations; in other words, when he is God, we may ascribe to him the same rules which regulate the Divine conduct. In the meanwhile, it is palpably untenable to make the standard of Deity the basis of morals to man, while he is wholly destitute of those attributes and of that power which constitute all the fitness and infallibly work out all the designs of Providence. This, which is the principal argument for the doctrine of expediency, is so inconclusive in it

self, and so inadmissible in its application, that the system founded upon it yields with the reasoning adopted, the structure trembles over a foundation so insecure: but we must not so dismiss the subject. It is not enough to prove the argument by which he defended his hypothesis, unequal to its support; it will be proper to look into the principle itself, and to show that it is false, pernicious, and impracticable.

If the principle be considered in its simplicity, and its simplicity is assumed to be its recommendation, it is impracticable; for it supposes, in order that we may decide upon what is expedient or the contrary, that we can trace with precision the relations of cause and effect, not merely in their more obvious alliances, but to their remotest dependencies,not in their simple forms only, but in all the complexities of their intricate, attenuated, and subtile combinations, through all the diversified shapes which they may wear,-not as applying to immediate and general principles, but as embracing the whole chain of possibilities to the most minute and apparently independent link,-not as confined to the present moment, but as extending through all future time. Unless this can be done, how shall the individual decide whether his action be expedient or not? In the very circumstance which he has overlooked, or does not know, may consist its inexpediency, and the rule laid down will then be violated in the very pursuit of it. There may be, there unquestionably is, an intelligence capable of grasping this mighty calculation, -whose wisdom and goodness pervading all the forms of created being, present themselves to our view, and. awaken our devotion at all times and in all places; to him this rule applies, and by it his dispensations must be measured; but man is not such an intelligence.

It will be doubtless maintained, that this rule, laid down as the basis of human morals, is only intended to be applied generally; and that man is to act, not according to his knowledge of the certain consequences of his actions, which cannot be ascertained with precision, but according to their probable results. The rule is, on this supposition, false; it affects to be simple, when in application it becomes the most complicated that can be imagined: it assumes to be fixed and determinate, when in fact it fluctuates with all circumstances, with the different persons by whom it is adopted, and with the same individual at various periods of his life, as his opinions alter, or as his situation and interests change. Every man will have his own standard of calculation relative to the moral qualities of actions; and these standards will be as various as there are existing individuals; and, if

circumstances induce a change of opinion, his rule, instead of being immutable as truth demands, must fluctuate with his opinion; for he alone is the judge, and for himself, of what is expedient. Granting that he is the best judge in his own case, while he is aiming to secure his individual interest, is he as capable of deciding upon the line of conduct which will tend most effectually to general utility? While he is pursuing the part, will he have leisure or inclination to secure the whole? Society will present the spectacle of innumerable individuals, all professing to stand towards each other in moral relations, acting upon an expediency of which they are separately the judges, each also having an interest of his own, which it will of course appear to him most expedient first to secure; and the result will, in effect, whatever may be the avowal, be wrought out from such materials as may remain to the whole, when each has laboured to secure himself by those various methods of operation, which will be as diversified as there are actors upon the busy stage of human life.

The principle is most pernicious when it is brought into action, and applied to moral obligations. A rule which rests on individual opinion must be subject to individual caprice. His very constitutional tendencies will prescribe to his moral standard. If the question be, What is good for man? The slothful would recommend an inglorious ease,--the enterprising, a dangerous and destructive activity: yet the expediency of these opposite qualities, in connexion with human happiness, would be undoubted by either party; and who is to decide between them when the rule is not right, but expediency?-and when each is to determine absolutely for himself? These again, being men, and liable to change, may alter their opinions at any moment, and with them the whole system of their morals must be revolutionized. We have not only opinion against opinion, in the multiplied combinations of society, but we have the opinion of the man against himself, at various periods of his existence. The balance is perpetually vibrating, as we pass the weights from scale to scale in our moral calculations: nothing is decided, and nothing can be fixed. Numa prescribed civilization, on the basis of expediency to the uncultivated Romans; Rousseau recommended to enlightened France, on the same plea, a return to barbarism. Facts soon decided which plan was the most beneficial in effect; but in speculation they appealed to the same principle, were tried by the same rule, and maintained with a plausibility the one not inferior to the other. What must we think of a rule which, in different lands, could lead to such opposite results? Whatever else it may be named, it is, in point of fact, no rule; and what a