Jenkins v. Charleston. to be trammeled and incumbered with so many exceptions, that the principle upon which its very existence depends is not only affected but destroyed. Personal property of a visible and tangible kind is taxed where it is found, without regard to the residence of the owner, and his domicile in one State will not so affect the possession of property beyond it as to subject it to taxation by the State in which he resides. If the rule contended for is without restriction, then the right to tax would be regulated, not by the actual situs of such personal property, but by the domicile of the owner. Mr. Story, in his 'Conflict of Laws, § 380, referring to the principle, says that "Lord LOUGHBOROUGH has stated it with great clearness and force in one of his most elaborate judgments."- Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 690. "It is a clear proposition," said he, "not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, both with respect to the disposition of it, and with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession or by the act of the party." He evidently here restricts the rule to the disposition and transmission of such property. Chancellor KENT, in the first volume of his Commentaries, p. 406, refers to the rule as a "fiction of law," and says: "It may now be considered as part of the settled jurisprudence of this country, that personal property, as against creditors, has locality, and the lex loci rei sito prevails over the law of the domicile with regard to the rules of preference in the case of insolvent estates." So, too, in regard to attachment laws, or any proceeding by which the court, not having jurisdiction of the person, obtains control of the property by its process against it, and makes it amenable to its judgment, thus acting on the party through his property, wherever the latter may be found, without respect to his domicile. Mr. Story, in the same work first referred to, § 550, himself says: "The general doctrine is not controverted, that although movables are, for many purposes, to be deemed to have no situs except that of the domicile of the owner, yet this being but a legal fiction, it yields whenever it is necessary, for the purposes of justice, that the actual situs of the thing should be examined." Does it consist with our idea of the justice which should govern the daily transactions of men, that the State which protects the property Jenkins v. Charleston. that, by its proper and discreet arrangement, gives it additional value, should not receive the consideration for these results in contribution to its expenses, while the State which affords it no protection and adds nothing to its value, should control it through the mere domicile of the holder? If it cannot do this as to visible property, on what principle can the right be claimed as to stock, because it is a thing incorporeal. The chose has value, as well as the visible property. While the use of the latter may yield its possessor income, the stock does the same thing, and in the very place where it was issued. In Hoyt v. The Courts, 23 N. Y. 228, in the opinion of the court, by LEMSTOCK, C. J., it is said: "These and other illustrations, which are mentioned, demonstrate that the fiction or maxim mobilia personam sequuntur is by no means of universal application. Like other fictions, it has its special uses. It may be resorted to when convenience and justice so require. In other circumstances, the truth, and not the fiction, affords, as it plainly ought to afford, the rule of action * ; accordingly there seems to be no place for the fiction of which we are speaking in a well-adjusted system of taxation.” In Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, it was held that "the fiction of law, that the domicile of the owner drew to it his personal estate, wherever it may happen to be, yields, whenever, for the purposes of justice, the actual situs of the property should be examined." The case of Cleveland, Painesville and Ashtabula R. R. Co. v. rennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, is much relied on by the appellants, but we do not think that the ruling there can sustain the proposition on which the cases here depend. There the question presented, as the opening remarks of the opinion admits, "applies to the interest or bonds of the railroad company, made payable out of the State, issued to and held by non-residents of the State, citizens of other States." The stock involved here was issued by the city of Charleston, payable and transferable there, and there alone can renewals of certificates, in case of loss, be obtained. The opinion in the case just referred to admits that the situs of public securities does not depend on the domicile of the owner. On page 323 it is said: "It is undoubtedly true that the actual situs of personal property, which has a visible and tangible existence, and not the domicile of its owner, will, in many cases, determine the States in Jenkins v. Chorleston. which it may be taxed. The same thing is true of public securities, consisting of State bonds and bonds of municipal bodies, etc.; but other personal property, consisting of bonds, mortgages, and debts generally, has no situs independent of the domicile of the owner." A clear and manifest distinction is here drawn between bonds of municipal corporations and those of private bodies and individuals. The title to bonds and debts generally cannot only be transferred anywhere, and legal demand of payment made on the debtor, and suit brought wherever he may be found, or, he being absent and his goods present, they may, by attachment proceeding, be subjected to their payment. But the debt of the municipal corporation is only transferable and demandable at its office, and it can only be sued in a court which has jurisdiction over territory within which its own limits are prescribed. All the qualities which demand it seem to give it a local existence, so far as its issue, transfer and payment are concerned. We are sustained in the views which have induced our conclusion by the opinion of Chief Justice WAITE, in the case of Tappan v. Merchants' Bank of Chicago, 19 Wall. 490. He says, in the course of it, that "shares of stock in national banks are personal property. They are a species of personal property, which is, in one sense, intangible and incorporeal, but the law which creates them may separate them from the person of their owner, for the purpose of taxation, and give them a situs of their own. The shareholder is protected in his person by the government at the place where he resides, but his property in this stock is protected at the place where the bank transacts its business. If he were a partner in a private bank doing business at the same place, he might be taxed there on account of his interests in the partnership. It is not easy to see why, upon the same principle, he may not be taxed there on account of his stock in an incorporate bank. His business is there as much in the one case as in the other. He requires for it the protection of the government there, and it seems reasonable that he should be compelled to contribute there to the expenses of maintaining that government. It certainly cannot be an abuse of legislative discretion to require him to do so." Objection has not been urged, in the argument, as to the particular mode provided by the ordinance for the collection of the tax. Jenkins v. Charleston. If the party was liable to the tax it worked no injury to him. Re30rt to summary proceedings at variance with the general spirit of our laws has been allowed against delinquent tax payers, and has been permitted very much by the necessity of the occasion, which requires energy and promptness in collecting the public dues of that character. State v. Allen, 2 McC. 59; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 28. A resident of the city might convert his whole estate into such stock, and the corporation left without remedy for the tax assessed upon it, unless it could be deducted from the interest payable to the holder. A non-resident holder of such stock could be reached for the tax in no other way. All the cases involve the same questions, and the motion in each is dismissed. WILLARD, J., dissented. VOL. XXII.—4 Motion dismissed. CASES D THE COURT OF APPEALS MARYLAND. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, appellant, v. WILKENS. (44 Md. 11.) Common carrier — bill of lading — fraudulent issue of, by agent The station agent of a railroad company, having authority to sign bills of lading, fraudulently signed and issued a bill of lading for goods never received for transportation, and the consignee therein made advances on the faith of such bill. Held, that the railroad company was not liable therefor. A CTION for money by Wilkens, as surviving partner of the firm of Benninghaus & Co. The opinion states the case. The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff on an agreed statement of the facts, and the defendant appealed. John K. Cowen, for appellant. A bill of lading signed by the agent of the carrier, when the goods have not been received for shipment, does not bind the carrier; the agent's act is outside of the scope of his authority, and the owner of the line of transportation is not responsible for the act of his agent, which causes an appearance of conformity to his authority. See Grant v. Norway, 2 Eng. Law & Eq. 337; Hubbersty v. Ward, 8 Exch. 330; Sears et al. v. Wingate et al., 3 Allen, 103; Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. 191; The Loon, 7 Blatchf. C. C. 244; Fellows v. Steamer Powell and Owners, 16 La. Ann. 316; 1 Parsons' Maritime Law, 135, note 2; Redfield on Carriers and Bailments, § 263; Story on Agency (6th ed.), § 451; Angell on Carriers, § 223; 1 Parsons on Contracts (5th ed.), 45; Coleman v. Riches, |