importance than the recovery of damages, and an advantage which could not be so well obtained by other means; and though, as already observed, this mode of relief be but incidental to the main end, yet its evident convenience furnishes a strong reason for relaxing somewhat of usual strictness for the sake of extending it.

The consideration of the plaintiff's loss, therefore, affords two subjects for inquiry:

1st, In what cases and upon what grounds does the law presume a Loss to the plaintiff from the slander?

2dly, Where a specific loss must be proved, how must such specific loss be connected with the slander?

1st, In what cases and upon what grounds does the law presume a loss to the plaintiff from the slander?

The general distinction of law as to the necessity of shewing special damage in such cases is, that "where the natural consequence of the words is a damage; as if they import a charge of having been guilty of a crime, or of having a contagious distemper, or if they are prejudicial to a person in an office, or to a person of a profession or trade, they are in themselves actionable; in other cases, the party who brings an action for words, must shew the damage which he has received from them","

6 Bac. Ab. 205.

From the books, it appears, that ar actions may

have been maintained without proof of special damage in the following cases.

Where a person is charged with the commission of a crime.

Where an infectious disorder is imputed,

Where the imputation affects him in his office, profession, or business.

Where the matter charged tends to the party's disinherison, or affects his title to land.

Where the slander is propagated by printing, writing, or signs.

In cases of scandalum magnatum.

It will be considered, under each of these divisions, by what rules the extent of the action in each case is limited, and the reasons upon which they are founded.'

1st. Where a person is charged with the commis. sion of a crime.

Here it may be considered,

1st. What must be the nature of the offence imputed.

2dly. In what manner and terms it must be imputed.

1st. What must be the nature of the offence imputed.

The action for scandalous words, though of high antiquity, was formerly so little resorted to, that between the first and fifth years of the reign of Ed

ward the third, not more than three instances occurred*.

From the commencement however of the reign of Elizabeth, such actions, especially for words containing an imputation of crime, began to multiply with great rapidity, a circumstance chiefly attributable to the increasing encouragement which they met with in our courts. No settled rule ascertaining their limits, seems however to have been established at any early period, and the host of conflicting decisions to be met with in the books, exhibit convincing marks of the precarious and fluctuating principles on which they were grounded.

A struggle between two opposite inconveniences, seems to have created this wavering in the minds of the judges. The fear of encouraging a spirit of idle and vexatious † litigation, by affording too great a facility to this species of action, was contrasted with the mischief resulting to the public peace from refusing legal redress to the party whose reputation had been slandered, every day's experience teaching, that the remedy, denied by our courts, would most surely be sought after by acts of personal violence. Accordingly it appears, that as the former or latter of these considerations preponderated, a more rigid or relaxed rule of decision was adopted by the judges.

According to Coke, C. J. 3 Bulst. 167.

† 6 Mod. 24.

Out of 200 successive cases, taken at random n Croke's

In Edward's case*, the defendant had charged the plaintiff with having attempted to burn the defendant's house; and the court were of opinion, that the charge was actionable, assigning, generally, as the reason, that "by such speech the plaintiff's good name is impaired."

In Stanhope v. Blitht, the words were" M. Stanhope hath but one manor, and that he hath gotten by swearing and forswearing;" and Wray, C. J. said, "that though slanders and false imputations are to be suppressed, because many times a verbis ad verbera perventum est;" yet he said, "that the judges had resolved, that actions for scandals should not be maintained by any strained construction or argument, nor any favour given to support them; forasmuch as in these days they more abound than in times past, and the intemperance and malice of men increase, et malitiis hominum est obviandum: and in our books actiones pro scandalis sunt rarissime; and such as are brought are for words of eminent slanders and of great import." In Smale v. Hammon‡, the words were, "thou

Reports of cases in the reign of Elizabeth, 15 consist of actions for words, a proportion somewhat greater than that of one in fourteen. If, upon the average, it be supposed that each individual case of the two classes occupied the same time, it will follow, that one day out of every fourteen, must have been devoted by the court to this unprofitable species of discussion. * Cro. Eliz. 6.

† 4 Co. 15.

1 Bulst, 40.

wert forsworn, and I can prove it." Upon motion in arrest of judgment, Williams, J. said, "this rule is to be observed as touching words, which are actionable; that is to say, where the words spoken do tend to the infamy, discredit, or disgrace of the party, there the words shall be actionable." And the rule was affirmed by the court.

Yet so little was this rule regarded, that in the very next case which occurred, where the words were "thou wert in gaol for robbing such an one on the highway," the court differed in opinion; and Fenner, J. held, that if one saith of another, "thou art as very a thief as any in Warwick gaol," none being then in prison, the words would not be actionable, but otherwise had a felon been there at the time.

In Sir Harbert Crofts v. Brownt, the words were, "Sir H. C. keepeth men to rob me." And upon giving judgment for the defendant, Coke, C. J. said, "We will not give more favour unto actions on the case for words, than of necessity we ought to do, where the words are not apparently scandalous, these actions being now too frequent."

In the early part of the reign of queen Anne, Chief Justice Holt‡ observed, that "it was not worth while to be learned on the subject, but when

* Bulst. 40.

† 3 Bulst. 167.

Baker v. Pierce, Holt, k. 654. 6 Mod. 24. Ș, C.