of action arose in that county, and not elsewhere in this kingdom

And in the case of Freeman v. Norris †, the distinction was recognized between libels dispersed throughout the kingdom and those which are published in one county only.

So that, where the libel is printed in one county and published in a second, the venue, if laid in the second, cannot be changed; for the publication in the latter county, is the act of the defendant, and he cannot make the usual affidavit.

But the court will otherwise change the venue where special ground is laid.

As if the defendant cannot have a fair trial in the original county.

But in an action for scandalum magnatum, it seems the venue cannot be changed upon the usual affidavit; and the reason assigned is, that the scandal raised of a peer of the realm reflects upon him throughout the kingdom §.

In the case of Lord Shaftesbury above alluded to, the venue was changed on the ground that the defendant could not have a fair trial in London where the venue was laid.

In the Marquis of Dorchester's case ||, on a mo

tion to change the venue, which had been laid in London, Pemberton, Serj. shewed cause against the motion.

1st. Because the king was a party to the suit; for it is,

2dly. Because the plaintiff was a lord of parlia ment, where his services would be required. North, C. J. was of opinion that the venue could not be changed, since the proceeding was in the nature of an information. But Atkins, J. inclined to think that the venue might be changed; but the court not agreeing, the defendant consented that the cause should be tried in London, and the venue was not changed.

But it seems that generally, unless special ground be laid for changing it, the plaintiff in scandalum magnatum may retain his venue*.

Formerly, in actions for slander as well as in others, where a local justification was pleaded, the courts observed great nicety in requiring the venue to be awarded, not only from the county, but the very place in which the justification, as stated in the plea, arose. The reasons for this were, indeed, frequently stronger in these actions than in other instances, since where the truth of a criminal charge is pleaded in justification, the issue partakes of the nature of a criminal process; and it is said, that

* Duke of Norfolk v. Alderton, 2 Salk. 668. 1 Lev. 56.307. 1 Vent. 364.

upon its being found against the plaintiff, he is liable to be tried by a petty jury without further inquest.

In the case of Ford v. Brooke *, which was an action for calling the plaintiff a perjured person at D. in Essex; the defendant justified, averring that the defendant had perjured himself at Westminster, in the county of Middlesex; the plaintiff replied, de injuriu, &c. and the court awarded the venire to be directed to the sheriff of Middlesex..

So, in an action for calling the plaintiff a thief, at Dale. in Essex, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had committed a robbery at Sale, in the same county; and issue being joined upon that fact, the court awarded the venire from Sale †. And a misdirection of the venire was a good ground for arresting or setting aside the judgment, though the court would, in such case, award a new venire. But the law upon this point is altered by the statutes 16, & 17. C. 2. c. 8. and 4 Ann, c. 16.. s. 6.; the former of which enacts, that after verdict, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed, for that there is no right venue, so as the cause of action were tried by a jury of the proper county or place where the action was laid and the latter directs that the venire shall be awarded

Cro. Eliz. 261.

+ Clerk v. James, Cro. Eliz. 870. See also Bowyer's case, Cro. Eliz.

out of the body of the county where such issue is triable*.

In Craft v. Boitet, the words were, "Look, there is a thievish young rogue, he hath stolen £200 worth of plate out of Wadham College," (meaning Wadham College, in the university of Oxford.) The plaintiff brought his action in London; the defendant justified the words, because he said that the plaintiff at Oxford, in the county of Oxford, stole certain plate out of Wadham College; the plaintiff pleaded de injuria, &c.; and the issue was tried in London, where the plaintiff had a verdict with £50 damages,

Saunders, for the plaintiff, moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground of the mistrial, but the court (against the opinion of Twisden) conceived that the fault was cured by the statute which And this, which appears to

had lately passed ‡.

be the first decision under the act, has since been acquiesced in.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of the Parties.

PARTIES. First, as to the number of plaintiffs. In this species of action, as well as in other cases of tort, two or more may join where their joint interest has been affected by the act of the defendant*. So that, where a libel reflects upon two partners in their trade, they may join in the action t. But unless a joint interest be affected, several actions should be brought, though the same words be spoken or libel published concerning two. As, where A. says to B. and C., "You have murdered D.," B. and C. must bring several, and not joint actions. So it seems, that two joint-tenants or coparceners may join in action of slander of their title to the estate: for, as it must be shewn in the declaration, and proved, that the plaintiffs received some particular damage by reason of the slander, the damage, even as well as their interest in the estate, is joint §.

So, for the words A. or B. murdered D., either

* Weller v. Baker, 2 Wils. 423. 2 Williams's Saund. 116.

a. n. 2.

↑ Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 425.

Cook v. Batchelor, Shepp. Ac. 53.

3 Bos. and Pull. 150.

Cro. Car. 512. 28 H. 8. fol. 19. Dyer, Shepp. Ac. 53. Deacon's case.

§ 2 Will. Saund. 117. a,