Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate telephone companies, and it was empowered to suspend advances in rates. Handling and Slaughtering Animals When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce. Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S. 398. The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange is conducted by a board of directors at the Kansas City Stock Yards, which are situated partly in Missouri and partly in Kansas; substantially all of the business tranacted in the matter of receiving, buying, selling, and hadling their live stock at Kansas City is carried on by the members of the exchange as commission merchants, and large amounts of live stock are shipped from other States; when this stock is received at the stock yards it is sold by the members of the exchange to the various packing houses in Kansas City, Mo., and Kansas City, Kans., and it is also sold for shipment to various other markets in other States. It was held that the business thus conducted is not interstate commerce. Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578, wherein the court said that there is a distinction between a regulation which directly affects and embarrasses interstate trade or commerce and one which is nothing more than a charge for a local facility provided for the transaction of such commerce. See Anderson v. U. S., 171 U. S. 604. Manufacture and Sale of Goods In general. Where the contract is for the sale of the article and for its delivery in another State the transaction is one of interstate commerce, although the vendor may have also agreed to manufacture it in order to fulfil his contract of sale. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S. (175 U. S. 246), in which case the court said: It is almost needless to add that we do not hold that every private enterprise which may be carried on chiefly or in part by means of interstate shipments is therefore to be regarded as so related to interstate commerce as to come within the regulating power of Congress. Such enterprises may be of the same nature as the manufacturing of refined sugar in the Knight case (156 U. S. 1)—that is, the parties may be engaged as manufacturers of a commodity which they thereafter intend at some time to sell, and possibly to sell in another State; but such sale we have already held is an incident to and not the direct result of the manufacture, and so is not a regulation of, or an illegal interference with, interstate commerce. See also Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate The sale of coal f. o. b. cars at the mine, the cars when loaded to be promptly forwarded to purchasers in other States, is inter state commerce. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sonman, etc., Co., 242 U. S. 120. A shipment of merchandise C. O. D. from one State into another constitutes interstate commerce, as the right of parties to make a contract in another State than that of the residence of the purchaser, for the sale and purchase of merchandise, and in doing so to fix by agreement the time when, and the condition on which, the completed title should pass, is beyond question. American Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 143. Adams Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147. Delivery by agent after breaking bulk.-The soliciting of orders by an agent of a nonresident principal, to be filled by putting up the objects of the several orders in distinct packages and forwarding them to the agent for delivery, each package being labeled for the customer, except that in the case of one class of goods, brooms, they were tagged and marked like the other articles, according to the number ordered, but then tied together into bundles of about a dozen, and wrapped up conveniently for shipment, is interstate commerce, and a municipal ordinance imposing a license fee for engaging in such business is void. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507. Transactions between manufacturing companies in one State, through agents, with citizens of another, constitute a large part of interstate commerce. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 632. Leases. When an act of Congress refers specifically to leases of chattels as well as to their sale in interstate commerce, whatever doubt there may be as to the validity of the statute will be resolved in favor of sustaining the exercise of the power of Congress over such subjects. When a corporation with millions of capital, doing an annual business amounting to millions of dollars, sees proper to conduct its business by only leasing its chattels, instead of selling them, it is as much engaged in commerce as if it sold them outright. U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Co. 234 Fed. 127. Subjects of Regulation by Congress In general. The commerce power embraces all instruments by which commerce may be carried on, and all the immediate vehicles and agents for all purposes, as well as the articles carried, and negotiations leading up to interstate and foreign commerce. The powers of Congress are not confined to instrumentalities known when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate with and adapt themselves to new developments, and what is an article of commerce is to be determined by usages of the commercial world. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 280. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 204. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 24. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 646. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union, 96 U. S. 9. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 581. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 501. Persons.-Persons are subject to the commerce power when they conduct commerce or are employed by others who conduct it or when they are carried as passengers. So Congress may prescribe rules for the government of pilots and fix their qualifications. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 316. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 282 (overruling New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 136, on this point). Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 40. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 269. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 516. People v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 60. Railroads and express companies.1-In general.-Carriers engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce are subject to the regulation of Congress in so far as they are engaged in interstate commerce, and to the regulation of the States so far as they are engaged in intrastate commerce. A contract by a railroad to furnish cars on a certain day for interstate transportation as common carrier, is void if not provided for in the published tariffs. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U. S. 560. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Larabee, 211 U. S. 612. Construction of railroads.-Under the power given by this clause, Congress has the right to authorize the construction of railroads and terminal facilities. California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 39. Railroad Comm. v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331. Right of way. In exercising the power of eminent domain, Congress has a right to grant railroad right of way through lands owned by an Indian nation where the road will have relation to interstate commerce. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641. Stocks and bonds.-Federal act requiring carrier to obtain permission before issuing stocks and bonds held not to deny due process. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. v. I. C. C., 293 Fed. 1001. Rolling stock.-An early conception of right-of-way railroads was that the corporation should provide only motive power and See also "Exclusive powers of Congress," p. 92. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate that cars should be provided by individual users of the road. Under such a scheme, the engines-while individually in and of themselves chattels-would, while in use, savor of realty, like trade fixtures, and would be, pro tanto, within principles applicable to the real estate plant. The scheme proved to be impracticable, as a general scheme, and gave way, in general, to the plan of ownership by the railroad corporation, of cars, as well as engines, and other rolling stock. Lake Superior, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 93 U. S. 442. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S. 667. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453. For instances of arbitrary and unreasonable (and therefore void) State requirement of furnishing freight cars, see: Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136. Distribution of coal cars.-A rule fixing the number of cars distributable to coal mines in proportion to the daily capacity of each to produce, held not arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of due process as applied to mines served by more than one carrier. United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533. Coal cars owned by an interstate carrier in which it receives from the tipple of the coal mines along its line purchased by it and used solely for its own fuel purposes, come within the instrumentalities by which commerce is carried on. I. C. C. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452. State railroad engaging in interstate commerce.-When a State railroad corporation voluntarily engages as a common carrier in interstate commerce by making an arrangement for a continuous carriage of shipment of goods it is subjected, so far as such traffic is concerned, to the regulating power of Congress; likewise, a railroad company which has become a link in a through line of road over which, as part of its business, freight and passengers are carried into and out of the State is engaged in interstate commerce. I. C. C. v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 642. Regulation of rates—(a) In general.-Congress may legislate in respect to interstate commerce to the same extent both as to rates and all other matters of regulation as the States may do in respect to purely local or internal commerce, and therefore State requirements as to rates for interstate commerce are not operative. In the absence of congressional action, however, minor State regulation is permissible. Kentucky, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 634. Hanley v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 187 U. S. 617. Railroad Company v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate (b) Long and short haul.-The long and short haul provision of the act to regulate commerce held valid. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 43. The long and short haul provision of the interstate commerce act (sec. 4) is violated, and the carrier incurs, prima facie at least, the penalties prescribed by section 10 by publishing, without authority from the commission, a rate for a longer haul lower than that scheduled for a shorter haul of the same kind of property over the same line or route in the same direction. Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403. (c) Abrogating passes granted for life.-That provision of the act to regulate commerce providing that no carrier should issue or give any interstate free ticket is not invalid as applied to the case of an agreement made many years previously to issue free passes for life in compromise of a claim for damages for injuries. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467. (d) Obtaining transportation at less than published rates.— The Elkins Act is not invalid in authorizing the prosecution of a shipper for securing transportation of goods in interstate commerce at less than the carrier's published rates within any district through which the transportation may have been conducted. Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56. No contract of a carrier can reduce the amount of charges legally payable to it under its tariff for an interstate shipment, or release from liability a shipper who has assumed their payment; nor can any act or omission of the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by the person liable. L. & N. R. R. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S. 59. For the purpose of securing the reduced rates for transportation of its property over land-grant railroads, the Government purchased goods for prices f. o. b. at place of shipment, paid the freight, and had shipment made by the sellers with Government bills of lading. Held, that title passed at place of shipment, although the contracts of sale reserved to the Government the right of inspection and rejection at the place of destination and imposed certain duties there upon the sellers, and that goods so transported, and accepted by the Government, were entitled to the reduced rates of transportation. Illinois Central R. R. v. U. S., 265 U. S. 209. (e) Connecting carriers.-Provisions of interstate commerce act, regulating liability of connecting carrier, is a valid regulation of interstate commerce. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. I. C. C. v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 633. |