Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334. U. S. v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 157 Fed. 321 (writ of certiorari denied, Barrett v. City of New York, 183 Fed. 793. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114. (f) Incidental control of intrastate rates.-Congress is entitled to keep the highways of interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms. That an unjust discrimination in the rates of a common carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored as against another under substantially similar conditions of traffic, constitutes an evil is undeniable; and where this evil consists in the action of an interstate carrier in unreasonably discriminating against interstate traffic over its line, the authority of Congress to prevent it is equally clear. It is immaterial, so far as the protecting power of Congress is concerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates. The use of the instrument of interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground for Federal intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of State authority alter the matter, where Congress has acted, for a State may not authorize the carrier to do that which Congress is entitled to forbid and has forbidden. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204. (g) Prohibiting combinations between competing roads.-Congress, in the exercise of its right to regulate interstate commerce, has the power to prohibit, as in restraint of interstate commerce, a contract or combination between competing railroads entered into for the purpose of establishing and maintaining interstate rates and fares for transportation on any of the roads parties to the contract or combination, even though the rates and fares thus established are reasonable. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505. (h) Express rates.-The so-called uniform zone or block system of express rates in interstate transportation, established by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which prohibits charging higher interstate rates than intrastate rates, and which may be complied with by reducing the interstate rates to the local scale, or by raising the local rates to the interstate scale, or by reducing one and raising the other until equality is reached in an intermediate scale, must be observed. American Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617. Section 15, paragraph 4, of the amended interstate commerce act provided that, in establishing any through route, the commission shall not "require any carrier by railroad, without its Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route, unless such inclusion of lines would make the through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established." Held, that an express company is not a "carrier by railroad" within the meaning of the paragraph. U. S. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U. S. 427. Prohibiting transportation of commodities produced by carrier.-So-called commodities clause of the act to regulate commerce (act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584) held to be within the power of Congress under this clause. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Safety appliance acts.-The acts of Congress known as the safety appliance acts were within the power of Congress to enact as applied to vehicles used on any railroad that is a highway of interstate traffic and are not confined to vehicles engaged in such traffic. Southern R. Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20. U. S. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 153 Fed. 918. Congress had the power to adopt the provisions of the safety appliance acts making a railroad whose right of way is used for the transportation of interstate traffic liable to an employee not engaged in interstate commerce for defects in appliances. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33. Liability for loss or injury to property.—The power of Congress comprehends power to regulate contracts between the shipper and the carrier by defining the liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage to such property. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 226 U. S. 513. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Owen & Co., 256 U. S. 427. See also Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. 693 (as to power of States). "Carmack amendment" making initial carrier liable for loss or injury.—The provisions of the so-called Carmack amendment to the act to regulate commerce (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595), the effect of which is to hold the initial carrier as having contracted for through carriage to destination and liable 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-12 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate to the shipper for loss or injury to property on a connecting line, held valid. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319. The first "Cummins Amendment " (March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196) made the carrier liable for the full actual loss of property shipped, when caused by the carrier, regardless of any agreement or representation of the shipper. Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U. S. 265. Liability for injury or death of employees.—A freight conductor on a round-trip run between State points held not engaged in interstate commerce within employers' liability act, while on a train on his return trip, devoted solely to domestic commerce, because his train on the trip out carried interstate freight. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Peery, 242 U. S. 292. A night watchman, injured while guarding tools and material for the erection of a depot, held not engaged in interstate commerce, though such depot was intended to be used in interstate commerce. New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. Member of crew switching loaded cars from storage track to coal shed was not engaged in interstate commerce, although coal was to be used by locomotives in interstate haul. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177. Fireman on switching engine, killed while his engine was transferring an empty car, was employed in interstate commerce if the movement was for purpose of reaching an interstate car. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 13. In Reed v. Director General (258 U. S. 92), the court held that in actions under the employers' liability act the doctrine of assumption of risk has no application when the negligence of a fellow servant which the injured party could not have foreseen is the sole, direct, and immediate cause of the injury. See also Erie R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U. S. 183. Southern R. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571. In North Carolina R. Co. v. Lee (260 U. S. 16) it was held that a lessor railroad was not liable for death of employee during Federal control. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate Qualifications and duties of employees.-Congress may legislate as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employees and others on railway trains engaged in interstate commerce, and such legislation will supersede any State action on the subject. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 99. Hours of service of employees.-The so-called hours-of-service act is not invalid as applied to those who are engaged in both interstate and intrastate service; that is, as to all employees connected with the movement of trains in interstate transportation, but intrastate railroads and employees engaged in purely and wholly local business are not affected by its provisions. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. Railroad Labor Board.-Transportation act 1920, authorizing the Labor Board to ascertain just and reasonable wages and working conditions does not violate right of private contract, or take property without due process. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 282 Fed. 693. Uniform system of accounting.-Act of Congress of June 29, 1906, authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the entire system of bookkeeping of interstate carriers, including its intrastate accounts, held valid. I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194. Valuation of property.-Under section 19a of the act to regulate commerce, directing the commission to investigate, ascertain, and report the value of the properties of common carriers, and to hear the protests of any carrier against a valuation tentatively made; declaring a final valuation prima facie evidence of the value of the carrier's property in all proceedings under the act and in various judicial proceedings, and providing that, unless otherwise ordered by the commission, its records and data shall be open to the inspection and examination of the public, held, that an order of the commission denying inspection of records by others than its employees, unless and until offered in evidence, was valid against an interested carrier in so far as the claim to examine them might be based upon the naked ground of their being public documents. Congress may make one fact prima facie evidence of another if the inference is not so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. St. Louis Ry. v. Int. Com. Com., 264 U. S. 64. Effect of membership in labor organization.—Act of Congress of June 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 424), making it a criminal offense against the United States for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier, having full authority in the premises from the carrier, to discharge an employee from service simply because of his membership in a labor organization, can not be sustained Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate under the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and is unconstitutional. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161. Telegraph and telephone companies.-A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce and their business is commerce itself. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460. Ships and shipping.—In general.-The power to regulate commerce includes navigation as well as traffic in its ordinary signification, and embraces ships and vessels as the instruments of intercourse and trade as well as officers and seamen employed in their navigation. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 216. Street v. Shipowners' Assn., 263 U. S. 334. The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the Constitution under the regulation of Congress, and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, is therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power. When, therefore, an act of the legislature of a State prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the State law must give way; and this without regard to the source of power whence the State legislature derived its enactment. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 243 (reversing Pilotage Comrs. v. See also The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 564. The duty of an interstate carrier by water under section 1, subdivision (4), of the amended interstate commerce act, to furnish transportation upon reasonable request, does not oblige it to continue operation of boats on a particular route; and section 1, subdivision (18), of the commerce act, concerning abandonment, relates only to railroads. Lucking v. Detroit Nav. Co., 265 U. S. 347. When a vessel is engaged in interstate commerce.—It is entirely possible for a vessel to be engaged in interstate commerce although all the ports touched by her are in the same State; and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it may be inferred from the route pursued by the boat and the connection between the boat and railroads at each end of her route, that the boat is so engaged. The extent to which she is engaged in interstate commerce is immaterial. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541. The Hazel Kirke, 25 Fed. 601. The Gretna Green, 20 Fed. 901. Enrolling and licensing of vessels.-The power of Congress to require vessels to be enrolled and licensed is derived from the |