Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Wharves.-Though the use of public wharves may be regulated by Congress as a part of the commercial power, it certainly does not belong to that class of subjects which are in their nature national, requiring a single uniform rule, but to that class which are in their nature local, requiring a diversity of rules and regulations. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 702. Ferries. It is within the maritime powers of Congress to impose regulations on steam ferryboats for the protection of their passengers and crews, although they are operated wholly within a State, where they navigate waters of the United States which are common highways of commerce. The Nassau, 188 Fed. 46, reversing judgment in 182 Fed. 696; writ of error denied, City of New York v. U. S., 223 U. S. 722. Purely and solely from the standpoint of movement and transportation, interferriage is within the general Federal power over commerce. Pursuant, however, to a common-law conception and to common-law usage and practice, an exclusive right of maintenance of a ferry from and to a certain parcel of riparian land within a State may exist as an easement appurtenant to such parcel. Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196. St. Clair County v. Interstate Transfer Co., 192 U. S. 454. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317. Intoxicating liquors.-The Wilson Act extends to criminal and penal as well as to civil State enforcement of the local policy. It applies to liquors brought into a State from a foreign country as well as to liquors brought in from other States. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545. De Bary v. Louisiana, 227 U. S. 108. It does not extend to liquors bought for the purchaser's own consumption. In respect of such liquors it does not vest either power of direct local control or power of indirect State action by way of dealing with interstate transportation. Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438. Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 62. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70. It does, however, vest power of indirect dealing with liquors purchased (or to be purchased) for such use to the extent of vesting local power of inhibition (or of regulation) of local solicitation of such purchases. Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93. See same subject, pp. 314, 605, 685, 734, and 747. Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce--Interstate It does not extend to liquors while in actual interstate transit proper-i. e., interstate transit apart from the conventional extension thereof by the original-package doctrine-even where the interstate transit is by its own terms terminable in a particular State or even in the case of C. O. D. sales in which the contract of sale was made outside of a State in question and delivery there is to be made in the State of the contract of sale by the vendor to a carrier as agent of the purchaser. Likewise it does not extend to liquors merely passing through a State in the course of interstate transit. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133 (explaining O'Neil v. Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147. Heyman v. Southern R. Co., 203 U. S. 270. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. It does not affect in any way the matter of State authority over goods after interstate transportation has ceased. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17. Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501. Rosenberger v. Pacific Exp. Co., 241 U. S. 48. The Webb-Kenyon Act.-What has been said of the Wilson Act is applicable also to the Webb-Kenyon Act. It is operative only where the proposed use is violative of specific law of the consignee's State dealing with alcoholic liquors, not qualificatory in and of itself of the general interstate commerce law. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190. The Reed amendment prohibiting the transportation of liquor into any State or Territory the laws of which prohibit the manufacture or sale of the same for beverage purposes is constitutional, though construed to include the transportation of the same on the person for personal use and though transported into a State which permits the introduction of liquor for personal use in limited quantities. U. S. v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420. Williams v. U. S., 255 U. S. 336. See also Seaboard Air Line v. North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298. (Statute requiring records to be kept by carriers of intoxicating liquors.) Food and drugs.-The food and drugs act (1906), under which adulterated articles of food, the subjects of interstate commerce, may be confiscated by a proceeding in rem in the Federal courts after they have reached destination and there remain in the hands of the consignee in the original unbroken packages, held constitutional. Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45. See also Seven Cases v. U. S., 239 U. S. 510. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461. U. S. v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394. Animals.-The regulation of the transportation of cattle from State to State is within the power of Congress. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375. Anderson v. U. S., 171 U. S. 604. Imports and exports.-The power of Congress under the commerce clause protects property transported as an article of commerce from foreign countries or among the States from interfering State legislation and from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166. Birds and game.'-The provisions of the act of Congress of May 25, 1900, known as the Lacey Act, prohibiting the shipment or transportation in interstate commerce of game killed in violation of the local laws, and requiring all packages containing game shipped in interstate commerce to be plainly marked showing the name and address of the shipper and the nature of the contents, and making the violation of such provisions a criminal offense, are within the powers of Congress. Rupert v. U. S., 181 Fed. 87. The provisions of the act of Congress of March 4, 1913 deeming migratory birds to be under the protection of the United States, and authorizing the Department of Agriculture to adopt regulations prescribing closed seasons, are invalid. U. S. v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288. U. S. v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154. See also U. S. v. Samples (258 Fed. 479) and Missouri v. Holland (252 U. S. 416), wherein similar act, following treaty, was held not unconstitutional. For jurisdiction of States, see Silz v. Hesterburg, 211 U. S. 31. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519. Correspondence schools.-The business of teaching by mail has been held to be interstate commerce where the school and the students are located in different States. International, etc., Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91. International, etc., Co. v. Peterson, 218 U. S. 664. 1 See also "Protection of Migratory Birds," under Article IV, section 3, clause 2, p. 530. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Oil and gas.-Act of Congress of March 2, 1917 (sec. 29), declaring "that no person shall mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or shall knowingly sell or keep for sale, or offer for sale such mixture, or shall sell or offer for sale oil made from petroleum for illuminating purposes," and that any person so doing shall be held to be guilty of a misdemeanor, etc., was held to be a police regulation relating exclusively to the internal trade of the State, and to have effect only where the legislative authority of Congress excludes, territorially, all State legislation, as, for example, in the District of Columbia. Within State limits, it can have no constitutional operation. U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41. While the transportation of natural gas is expressly excepted from the provisions of the act to regulate commerce (sec. 1), yet there have been some cases carried to the Supreme Court of the United States in which State laws attempting to regulate the subject have been held to be unconstitutional as interfering with interstate commerce. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229. See also Haskell v. Cowham, 187 Fed. 403. Manufacturers' Light & Heat Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Kansas, etc., Gas Co., 219 Fed. 614. The business of piping natural gas from one State to another and selling it, not to consumers, but to independent distributing companies which sell it locally to the consumers, is interstate commerce free from State interference. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U. S. 23, distinguished. An attempt of a State to fix the rates chargeable in this interstate business is a direct burden on interstate commerce, even in the absence of any regulation of it by Congress. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298. Sponges. The act of Congress of June 20, 1906, making it unlawful to land, deliver, cure, or offer for sale at any port or place in the United States, any sponges taken by means of diving or diving apparatus from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of Florida, can not be applied to sponges taken from the territorial waters of a State, but must be construed as confined to sponges taken outside of such waters. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166. Transportation of women for immoral purposes.-The act of Congress of June 25, 1910, known as the white slave traffic act, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress. Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308. Harris v. U. S., 227 U. S. 340. Wilson v. U. S, 232 U. S. 563. Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Obscene publications.-The act of Congress (sec. 245 of the Penal Code) declaring it an offense knowingly to deposit with an express company an obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, for carriage from one State to another, is valid. Clark v. U. S., 211 Fed. 916. Importation of prize-fight films.-The act of Congress of July 31, 1912, prohibiting the importation and the interstate transportation of prize-fight films or pictorial representations of prize fights held valid. Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325. U. S. v. Johnston, 232 Fed. 970. Trade-marks.-Legislation respecting trade-marks, which is not confined to the case of a trade-mark used in foreign or interstate commerce, but which has the broad purpose of establishing a universal system of trade-mark registration for the benefit of all who had already used a trade-mark, or who wished to adopt one for the future, without regard to the character of the trade to which it was to be applied or the residence of the owner, is not within the power of Congress under this clause. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82. In U. S. v. Koch (40 Fed. 250), the court said: the Supreme In what are known as the Trade-mark cases Leschen Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U. S. 166. In Elgin, etc., Co. v. Illinois, etc., Co. (179 U. S. 677), the court refrained from discussing the constitutionality of the act of Congress of March 3, 1881, on affirming a decree of dismissal in 94 Fed. 667, for want of jurisdiction, the constitutional question not having been raised in the lower court. Lottery tickets. The power to prohibit the carriage of lottery tickets is included in the plenary power of Congress to regulate commerce. Lottery case, 188 U. S. 321. Reilley v. U. S. 106 Fed. 896. See also In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110; and Horner v. U. S., 147 U. S. 449, as to exclusion of lottery tickets from the mails. Embargo.-Every subject falling within the legitimate sphere of commercial regulation may be partially or wholly excluded when either measure shall be demanded by the safety or by the |