Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate important interests of the entire Nation. Such exclusion can not be limited to particular classes or descriptions of commercial subjects; it may embrace manufactures, bullion, coin, or any other thing. The power once conceded, it may operate on any and every subject of commerce to which the legislative discretion may apply it. U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 566. In Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 191), the court said: "The universally acknowledged power of the Government to impose embargoes must also be considered as showing that all America is united in that construction which comprehends navigation in the word 'commerce.' Original packages.-In McDermott v. Wisconsin (228 U. S. 136), the court said: "The doctrine of original packages had its origin in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland." (12 Wheat. 419.) In May v. New Orleans (178 U. S. 496), it was held (p. 508) that where goods were imported from foreign countries and were put up for sale in packages and a number of such packages were enclosed in boxes or cases for purposes of transportation, the box or case in which the packages were shipped, and not the packages themselves, constituted the original package. In this case four of the justices dissented from the judgement of the court. In Austin v. Tennessee (179 U. S. 343), Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, referred to the case of Brown v. Maryland, supra, as the source of the doctrine of original packages, and in the course of his opinion intimated that it was doubtful whether the decision would have been the same if the orginal package considered in that case had been minute in size instead of consisting of hogsheads and bales of dry goods, and that it was obvious that the doctrine of that case was directed only to those large packages in which, from time to time, it had been customary to import goods from foreign countries. The conclusion of the court is (p. 360) that original packages are those used in good faith in transactions carried on between the manufacturer and wholesale dealers residing in different States. But where the size of the package indicates that it was gotten up to evade the law of the State to which it is shipped, it will not be protected as an original package. Cigarettes imported in paper packages holding ten cigarettes and without being boxed but thrown loosely into baskets, the court held not to be original packages, but if there be an original package in the case, "it was the basket and not the paper box." To this decision Mr. Justice Brewer delivered a most vigorous dissent. (See p. 382.) Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate In Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100), the court held that beer in quarter barrels, one-eighth barrels, and cases of beer constituted original packages. In Cook v. Marshall County (196 U. S. 270), the court said: The term " original package" is not defined by any statute, and is simply a convenient form of expression adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, to indicate that a license tax could not be exacted of an importer of goods from a foreign country who disposes of such goods in the form in which they were imported. In In re Harmon (43 Fed. 372), an express company transported boxes containing different sized bottles, some holding a quart, and some a pint. Each bottle was wrapped in a paper wrapper, or placed in a paper box and then sealed. The bottles were then placed in wooden boxes, without a cover and packed closely together. These boxes were labeled "to be returned." It was held that the boxes and not the bottles were the original packages. In Guckenheimer v. Sellers (81 Fed. 1000), it was held "that an original package is a package delivered by the importer to the carrier at the initial point of shipment, in the exact condition in which it was shipped." See also Purity Extract, etc., Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192. Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 33. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 573. Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545. Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472. Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45. Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415. Standard, etc., Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540. Rossi v Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 62. Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506. Trusts and trade associations.-Congress did not exceed its power under the commerce clause in the enactment of the antitrust act. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505. The rules and regulations of a live-stock exchange or a board of trade are not agreements affecting interstate commerce within the meaning of the antitrust law, though some of the sales themselves may constitute interstate commerce. Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578. Chicago Board of Trade v. U. S., 246 U. S. 231. A combination of independent meat dealers, in aid of an attempt to monopolize commerce in fresh meats among the States, to restrict the competition of their respective agents when pur Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate chasing stock for them in the stockyards, is an interference with interstate commerce, forbidden by the antitrust act. Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375. The prohibitions of the antitrust act do not exceed the authority of Congress as applied to undue restraints of commerce in petroleum and its products, by contract, combination, or conspiracy, or monopolization. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1. Adair v. U. S.. 208 U. S. 161. The so-called "Open competition plan" of hardwood lumber dealers found to have the effect of restricting competition in interstate commerce by curtailing production and increasing prices, and held a combination and conspiracy in violation of the antitrust act. American Column Co. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 377 (Justices Holmes, Businesses Not Subjects of Interstate Commerce Insurance. There are some kinds of business not confined to the States which are yet not within the classification of interstate commerce and which accordingly Congress has no power to regulate. Among these is the business of insurance. It has been held that issuing a policy of fire insurance was not a transaction of commerce; neither is marine insurance, nor life insurance. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648. New York Life v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389. New York Life v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495. Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410. Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110. Equitable Life v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226. Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U. S. 367. Mutual Life v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262. . Mutual Life v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551. Northwestern Life v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234. Aetna Life v. Moore, 231 U. S. 543. Provident Sav. Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103. Northwestern Life v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132. As to an English association having the attributes of an American corporation, see: Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566. Negotiable instruments are not instruments of commerce, nor is the hiring of laborers to work beyond the State interstate commerce; nor are buying and selling futures in another State nor sending apparel outside the State to be laundered and returned interstate commerce. The business of slaughtering and packing cattle, sheep, and hogs within the State, the carcasses and prod 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-13 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate ucts of which were intended for transport and sale for human consumption in other States, is not interstate commerce. The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 369. Smith v. Jackson, 103 Tenn. 673. Manufacture. The business of manufacturing is not commerce. The court said, in Kidd v. Pearson (128 U. S. 20): No distinction is more popular to the common mind or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature than that between manufactures and commerce. Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce are different. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce; and the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the regulation at least of such transportation. The legal definition of the term, as given by this court in County of Mobile v. Kimball (102 U. S. 671, 702), is as follows: " Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities." If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only manufactures but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry. For is there one of them that does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market? The power being vested in Congress and denied to the States, it would follow as an inevitable result that the duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform, and vital interests-interests which in their nature are and must be local in all the details of their successful management. See also Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129. Manufacture of paper is not commerce though paper may become a subject of commerce. International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135. Mining. The mining of coal is not interstate commerce; and a conspiracy to obstruct mining at particular mines, though it may prevent coal from going into interstate commerce, is not a conspiracy to restrain that commerce, within the Sherman Act, unless an intention to restrain it be proved. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344. The mining of ore, even when substantially all of the ore mined is immediately and continuously loaded on cars and shipped into other States to satisfy existing contracts, is not interstate commerce and is subject to local taxation. Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate Articles made by women and children.-Watson on the Constitution (p. 523) says: Closely akin to the question of regulating manufacturing is the question hether Congress can forbid the hauling of a commodity by a carrier of interstate commerce which was manufactured in a State, for instance, by women or children under a certain age, as has recently been maintained. This question is of far-reaching effect, and if such power exists in Congress it would result in the most complete invasion of the sovereignty of the States by the General Government which has ever been accomplished under the Federal Constitution. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 20. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. In Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U. S. 251) it was held that the child labor law can not be sustained on the theory that Congress has power to control interstate commerce in the shipment of child-made goods because of the effect of such goods in States where the evil of child labor has been recognized by local legislation and the right to employ child labor has been more rigorously restrained than in the State of production. See also Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co., 259 U. S. 20, in which act imposing tax on child-labor-made goods was declared unconstitutional. Suppression of monopoly.-The argument in U. S. v. Knight Company (156 U. S. 1) was that the power to control the manufacture of refined sugar is a monopoly over a necessary of life, to the enjoyment of which by a large part of the population of the United States interstate commerce is indispensable, and that, therefore, the General Government in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce may repress such monopoly directly and set aside the instruments which have created it. But the court said: This argument can not be confined to necessaries of life merely, and must include all articles of general consumption. Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is a secondary and not the primary sense; and although the exercise of that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it. The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and is a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly. But it may operate in repression of monopoly whenever that comes within the rules by which commerce is governed or whenever the transaction is itself a monopoly of commerce. It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed. Acquisition, control, and disposition of property.-Congress certainly has not the power or authority under the commerce clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, to limit and restrict the right of corporations created by the States, or the citizens of the States, in the acquisition, control, and the dispo |