Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate sition of property. Neither can Congress regulate or prescribe the price or prices at which such property, or the products thereof, shall be sold by the owner, or owners, whether corporations or individuals. It is equally clear that Congress has no jurisdiction over, and can not make criminal, the aims, purposes, and intentions of persons in the acquisition and control of property, which the States of their residence or creation sanction and permit. In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104. Weeds v. U. S., 255 U. S. 109. Delivery on agents' orders.-The business of taking orders on commission for the purchase and sale of grain and cotton for future delivery and transmitting them to other States is not in terstate commerce. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405. Live-stock commission merchants.-A live-stock commission merchant whose place of business is at a certain stockyards in a city and who there buys and sells stock for others is not engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the antitrust statute, although the stock may have been shipped from another State, consigned to him for sale, and may be sold for shipment to another State or a foreign country. Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578. The delivery of coupons, etc., redeemable in premiums in connection with retail sales of merchandise held not interstate commerce, though coupons are inserted in the retail packages and are redeemable outside the State. Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342. Foreign holding corporation whose local activities were confined to holding stockholders' and directors' meetings, keeping records, distributing dividends, etc., was not engaged in interstate commerce. Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147. Associated Press v. Commonwealth, 60 S. W. 295. A loan of money by a foreign corporation to a citizen of Alabama is not a matter of interstate commerce, but is subject to the restrictions imposed on foreign corporations by the laws of Alabama. Nelms v. Edinburgh-American, etc., Co., 9 So. 141. The retailing of liquors on a steamboat while at its landing, though the boat is engaged in interstate commerce, is not itself interstate commerce. Foppiano v. Speed, 82 S. W. 222 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Powers Remaining in the States-Intrastate Commerce The power which the Constitution bestows upon Congress over commerce does not exhaust the subject of the control of commerce, for there is a commerce which lies beyond the power of Congress to control. The States have a commerce of their own and they are as supreme in its control as Congress is supreme in the control of interstate and foreign commerce. This has never been disputed since the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheat. 1). Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 543. See also License Cases, 5 How. 574. Norris v. Boston, 7 How. 415. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 243. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 488. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 247. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342. Concurrent Powers of Congress and the States In the Passenger Cases (7 How. 396) the court said that a concurrent power in the States to regulate commerce is an anomaly not found in the Constitution. If such power exist, it may be exercised independently of the Federal authority. A concurrent power excludes the idea of a dependent power. The General Government and the State exercise concurrent powers in taxing the people of the State. The objects of taxation may be the same, but the motives and policy of the tax are different and the powers are distinct and independent. The report continues: A concurrent power in two distinct sovereignties to regulate the same thing is as inconsistent in principle as it is impracticable in action. It involves a moral and physical impossibility. A joint action is not supposed, and two independent wills can not do the same thing. The action of one, unless there be an arrangement, must necessarily precede the action of the other; and that which is first, being competent, must establish the rule. If the powers be equal, as must be the case, both being sovereign, one may undo what the other does, and this must be the result of their action. But the argument is that a State acting in a subordinate capacity wholly inconsistent with its sovereignty may regulate foreign commerce until Congress shall act on the same subject, and that the State must then yield to the paramount authority. A Jealousy of the Federal powers has often been expressed and an apprehension entertained that they would impair the sovereignty of the States. But this argument degrades the States by making their legislation, to the extent stated, subject to the will of Congress. See also Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress When States May Exercise Power Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate The power to regulate commerce among the States is a unit, but if particular subjects within its operation do not require the application of a general or uniform system, the States may legislate in regard to them with a view to local needs and circumstances until Congress otherwise directs; but the power thus exercised by the States is not identical in its extent with the power to regulate commerce among the States. The power to pass laws in respect to internal commerce, inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws, and laws in relation to bridges, ferries, and highways belongs to the class of powers pertaining to locality, essential to local intercommunication, to the progress and development of local prosperity, and to the protection, the safety, and the welfare of society, originally necessarily belonging to, and upon the adoption of the Constitution reserved by, the States, except so far as falling within the scope of a power confided to the General Government. Where the subject matter requires a uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress and can not be encroached upon by the States; but where in relation to the subject matter different rules may be suitable for different localities, the States may exercise powers which, though they may be said to partake of the nature of the power granted to the General Government, are strictly not such, but are simply local powers, which have full operation until or unless circumscribed by the action of Congress. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 108. See also Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Escanaba, etc., Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 683. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 698. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 726. Cardwell v. Bridge Company, 113 U. S. 210. Police Powers of the States In general. Consistent with the power of Congress to regulate commerce, the States possess, because it was reserved, the power to protect the public health, the public morals, and the public safety by any legislation appropriate to that end which does not encroach upon rights guaranteed by the National Constitution nor come in conflict with acts of Congress. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 628. See also Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197. McLean v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 203 U. S. 38. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 489. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 493. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 215. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 470. Bec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 292. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 138, on certificate of division of opinion in 2 Paine (U. S.), 429. This case has been discredited in opinions in subsequent cases, notably in Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 265. In the absence of legislation by Congress.-While the laws of the State must yield to acts of Congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did not of itself and without legislation by Congress impair the authority of the States to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people. New York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 631. See also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Burden upon interstate commerce.-The State can do nothing which will directly burden or impede interstate commerce, and the police power does not justify a direct interference with such commerce. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 299. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 12. A State may make valid enactments in the exercise of its legislative power to promote the welfare and convenience of its citizens, although in their operation they may have an effect upon interstate commerce. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 488. See also South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 518. License Cases, 5 How. 599, and adopted by the court in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, as to the distinction between the incidental regulation of commerce admissible under the reserved police power of the States and the power of commercial regulation delegated to Congress. Effect of action by Congress.-Generally it may be said in rcspect to laws of this character that, though resting upon the police power of the State, they must yield whenever Congress, in the exercise of the powers granted to it, legislates upon the precise subject matter, for that power, like all other reserved Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate powers of the States, is subordinate to those in terms conferred Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 104. Even when an act of Congress does not go into effect until a certain time following its passage, State legislation is immediately superseded upon the enactment of the Federal statute. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. An unconstitutional act of Congress does not so manifest a purpose to take control of the subject matter of the statute as to supersede State legislation on the same subject; a void statute is not law for any purpose. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559. See also U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, in which the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, making it a misdemeanor to sell oil for illuminating purposes inflammable at a temperature of less than 110° F., was held unconstitutional as being merely a police regulation of trade within the State. Effect of delegation of power to Interstate Commerce Commission.— The fact that Congress has intrusted power to that commission does not, in the absence of action by it, change the rule which existed prior to the creation of the commission. Congress could always regulate interstate commerce, and could make specific provisions in reference thereto, and yet this has not been held to interfere with the power of the State in these incidental matters. A mere delegation by Congress to the commission of a like power has no greater effect, and does not of itself disturb the authority of the State. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Larabee, 211 U. S. 612. Effect of nonaction by Congress.-Where the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive, the failure of Congress to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free from any restrictions or impositions; and any regulation of the subject by the States, except in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such freedom. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 493. See also Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Western Union v. James, 162 U. S. 655. U. S. v. Knight, 156 U. S. 11. Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 588. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 555. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 110. Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 336. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 455. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 687. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 302. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 482. |