Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate (b) Requiring railroads to post their schedules of rates.State law requiring railroad companies to post up their rates of fare and freight and imposing penalties for nonobservance is not a regulation of commerce but is valid as a police regulation. Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560. Statute providing for the collection of amount specified in the bill of lading held inconsistent with provision of interstate commerce act requiring collection of rates specified in published tariff schedules. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. The State legislature may authorize its railroad commission to reduce as unreasonable a joint through rate agreed upon by two or more railroads and apportion the same among the several railroads interested. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257. Stone v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 116 U. S. 347. In establishing local rates for an interstate carrier a State must be assumed to intend to act within the limits set by the Federal Constitution. Rowland v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 244 U. S. 106. State's authority to regulate intrastate rates of interstate carriers may be exercised through commissions. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Towers, 245 U. S. 6. (c) Lack of power to regulate interstate rates.-Since the decision in Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois (118 U. S. 557), it must be regarded as settled, whatever doubts may have been previously entertained, that a regulation, as by prescribing rates, of such transportation as is deemed interstate as distinguished from wholly domestic carriage is exclusively given to Congress. Wilmington Transp. Co. v. California, 236 U. S. 151. State statutes regulating rates must have reference only to the intrastate proportion of the value of the property. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 196 Fed. 800, citing (d) Incidental effect on interstate rates.1-In the absence of action by Congress the reduction of intrastate rates below the level of interstate rates in those instances in which they had been maintained on a parity in competitive areas crossed by a State line, so as to alter the existing relations between State and inter See also for comparison "Exclusive powers of Congress-Incidental control of intrastate rates," p. 98. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate state rates as to places within those zones of competition, does not render such State rates invalid. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 242 U. S. 333. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 474. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513. Oregon, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 525. Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537. Allen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 230 U. S. 553. (e) Interstate passes.-A State statute prohibiting a railway company from giving free passes or free transportation, but authorizing the issue of transportation in payment for printing and advertising, can not, as to the exception, be allowed to operate in view of the act of Congress prohibiting free interstate transportation. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 219 U. S. 486. (f) Establishing joint through rates.-A State statute creating a railroad and warehouse commission and defining its duties, is constitutional in so far as it assumes to establish joint through rates over the lines of independent connecting railroads within the State, and by virtue of which it assumes to arbitrarily apportion and divide joint earnings. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 260. (g) Rates on the part of interstate shipment within the State. If transportation be partly within and partly without, the State can not regulate that within and leave the Federal power to act on that without, but has no control whatever over the charges for such a transportation. It is the very nature of the thing itself, not local or of domestic concern, and the States have no more power by such a construction or characterization to regulate the rates by uniform legislation than they have to so regulate the rates of postage or the weights of coins. That Congress refrains from establishing such uniform regulation only indicates an expression of the Federal will that the rates shall be left to regulate themselves under the ordinary economic laws that govern the commerce between the States. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 702, but this case was decided in 1884, prior to the enactment of the act to regulate commerce. See also Kaeiser v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 18 Fed. 151. State statute attempting to prohibit discrimination in rates as applied to long and short hauls on interstate transporation held void. Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 577. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 325. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stone, 20 Fed. 468. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S. 667. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate States may prohibit discrimination on the long-and-short-haul theory if the regulations are restricted to those who own or operate a railroad within the State. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 511. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U. S. 191. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McGrew Coal Co., 256 U. S. 134. (h) Tickets and mileage books.-A Michigan statute requiring one-thousand-mile tickets to be kept for sale at the principal ticket offices at a stipulated price, held invalid as depriving railroads of property without due process of law. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684; followed by Beardsley v. New York, etc., R. Co., 162 N. Y. 230. Running of trains-(a) Regulating speed of trains.-It is within the undoubted province of a State to make regulations with regard to all operations of trains and in which the lives and health of people are concerned, even though such regulations affect to some extent the operations of interstate commerce. Such regulations are eminently local in their character, and, in the absence of congressional regulations over the same subject, are free from all constitutional objections and unquestionably valid. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 61. Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299. (b) Regulating stoppage of trains.-A statute requiring every regular passenger train, running wholly within the limits of the State, to stop at all stations of county seats directly in its course for a sufficient length of time to take on and discharge passengers, is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and is not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 430. A State statute which requires every passenger train, regardless of the number of such trains passing each way daily, and of the character of the traffic carried by them, to stop at every county seat through which such trains may pass by day or night, and regardless also of the fact whether another train designated especially for local traffic may stop at the same station within a few minutes before or after the arrival of the train in question, is a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 521. See also Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 153. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Missouri, 254 U. S. 535. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm., 261 U. S. 369 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate (c) Regulating number in train crew.-A statute penalizing the operation of a freight train of more than 25 cars without having such train equipped with as many as three brakemen is not invalid as a regulation of commerce. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518. (d) Requiring use of electric headlight.-A statute requiring railroad companies to use electric headlights of not less than a certain capacity is valid. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280. Vandalia R. Co. v. Indiana, 242 U. S. 255. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 196 Fed. 690. States may make regulations to be observed at crossings in case such regulations do not impose a burden on interstate commerce. Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524. Seaboard, etc., R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310. Erie R. Co. v. New Jersey, 254 U. S. 394. (e) Examining and licensing trainmen.-A State may regulate this subject, unless such regulation burdens or impedes interstate commerce, in the absence of express enactment of Congress. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 480. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96. (f) Requiring railroads to pay employees semimonthly.—A statute requiring semimonthly payment of wages of railway employees, both State and interstate, has merely an incidental effect on interstate commerce and is valid. Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685. (g) Hours of service.-State statutes regulating the hours of service of railway employees are superseded by the Federal hours of service act of March 4, 1907. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. (h) Heating passenger cars.-A statute is valid which forbids under penalty the heating of passenger cars in the State by stoves or furnaces kept inside the car or suspended therefrom, although such cars may be employed in interstate commerce, in the absence of congressional action. New York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 629. (i) Accommodations for different races.'-Statute which requires railroad companies operating within the State to furnish separate coaches or cars for the transportation of white and colored passengers is not invalid so far as it is applicable to passengers traveling between two points in the State. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388. 1 See same subject under "Commerce Among the States," p. 116. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate In Anderson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (62 Fed. 46) it was held that a State statute so broad as to cover both State and interstate transportation is void. But in Smith v. State (100 Tenn. 494) it was held that a similar statute is a reasonable police regulation, applies to both intrastate and interstate travel, and is not obnoxious to the commerce clause. In Chiles v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (218 U. S. 71) it was said, in effect, that the inaction of Congress is equivalent to a declaration that a carrier can, by regulations, separate white and colored interstate passengers. In Hall v. De Cuir (95 U. S. 487) it was held that a State statute which, as construed by the supreme court of the State, requires those engaged in interstate commerce to give all persons traveling in that State upon the public conveyances employed in such business equal rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyances, without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color, is invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce. Street railway may be required by State statute to furnish either separate cars or separate compartments in the same car for white and negro passengers, although its principal business is the carriage of interstate passengers. South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 399. (j) No obligation to operate at a loss.-Texas statute requiring all railroads carrying passengers for hire to run certain passenger trains and make certain stops, etc., is a mere regulation of passenger service, and does not subject railroad company, through charter contract or otherwise, to an absolute duty to operate for its full charter period in face of a reasonable certainty of pronounced loss. Railroad Comm. v. Eastern Texas R. R., 264 U. S. 79. Liability for acts of nonfeasance or misfeasance.-(a) In general. Until Congress has legislated upon the subject, the liability of such a carrier, exercising its calling within a particular State, although engaged in the business of interstate commerce, for loss or damage to such property, may be regulated by the law of the State. Such regulations would fall within that class of regulations which it is competent for a State to make in the territorial jurisdiction of the State over such carriers and its duty and power to safeguard the general public against acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance committed within its limits, although interstate commerce may be indirectly affected. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. |