Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate (b) Employers' liability act.—The Federal employers' liability acts supersede the laws of the States on the same subject. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702. Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U. S. 363. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360. (c) Workmen's compensation act.-The fact that a railroad company is in a general sense engaged in interstate commerce does not prevent the operation of a State workmen's compensation act. New York, etc., R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. Raymond v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 243 U. S. 43. In Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co. (215 N. Y. 514) it was held that the Federal employers' liability act does not apply to a carrier by water, and a State workmen's compensation act applies to an employee of such a carrier, which was reversed in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen (244 U. S. 205) on the ground that while the Federal employers' liability act, does not apply to a carrier by water, yet a State workmen's compensation act is not applicable to an action based on a maritime tort. See also Valley S. S. Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U. S. 202. A State workmen's compensation act, requiring an employer to respond for injuries occurring where it is not chargeable with negligence, is not operative in the case of an employee engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170. (d) A common-law right of action is superseded by the Federal statute. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360. (e) Safety appliance act.-The Federal safety appliance act supersedes State statutes on the same subject. Southern R. Co. v. Indiana, 236 U. S. 439. (f) Injury to postal clerk.-State statute making a railroad company liable for injury to a railway postal clerk as if he were an employee of the railroad and not as a passenger does not, in the absence of legislation by Congress, conflict with the commerce clause. Martin v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 203 U. S. 284. (g) Allowance of attorney's fees.-Statute providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in actions on small claims Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate against all classes of defendants, individual and corporate, is valid as applied to claims based upon freight lost in interstate commerce, in the absence of Federal legislation on the subject, and the act to regulate commerce does not interfere with such a State statute. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35. (h) Furnishing cars.-A statute, the material requirement of which is that when the shipper of freight shall make a requisition in writing for a number of cars to be furnished at any point indicated within a certain number of days, and shall deposit one-fourth of the freight with the agent of the company, the company failing to furnish them shall forfeit $25 per day for each such car failed to be furnished, the only proviso being that the law "shall not apply in cases of strikes or other public calamity," is invalid, as sufficient allowance is not made for the practical difficulties in the administration of the law. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 236 U. S. 157. When such a statute is construed by the State court as merely declaratory of the common law, and any reasonable excuse for a failure to furnish cars upon the requirement of a shipper may be interposed, it is valid. Hampton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 227 U. S. 456. By the interstate commerce act, as amended, Congress has specifically concerned itself with the subject of furnishing cars for interstate traffic, and this supersedes any legislation by the States on that subject. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hardwick, 226 U. S. 426. A statute which merely requires a railroad company to furnish cars within a reasonable time after demand made, where the question as to what is a reasonable time is to be determined in view of the requirements of interstate commerce, is valid. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mulberry Coal Co., 238 U. S. 275. (i) Uniform bills of lading.-The uniform bills of lading act, construed as limited to the rights of parties under their domestic endorsements of a foreign bill of lading, is not invalid as a regulation of commerce. Baker Co. v. Brown, 100 N. E. 1025. (j) Refusal to accept freight for transportation.—Statute which penalizes a carrier which refuses to receive freight for transportation whenever tendered at a regular station is invalid as Congress had, by statute, occupied the whole field of rate making and has provided that no carrier "shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this act, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this act." Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Southern R. Co. v. Burlington Lbr. Co., 225 U. S. 99. Contra Currie v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 47 S. E. 654. (k) Delivery of freight and express matter.-Where a State court considered that a statute forbidding a delivery of goods except upon surrender and cancellation of the bills of lading and providing that any person aggrieved may recover all damages sustained by its violation is merely declaratory of the common law. No question of the repugnancy of the statute to the Constitution is presented. Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. German Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 270. Statute authorizing the recovery of a penalty for delay in giving notice to a consignee of the arrival of freight at the termination of an interstate shipment is invalid in consequence of the operation of the act to regulate commerce as amended. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265. Rule of a railroad commission authorizing the recovery of a penalty for failure to deliver freight at the depots and warehouses, or, in case of shipment for track delivery, to place loaded cars at an accessible place for unloading within 24 hours after arrival, is an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce since the requirement as to the delivery of cars within the short period fixed in the rule is absolute and makes no allowance for any justifiable and unavoidable cause for the failure to deliver. Yazoo, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwood Gro. Co., 227 U. S. 1. Municipal ordinance requiring an express company doing business in the city to give a bond for each and every vehicle licensed, to be conditioned for the safe and prompt delivery of all baggage, packages, etc., is invalid as applied to interstate transportation. Adams Exp. Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14. Statute penalizing the failure of common carriers to adjust and pay within a specified time claims for loss or damage is valid as applied to an interstate shipment when the loss or damage occurred while in the possession of the carrier within the State. Atlantic Coast Line v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122. But such a statute is superseded by the Carmack amendment to the act to regulate commerce, as further amended by the act of June 18, 1910. Charleston, etc., R. Co. v. Varnville Furn. Co., 237 U. S. 597. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, as to statute imposing liability for interest and attorney's fees for nonpayment of claims. Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce--Intrastate Connecting carriers.-Compelling two railroad companies to provide at a place of intersection of their two roads ample facilities by track connections for transferring any and all cars used in the regular business of the respective lines of road from the lines or tracks of one of said companies to those of the other, and to provide at such place of intersection equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange of cars and traffic, would plainly afford facilities to interstate commerce, if there were any, and would in no wise regulate such commerce within the meaning of the Constitution. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 295. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. McCann, 174 U. S. 580. Central Stockyards Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 192 U. S. 568. Orders of State railroad commissions are void when they conflict with Federal regulations. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 236 U. S. 157. The imposition upon the initial or any connecting carrier of the duty of tracing the freight and informing the shipper in writing when, where, how, and by which carrier the freight was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of the parties and their official position, by whom the truths of the facts set out in the information can be established, is, when applied to interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce clause. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U. S. 202. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 312. Switching and terminal facilities.-Interstate freight retains its character as such until the actual delivery to the consignee takes place, and an order of a State railroad commission regulating the transfer and switching of cars upon the private sidings or spur tracks of private shippers is void. Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro Ice, etc., Co., 134 Fed. 82, affirmed in See also Iowa v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Fed. 391. A State can not be said, as a matter of law, to have imposed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce by forbidding any change in location of the machine shops, roundhouses, and general offices of a railway company which has agreed to maintain them in a designated county in consideration of receiving county aid. International, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson County, 246 U. S. 424. State statute forbidding the switching of cars over public. crossings in cities of the first and second class with a crew con Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate taining less than a specified number of employees is not violative of the commerce clause. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518. Sunday laws.-Statute which declares that transportation of freight shall be suspended on Sunday, although in a limited degree affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a needless intrusion upon the domain of Federal jurisdiction nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered in its own nature, is an ordinary police regulation and not invalid by force alone of the Constitution. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 318. Attachment and garnishment.-Sums of money due from other carriers as the nonresident defendant carrier's share of the freight on interstate shipments are not exempt from garnishment under State laws. Railway cars are not exempt from attachment under State. laws, though they may have been or are intended to be used in interstate commerce. Davis v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 217 U. S. 157. Regulations affecting interstate street-car service.-Municipal ordinances which only incidentally affect interstate street-car service are valid, and therefore an ordinance which prohibits the company from allowing passengers to ride on the rear or front platforms without suitable barriers, and requiring it to keep the cars clean and ventilated and fumigated, is valid, but provisions of the ordinance that cars shall never be permitted to be below a certain temperature are unreasonable, and those provisions so regulating the number of passengers to be carried in the cars as to subject the company to varying conditions and conflicting municipal regulations are a burden on interstate commerce. South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537. No unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce results from a municipal ordinance which directs a railway company to remove its tracks from a busy street intersection, where the ordinance makes no discrimination against interstate commerce. Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241. Natural gas.-Statute prohibiting transportation of natural gas by foreign corporation held invalid. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229. Until Congress acts under its superior authority, the regulation by a State public service commission of rates for natural gas transmitted directly from the source of supply outside the |