Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate If Congress has not legislated on the subject of obstructions to navigation, the States may act. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459. Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188. Power to prohibit obstructions.-Congress has power to pass laws for the regulation of the navigation of public rivers and to prevent any and all obstructions therein, but until it does pass some such law there is no common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers unless it be by the maritime law, administered by the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and in the absence of the exercise of such power by Congress the States may adopt regulations. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 8. Liability for marine torts.-Until Congress makes some regulation touching the liability of parties for marine torts resulting in the death of the persons injured, a State statute providing "that when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action there for against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission," applies, and, as thus applied, it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of Congress. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 104. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398. Rules of navigation as to displaying lights.-In Steamboat "New York "v. Rea (18 How. 225), the court said that a statute requiring a light to be suspended in the rigging at least 20 feet above deck as a rule of navigation is doubtless binding upon the State courts, but can not regulate the decisions of the Federal courts administering the general admiralty law. They can be governed only by the principles peculiar to that system, as generally recognized in maritime countries, modified by acts of Congress independently of local legislation. Harbor regulations.-Statute enacting that the master and warden of a port within the State should be entitled to demand and receive, in addition to other fees, the sum of $5 whether called on to perform any service or not, for every vessel arriving in that port is void as a prohibition on commerce. Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31. Gloucester Ferry Co., v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 214. A State may, by its legislature, or through a board of harbor commissioners, establish, for the protection and benefit of commerce and navigation, harbor lines in navigable waters not Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate inconsistent with any legislation of Congress limiting the building of wharves and other structures. Prosser v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 152 U. S. 64. Gring v. Ives, 222 U. S. 365. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605. Surveys and repairs of vessels.—Statute making it the duty of the masters and wardens of a port within a State to offer their services to make a survey of the hatches of all seagoing vessels which should arrive at that port is void as a regulation of com merce. Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. Fisheries.-The commerce clause does not prohibit a State from regulating fisheries in the navigable waters within its territory where such regulation makes no discrimination in favor of its own citizens and against those of other States, and where there is no Federal statute or treaty on the subject. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240. Ferries. The power of the State to regulate matters of internal police includes the establishment of ferries as well as the construction of roads and bridges. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 215. The right to establish and regulate ferries is part of that mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government. Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black 634. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S. 333. Conceding, arguendo, that the police power of a State extends to the establishment, regulation, and licensing of ferries on a navigable stream being the boundary between two States, none of the cases justifies the proposition that such power embraces transportation by water across such a river which does not constitute a ferry in a strict technical sense. St. Clair County v. Interstate Transfer Co., 192 U. S. 466. In the case of a ferry between two States, not operated in connection with railroads and not part of continuous transportation, each State has the power to regulate the ferriage charges from its own shore. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317. When Congress legislates with respect to interstate ferries, State legislation is superseded and the inclusion of interstate railroad ferries in the act to regulate commerce prevents the operation of an ordinance regulating fares on such ferries even as applicable to persons other than railroad passengers. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Wharves, piers, and docks.-A State has authority to construct piers, etc., on navigable rivers within the State in the absence of controlling legislation by Congress. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 464. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691. Cushing v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184. Ordinance regulating the use of wharves in a town and forbidding the landing of vessels, except by permission of a wharfmaster at any point within the town other than between certain designated streets, if it be a regulation of commerce is one which belongs to that class of rules which like pilotage can be most wisely exercised by local authority and is valid until Congress assumes to establish regulations. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. In the absence of congressional legislation, wharfage is governed by the local State law. By the State law it is generally required to be reasonable, and by that law its reasonableness must be judged. The appropriation of the wharfage receipts to the objects of keeping wharves in repair, of gradually expending them as additions may be needed, and of maintaining a police for their protection and lights for their better enjoyment, is entirely germane to the purposes of wharfage facilities. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 448. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 427. A municipal corporation having by the law of its organization an exclusive right to construct wharves, collect wharfage, and regulate wharfage rates, can not consistently with the Constitution charge and collect wharfage proportionate to the tonnage of the vessel from the owners of enrolled and licensed steamboats mooring and landing at the wharves constructed on the banks of a navigable river. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80. Bridges. Authority to erect.-Bridges over navigable streams which are entirely within the limits of a State are of the class of subjects on which the power of the State may be exercised as local in their nature and operation. The local authority can better appreciate their necessity, and can better direct the manner in which they shall be used and regulated than a government at a distance. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 687. Cardwell v. Bridge Company, 113 U. S. 205. Power to order removal.-Ordering the raising of railroad bridges to specified heights and the removal of other bridges over navigable waters and across which interstate commerce passes is a direct interference with such commerce. Kansas City Sou. R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Regulation of tolls.-A State has not the power to regulate tolls upon a bridge connecting it with another State. Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204. See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 565; 18 How. 421. Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Transp. Co., 155 U. S. 585. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S., 216 U S. 177. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1. Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 395. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12. International bridge.-International character does not of itself divest State of power over its part of structure in silence of Congress. International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126. Pilots and pilotage. The regulation of pilots and pilotage is not a subject which is national in its nature, admitting only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, and the States may act in the absence of congressional legislation. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 319. Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572. Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 242. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 341. Steamship Company v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 459. Steamship Company v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 34. Thompson v. Darden, 198 U. S. 315. Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 93. Dams and booms.-Statute authorizing the erection of dams and booms held valid. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 460. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 250. Lindsay, etc., Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. S. 145. As to controlling authority of acts of Congress prohibiting obstructions to navigable streams, see— North Shore Boom Co. v. Nicomen Boom Co., 212 U. S. 466. Canals.-A license taken out under an act of Congress to prosecute the coasting trade conveys no privilege to use, free of tolls or of any conditions whatsoever, the canals constructed by a State and made practicable for navigation by the funds of the State. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 567. Riparian water rights. Statute declaring that “it shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches, or canals, the waters of any Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate fresh-water lake, pond, brook, creek, river, or stream of this State into any other State for use therein" does not impair any right of such owner to use such waters in interstate commerce as to one who has entered into a contract to carry such water into another State, as a person can not acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in interstate commerce. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349. Warehouses and elevators.-A general State statute regulating the business and charges of public warehousemen engaged in elevating and storing grain for profit does not amount to a regulation of commerce. Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 405. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517. Merchants' Exch. v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365. Stockyards.-State laws attempting to regulate the interstate and local business of stockyards companies, sustained in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (82 Fed. 844, 79 Fed. 679), held invalid on the ground that the statutes denied to the company the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 110 Banks and banking.-Statute which forbids individuals or partnerships engaged in the banking business without a license from the comptroller, is not, as to one whose business chiefly consists in receiving deposits in small sums from time to time until they reach an amount sufficient to be sent to other States and mainly to foreign countries, invalid as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128. As to State law escheating unclaimed deposits as applied to a national bank, see First Natl. Bank v. California, 262 U. S. 366. Automobiles.-Statute prescribing a comprehensive scheme for licensing and regulating motor vehicles is not, as to vehicles coming into the State, invalid as a regulation of interstate com merce. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. Manufacture, sale, and delivery of goods.-The legislature of a State has the power in many cases to determine as a matter of State policy whether to permit the manufacture and sale of articles within the State or entirely to forbid such manufacture and sale, so long as the legislation is confined to the manufacture and sale within the State. Those are questions of public policy which belong to the legislative department to determine, but the legislative policy does not extend so far as to embrace the right 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-15 |