Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Vessels registered or enrolled are not exempt from the ordinary rules respecting taxation of personal property. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 307. See also Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 285. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 74. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194. A State may create liens for materials and supplies furnished a vessel in her home port where not amounting to a regulation of commerce, and may enact reasonable regulations for their enforcement. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 645. See also Norton v. Switzer, 93 U. S. 355. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 574. Corporate receipts, earnings, and dividends.-Tax by a State Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206. Western Union v. Pennsylvania, 128 U. S. 39. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549 The levy and assessment under State law of a general income tax upon the net income of a Wisconsin corporation derived from transactions in interstate commerce is not such a direct burden on interstate commerce as to contravene the commerce clause. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132. Gross receipts-(a) From interstate and foreign transportation.-Statute which, as interpreted by the supreme court of the State, imposes a tax upon the gross receipts of a transportation company for the transportation of freight from points without to points within the State, and vice versa, is invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230. See also Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217. Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 469. Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450. Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1. Sec 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate (b) Graduated to the proportion of number of miles.-Gross receipts of interstate transportation companies. Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217. A state constitutionally may condition the right of an exPress company to enter upon and transact intrastate business by requiring antecedent payment of a tax based on the number of miles of railroad tracks in the State over which the business is to be operated and varied according to a classification of the tracks made for the purposes of railroad taxation and as to which neither notice nor opportunity to be heard is vouchsafed the express company. Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Robertson, 264 U. S. 535. (c) When interstate and intrastate receipts can be separated.— A single tax assessed under a State statute upon the receipts of a telegraph company which were derived partly from interstate and partly from intrastate commerce, but which were returned and assessed in gross and without separation or apportionment is not wholly invalid, but is invalid only in proportion to the extent that such receipts were derived from interstate commerce. Ratterman v. Western Union, 127 U. S. 411. Western Union v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472. (d) Tolls received for use of road.—Statute imposing taxes on tolls paid by one company to another for the use of its railroad, where the company paying tolls is engaged in the transportation of merchandise within the State to points beyond, is not an interference with interstate commerce. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431. (e) As to measure of property tax.-A property tax, measured by the gross receipts of an express company within the State, including earnings on interstate business, which is in lieu of all taxes upon its property and which is merely a scheme of taxation seeking to reach the value of the property of such a company in the State, measured by the receipts from business done within the State, is valid. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335. (f) From internal transportation.-Statute which imposes a tax on the receipts of an express company for business done within the State is evidently intended to exclude the idea that the tax is to be imposed upon the interstate business of the company. Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 350. Ohio River, etc., R. Co. v. Dittey, 203 Fed. 537. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 201. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate (g) According to unit rule.-Where an assessing board is charged with the duty of valuing a certain number of miles of railroad within a State, forming part of a line of road running into another State, and assesses those miles of road at their actual cash value determined on a mileage basis, it does not place a burden upon interstate commerce, beyond the power of the State, simply because the value of that railroad as a whole is created partly, and perhaps largely, by the interstate commerce which it is doing. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 443. Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519. The unit rule of valuation applies to express companies. The unit is a unit of use and management, and the horses, wagons, safes, pouches, and furniture, the contracts for transportation facilities, and the capital necessary to carry on the business, possesses a value in combination and from use in connection with the property and capital elsewhere which can rightfully be recognized in the assessment for taxation. Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 221. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171. (h) On mileage basis.-Statute taxing the capital stock of a sleeping-car company engaged in interstate business, by taking as a basis of assessment such proportion of the capital stock of the company as the number of miles over which it runs cars within the State bears to the whole number of miles in that and other States, is constitutional. Pullman Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 26. Statute regarding telegraph companies, which, as construed and applied by the supreme court of the State, takes as the basis of valuation of the company's property within the State the proportion of the value of its whole capital stock which the length of its lines within the State bears to the whole length of all its lines, and makes it the duty of the State board to make such deduction, on account of a greater proportional value of the company's property outside the State, as to assess its property within the State at its true cash value only, is constitutional. Western Union v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 27. Assessment of taxes on track mileage basis held invalid where cost of construction per mile is less within than without taxing State. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, in connection with which see Davis v. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Including property not used in the business of the company.-The principle of organic unity may not be made the means of unlawfully taxing the privilege of property outside the State, under the name of enhanced value or good will, and a tax purporting to be based on an assessment under the unit rule, which includes property outside the State not necessarily used in the actual business of the company, is invalid. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490. License and privilege taxes-(a) In general.-No State can compel a party, individual, or corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160. No State can interfere with interstate commerce through the imposition of a tax, by whatever name called, which is in effect a tax for the privilege of transacting such commerce; but this restriction does not in the least abridge the right of a State to tax at their full value all the instrumentalities used for such commerce. Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185. The fact that grain stored in an elevator is to be shipped out of the State does not make a State statute requiring a license for conducting the business of such elevator in the State amount to a regulation of interstate commerce. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452. Statute providing that no person shall engage in certain occupations without obtaining license from the United States is not unconstitutional. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462. Where the business or occupation consists in the sale of goods, the license tax required for its pursuit is in effect a tax upon the goods themselves. If such a tax be within the power of the State to levy, it matters not whether it be raised directly from the goods, or indirectly from them, through the license to the dealer; but if such tax conflict with any power vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States, it will not be any the less invalid because enforced through the form of a personal license. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 278. A city can not make a charge as the price of the privilege of navigating a river in accordance with the terms of the party's license from the United States, as it violates the commerce clause. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69. (b) Express companies.-Statute imposing license tax on express companies doing business within the State held valid. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 654. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Municipal ordinance requiring a license tax to be paid by an express company as a condition to its right to do business in the city is invalid as applied to a company doing an interstate business. Adams Exp. Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14. State tax purporting on its face to be for carrying on the express business within the State, the length of the line used being the measure of the tax and thereby casting the burden of the tax upon interstate business, is void. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Allen, 39 Fed. 712, reversed in Shelton v. Platt, 139 (c) Osborne v. Mobile (16 Wall. 479) overruleḍ.-In Leloup v. Mobile (127 U. S. 647) the court said: The State court relies upon the case of Osborne v. Mobile (16 Wall. 479), which brought up for consideration an ordinance of the city requiring every express company or railroad company doing business in that city, and having a business extending beyond the limits of the State, to pay an annual license of $500; if the business was confined within the limits of the State the license fee was only $100; if confined within the city it was $50; subject in each case to a penalty for neglect or refusal to pay the charge. This court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional. This was in December term, 1872. In view of the course of decisions which have been made since that time, it is very certain that such an ordinance would now be regarded as repugnant to the power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. Statute requiring the agent of a foreign express company doing business in the State to pay a license fee, and to deposit with the auditor a statement of the company's assets and liabilities, is unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171. Ewing v. Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464. (d) Railroad companies.-State tax on cab service maintained by railroad company held valid. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21 Stipulation in a railroad company's charter that it shall pay a bonus to the State from time to time is not invalid as a tax on the transportation of passengers or as infringing the powers of Congress. Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 469. Statute prescribing a different rule of taxation for railroad companies from that for individuals does not violate the Constitution. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. State board of equalization included in their assessment all the franchises of a railroad company, among which were franchises |