Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 12.-Army Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, in which the law was upheld against the following objections: (1) That by some of its administrative features it delegates Federal power to State officials; (2) that it vests both legislative and judicial power in administrative officers; (3) that, by exempting ministers of religion and theological students under certain conditions and by relieving from strictly military service members of certain religious sects whose tenets deny the moral right to engage in war, it is repugnant to the first amendment, as establishing or interfering with religion; and (4) that it creates involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment. See also Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, as to the constitutionality of the conscription act of March 3, 1863; and Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3, as to conscription for military duty in a foreign country. Hammerschmidt v. U. S., 265 U. S. 182. Clause 13.-NAVY. The Congress shall have power. . . To provide and maintain a Navy. This grant of power authorizes Congress to buy or build vessels of war, to man, arm, and equip them, and to establish naval academies, and to provide for the punishment of desertion and other crimes, and make all needful rules for the government of the Navy. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336. Ships of war of a friendly foreign power are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States while in our ports and are immune from United States laws so long as they respect the sovereignty of this Government. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336. The Exchange, 7 Cranch 145. The Santissima Trinidad, 1 Brock. 478. Clause 14.-MILITARY LAW. The Congress shall have power .. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. Exclusive Power of Congress The power of Congress to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses by courts-martial may be exercised under this clause, without regard to the fifth amendment, and it can not be abridged or in any way affected by the States through either their legislative or judicial departments. In Kurtz v. Moffitt (115 U. S. 500) the court, citing Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 14.-Military Law Dynes v. Hoover (20 How. 65), Ex parte Mason (105 U. S. 700), and Wales v. Whitney (114 U. S. 564), said: The fifth amendment to the Constitution, which declares that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," expressly excepts 64 cases arising in the land and naval forces," and leaves such cases subject to the rules for the government and regulation of those forces which, by the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, Congress is empowered to make. Courts-martial form no part of the judicial system of the United States, and their proceedings, within the limits of their jurisdiction, can not be controlled or revised by the civil courts. See also Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 115. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 408. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 176. In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 69. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 401. Power to Modify or Repeal Rules The power to establish rules implies necessarily the power to modify or repeal or to create anew. Army and Navy regulations authorized by Congress have the force of law, and the same effect is given to department regulations by congressional recognition. U. S. v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 302. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 176. Offense Committed by Marine on Board Ship Under the power to provide and maintain a navy, and the power given by this clause, Congress may enact a statute for the punishment of an offense committed by a marine on board a ship of war wherever that ship may lie. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 390. Habeas Corpus Proceedings The civil courts on habeas corpus can only consider whether the military court had jurisdiction. Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496. Swaim v. U. S., 165 U. S. 553. Clause 15.-TO PROVIDE FOR CALLING MILITIA. The Congress shall have power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions. Power of Congress Congress is not deprived of its power under this clause when the necessity for its exercise i called out by civil war. Author Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 15.-Militia ity to suppress rebellion is found in the power to suppress insurrection and carry on war; and authority to provide for the restoration of State governments, under the Constitution, when subverted and overthrown, is derived from the obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government. The latter, in the case of a rebellion which involves the government of a State and, for the time, excludes the national authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the other. Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall. 331. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700. Concurrent State Power Congress may make laws to enforce a call; in this the States have concurrent power, and may prescribe penalties for failure to obey the President's call. They possess also a concurrent power to aid the National Government by calls under their own authority, and in emergencies may use the militia to put down armed insurrection. Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 176; affirmed in The power to declare war and suppress insurrection carries with it inherently rightful authority to guard against an immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils growing out of its rise and progress. Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U .S. 714. Effect of National Defense Act of 1916 On the question of how far the act of 1903, known as the Dick law, and designed to promote the efficiency of the militia, as amended in 1908, was affected by the act of Congress of June 3, 1916, known as the national defense act, it was held that the latter was intended to give greater efficiency to the Federal military force, through classification and standardization under military regulations and orders based upon existing rights and obligations, rather than one intended to operate to the end that members of the Organized Militia who do not see fit voluntarily to enlist for a longer term and assume the broader obligations which might require them to go beyond the national bounds, should be absolved from the duty of responding to the emergency call of the President in discharge of their obligations, and from the narrower service which they had already assumed under existing law-that of serving a specified term within the national domain. And that when a person had elected not to enlist for the longer term and for the broader service, though not recognized as distinctly a member of the National Guard, that he was still in the service for the Federal purposes contemplated at the time he enlisted in the militia. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Delegation of Power to the President C. 15.-Militia Act of Congress of February 28, 1795, delegating to the President power to call forth the militia, held constitutional. Under this act the power to determine when the exigency requiring the calling forth of the militia has arisen is exclusively in the President, and his determination upon this point is conclusive. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 43. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 32. The President may make his request directly to the executive of the State, or by order directed to any subordinate officer of the militia; such a request is, in legal intendment, an order, disobedience of which renders a citizen liable to court-martial. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 15. Status of Militia in Service So long as the militia is acting under the military jurisdiction to which it belongs the State and Federal Governments have concurrent power over it; but the militia is not subject to the rules and Articles of War unless in the actual employment of the United States. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 16. Congress has always recognized a substantial difference between the regular forces and the militia, and it is only when called out and actually mustered into the service of the United States that State forces become national militia. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 56. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390. Relator's claim that he was entitled to discharge from military service under selective draft act of May 18, 1917, on ground that call to service for which draft was made under act, was for duty in foreign country, need not be considered as original proposition; power of Congress to compel military service in foreign country is not restricted to militia clause. Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3. Clause 16.-TO PROVIDE FOR ORGANIZING MILITIA. The Congress shall have power To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. In Houston v. Moore (5 Wheat. 16) the court said: Congress has power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining them, and this power being unlimited, except in the two particulars of 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-19 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress * Cl. 16.-Militia officering and training them, according to the discipline to be prescribed But after a detachment of the militia has been called forth, and has entered the Federal service, the authority of Congress over such detachment is exclusive. Clause 17.-SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. The Congress shall have power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. District of Columbia In General This clause confers upon Congress absolute authority and control over the District of Columbia. It probably grew out of an unpleasant episode in the history of the Continental Congress while it was sitting in Philadelphia. Toward the close of the War of the Revolution Congress was surrounded and greatly mistreated by a body of mutineers of the Continental Army. This led to the removal of the seat of government from Philadelphia to Princeton, N. J., and later, for the sake of greater convenience, to Annapolis. (Watson on the Constitution, p. 698.) By this clause Congress is given exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government, national or local, in all cases whatsoever, including taxation. The terms of the clause are not limited by the principle that representation is necessary to taxation; taxes may be levied on the basis of the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 321. Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 619. Shoemaker v. U. S., 147 U. S. 300. Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 52. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404. Congress legislates for the District with the same power as the legislative assemblies of the States, and in doing so it acts as the legislature of the Union. The failure of Congress to exercise its |