Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.-Land Purchased long as the place is used for the purposes specified; may continue its laws in force there so far as they do not conflict with necessary acts of Congress; or may provide that civil and criminal process of State courts may be executed therein; but where a cession has been made subject to certain conditions, the United States takes entire political jurisdiction, save as expressed in the conditions, and it can not be limited without the consent of Congress. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 545. Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399. In re Ladd, 74 Fed. 31. Consent or ratification by the State is necessary to the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction, but it is necessary for no other purpose, and can not be required in order to permit the United States to exercise its right of eminent domain. U. S. v. San Francisco Brdg. Co., 88 Fed. 891. Federal Jurisdiction By the constitutional method.-When the title is acquired by purchase by consent of the legislatures of the States, the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority. When a purchase of land for any of the purposes enumerated is made by the National Government and the State legislature has given its consent to the purchase, the land so purchased, by the very terms of the Constitution, ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation of Congress, and the State jurisdiction is completely ousted. This is the necessary result, for exclusive jurisdiction is the attendant upon exclusive legislation. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 532. U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason (U. S.) 60. As to land purchased without the consent of the State, as at tax sale, or where political jurisdiction over the same has not been otherwise ceded to the United States, see U. S. v. Penn, 48 Fed. 669. Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 402. By other than constitutional method.-Where lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a State than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to this qualification: * That if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected for the uses of the General Government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the General Government. Their exemption from State control is essential to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegatel powers. But when not used as such instrumentalities, the legis Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.-Land Purchased lative power of the State over the places acquired will be as full and complete as over any other places within her limits. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 539. See also Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S. 325. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 545 National and Municipal Powers United In Pollard v. Hagan (3 How. 223) it was said: Within the District of Columbia and the other places purchased and used for the purposes above mentioned, the national and municipal powers of government of every description are united in the Government of the Union. Jurisdiction to Recapture Escaped Felon In Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheat. 428) Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking of the recapture of a felon escaped from a place Over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, said: The power vested in Congress, as the Legislature of the United States, to legislate exclusively within any place ceded by a State, carries with it, as an incident, the right to make that power effectual. If a felon escape out of the State in which the act has been committed, the Government can not pursue him into another State and apprehend him there, but must demand him from the executive power of that other State. If Congress were to be considered merely as the local legislature for the fort or other place in which the offense might be committed, then this principle would apply to them as to other local legislatures, and the felon who should escape out of the fort or other place in which the felony may have been committed could not be apprehended by the marshal but must be demanded from the executive of the State. But we know that the principle does not apply; and the reason is that Congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other powers, in its high character as the Legislature of the Union. For Purposes Not Named The broadest construction has been put upon the language of this clause-one which makes it cover all structures and all Places necessary for carrying on the business of the National Government. U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518. Murder committed in a post office over which the State had ceded jurisdiction may be prosecuted in a Federal court under Section 5339, Revised Statutes. Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S. 36. State Jurisdiction Judicial and legislative. The cession by the State includes judicial as well as legislative jurisdiction. Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011. Over national soldiers' home.-A State has not the power to legislate so as to control the governor of a national soldiers' home, acting under the direction of the board of managers and Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.--Land Purchased by the authority of Congress, in regard to the internal administration of the affairs of the home. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276. See also In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 551, as to offense committed at a national soldiers' home. Operation of State railroad stock law. Upon the cession by a State of jurisdiction to the United States over a particular tract, a law of the State respecting the liability of a railroad within the territory ceded for the killing of stock remains in force, it being in no respect inconsistent with any law of the United States, never having been changed or abrogated. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 547. Penalty for default in delivery of telegram.-State statute providing for the recovery of a penalty for default in the delivery of a telegram does not apply to a telegram to be delivered within a United States navy yard. Western Union v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274. Clause 18.-INCIDENTAL POWERS. The Congress shall have power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. Leading Cases McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat, 1. Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581. In General This clause is not a limitation or restriction upon the powers of Congress, but an enlargement of them. Many powers are necessarily implied under the express grants of power in the Constitution; "it would be utopian to suppose that a government can exist without leaving the exercise of discretion somewhere." U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 396. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 411. U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 532. I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 472. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 578. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 537. Bec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental The Constitution does not profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers shall be enumerated, and where an end is required and a duty is enjoined the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is intrusted. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 407. The courts will determine whether the means employed by Congress to accomplish the ends sought have any relation to the powers granted by the Constitution, and if the measures adopted as the most eligible and appropriate are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent in letter or spirit with the limitations of the Constitution, the courts can not declare them inexpedient or unwise. Cherokee Nation v Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 657. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 283. Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 127. Every act of Congress, to be valid, must find in the Constitution some warrant for its passage; but while construction, for the purpose of conferring a power, should be resorted to with great caution, yet resort must be had to every reasonable construction to save a statute from unconstitutionality, and a choice of means by Congress is not to be adjudged invalid unless the conflict between the Constitution and the statute is clear and strong. U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 635. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 657. In the execution of a power Congress is not restricted to the employment of those means alone without which the power would be nugatory, and if the end may be reached indirectly by One mode, it may be reached directly by another. The limitation of necessity and propriety expressed in this clause extends only to incidental legislation, and in no way affects the powers expressly granted. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 468. Every right created by, arising under, or dependent upon the Constitution may be protected or enforced by such means as Congress may deem best; if the Constitution guarantees a right, the National Government is clothed with authority to enforce it-the powers given to the National Government are not ineffective because the means of enforcing them are not expressly given. Congress has a large discretion as to the means to be emPloyed, and may employ those means which, in its judgment, Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental are most advantageous, taking care only that they are not inconsistent with the limitations placed upon the general power by the Constitution. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 535. Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet. 619. Congress has undoubted power to construct interstate highways, and as a means to the exercise of that power may organize a corporation. Under its power to regulate commerce Congress may empower a commission to investigate the conduct of interstate commerce, and may provide a penalty for obstructing it. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 529. I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 473. U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 578.1 Congress may use all known and appropriate means for collecting and disbursing the revenue, and may provide for the protection of revenue collectors and officers, and in case of the death of a collector may provide that the Government shall be the first paid out of his estate. Murray v. Hoboken, etc., Co., 18 How. 272. Dugan v. U. S., 3 Wheat. 179. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 388. As an incident to its power to carry on war Congress had power to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations during the Rebellion and to pass the nonintercourse acts. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 507. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 93. Under this clause Congress may incorporate a bank. National banks being designed to aid the Government, Congress is the sole judge of the necessity for creating them. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 411. Farmers', etc., Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 33. See also U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 386. Talbot v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 440. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 543. The power to make Treasury notes legal tender is not expressly given to Congress, but the power exists and is attributable to the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States and to regulate the currency. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 553; 110 U. S. 438. Congress may create, define, and punish crimes or offenses when necessary for effectuating the objects of government. The 1 For other citations under the power of Congress to regulate commerce, see com neros clause, p. 83. |