Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Attainder sary inference, that these taxes were required to be collected in coin. It was so held. Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 74. See also Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229. Butler v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258. Statute allowing State banks to pay checks by exchange when maker does not expressly direct otherwise does not violate this clause. Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649. No State Shall Pass Any Bill of Attainder 1 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. The Constitution deals with substance, not form, and any statute depriving a citizen of rights for past misconduct is void, however disguised. The term "bill of attainder" embraces bills of pains and penalties, and comprehends laws confiscating property as well as those affecting the life of an individual. Any deprivation or suspension of an inalienable right is a punishment. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266. The so-called test-oath acts contravene this clause in excluding certain persons from practicing their professions for previous acts of rebellion, or depriving such persons of the right to a rehearing in civil suits or denying to nonresidents the right to appear and defend without taking the prescribed oath. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 323. This clause does not forbid a State to prescribe the necessary qualifications to entitle a person to practice his profession, or to exclude ex-convicts from the practice of medicine. The fact that such statutes are applicable in terms to persons who had previously enjoyed the right to pursue their avocations does not render them objectionable. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 125. See also Watson on the Constitution, p. 735, reciting the history of a bill of attainder passed by the Legislature of Virginia. No State Shall Pass Any Ex Post Facto Law 2 Definition In general.—An ex post facto law is a law enacted after an offense has been committed and which, in relation to it or its consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disad See also Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3, p. 260, for inhibition on Congress. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Ex Post Facto Law vantage. The term embraces every law that makes an act done before the passage of the law, and innocent when done, criminal; every law that aggravates a crime or changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than was required by law at the time the offense was committed. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 235. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U. S. 180. Decisions of courts.-This prohibition, as its terms indicate, is directed against legislative action only, and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309. As applied to civil proceedings.-This clause relates to penal and criminal proceedings which impose punishments and forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110. See also Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140. Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall. 210. Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456. In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 219. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall, 173. Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U. S. 647. Lehmann v. Board of Accountancy, 263 U. S. 394. A statute ordering a new trial of an inquisition to ascertain damages on condemnation of land for a railroad is not assailable as an ex post facto law. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 402. Law mitigating punishment.-A statute which mitigates the rigor of the law in force at the time the crime was committed can not be regarded as ex post facto with reference to that crime. Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 324. No deprivation of substantial rights permissible. It is well settled that the accused is not entitled, of right, to be triedl in the exact mode, in all respects, that may be prescribed at the time of the commission of said crime, and that he is not entitled of right to be tried before the court having jurisdiction of the crime when Sec. 10.--Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Ex Post Facto Law committed, but that the legislature may prescribe a new and different mode of procedure and vest jurisdiction in a new and different court. But it is equally well settled that the lawmaking power can not, in the exercise of the authority to regulate the mode of procedure whereby and to determine the court wherein a crime shall be prosecuted, deprive the accused of any substantial rights which he possessed when the crime was committed. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343. Statutes Relating to Offenses Repeal of statute without saving clause. When a statute has been repealed without making any provision, by way of saving or otherwise, by which the punishment therein prescribed, or any other, could be legally visited upon those who had previously been guilty of that offense, the effect of the repeal is to leave no sanction or punishment for that crime which is applicable to such previous offenders, and a person accused of such an offense can not be convicted under a substitute statute. State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272. Carrying out agreement made before enactment of statute.-When a corporation is charged with a violation of a State antitrust act, and it appears that since the act was passed it has been carrying out agreements entered into it by its predecessor before the passage of the act, the statute is not an ex post facto law. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. Increasing punishment for subsequent offenses.-State statute providing that "whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other State, or once in this and once at least in any other State, for terms of not less than three years each, shall upon conviction of a felony committed in this State after the passage of this act be deemed to be an habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for 25 years," is not objectionable as an ex post facto law. The punishment is for the new crime only, but is the heavier if the offender is an habitual criminal. McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311. Iowa v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626. Statutes Relating to Remedies Affecting jurisdiction of the courts.-The prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional prohibition. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 382. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Ex Post Facto Law Changing place of trial.-A law changing the place of trial from one county to another county in the same district, or even to a different district from that in which the offense was committed or the indictment found, is not an ex post facto law, though passed subsequent to the commission of the offense or the finding of the indictment. Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 37. Grand and petit jurors.-A change in the law regulating the selection of grand and petit jurors is not ex post facto as to a crime theretofore committed. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 588. Regulating appeals.-A law granting the right of appeal to the State is not an ex post facto law within the meaning of the Constitution. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 593. No State Shall Pass Any Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts Leading Cases Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), in connection with which see Evans's Leading Cases on American Constitutional Law, p. 170, note. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659. Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307. Skaneateles Water Works v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354. Joplin v. Light Co., 191 U. S. 150. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213. Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87. New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373. Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190. Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174. East Hartford v. Hartford Brdg. Co., 10 How. 511. Morley v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 146 U. S. 162. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608. As to particular contracts protected by the Federal Constitu tion against impairment by the States, see Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282 (a State constitution). Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (a conveyance). Sec. 10.--Powers Denied to States New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164. Cl. 1.-Contracts-Leading Cases Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (exemption from taxation). Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (contract between States for the benefit of individuals). The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51. New Orleans Water Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674. Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453 (exclusive franchises). Los Angeles v. City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558 (contracts as to rates of public service companies). Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (judgment for damages collectible in an action of contract). Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (how far governmental powers can be made the subject of irrepealable contracts). By the obligation of a contract is meant the means which at the time of its creation the law affords for its enforcement. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716. Any form of State law which impairs the obligation of a contract is invalid. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, etc., Co., 125 U. S. 18. Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150. The restraint operates only upon a State's legislative power, not upon the decisions of its courts. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87. Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103. Moore-Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Electrical, etc., Co., 234 U. S. 619. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666. Douglas v. Pike, 101 U. S. 677. Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278. When a State gives effect to later legislation on the ground that the earlier legislation did not create a contract, it is for the Federal Supreme Court to determine whether or not a contract existed. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195. Louisiana R., etc., Co. v. New Orleans, 235 U. S. 164. As to what constitutes an impairment of the obligation of a contract, see Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314. Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. New Orleans, 157 U. S. 219. Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311. |