Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Laws Affecting quent change to the injury of a contracting party impairs the obligation of the contract. Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536. Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. Co., 197 U. S. 570. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 206. Perry Co. v. Norfolk, 220 U. S. 472. As to an order by State railroad commission.-Such an order is a "law" within the meaning of this clause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298. Legislation of foreign country.-Legislation of a foreign state which would, if passed by one of the United States, have been unconstitutional as violating the obligation of a contract will not be recognized as valid, comity not requiring the recognition of a foreign law which is repugnant to the fundamental principles of the lex fori. Gebhard v. Canada Southern R. Co., 1 Fed. 387; reversed in Canada Police Powers' Regulations as affecting obligation-In general.-All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of the sovereign, the exercise of which is never understood to involve their violation within the meaning of the obligation clause of the Constitution; the power acts upon property, not upon contract. Neither the legislature nor the people themselves can bargain away the power to regulate the public health and morals, or legislative discretion concerning such regulation, and the power is inalienable even by express grant. One legislature can not by contract restrain the power of a subsequent legislature to legislate for the public welfare, and to that end to suppress any and all practices tending to corrupt the public morals or impair the public health. The legislative power extends only to irrevocable grants of property and franchises which do not impair this sovereign right of police regulation, but while this power can not be abdicated, it may in some instances be delegated, subject always to the power of revocation. Osborn v. Nicholson. 13 Wall. 660. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 819. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 650. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 453. See also New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 672. New Orleans Waterworks v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 681. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 751. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 567. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 392. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 670. 1 See same subject, pp. 146, 634, 672, and 726. Sec. 10.--Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers The police power comprehends all those general laws of internal regulation necessary to secure peace, good order, health, and the comfort of society, private interests being subservient to the general interests of the community. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 62. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 125. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 504. Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 84. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community, and for the commonwealth individuals must suffer the destruction of property, and even of life, rights of necessity being part of the law. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 89. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 18. See also U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41. Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 163. Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 498. It is the province of the legislature to determine the exigency. calling for the exercise of the police power, and of the courts to decide as to the proper subjects of its exercise. As to whether a purported police regulation is wise or reasonable the courts will not determine; the legislature possesses a wide discretion in this respect. The mere fact of pecuniary injury is not sufficient to warrant the holding of a police regulation as invalid. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 136. Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 528. L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 598. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 590. This clause does not restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, morals, or safety. Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, etc., in the same sense and to the same extent as are all contracts and all property. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 672. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 681. Control of streets.-The general principle is well established that the legislative power of a city may control and improve the streets, and that such power, when duly exercised by ordinances, will override any license previously given by which the control of a certain street has been surrendered to any individual or corporation. Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 97. Missouri v. Murphy, 170 U. S. 78. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers Regulation of business-(a) In general.-The reasonable regulation of a business or trade is within the police power of the States, and such regulation may extend to both the exercise and mode of exercise of the business or trade. So the regulation of the business of mining and the prescribing of certain precautions to secure the safety, health, and comfort of laborers is a valid exercise of the power, e. g., an act regulating the hours of labor in mines and smelters. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 708. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 188. St. Louis, etc., Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 207. (b) Hours of labor.-State labor law providing that no employees shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries more than 60 hours in a week, or 10 hours a day, is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract, in relation to labor, and as such it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, Justices Harlan, White, Day, and Holmes dissenting. (c) Corporations.-The imposition of duties and obligations in a corporate charter does not prevent the legislature from imposing further duties for the safety of persons and property, and statutory authority given to a corporation to engage in a particular private business detrimental to public health or morals does not constitute a contract preventing its withdrawal. Provisions for penalties and forfeitures in a charter are not mere matters of contract. When applied to corporations, however, the police power is subject to constitutional limitations, and to be valid they must be in fact regulations calculated to preserve the public health, morals, or safety. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 368. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 669. Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery, 70 Ill. 191. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 158. The charter of an insurance company does not exempt it from the obligation to comply with a subsequently established police regulation requiring it to make a statement of its condition and business. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ohio, 153 U. S. 453. (d) Gas works.-Where a city ordinance prescribed certain limits for the erection of gas works, and subsequent thereto contracts were made to furnish materials and labor for gas works which were about to be erected, lands were purchased for a site within the territory and other money expended, it further appearing that prior to the adoption of a second ordinance a permit of the board of fire commissioners to erect the works was ob Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers tained, it was held that a second ordinance changing the boundary so as to put the contemplated works outside of the territory where they could be erected was void. Robbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223. Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818. (e) Slaughterhouses.-A State legislature can not, by contract with an individual or corporation, restrain, diminish, or surrender its powers to enact laws for the preservation of the public health or the public morals. A State constitution and municipal ordinances passed thereunder, opening to general competition the right to build slaughterhouses, establish stock landings, and engage in the business of butchering in that city, under regulations established by these ordinances, are not void as impairing the obligation of a contract granting exclusive privileges for stock landings and slaughterhouses at that city. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746. (f) Railroad companies.-The charter of a railroad is not such a contract binding the State to allow the company at all times and in all ways to manage its own affairs, as is impaired by legislation establishing a railroad commission and empowering it to fix rates and make regulations for the operation of the road. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 331. (g) Liability of railroad for negligence.-A statute under which a railroad company was incorporated, which contained a provision exempting the company from liability for the death of any person in its service, even if caused by its negligence, does not confer such a contract right as to exempt it from the operation of a later statute subjecting it to liability for negligence. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408. As to the State increasing the liability of a railroad company, see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75. (h) Abolition of grade crossings.-A State statute which is directed to the elimination of railroad grade crossings and which authorizes municipal corporations to require alterations in such crossings, allowing the imposition of the entire expense of changes of grade, both costs and damages, irrespective of benefits, on the railway companies, does not impair the obligation of the charter contracts of the companies. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 566. (i) Liability for communicated fires.-State statute by which a railroad is made responsible in damages for property injured See same subject under commerce clause, p. 83. Sec. 10.--Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers or destroyed by fire communicated by its locomotives does not impair the obligation of the charter contracts. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 5. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, as to requiring railroad to cut drain through railroad embankment. (j) Advertising in stage coaches.-Contract obligations are not unconstitutionally impaired by a municipal ordinance under which a domestic corporation operating stage routes in the city streets is forbidden to display exterior advertisements on its stages, where at the time the advertising contracts were entered into there existed an ordinance almost identical in terms, and the company's charter did not confer any right to use its stages for advertising purposes. Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467. (k) Use of city streets.—An ordinance prohibiting the hauling of freight cars on railroads in a city street is not a valid exercise of regulation reserved in ordinance designating streets on which railroad tracks could be located, as impairing the obligation of the contract under which tracks were located and terminals built. Southern Pac. Co. v. Portland, 227 U. S. 559. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548. No contract rights to occupy city sidewalks with a spur track can be implied from resolution of aldermen, after construction of road, granting permission to occupy the sidewalk without any contract as to time. Seaboard Air Line v. Raleigh, 242 U. S. 15. See also Northern Ohio Traction, etc., Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574. (1) Free transportation.-Requirements of Laws of New Jersey, 1912, page 235, that street railways grant transportation to city detectives held not an arbitrary exercise of police power, where charter of street railway company in question was subject to alteration by legislature. Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258. (m) Location of station.-The consent of railroad commissioners that a railroad company might discontinue and abandon a depot at a certain place, upon providing suitable accommodations at another point, is not such a contract as is impaired by a statute requiring the company to maintain a depot at the abandoned place. Railroad Co. v. Hamersley, 104 U. S. 1. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 239. |